产业组织理论-the theory of the firm
产业组织理论的发展
（三）政策主张
芝加哥学派在产业政策上主张：一个政府对其合意的市场绩效所能够做的 事情，就是不参与，要让市场力量自动起调节作用。他们对政府在众多领域的 市场干预政策的必要性持怀疑态度，认为应尽可能的减少政策对产业活动的干 预，以扩大企业和私人的自由经济活动的范围，主张放松反托拉斯法的实施和 政府规制政策，反对哈佛学派所主张的对长期存在的过度集中的大企业采取分 割政策和实行严格的兼并控制的做法
（二）基本观点
芝加哥学派则认为，市场绩效起着决定性的作用，不同的企业效率形成不 同的市场结构。正是由于一些企业在剧烈的市场竞争中能取得更高的生产效率， 所以它们才能获得高额利润，并进而促进了企业规模的扩大和市场集中度的提 高，形成以大企业和高集中度为特征的市场结构。 芝加哥学派认为，高集中 度市场中的大企业必然具有高效率，而产生这种高效率主要在于大规模生产的 规模经济性、先进的技术和生产设备、优越的产品质量和完善的企业组织和管 理等因素。芝加哥学派特别注重判断集中及定价结果是否提高了效率，而不是 像结构主义者那样只看是否损害了竞争。从这一立场出发，芝加哥学派对哈佛 学派的SCP分析框架进行了猛烈抨击，认为与其说存在着市场结构决定市场行为 进而决定市场绩效这样的因果关系，倒不如应该说是市场绩效或市场行为决定 市场结构。
Theory of Industrial Organization
01
哈佛学派
02
芝加哥学派
03
新奥地利学派
04
可竞争市场理论
一、哈佛学派
（一）产业组织理论的代表人物及作品
产业组织的哈佛学派产生于1938年。主要代表人物有：哈佛大学的梅森 (E.Means)、克拉克（J.M.Clark）、贝恩（Z.Bain）、谢勒（F.M.Scherer）等。 1939年，梅森出版了《大企业的生产价格政策》；1940年，克拉克（J.M.Clark） 发表《论有效竞争的概念》一文；1959年，贝恩（Z.Bain）出版了第一部系统 论述产业组织理论的教科书《产业组织》。1970年，谢勒（F.M.Scherer）出版 了《产业市场结构和经济绩效》，弥补了贝恩《产业组织》一书中对市场行为 论述的不足，将哈佛学派的产业组织理论体系向前推进了一步
产业组织理论 第1章
产业组织理论
•, 研究市场在不完全竞争条件下的企业行为和市场 构造，是微观经济学(个体经济学)中的一个重要分 支。
• 产业组织理论的研究对象就是产业组织。产业组织 理论主要是为了解决所谓的“马歇尔冲突”的难题， 即产业内企业的规模经济效应与企业之间的竞争活 力的冲突。
• 产业组织理论正是从微观经济学分离出来，一种进 一步解释微观市场的主流理论 。
Hale Waihona Puke 第二，产业内企业间的组织形态是指同 类企业相互联结的组织形态，如企业集 团、分包制、企业系列等。这些不同的 产业组织形态既根源于企业间技术关联 的专业化协作程度，又取决于产业内企 业间垄断与竞争的不同结合形态。
产业组织特点
• 产业组织，是产业的“集合体”,有一定结构条件的。就是说，作为一个 产业部门“有很多基本单元。这些基本单元根据一定的条件而构成一个 产业部门。这些条件就是集合体诸元素之间存在的共同性，归纳起来有 如下几点。
内容简介
产业组织理论是以产业作为研究对象， 分析产业经济问题的经济学分支学科， 它涉及企业及其所属产业的理论和经验 性研究。
传统的产业组织理论
以贝恩为代表，出现在1960s，该理论主 要涉及到厂商之间经济行为和关系，强 调市场结构在对行为和绩效的影响作用， 被视为“结构主义”。
新产业组织理论
Industrial Organization ，IO）
IO 是国际公认的经济学专业的核心课 程，是目前经济学领域研究最为活跃、 取得成果最为丰富的领域之一。
1.1.1. 产业组织理论的定义
产业: 生产同一类商品（紧密替代性）的 企业的集合
➢ 需求替代性 ➢ 生产替代性（使用同样的原材料或生产工艺） ➢ 更注重生产方面的替代性
产业组织理论课件(PPT)
价格水平上重新形成。
P
P
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Q
第二十二页，共一百四十一页。
Q
2222
〔2〕本钱 递增 (běn qián)
• 当需求增加，初始(chū shǐ)时价格上升。
• 然后，新企业的进入，导致供给曲线右移。 • 但由于投入品价格的上升，新均衡高于初始均衡的
• 在长期，无法采用加总个别企业的供给曲 线
• 而获得长期供给曲线。
• 因为，企业在进出产业的过程(guòchéng)中，
• 我们无法确知需要加总
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• 的是哪些企业。 2200
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假设(jiǎshè)
• 为了分析此问题，我们假设：
• 1、所有企业都可以获得现有的生产技术。
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6.1-1 Perfect Competition
完全 竞争 (wánquán)
• 〔1〕The Characteristic of Perfect Competition
完全(wánquán)竞争市场的特点
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A、
• 虽然最正确产量(chǎnliàng)仍然由MC=MR决定，但价格却并不是相 应的MR，而是比MR大的AM。
• 即：取决于P〔=AR〕与MR之间有多大距离，
• 而这又取决于需求曲线的形状。
• 即使是同一产量，当需求曲线不同时，会对 • 应不同的价格；反之也然。
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Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs andOwnership StructureMichael C. Jensen Harvard Business School and William H. Meckling*University of Rochester1. Introduction1.1.Motivation of the PaperIn this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency,and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm. In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness of markets problems.Our theory helps explain:1. why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm which has a mixed financial structure(containing both debt and outside equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of the firm is less than it would be if he were the sole owner and why this result is independent of whether the firm operates in monopolistic or competitive product or factor markets;2. why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent withefficiency;3. why the sale of common stock is a viable source of capital even though managers do not literally maximize the value of the firm;4. why debt was relied upon as a source of capital before debt financing offered any tax advantage relative to equity;5. why preferred stock would be issued;6. why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports;7. why lenders often place restrictions on the activities of firms to whom they lend, and why firms would themselves be led to suggest the imposition of such restrictions;8. why some industries are characterized by owner-operated firms whose sole outside source of capital is borrowing;9. why highly regulated industries such as public utilities or banks will have higher debt equity ratios for equivalent levels of risk than the average nonregulated firm;10. why security analysis can be socially productive even if it does not increase portfolio returns to investors.1.2 Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,” the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however,we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.A number of major attempts have been made during recent years to construct a theory of the firm by substituting other models for profit or value maximization, with each attempt motivated by a conviction that the latter is inadequate to explain managerial behavior in large corporations. Some of these reformulation attempts have rejected the fundamental principle of maximizingbehavior as well as rejecting the more specific profit-maximizing model. We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis that follows.1.3 Property RightsAn independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others. A comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972).While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,the subject matter encompassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.1.4 Agency CostsMany problems associated with the inadequacy of the current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships in which there is a growing literature. This literature has developed independently of the property rights literature even though the problems with which it is concerned are similar; the approaches are in fact highly complementary to each other.We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. Theprincipal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this latter cost as the “residual loss.” We define agency costs as the sum of:1. the monitoring expenditures by the principal,2. the bonding expenditures by the agent,3. the residual loss.Note also that agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the coauthoring of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed in this light it is clear that our definition of agency costs and their importance to the theory of the firm bears a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the theory of the firm.Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. We show below that an explanation of why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality of the agency problem. The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally.We confine our attention in this paper to only a small part of this general problem—the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation.Our approach to the agency problem here differs fundamentally from most of theexisting literature. That literature focuses almost exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to structure the contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist.We focus almost entirely on the positive aspects of the theory. That is, we assume individuals solve these normative problems, and given that only stocks and bonds can be issued as claims, we investigate the incentives faced by each of the parties and the elements entering into the determination of the equilibrium contractual form characterizing the relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm and the outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals).1.5 General Comments on the Definition of the firmRonald Coase in his seminal paper entitled “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) pointed out that economics had no positive theory to determine the bounds of the firm. He characterized the bounds of the firm as that range of exchanges over which the market system was suppressed and where resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction. He focused on the cost of using markets to effect contracts and exchanges and argued that activities would be included within the firm whenever the costs of using markets were greater than the costs of using direct authority. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) object to the notion that activities within the firm are governed by authority, and correctly emphasize the role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange. They emphasize the role of monitoring in situations in which there is joint input or team production.We are sympathetic to with the importance they attach to monitoring, but we believe the emphasis that Alchian and Demsetz place on joint input production is too narrow and therefore misleading. Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so on. The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent of whether there is joint production in their sense; i.e., joint production can explain only a small fraction of the behavior of individuals associated with a firm.It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. This includes firms, non-profit institutions such as universities, hospitals, and foundations, mutual organizations such as mutual savings banks and insurance companies and co-operatives, some private clubs, and even governmental bodies such as cities, states, and the federal government, government enterprises such as TV A, the Post Office, transit systems, and so forth.The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for varioustypes of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e.,contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the objective function of the firm?” or “does the firm have a social responsibility?” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like the behavior of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.1.6 Overview of the PaperWe develop our theory in stages. Sections 2 and 4 provide analyses of the agency costs of equity and debt respectively. These form the major foundation of the theory. In Section 3, we pose some questions regarding the existence of the corporate form of organization and examines the role of limited liability. Section 5 provides a synthesis of the basic concepts derived in sections 2-4 into a theory of the corporate ownership structure which takes account of the trade-offs available to the entrepreneur-manager between inside and outside equity and debt. Some qualifications and extensions of the analysis are discussed in section 6, and section 7 contains a brief summary and conclusions.企业理论：管理行为，代理成本和所有权结构迈克尔詹森哈佛商学院和威廉H.麦克林罗切斯特大学1．简介1.1.研究背景在本文中，我们借鉴在产权，机构，以及金融方面的最新成果，希望可以发展一种所有制结构的企业理论。
产业组织理论第1讲：导论
芝加哥学派的研究框架
技术 结构
行为 自由进入 绩效
偏离竞争模型只是短期现象
芝加哥学派的观点
1、不论市场集中与否，竞争都应该被看成厂商获 取最佳产业绩效的过程 2、企业为生存而战的获利能力决定现有的市场结 构 3、集中性产业并不一定出现垄断合谋 4、产业集中现象并不是一个严重的问题，有效率 的厂商驱逐了低效率的厂商 5、进入障碍问题 融资、消费者品牌忠诚、规模经济 政府干预
结构、行为、绩效复杂的关系
绩 效 研 究 范 式 ）
哈 佛 学 派 （ 结 构 — 行 为 —
方法论：
实验观察、经验性研究、统计学的应用 某一时点上的许多产业、跨时期的许多产 业、跨时期的单一产业 假定行为和市场结构与绩效关联
方法论：
π i = f (CRi , BEi ,...)
i代表产业，π i 代表产业或者厂商的获利能力 CRi是集中度， BEi表示进入壁垒，如最小最佳规模，广告强度等
芝加哥学派的研究范式
代表人物：施蒂格勒（1982）、德姆塞茨、 布罗曾、波斯纳 经济自由主义思想和社会达尔文主义，信 奉自由市场制度和价格理论，相信市场力 量的自我调节能力
芝加哥学派的研究范式
一个政府对其所意愿的市场绩效能够做的事情就是不参 与，要让市场力量自动调节。 自由企业制度和自由的市场竞争秩序，提高产业效率，增 进社会福利。 政府反垄断政策的目的，在于提高市场运行效率。 超额利润只是短期现象，现实生活并不存在特别严重的垄 断问题。 基础理论性：价格理论（完全竞争、垄断）作为研究基础 垄断势力并不存在，现实中的价格和产量是市场取向长期 均衡的近似值（如果没有政府的支持或干预，个体垄断势 力就不会长久） 通常否认在为公司对其他在位公司或者潜在进入者能够成 功实施策略性行为的可能性。
Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership StructureMichael C. JensenHarvard Business SchoolMJensen@AndWilliam H. MecklingUniversity of RochesterAbstractThis paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’ issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of otherpeople’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it withthe same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch overtheir own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as notfor their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of theaffairs of such a company.— Adam Smith (1776) Keywords: Agency costs and theory, internal control systems, conflicts of interest, capital structure, internal equity, outside equity, demand for security analysis, completeness of markets, supply of claims, limited liability©1976 Jensen and MecklingJournal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, V. 3, No. 4, pp. 305-360.Reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm: Governance,Residual Claims and Organizational Forms (Harvard University Press, December 2000)available at /catalog/JENTHF.htmlAlso published in Foundations of Organizational Strategy,Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998.You may redistribute this document freely, but please do not post the electronic file on the web. I welcome web links to this document at: /abstract=94043. I revise my papers regularly, and providing a link to the original ensures that readers will receive the most recent version. Thank you,Michael C. JensenTheory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership StructureMichael C. JensenHarvard Business SchoolandWilliam H. Meckling*University of Rochester1. Introduction1.1.Motivation of the PaperIn this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure1 for the firm. In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness of markets problems.1 We do not use the term ‘capital structure’ because that term usually denotes the relative quantities of bonds, equity, warrants, trade credit, etc., which represent the liabilities of a firm. Our theory implies there is another important dimension to this problem—namely the relative amount of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in the management of the firm).* Associate Professor and Dean, respectively, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Analysis and Ideology, Interlaken, Switzerland, June 1974, sponsored by the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business at the University of Rochester, Graduate School of Management. We are indebted to F. Black, E. Fama, R. Ibbotson, W. Klein, M. Rozeff, R. Weil, O. Williamson, an anonymous referee, and to our colleagues and members of the Finance Workshop at the University of Rochester for their comments and criticisms, in particular G. Benston, M. Canes, D. Henderson, K. Leffler, J. Long, C. Smith, R. Thompson, R. Watts, and J. Zimmerman.Our theory helps explain:1.why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm which has a mixed financial structure(containing both debt and outside equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of the firm is less than it would be if he were the sole owner and why this result is independent of whether the firm operates in monopolistic or competitive product or factor markets;2.why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent withefficiency;3.why the sale of common stock is a viable source of capital even though managers donot literally maximize the value of the firm;4.why debt was relied upon as a source of capital before debt financing offered any taxadvantage relative to equity;5.why preferred stock would be issued;6.why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders,and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports;7.why lenders often place restrictions on the activities of firms to whom they lend, andwhy firms would themselves be led to suggest the imposition of such restrictions;8.why some industries are characterized by owner-operated firms whose sole outsidesource of capital is borrowing;9.why highly regulated industries such as public utilities or banks will have higher debtequity ratios for equivalent levels of risk than the average nonregulated firm;10.why security analysis can be socially productive even if it does not increase portfolioreturns to investors.1.2Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,”the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however, we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.2A number of major attempts have been made during recent years to construct a theory of the firm by substituting other models for profit or value maximization, with each attempt motivated by a conviction that the latter is inadequate to explain managerial behavior in large corporations.3 Some of these reformulation attempts have rejected the fundamental principle of maximizing2 Reviews of this literature are given by Peterson (1965), Alchian (1965, 1968), Machlup (1967), Shubik (1970), Cyert and Hedrick (1972), Branch (1973), Preston (1975).3 See Williamson (1964, 1970, 1975), Marris (1964), Baumol (1959), Penrose (1958), and Cyert and March (1963). Thorough reviews of these and other contributions are given by Machlup (1967) and Alchian (1965).Simon (1955) developed a model of human choice incorporating information (search) and computational costs which also has important implications for the behavior of managers. Unfortunately, Simon’s work has often been misinterpreted as a denial of maximizing behavior, and misused, especially in the marketing and behavioral science literature. His later use of the term “satisficing” (Simon, 1959) has undoubtedly contributed to this confusion because it suggests rejection of maximizing behavior rather than maximization subject to costs of information and of decision making.behavior as well as rejecting the more specific profit-maximizing model. We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis that follows.41.3Property RightsAn independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others.5 A comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,6 the subject matter encompassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.1.4Agency CostsMany problems associated with the inadequacy of the current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships in which there is a growing4 See Meckling (1976) for a discussion of the fundamental importance of the assumption of resourceful, evaluative, maximizing behavior on the part of individuals in the development of theory. Klein (1976) takes an approach similar to the one we embark on in this paper in his review of the theory of the firm and the law.5 See Coase (1937, 1959, 1960), Alchian (1965, 1968), Alchian and Kessel (1962), Demsetz (1967), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Monson and Downs (1965), Silver and Auster (1969), and McManus (1975).6 Property rights are of course human rights, i.e., rights which are possessed by human beings. The introduction of the wholly false distinction between property rights and human rights in many policy discussions is surely one of the all time great semantic flimflams.literature.7 This literature has developed independently of the property rights literature even though the problems with which it is concerned are similar; the approaches are in fact highly complementary to each other.We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions8 and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this latter cost as the “residual loss.” We define agency costs as the sum of:7 Cf. Berhold (1971), Ross (1973, 1974a), Wilson (1968, 1969), and Heckerman (1975).8 Given the optimal monitoring and bonding activities by the principal and agent.1.the monitoring expenditures by the principal,92.the bonding expenditures by the agent,3.the residual loss.Note also that agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the co-authoring of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed in this light it is clear that our definition of agency costs and their importance to the theory of the firm bears a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the theory of the firm.Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. We show below that an explanation of why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality of the agency problem. The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms,10 in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in9 As it is used in this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.10 As we show below the existence of positive monitoring and bonding costs will result in the manager of a corporation possessing control over some resources which he can allocate (within certain constraints) to satisfy his own preferences. However, to the extent that he must obtain the cooperation of others in order to carry out his tasks (such as divisional vice presidents) and to the extent that he cannot control their behavior perfectly and costlessly they will be able to appropriate some of these resources for their own ends. In short, there are agency costs generated at every level of the organization. Unfortunately, the analysis of these more general organizational issues is even more difficult than that of the ‘ownership andgovernmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally. We confine our attention in this paper to only a small part of this general problem—the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation.Our approach to the agency problem here differs fundamentally from most of the existing literature. That literature focuses almost exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to structure the contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist. We focus almost entirely on the positive aspects of the theory. That is, we assume individuals solve these normative problems, and given that only stocks and bonds can be issued as claims, we investigate the incentives faced by each of the parties and the elements entering into the determination of the equilibrium contractual form characterizing the relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm and the outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals).1.5General Comments on the Definition of the firmRonald Coase in his seminal paper entitled “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) pointed out that economics had no positive theory to determine the bounds of the firm. He characterized thecontrol’ issue because the nature of the contractual obligations and rights of the parties are much more varied and generally not as well specified in explicit contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, they exist and we believe that extensions of our analysis in these directions show promise of producing insights into a viable theory of organization.bounds of the firm as that range of exchanges over which the market system was suppressed and where resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction. He focused on the cost of using markets to effect contracts and exchanges and argued that activities would be included within the firm whenever the costs of using markets were greater than the costs of using direct authority. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) object to the notion that activities within the firm are governed by authority, and correctly emphasize the role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange. They emphasize the role of monitoring in situations in which there is joint input or team production.11 We are sympathetic to with the importance they attach to monitoring, but we believe the emphasis that Alchian and Demsetz place on joint input production is too narrow and therefore misleading. Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so on. The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent of whether there is joint production in their sense; i.e., joint production can explain only a small fraction of the behavior of individuals associated with a firm.It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions12 which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. This includes firms, non-profit institutions such as universities, hospitals, and foundations, mutual organizations such as mutual savings banks and insurance companies and co-operatives, some private clubs, and even governmental bodies such as cities, states, and the federal government, government enterprises such as TVA, the Post Office, transit systems, and so forth.11 They define the classical capitalist firm as a contractual organization of inputs in which there is ‘(a) joint input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, (d) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, and (f) who has the right to sell his contractual residual status.’12 By legal fiction we mean the artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals.The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.13Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the objective function of the firm?” or “does the firm have a social responsibility?” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like the behavior of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing13 For example, we ordinarily think of a product as leaving the firm at the time it is sold, but implicitly or explicitly such sales generally carry with them continuing contracts between the firm and the buyer. If the product does not perform as expected the buyer often can and does have a right to satisfaction. Explicit evidence that such implicit contracts do exist is the practice we occasionally observe of specific provision that ‘all sales are final.’the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.141.6 Overview of the PaperWe develop our theory in stages. Sections 2 and 4 provide analyses of the agency costs of equity and debt respectively. These form the major foundation of the theory. In Section 3, we pose some questions regarding the existence of the corporate form of organization and examines the role of limited liability. Section 5 provides a synthesis of the basic concepts derived in sections 2-4 into a theory of the corporate ownership structure which takes account of the trade-offs available to the entrepreneur-manager between inside and outside equity and debt. Some qualifications and extensions of the analysis are discussed in section 6, and section 7 contains a brief summary and conclusions.2. The Agency Costs of Outside Equity2.1OverviewIn this section we analyze the effect of outside equity on agency costs by comparing the behavior of a manager when he owns 100 percent of the residual claims on a firm with his behavior when he sells off a portion of those claims to outsiders. If a wholly-owned firm is managed by the owner, he will make operating decisions that maximize his utility. These decisions14 This view of the firm points up the important role which the legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic activity. Statutory laws sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police powers of the state are available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-performance. The courts adjudicate conflicts between contracting parties and establish precedents which form the body of common law. All of these government activities affect both the kinds of contracts executed and the extent to which contracting is relied upon. This in turn determines the usefulness, productivity, profitability and viability of various forms of organization. Moreover, new laws as well as court decisions often can and do change the rights of contracting parties ex post, and they can and do serve as a vehicle for redistribution of wealth. An analysis of some of the implications of these facts is contained in Jensen and Meckling (1978) and we shall not pursue them here.will involve not only the benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the kind and amount of charitable contributions, personal relations (“friendship,” “respect,” and so on) with employees, a larger than optimal computer to play with, or purchase of production inputs from friends. The optimum mix (in the absence of taxes) of the various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is achieved when the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of expenditure (measured net of any productive effects) is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of after-tax purchasing power (wealth).If the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation which are identical to his own (i.e., which share proportionately in the profits of the firm and have limited liability), agency costs will be generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders, since he will then bear only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his own utility. If the manager owns only 95 percent of the stock, he will expend resources to the point where the marginal utility derived from a dollar’s expenditure of the firm’s resources on such items equals the marginal utility of an additional 95 cents in general purchasing power (i.e., his share of the wealth reduction) and not one dollar. Such activities, on his part, can be limited (but probably not eliminated) by the expenditure of resources on monitoring activities by the outside stockholders. But as we show below, the owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so long as the equity market anticipates these effects. Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs; hence the price which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the manager’s interest and theirs. Nevertheless, ignoring for the moment the possibility of borrowing against his wealth, the owner will find it desirable to bear these costsas long as the welfare increment he experiences from converting his claims on the firm into general purchasing power15 is large enough to offset them.As the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This also makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his behavior. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner of obtaining additional cash in the equity markets rise as his fractional ownership falls.We shall continue to characterize the agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders as deriving from the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption. However, we do not mean to leave the impression that this is the only or even the most important source of conflict. Indeed, it is likely that the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and it can result in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it otherwise could be.2.2A Simple Formal Analysis of the Sources of Agency Costs of Equity and Who Bears ThemIn order to develop some structure for the analysis to follow we make two sets of assumptions. The first set (permanent assumptions) are those which will carry through almost all of the analysis in sections 2-5. The effects of relaxing some of these are discussed in section 6.15 For use in consumption, for the diversification of his wealth, or more importantly, for the financing of ‘profitable’ projects which he could not otherwise finance out of his personal wealth. We deal with these issues below after having developed some of the elementary analytical tools necessary to their solution.。
产业组织理论
一、定义及发展脉络定义：产业组织理论(Industrial Organization), 研究市场在不完全竞争条件下的企业行为和市场构造，是微观经济学(个体经济学)中的一个重要分支。
产业组织理论的研究对象就是产业组织。
产业组织理论主要是为了解决所谓的“马歇尔冲突”的难题，即产业内企业的规模经济效应与企业之间的竞争活力的冲突。
发展：马歇尔对微观经济进行了经典的解释后，市场理论的讨论便一直成为经济理论的主要重点。
在罗宾逊夫妇、张伯伦等早期经济学家开创性的努力下，市场中竞争和垄断问题得到深入的研究，人们对经济领域的微观部分的认识大大加深了。
产业组织理论正是在不断汲取前人的营养下逐渐从微观经济学分离出来，逐渐形成和发展为一种进一步解释微观市场的主流理论。
近一个世纪以来，产业组织理论无论在研究方法、对象和解释的问题都发生了很大的变化，这从另一个侧面也反映了市场本身在许多方面已经出现了许多深刻的变革。
本文通过对产业组织理论发展过程的梳理来分析产业组织理论发展的主要趋势和研究方向。
产业组织出现在20世纪开始现代制造业企业兴起后，早期学者将“产业”和“制造业”等同，把产业视为生产同一或相似产品的企业集合。
马歇尔首先提出了产业组织概念。
在他看来，产业和生物组织体一样，是一个伴随着组织体中各部分的机能分化（企业内的分工和社会分工）和组织各部分之间紧密联系和联合（企业的兼并和准兼并）的社会组织体。
他以分工和协作为基础讨论了产业组织中的内部经济和外部经济，工厂规模和经济规模。
现代产业组织理论以此为基础构架了整个产业组织的主要问题，更加强调了产业组织中的厂商结构和行为。
产业组织理论发展主要经历了两个阶段。
传统的产业组织理论以贝恩为代表，出现在1960s，该理论主要涉及到厂商之间经济行为和关系，强调市场结构在对行为和绩效的影响作用，被视为“结构主义”。
新产业组织理论则出现在1970s后期，该理论大量引入了新的分析方法，包括可竞争市场理论、博弈论、新制度理论（产权理论和交易成本理论）、信息理论，通过整合厂商内部组织和外部关系，进一步考察了厂商行为的多重复杂关系。
31种组织理论
附：31种组织理论中文对照表1. Adjustment-Cost Theoryof the Firm调整价格理论本身视角：企业各方应不断审视各方关系并调整；营销视角：供应链体系中，应不断审视调整各个营销组织间的关系和营销战略；营销洞见：战略营销资源的使用是与其需求程度和多样化的营销适应性。
例如一个营销组织对灵活性需求较大，该理论建议营销组织应该加强垂直化建设。
2. AgencyTheory代理理论本身视角：企业所有者雇佣职业经理人来经营管理组织；营销视角：企业所有者雇佣职业经理人来经营管理营销组织；营销洞见：信息不对称——逆向选择、道德风险：基于他们自身利益而非所有者利益，跨国营销组织会比国内组织更难以监管。
3. BehavioralTheory ofthe Firm企业行为理论本身视角：企业是由一些联盟和管理角色组成，来解决冲突和避免不确定性；营销视角：企业是由一些营销联盟和营销管理角色组成，来解决冲突和避免不确定性；营销洞见：营销组织是在市场环境的不确定、市场环境并不能完美匹配、各方利益冲突中进行的。
4. BoundedRationalityTheory有限理性理论本身视角：在做出企业决策时，明白并分析所有相关信息是不可能的；营销视角：在制定营销战略决策时，明白并分析所有相关信息是不可能的；营销洞见：由于信息有限、认知有限、时间约束，管理者在做营销战略决策时是有限理性的。
5. Competence-BasedTheory基于竞争力理论营销洞见：内在因素理论，与众不同的竞争力，在竞争中存活，创造未来的竞争优势、核心竞争力：改善现有的或是学习新的。
6. ContingencyTheory权变理论营销洞见：与组织相联系的相关的环境需求匹配程度，没有最好的方法来组织营销组织、每一种组织方式并非同样有效，营销组织需要面对不同的市场环境、各种各样潜在的挑战。
7. EclecticTheory ofInternationalProduction国际生产的折衷理论营销洞见：企业对外直接投资所能够利用的是所有权优势、内部化优势和区位优势，只有当企业同时具备这三种优势时，才完全具备了对外直接投资的条件。
产业组织理论(导论)
产业组织学的主要学术杂志
1.《产业经济学杂志》(The Journal of Industrial Economics)）。该杂 志创刊于1952年，同时在美国的加利福尼亚大学(伯克利分校)和英国伦 敦经济学院设编辑部，可通过 http:∥/journals 网页进 行浏览。它主要发表产业组织、市场功能、企业行为与政策方面的创新 性研究成果。主要领域包括：寡头垄断理论：产品差异与技术进步；企 业理论与内部组织；规制、垄断与兼并等。 2.《经济学与管理策略杂志》(Journal of Economics and Management Strategy)。它可通过 http:∥ 进行浏览。 它侧重于对管理者竞争策略和企业组织结构的研究，包括产业组织的理 论与实证，应用性博弈论和管理策略等方面。 3.《国际产业组织学杂志》( Organization)。 International Journal of Industrial
6.《兰德经济学杂志)(RAND Journal of Economics)。 原名为《贝尔经济学杂志》( Bell Journal of Economics),可通过 网页进行浏览。
7.《产业组织学评论》(Review of Industrial Organization)。 它是“产业组织学学会”的专门刊物，可通过 http://kapis.www.wkap.nl 网页进行浏览。它发表广义的产 业组织学领域的研究论文，包括竞争和垄断的形式和过程， 及其对效率、创新和社会的影响。范围可以是从企业的内部 组织到国际比较。在公共政策方面，关注反垄断、规制、放 松规制、公共企业、私有化等方面问题。在方法方面，欢迎 经济计量学实证和案例分析以及实际调查。 8.《SSRN产业组织与规制文摘》(SSRN Industrial Organization and Regulation Abstracts)。可通过 网页进行浏览。该杂志专门发表产业 组织学与规制方面的研究成果文摘，包括市场结构、企业策 略、技术进步的原因、各种形式的规制、反垄断政策以及特 定产业的专门研究
《产业组织理论》研究生教学大纲
《产业组织理论》研究生教学大纲课程名称：产业组织理论课程英文名称： Industrial Organization Theory课内学时：48 课程学分：3课程性质（学位课/选修课）开课学期：每学年第二学期教学方式：课堂讲授考核方式（考试/考查）：考核大纲执笔人：刘林主讲教师：刘林师资队伍：刘林郭海涛一、课程内容简介产业经济学是经济学的主要领域之一，历史上曾经有过两次高潮，第一次高潮出现在上个世纪70年代之前，具有经验主义的性质；第二次高潮起始于上个世纪70年代之后，理论性特征鲜明。
产业经济学中的经验主义有时被称为“哈佛传统”，形成了著名的“结构-行为-绩效”范式：市场上卖者的数量、产品差异化程度、成本结构以及供给者纵向一体化的程度等等，决定了价格、研究与开发、投资、广告等等，企业的这些行为产生了企业的效率、价格与边际成本的比率、产品多样性、创新率、利润和分配。
经验主义传统的确试图计量更基本的外生因素：技术方面的因素，如规模报酬、进入成本、资本沉淀比例、学习曲线状况、耐用与非耐用消费品等；偏好和消费者方面的因素，如产品质量的信息结构、声誉问题以及对品牌的忠实度；技术变化等；但是，这些研究常常难以收集到精确计量基本因素和产业间可比较的资料，因而遭到了后来兴起的具有鲜明理论特性的“芝加哥传统”的严厉批评。
“芝加哥传统”之所以能够掀起第二次高潮，大概有两个方面的原因：一是在“需求方面”，对跨部门经验分析的局限性的不满日益增长，这种跨部门经验分析曾经主宰了产业组织领域，特别是经验主义的工作并不要求特定寡头市场的正式模型。
二是在“供给方面”，在上个世纪70年代之前，经济学家很不重视产业组织，因此未能建立起像竞争性一般均衡那样的精致的一般分析方法；自从非合作博弈引入到产业组织的理论研究之中，这种情况才有了根本性的改变。
企业理论的迅速发展，也为产业组织理论的研究提供了很有用的理论支持。
所以，现代产业组织理论把博弈论与企业理论作为其理论基础。
产业组织理论 第1章
• 企业内部组织的另一重要方面是其法人治理结构。这也是产业经济学研究的热点问题。其实道理非 常简单，产业组织关注企业行为，而企业行为又在很大程度上决定于企业的法人治理结构。如一般 情况下，股东控制较强的企业多注重利润最大化，经理等“内部人”控制较强的企业可能更多地追 求企业规模（或销售额最大化）。
产业组织（Industrial Organization）
产业组织概念和含义
产业组织的“产业”范围较小，仅指生产具有密切替 代产品或服务的企业集合。 产业组织指同一产业内企业间的市场关系和组织形态。 这一概念包括两层含义：
第一，产业内企业间的市场关系，是指同类企业间的 垄断、竞争关系。它表现为产业内企业间垄断与竞争 不同程度结合的四类市场结构，即完全竞争型、完全 垄断型、垄断竞争型和寡占垄断型等市场结构。它反 映了产业内不同企业的市场支配力差异、市场地位差 异和市场效果差异。
产业组织与企业组织两者区别
• 产业组织对应的是产业内、企业间关系（Inter-firm），而企业组织主要指企业内部组织（Intrafirm），包括科层组织（U型结构、H型结构、M型结构、X型结构）和法人治理结构 （Corporate Governance）等。
• 企业科层组织
• 企业内部的科层组织，过去的企业内部科层组织多为U型结构，即按职能划分部门的一元结构 （Unitary Structure）。随着科技发展和企业规模的扩大，采用最多的是M型结构，即事业部制 或称多分支单位结构（Multidivisional Structure）。企业集团中则多采用H型结构，或控股公 司（Holding Company）结构。X型结构则是这几种结构的混合体。企业集团是介于“纯产业” 与“纯企业”之间的“灰色组织”。说它是一个“企业”，构成集团的企业又多是独立法人；说它 们是分散的单个企业，它们之间又存在一定程度的协调。多强调企业的独立性，则会更多地体现出 市场特征；多强调企业之间的协调性，则会更多地体现出科层性（Hierarchy）。
文献导读
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产业组织理论
微观经济学研究了什么？（3）
微观经济理论的核心内容
偏好假设 完全竞争市场理论 技术假设 一般 均衡 分析 局部 均衡 分析 供求均衡条件与 消费者剩余和生 产者剩余
福利经济学的两 个基本定理
微观经济学研究了什么？（4）
市场总是有效的吗？市场会失灵吗？
本讲内容
微观经济学的基本体系 产业组织理论的演变 产业组织理论的分析方法 局部均衡下的福利分析 本课程的基本安排
微观经济学研究了什么？（1）
从不是特别严格的偏好和技术假设出发： 偏好的单调性、连续性和凸性 技术的单调性和凸性 个体理性假设
微观经济学研究了什么？（2）
试图回答的基本问题：既然资源是稀缺的，那么 如何实现资源的最优配置？ 试图得到的基本答案：市场是调节资源配置的最 佳手段
max U ( x1 , x2 ) v( x1 ) x2
s.t. p1x1 x 2 m.
局部均衡中的福利分析与设定(4)
最优化的一阶条件：
v( x1 ) m p1x1 .
v'( x1 ) p1 0 p1 v'( x1 ).
得到商品1的需求曲线，该需求曲线只 受价格影响，不受收入影响，故收入 效应为0
边际成本
p'
可变成本之和
y
'
y
局部均衡中的福利分析与设定(7)
总剩余的最优化条件： y
0
max TS CS PS ( D( x) S ( x))dx
一阶条件
即
d
D( y) D(s)
s
0
p p
竞争性市场与垄断市场的福利特征
Lecture_3_-_Theory_of_the_Firm
COSTS
Firms will incur costs. These costs an be categorised as: -Fixed Costs - do NOT depend on quantity produced – same whether you produce a lot or a little - Rent, Insurance. -Variable Costs -vary directly with the amount produced - Raw materials, Labour -Semi–Variable Costs -have a fixed element and a variable element - electricity, telephone.
4
PRODUCTION FUNCTION
The relationship between inputs (factors of production) and outputs can be expressed as a production function
Q = f(k,l )
Here output Q is dependent on labour (l) and capital (k)
Assumption
2: MINIMISE COSTS
But costs differ between the short run and the long run
2
INPUTS/OUTPUTS
For a firm to produce the goods it sells, it needs many different inputs to make these goods For example the inputs for car production could include: Sheet steel Rubber Electricity supply Work space in the factory Painting machines Accountants Workers Managers
1 产业组织理论-the theory of the firm
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
Compare the net benefit (i)Vertical Separation VS= 0.375(1+d2) (ii)1-type Integration V1I = 0.5 (iii)2-type Integration V2I = 0.5*d2
two agent 1,2 ; two input A ,B ,initially 1 owns A ,2 owns B Three forms of organization: (i) Vertical Separation: 1 owns A and 2 owns B . (ii) 1-type Integration: 1 is the owner of the firm, i.e. 1 owns A and B . (iii) 2-type Integration : 2 is the owner of the firm, i.e. 2 owns A and B . The value of the output is v=e1+de2, cost 0.5*e12, 0.5*e22.
I. Two basic question
Why do firms exist :
•
What determines its size?
II. Three branches of views
Traditional theory: technological view Team production: Free Rider problem Incomplete Contract Theory
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
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Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
(i) Vertical Separation 1 owns A and 2 owns B, the ex post is divided through bargaining, and each party’s bargaining power is symmetric The net benefit of 1 is v1=0.5*(e1+de2)-0.5*e12. Thus 1’s effort is e1=0.5; The net benefit of 2 is v2=0.5*(e1+de2)-0.5*e22. Thus 1’s effort is e2=0.5d; Total net benefit: VS= e1+de2-0.5*e12-0.5*e22 = 0.375(1+d2)
Topic 2. Team production: Free Rider problem
Question 1: Why does the monk shirk? Each monk can only capture a fraction of the total benefit. Question 2 : How to solve the shirking problem? Possible solution: Hire a monitor who tries to measure inputs and distributes output .
Consider a monk hauls water by himself , and the volume of water depends on his effort e. Let the benefits and cost (measured in dollars) be respectively denoted by e and .5*e2 Net benefit: π(e)= e -0.5*e2 thus the monk will choose efficient level of effort e*=1, Now for team cooperation. Suppose that two monks decide to form a group, and their benefit is simply e1+ e2 The net benefit of one monk is .5*(e1+ e2)- 0.5*ei2 , i=1,2 => ei=0.5 <1
Topic 1. Traditional theory: technological view
Core idea: the minimum average cost determine its size, the most efficient size
Question: Why should economies of scale be exploited within a firm?
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
Williamson(1975,1985): Bring the transaction within a firm will offer safeguards against opportunistic behavior.
power, thus the optimal ownership depend on whose effort is relatively more important
Let’ do some formal stuff!
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
Why can’t one merge two firms into one , while duplicate the market outcome (through selective intervention)
Topic 2. Team production: Free Rider problem
Topic 2. Team production: Free Rider problem
New problem:
Who monitors the monitor? What should we do if they collude? Why should one listen to the monitor? Authority! The main problem: it does offer an explanation for firm boundaries, contract execution is independent of institutional setting (firm or market). But things change dramatically if contracts are incomplete.
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
Why is contract incomplete? 1, indescribable, unforeseen contingencies 2, writing cost 3, unverifiable Two stories S. Grossman; “The Clever King Solomon”
I. Two basic question
Why do firms exist :
•
What determines its size?
II. Three branches of views
Traditional theory: technological view Team production: Free Rider problem Incomplete Contract Theory
Lecture 1 : The Theory of the Firm
Lecture 1 The Theory of the Firm
I. Two basic question II. Three branches of theories Topic 1. Traditional theory: technological view Topic 2. Team production Topic 3. Incomplete contract
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
Grossman and Hartman(1986) Organization ex post bargaining positions surplus division Key result: The owner of the firm has stronger bargaining
Intuition: The owner of the important input should own the firm!
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
Long, long ago, there was a king. Solomon was his name. He was very clever. In his country, there were two women. They lived in same house and each had a baby. One night, one of the babies died. The dead mother took the other woman’s baby, and put it in her own bed. The next morning, they had a quarrel. “No, this is my baby! The dead baby is yours!” Each one wanted the living baby. So they went to see King Solomon. “Bring me a knife, cut the child into two and give each woman one half.” said the King. “Oh, your Majesty! Give her my baby. Please don’t kill my baby!” Then King Solomon pointed to the woman in tears and said: “Give the baby to her. She is the mother.”
Topic 3. Incomplete Contract and the Theory of the Firm
(ii) 1-type Integration 1 owns A and B, by owns the two input , 1 has the rights to dispose the two input , thus has stronger bargaining power than 2 The net benefit of 1 is v1=(e1+de2)-0.5*e12. Thus 1’s effort is e1= 1; The net benefit of 2 is v2=0*(e1+de2)-0.5*e22. Thus 1’s effort is e2= 0; Total net benefit: V1I = 0.5 (iii) 2-type Integration e1= 0, e2= d V2I = 0.5*d2