毕业论文-ted演讲martinjacques《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)
TED演讲稿中英文3分钟
yang lan: the generation thats remaking china the night before i was heading for scotland, i was invited to host the final ofchinas got talent show in shanghai with the 80,000 live audience in the stadium. guesswho was the performing guest?susan boyle. and i told her, im going to scotland thenext day. she sang beautifully, and she even managed to say a few words in chinese.[chinese]so its not like hello or thank you, that ordinary stuff. it means green onionfor free. why did she say that? because it was a line from our chinese parallel susanboyle -- a 50-some year-old woman, a vegetable vendor in shanghai, who loves singingwestern opera, but she didnt understand any english or french or italian, so shemanaged to fill in the lyrics with vegetable names in chinese. (laughter) and thelast sentence of nessun dorma that she was singing in the stadium was green onionfor free. so[as] susan boyle was saying that, 80,000 live audience sang together. that washilarious.so i guess both susan boyle and this vegetable vendor in shanghai belonged tootherness. they were the least expected to be successful in the business calledentertainment, yet their courage and talent brought them through. and a show and aplatform gave them the stage to realize their dreams. well, being different is notthat difficult. we are all different from different perspectives. but i think beingdifferent is good, because you present a different point of view. you may have thechance to make a difference. my generation has been very fortunate to witness and participate in the historictransformation of china that has made so many changes in the past 20, 30 years. iremember that in the year of 1990,when i was graduating from college, i was applyingfor a job in the sales department of the first five-star hotel in beijing, great wallsheraton -- its still there. so after being interrogated by this japanese managerfor a half an hour, he finally said, so, miss yang, do you have any questions to askme?i summoned my courage and poise and said,yes, but could you let me know, whatactually do you sell? i didnt have a clue what a sales department was about in afive-star hotel. that was the first day i set my foot in a five-star hotel. my life, and i feel proud of that. but then we are also so fortunate to witnessthe transformation of the whole country. i was in beijings bidding for the olympicgames. i was representing the shanghai expo. i saw china embracing the world and viceversa. but then sometimes im thinking, what are todays young generation up to? howare they different, and what are the differences they are going to make to shape thefuture of china, or at large, the world? so making a living is not that easy for young people. college graduates are notin short supply.in urban areas, college graduates find the starting salary is about 400 u.s. dollarsa month, while the average rent is above $500. so what do they do? they have to sharespace -- squeezed in very limited space to save money -- and they call themselvestribe of ants. and for those who are ready to get married and buy their apartment,they figured out they have to work for 30 to 40 years to afford their first apartment.that ratio in americawould only cost a couple five years to earn, but in china its30 to 40 years with the skyrocketing real estate price. so through some of the hottest topics on microblogging, we can see what youngpeople care most about. social justice and government accountability runs the firstin what they demand.for the past decade or so, a massive urbanization and developmenthave let us witness a lot of reports on the forced demolition of private property.andit has aroused huge anger and frustrationamong our young generation. sometimes peopleget killed, and sometimes people set themselves on fire to protest. so when theseincidents are reported more and more frequently on the internet,people cry for thegovernment to take actions to stop this. so the good news is that earlier this year, the state council passed a newregulation on house requisition and demolition and passed the right to order forceddemolition from local governments to the court. similarly, many other issues concerning public safety is a hot topicon the internet. we heard about polluted air, polluted water, poisoned food. and guesswhat, we have faked beef. they have sorts of ingredients that you brush on a pieceof chicken or fish, and it turns it to look like beef.and then lately, people arevery concerned about cooking oil, because thousands of people have been found[refining] cooking oil from restaurant slop. so all these things have aroused a hugeoutcry from the internet. and fortunately, we have seen the government respondingmore timely and also more frequently to the public concerns. while young people seem to be very sure about their participation in publicpolicy-making, but sometimes theyre a little bit lost in terms of what they want fortheir personal life. china is soon to pass the u.s. as the number one market for luxurybrands -- thats not including the chinese expenditures in europe and elsewhere. butyou know what, half of those consumers are earning a salary below 2,000 u.s. dollars.theyre not rich at all. theyre taking those bags and clothes as a sense of identityand social status. and this is a girl explicitly saying on a tv dating show that shewould rather cry in a bmw than smile on a bicycle.but of course, we do have youngpeople who would still prefer to smile, whether in a bmw or [on] a bicycle. so happiness is the most popular word we have heard through the past two years.happiness is not only related to personal experiences and personal values, but also,its about the environment. people are thinking about the following questions: arewe going to sacrifice our environment further to produce higher gdp? how are we goingto perform our social and political reform to keep pace with economic growth, to keepsustainability and stability? and also, how capable is the systemof self-correctnessto keep more people contentwith all sorts of friction going on at the same time?iguess these are the questions people are going to answer. and our younger generationare going to transform this country while at the same time being transformedthemselves.thank you very much.杨澜ted演讲：重塑中国的一代中文演讲稿在来爱尔兰的前一晚，我应邀主持了中国达人秀在上海的体育场和八万现场观众。
中国崛起的英文演讲
本文共有12752字，如对您有帮助，可购买打赏目录第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲第二篇：中国崛起演讲第三篇：中国节日的英文演讲第四篇：中国功夫英文演讲第五篇：中国的崛起正文第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china's rise will benefit the whole world.in the past decades,especially after the implementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has witnessed remarkable changes in various fields and has attracted worldwide attention,so a wholly new word "china's rise"came into being.in the world arena,there are two apparently different viewpoints towards china's rise.some countries subjectively and baselessly think china's rise is horrifying and worrying,they interpret china as a growing monster,putting forward "china threat theory" to deter or contain this great country.but i hold the totally opposite opinion.china has diligent,wise and charismatic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous world.every year,china sends a large number of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the world,and china now has more peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just to carry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threateningothers.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassed japan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in xx,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country with a rare sense of responsibility to all humanity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china waived many debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn't mean to gain peace and stability,it will give up necessary principles.it firmly upholds its national core interests.when it comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china will not yield or compromise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china knows perfectly that it can't develop in isolation from the rest of the world,so china is more than happy to work with any countries who are willing to adhere to political trust and mutual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful way,and it will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have beenreiterating we don't seek hegemony now,and we won't do it either even when china is a developed country.in a word,china's rise is sure to be a good chance for a healthier and richer world.罗伯特，亲爱的同学们：我的讲话是中国的崛起将造福于整个世界。
中国崛起的英文演讲
中国崛起的英文演讲第1篇第2篇第3篇第4篇第5篇更多顶部目录第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲第二篇：中国崛起演讲第三篇：中国节日的英文演讲第四篇：中国功夫英文演讲第五篇：中国的崛起更多相关范文正文第一篇：中国崛起的英文演讲mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china’s rise plementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has arkable changes in various fields and has attracted e into being.in the e countries subjectively and baselessly think china’s rise is horrifying and onster,putting foratic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous ber of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the ore peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just to carry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threatening others.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassedjapan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in xx,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country anity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china any debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn’t mean to gain peace and stability,it ly upholds its national core interests.es to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china promise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china kno the rest of the ore than happy to utual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful ent and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have been reiterating ony noe国家的观点认为主观和baselessly中国的崛起是令人震惊和担心，他们解释为中国不断增长的怪物，提出“中国威胁论”，以阻止或遏制这一伟大country.but我拥有完全相反的意见。
TED演讲—Martin Jacques《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)教学文案
T E D演讲—M a r t i n J a c q u e s《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of ChinaThe world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025 these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. We should bear in mind here these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crises.世界正在以惊人的速度飞快得改变着。
如果你看着这上方的图表,你会看到在2025年，高盛投资公司的这些预测表明中国经济规模会和美国经济几乎相当。
如果看 2050年的图表，预测表明中国经济规模将会是美国经济的两倍，印度的经济规模将会和美国的经济几乎持平。
在这里，我们应该记住这些预测是在西方经济危机之前做出的。
A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) PARIBAS for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2010. That’s just a decade way.几周前，我查看法国巴黎银行的最近预测，中国在什么时候会超越美国经济，成为第一大经济体。
了解中国的崛起演讲稿范文
了解中国的崛起演讲稿The wor l d is changi n n g with real l y remarkabl e e speed. If y y ou look at t he chart at the top her e e, you’ll se e e that in 20225, these Go l dman Sachs p p rojections s s uggest that the Chinese economy wil l be almost t he same siz e e as the Ame r ican econom y y. And if yo u u look at th e e chart for 22050, it’s p r ojected tha t the Chines e e economy wi l l be twice t he size of t he American economy, an d d the Indian economy wil l be almost t he same siz e e as the Ame r ican econom y y. And we sh o o uld bear in mind here t h h at these pr o o jections we r e drawn up b b efore the W e e stern finan c c ial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was lookin g g at the lat e e st projecti o o n by BNP Pa r ibas for wh e e n China wil l have a lar g g er economy t han the Uni t ed States. G G oldman Sach s s projected 22027. The po s s t-crisis pr o o jection is 22020. That’s just a deca d d e away. Chi n n a is going t o change th e e world in t w w o fundament a a l respects.First of al l, it’s a hu g g e developin g g country wi t h a populat i on of 1.3 b i llion peopl e e, which has been growin g g for over 300 years at a r ound 10 per c c ent a year.And within a decade, it w w ill have th e e largest ec o o nomy in the world. Neve r before in t he modern e r a has the l a a rgest econo m m y in the wo r ld been tha t of a devel o o ping countr y y, rather th a a n a develop e e d country. S S econdly, fo r the first t ime in the m m odern era, t he dominant country in t he world --which I thi n n k is what C h h ina will be c c ome -- will be not from the West an d d from very,very differ e e nt civiliza t ional roots.Now I know it’s a wide s s pread assum p p tion in the West that, a a s countries modernize, t hey also We s s ternize. Th i s is an ill u u sion. It’s a a n assumptio n n that moder n n ity is a pr o o duct simply of competit i on, markets and technol o o gy. It is n o o t; it is al s s o shaped eq u u ally by his t ory and cul t ure. China i s not like t he West, an d d it will no t become lik e e the West. I t will rema i n in very f u u ndamental r e e spects very different. N N ow the big q q uestion her e e is obvious l y, how do w e e make sense of China? H o o w do we try to understa n n d what Chin a a is? And th e e problem we have in the West at the moment by-a n n d-large is t hat the con v v entional ap p p roach is th a a t we unders t and it real l y in Wester n n terms, usi n n g Western i d d eas. We can’t. Now I wa n n t to offer y y ou three bu i lding block s s for trying to understa n n d what Chin a a is like --just as a b e e ginning.Th e e first is t h h is, that Ch i na is not r e e ally a nati o o n state. Ok a a y, it’s cal l ed itself a nation stat e e for the la s s t hundred y e e ars. But ev e e ryone who k n n ows anythin g g about Chin a a knows it’s a lot older than this. T T his was wha t China look e e d like with the victory of the Qin D D ynasty in 2221 B.C. at t h h e end of th e e warring st a a te period -- the birth o o f modern Ch i na. And you can see it a a gainst the b b oundaries o f modern Chi n n a. Or immed i ately after w w ard, the Ha n n Dynasty, s t ill 2,000 y e e ars ago. An d d you can se e e already it occupies mo s s t of what w e e now know a s s Eastern Ch i na, whichi s s where the v v ast majorit y y of Chinese lived then a a nd live now.Now what i s s extraordin a a ry about th i s is, what g g ives China i t’s sense o f being Chin a a, what give s s the Chines e e the sense o o f what it i s s to be Chin e e se, comes n o o t from the l ast hundred years, not f rom the nat i on state pe r iod, which i s what happ e e ned in the W W est, but fr o o m the perio d d, if you li k k e, of the c i vilization s s tate. I’m t h h inking here, for exampl e e, of custom s s like ances t ral worship, of a very d d istinctive n n otion of th e e state, lik e e wise, a ver y y distinctiv e e notion of t he family, s s ocial relat i onships lik e e guanxi, Co n n fucian valu e e s and so on.These are a a ll things t h h at come fro m m the period of the civi l ization sta t e. In other words, Chin a a, unlike th e e Western st a a tes and mos t countries i n the world,is shaped b b y its sense of civiliza t ion, its ex i stence as a civilizatio n n state, rat h h er than as a a nation sta t e. And ther e e’s one othe r thing to a d d d to this, a a nd that is t his: Of cou r se we know C C hina’s big,huge, demog r aphically a n n d geographi c c ally, with a a population of 1.3 bill i on people. W W hat we ofte n n aren’t rea l ly aware of is the fact that China i s extremely diverse and very plural i stic, and i n n many ways v v ery decentr a a lized. Y ou c c an’t run a p p lace on thi s s scale simp l y from Beij i ng, even th o o ugh we thin k k this to be the case. I t’s never be e e n the case.So this is C C hina, a civ i lization st a a te, rather t han a natio n n state. And what does i t mean? Well I think it h h as all sort s s of profoun d d implicatio n n s.I’ll giv e e you two qu i ck ones. Th e e first is t h h at the most important p o o litical val u u e for the C h h inese is un i ty, is the m m aintenance o o f Chinese c i vilization. Y ou know, 2,000 years a g g o, Europe: b b reakdown, t h h e fragmenta t ion of the H H oly Roman E m m pire [Roman Empire]. It divided, an d d it’s remai n n ed divided e e ver since. C C hina, over t he same tim e e period, we n n t in exactl y y the opposi t e direction,very painf u u lly holding this huge c i vilization, civilizatio n n state toge t her.The se c c ond is mayb e e more prosa i c, which is Hong Kong. D D o you remem b b er the hand o o ver of Hong Kong by Bri t ain to Chin a a in 1997? Y o o u may remem b b er what the Chinese con s s titutional p p roposition w w as. One cou n n try, two sy s s tems. And I’ll lay a wa g g er that bar e e ly anyone i n n the West b e e lieved them. “Window dr e e ssing. When China gets i t’s hands o n n Hong Kong,that won’t b b e the case.”” 13 years o n n, the polit i cal and leg a a l system in Hong Kong i s s as differe n n t now as it was in 1997.We were wr o o ng. Why wer e e we wrong? W W e were wron g g because we thought, na t urally enou g g h, in natio n n state ways. Think of G e e rman unific a a tion, 1990.What happen e e d? Well, ba s s ically the E E ast was swa l lowed by th e e West. One n n ation, one s s ystem. That is the nati o o n state men t ality. But y y ou can’t ru n n a country l ike China, a a civilizati o o n state, on the basis o f one civili z z ation, one s s ystem. It d o o esn’t work.So actually the respons e e of China t o o the questi o o n of Hong K o o ng -- as it will be to t he question of Taiwan -- was a natu r al response: one civili z z ation, many systems.Le t me offer y o o u another b u u ilding bloc k k to try and understand C C hina -- may b b e not such a a comfortabl e e one. The C h h inese have a a very, very different c o o nception of race to mos t other coun t ries. Do yo u u know, of t h h e 1.3 billi o o n Chinese, o o ver 90 perc e e nt of them t hink they b e e long to the same race, t he Han. Now this is com p p letely diff e e rent from t h h e other wor l d’s most po p p ulous count r ies. India,the United S S tates, Indo n n esia, Brazi l-- all of t hem are mul t iracial. Th e e Chinese do n n’t feel lik e e that. Chin a a is only mu l tiracial re a a lly at the m m argins. So t he question is, why? We l l the reaso n n, I think, e e ssentially i s, again, b a a ck to the c i vilization s s tate.A his t ory of at l e e ast 2,000 y e e ars, a hist o o ry of conqu e e st, occupat i on, absorpt i on, assimil a a tion and so on, led to t he process b b y which, ov e e r time, thi s s notion of t he Han emer g g ed -- of co u u rse, nurtur e e d by a grow i ng and very powerful se n n se of cultu r al identity.Now the gr e e at advantag e e of this hi s s torical exp e e rience has b b een that, w i thout the H a a n, China co u u ld never ha v v e held toge t her. The Ha n n identity h a a s been the c c ement which has held th i s country t o o gether. The great disad v v antage of i t is that th e e Han have a very weak c o o nception of cultural di f ference. Th e e y really be l ieve in the i r own super i ority, and t hey are dis r espectful o f those who a a re not. Hen c c e their att i tude, for e x x ample, to t h h e Uyghurs a n n d to the Ti b b etans.Or l e e t me give y o o u my third b b uilding blo c c k, the Chin e e se state. N o o w the relat i onship betw e e en the stat e e and societ y y in China i s s very diffe r entfrom th a a t in the We s s t. Now we i n n the West o v v erwhelmingl y y seem to th i nk -- in th e e se days at l east -- tha t the author i ty and legi t imacy of th e e state is a function of democracy. T T he problem w w ith this pr o o position is that the Ch i nese state e e njoys more l egitimacy a n n d more auth o o rity amongs t the Chines e e than is tr u u e with any W W estern stat e e. And the r e e ason for th i s is becaus e e-- well, t h h ere are two reasons, I t hink. And i t’s obviousl y y got nothin g g to do with democracy, b b ecause in o u u r terms the Chinese cer t ainly don’t have a demo c c racy. And t h h e reason fo r this is, f i rstly, beca u u se the stat e e in China i s s given a ve r y special --it enjoys a a very speci a a l significa n n ce as the r e e presentativ e e, the embod i ment and th e e guardian o f Chinese ci v v ilization, o o f the civil i zation stat e e. This is a s s close as C h h ina gets to a kind of s p p iritual rol e e.And the s e e cond reason is because,whereas in E E urope and N o o rth America,the state’s s power is c o o ntinuously c c hallenged --I mean in t he European tradition, h h istorically against the church, aga i nst other s e e ctors of th e e aristocrac y y, against m e e rchants and so on -- fo r1,000 year s s, the power of the Chin e e se state ha s s not been c h h allenged. I t’s had no s e e rious rival s s. So you ca n n see that t h h e way in wh i ch power ha s s been const r ucted in Ch i na is very d d ifferent fr o o m our exper i ence in Wes t ern history.The result, by the way, is that th e e Chinese ha v v e a very di f ferent view of the stat e e. Whereas w e e tend to vi e e w it as an i ntruder, a s s tranger, ce r tainly an o r gan whose p o o wers need t o o be limited or defined a a nd constrai n n ed, theChi n n ese don’t s e e e the state like that a t all. The C h h inese view t he state as an intimate-- not just as an intim a a te actually, as a membe r of the fam i ly -- not j u u st in fact a a s a member o o f the famil y y, but as th e e head of th e e family, th e e patriarch o o f the famil y y. This is t h h e Chinese v i ew of the s t ate -- very, very diffe r ent to ours. It’s embed d d ed in socie t y in a diff e e rent kind o f way to wha t is the cas e e in the Wes t.And I wou l d suggest t o o you that a c c tually what we are deal i ng with her e e, in the Ch i nese contex t, is a new k k ind of para d d igm, which i s different from anythi n n g we’ve had to think ab o o ut in the p a a st. Know th a a t China bel i eves in the market and t he state. I mean, Adam S S mith, alrea d d y writing i n n the late 188th century s s aid, “The C h h inese marke t is larger a a nd more dev e e loped and m o o re sophisti c c ated than a n n ything in E u u rope.” And, apart from t he Mao peri o o d, that has remained mo r e-or-less t h h e case ever since. But t his is comb i ned with an extremely s t rong and ub i quitous sta t e. The stat e e is everywh e e re in China.I mean, it’s leading f i rms, many o f them are s t ill publicl y y owned. Pri v v ate firms, h h owever larg e e they are, l ike Lenovo,depend in m a a ny ways on s s tate patron a a ge. Targets for the eco n n omy and so o o n are set b y y the state.And the sta t e, of cours e e, its autho r ity flows i n n to lots of o o ther areas -- as we are familiar wi t h -- with s o o mething lik e e the the on e e-child poli c c y.Moreover, this is a v v ery old sta t e tradition, a very old tradition o f statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustratio n n of this, t h h e Great Wal l isone. Bu t this is an o o ther, this i s the Grand Canal, whic h h was constr u u cted in the first insta n n ce in the f i fth century B.C. and wa s s finally co m m pleted in t h h e seventh c e e ntury A.D. I t went for 11,114 miles,linking Bei j ing with Ha n n gzhou and S h h anghai. So t here’s a lo n n g history o f extraordin a a ry state in f rastructura l projects i n n China, whi c c h I suppose helps us to explain wha t we see tod a a y, which is something l i ke the Thre e e Gorges Dam and many ot h h er expressi o o ns of state competence w w ithin China. So there w e e have three building bl o o cks for try i ng to to un d d erstand the difference t hat is Chin a a -- the civ i lization st a a te, the not i on of race a a nd the natu r e of the st a a te and its r elationship to society.And yet we s s till insist,by-and-lar g g e, in think i ng that we c c an understa n n d China by s s imply drawi n n g on Wester n n experience, looking at it through W W estern eyes,using West e e rn concepts.If you wan t to know wh y y we unerrin g g ly seem to g g et China wr o o ng -- our p r edictions a b b out what’s g g oing to hap p p en to China are incorre c c t -- this i s s the reason. Unfortunat e e ly I think,I have to s a a y that I th i nk attitude towards Chi n n a is that o f a kind of l ittle Weste r ner mentali t y. It’s kin d d of arrogan t. It’s arro g g ant in the s s ense that w e e think that we are best,and theref o o re we have t he universa l measure. A n n d secondly,it’s ignora n n t. We refus e e to really a a ddress the i ssue of dif f erence. Y ou know, there’s a very in t eresting pa s s sage in a b o o ok by Paul C C ohen, the A m m erican hist o o rian. AndP a a ul Cohen ar g g ues that th e e West think s s of itself a a s probably t he most cos m m opolitan of all culture s s. But it’s n n ot. In many ways, it’s t he most par o o chial, beca u u se for 200 y y ears, the W e e st has been so dominant in the worl d d that it’s n n ot really n e e eded to und e e rstand othe r cultures, o o ther civili z z ations. Bec a a use, at the end of the d d ay, it coul d d, if necess a a ry by force, get its ow n n way. Where a a s those cul t ures -- vir t ually the r e e st of the w o o rld, in fac t -- which h a a ve been in a a far weaker position, v i s-a-vis the West, have b b een thereby forced to u n n derstand th e e West, beca u u se of the W e e st’s presen c c e in those s s ocieties. A n n d therefore,they are, a a s a result, more cosmop o o litan in ma n n y ways than the West.I mean, take t he question of East Asi a a. East Asia:Japan, Kor e e a, China, e t c. -- a thi r d of the wo r ld’s popula t ion lives t h h ere, now th e e largest ec o o nomic regio n n in the wor l d. And I’ll tell you no w w, that East Asianers, p e e ople from E a a st Asia, ar e e far more k n n owledgeable about the W e e st than the West is abo u u t East Asia. Now this p o o int is very germane, I’m m afraid, to the present.Because wh a a t’s happeni n n g? Back to t hat chart a t the beginn i ng -- the G o o ldman Sachs chart. What is happenin g g is that, v e e ry rapidly i n historica l terms, the world is be i ng driven a n n d shaped, n o o t by the ol d d developed c c ountries, b u u t by the de v v eloping wor l d. We’ve se e e n this in t e e rms of the G G20 -- usurp i ng very rap i dly the pos i tion of the G7, or the G G8. And ther e e are two co n n sequences o f this. Firs t, the West i s rapidly l o o sing its in f luence in t h h e world. Th e e re was a dr a a matic illus t ration of t h h isactually a year ago -- Copenhage n n, climate c h h ange confer e e nce. Europe was not at t he final ne g g otiating ta b b le. When di d d that last h h appen? I wo u u ld wager it was probabl y y about 200 y y ears ago. A n n d that is w h h at is going to happen i n n the future.And the se c c ond implica t ion is that the world w i ll inevitab l y, as a con s s equence, be c c ome increas i ngly unfami l iar to us, b b ecause it’l l be shaped b b y cultures a a nd experien c c es and hist o o ries that w e e are not re a a lly familia r with, or c o o nversant wi t h. And at l a a st, I’m afr a a id -- take E E urope, Amer i ca is sligh t ly differen t-- but Eur o o peans by an d d large, I h a a ve to say, a a re ignorant, are unawar e e about the w w ay the worl d d is changin g g. Some peop l e -- I’ve g o o t an Englis h h friend in C C hina, and h e e said, “The continent i s s sleepwalki n n g into obli v v ion.” Well,maybe that’s s true, mayb e e that’s an e e xaggeration. But there’s s another pr o o blem which g g oes along w i th this -- t hat Europe i s increasin g g ly out of t o o uch with th e e world -- a n n d that is a sort of los s s of a sense of the futu r e. I mean, E E urope once,of course, o o nce command e e d the futur e e in it’s co n n fidence. Ta k k e the 19th c c entury for e e xample. But this, alas,is no longe r true.If y o o u want to f e e el the futu r e, if you w a a nt to taste the future,try China --there’s ol d d Confucius.This is a r a a ilway stati o o n the like o o f which you’ve never se e e n before. I t does n’t ev e e n look like a railway s t ation. This is the new G G uangzhou ra i lway statio n n for the hi g g h-speed tra i ns. China a l ready has a bigger netw o o rk than any other count r y in the wo r ld andwill soon have m o o re than all the rest of the world p u u t together.Or take thi s s: Now this i s an idea, b b ut it’s an i dea to by t r ied out sho r tly in a su b b urb of Beij i ng. Here yo u u have a meg a a bus, on the upper deck c c arries abou t 2,000 peop l e. It trave l s on rails d d own a subur b b an road, an d d the cars t r avel undern e e ath it. And it does spe e e ds of up to about 100 m i les an hour. Now this i s s the way th i ngs are goi n n g to move, b b ecause Chin a a has a very specific pr o o blem, which is differen t from Europ e e and differ e e nt from the United Stat e e s. China ha s s huge numbe r s of people and no spac e e. So this i s s a solution to a situat i on where Ch i na’s going t o have many, many, many cities over20 million p p eople.Okay, so how wou l d I like to finish? Wel l, what shou l d our attit u u de be towar d d s this worl d d that we se e e very rapid l y developin g g before us?I think the r e will be g o o od things a b b out it and t here will b e e bad things about it. B u u t I want to argue, abov e e all, a big picture pos i tive for th i s world. Fo r 200 years,the world w a a s essential l y governed b b y a fragmen t of the hum a a n populatio n n. That’s wh a a t Europe an d d North Amer i ca represen t ed. The arr i val of coun t ries like C h h ina and Ind i a -- betwee n n them 38 pe r cent of the world’s pop u u lation -- a n n d others li k k e Indonesia and Brazil a a nd so on, r e e present the most import a a nt single a c c t of democr a a tization in the last 2000years. Civ i lizations a n n d cultures,which had b e e en ignored,which had n o o voice, whi c c h were not l istened to,which were n n ot known ab o o ut, will ha v v e a differe n n t sort of r e e presentatio n n in this wo r ld. As huma n n ists, wemu s s t welcome, s s urely, this transformat i on. And we w w ill have to learn about these civil i zations.Th i s big ship h h ere was the one sailed i n by Zheng H H e in the ea r ly 15th cen t ury on his g g reat voyage s s around the South China Sea, the Ea s s t China Sea and across t he Indian O c c ean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the o o ne in which, 80 years l a a ter, Christ o o pher Columb u u s crossed t h h e Atlantic.(Laughter) O O r, look car e e fully at th i s silk scro l l made by Z h h uZhou in 13668. I think t hey’re play i ng golf. Ch r ist, the Ch i nese even i n n vented golf.Welcome to the future.Thank you.。
关于中国崛起的英文演讲带翻译范文(精选多篇)
关于中国崛起的英文演讲带翻译范文（精选多篇）1. Speech on the Rise of ChinaAs the world's most populous nation, China has been on a remarkable journey of transformation and modernization over the past few decades. Through economic liberalization, technological innovation, and a concerted effort to improve infrastructure and build up its industries, China has become a major economic and political force on the global stage. While challenges remain, China's rise is undoubtedly a significant development in the 21st century that will shape the future of the world.Over the past few decades, China has experienced astonishing levels of economic growth, averaging an annual GDP growth rate of roughly 9% over the past several decades. Today, China's economy is the second largest in the world, and its middle class has grown to over 400 million people. This rapid growth has led to significant improvements in living standards across the country, but it has also created numerous challenges as China seeks to maintain its growth trajectory while balancing environmental sustainability and social equity.Moreover, China's rise has created geopolitical tensions with other major powers, particularly the United States. The two countries have been engaged in a tense bilateral relationship that has been marked by trade tensions, strategic competition, and geopolitical posturing. As China becomes increasingly assertive on the world stage, it is likely that these tensions will continue to shape the dynamics of global politics.China's rise also has implications for the international system more broadly. As a major power, China is becoming increasingly influential in shaping global governance, from climate change tothe regulation of emerging technologies. The rise of China, along with other emerging powers, is challenging the dominance of the traditional actors in the international system, and there is an urgent need to rethink how global governance can be reformed to accommodate the new realities of the 21st century.In conclusion, China's rise is one of the defining developments of the 21st century. While it brings with it numerous opportunities, it also poses significant challenges for China and the rest of the world. It is up to global leaders to manage these challenges effectively and to ensure that the rise of China is ultimately a force for good in the world.中文翻译：作为世界上人口最多的国家，中国在过去几十年中经历了一次引人注目的转型和现代化之旅。
演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿
三一文库（）/演讲稿范文/演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿Theworldischangingwithreallyremarkablespeed.Ifyoulookatthechart atthetophere,you'llseethatin2025,theseGoldmanSachsprojectionssu ggestthattheChineseeconomywillbealmostthesamesizeastheAmeric aneconomy.Andifyoulookatthechartfor2050,it'sprojectedthattheChi neseeconomywillbetwicethesizeoftheAmericaneconomy,andtheIndi aneconomywillbealmostthesamesizeastheAmericaneconomy.Andw eshouldbearinmindherethattheseprojectionsweredrawnupbeforeth eWesternfinancialcrisis.Acoupleofweeksago,IwaslookingatthelatestprojectionbyBNPParibas forwhenChinawillhavealargereconomythantheUnitedStates.Goldma nSachsprojected2027.Thepost-crisisprojectionis2020.That'sjustadec adeaway.Chinaisgoingtochangetheworldintwofundamentalrespects .Firstofall,it'sahugedevelopingcountrywithapopulationof1.3billionpeople,whichhasbeengrowingforover30yearsataround10percentayear .Andwithinadecade,itwillhavethelargesteconomyintheworld.Neverb eforeinthemodernerahasthelargesteconomyintheworldbeenthatofa developingcountry,ratherthanadevelopedcountry.Secondly,forthefi rsttimeinthemodernera,thedominantcountryintheworld--whichIthin kiswhatChinawillbecome--willbenotfromtheWestandfromvery,very differentcivilizationalroots.NowIknowit'sawidespreadassumptionintheWestthat,ascountriesmo dernize,theyalsoWesternize.Thisisanillusion.It'sanassumptionthatm odernityisaproductsimplyofcompetition,marketsandtechnology.Itis not;itisalsoshapedequallybyhistoryandculture.ChinaisnotliketheWes t,anditwillnotbecomeliketheWest.Itwillremaininveryfundamentalre spectsverydifferent.Nowthebigquestionhereisobviously,howdowem akesenseofChina?HowdowetrytounderstandwhatChinais?Andthepr oblemwehaveintheWestatthemomentby-and-largeisthattheconven tionalapproachisthatweunderstanditreallyinWesternterms,usingWe sternideas.Wecan't.NowIwanttoofferyouthreebuildingblocksfortryi ngtounderstandwhatChinaislike--justasabeginning.Nowwhatisextraordinaryaboutthisis,whatgivesChinait'ssenseofbein gChina,whatgivestheChinesethesenseofwhatitistobeChinese,comes notfromthelasthundredyears,notfromthenationstateperiod,whichis whathappenedintheWest,butfromtheperiod,ifyoulike,ofthecivilizati onstate.I'mthinkinghere,forexample,ofcustomslikeancestralworship ,ofaverydistinctivenotionofthestate,likewise,averydistinctivenotion ofthefamily,socialrelationshipslikeguanxi,Confucianvaluesandsoon.T heseareallthingsthatcomefromtheperiodofthecivilizationstate.Inoth erwords,China,unliketheWesternstatesandmostcountriesintheworl d,isshapedbyitssenseofcivilization,itsexistenceasacivilizationstate,ra therthanasanationstate.Andthere'soneotherthingtoaddtothis,andth atisthis:OfcourseweknowChina'sbig,huge,demographicallyandgeogr aphically,withapopulationof1.3billionpeople.Whatweoftenaren'trea llyawareofisthefactthatChinaisextremelydiverseandverypluralistic,a ndinmanywaysverydecentralized.Youcan'trunaplaceonthisscalesimp lyfromBeijing,eventhoughwethinkthistobethecase.It'sneverbeenthe case.SothisisChina,acivilizationstate,ratherthananationstate.Andwhatdoesitmean?WellIthinkithasallsortsofprofoundimplications.I'llgiveyout woquickones.ThefirstisthatthemostimportantpoliticalvaluefortheCh ineseisunity,isthemaintenanceofChinesecivilization.Youknow,2,000y earsago,Europe:breakdown,thefragmentationoftheHolyRomanEmpi re[RomanEmpire].Itdivided,andit'sremaineddividedeversince.China, overthesametimeperiod,wentinexactlytheoppositedirection,verypai nfullyholdingthishugecivilization,civilizationstatetogether.Thesecondismaybemoreprosaic,whichisHongKong.Doyouremember thehandoverofHongKongbyBritaintoChinain1997?Youmayremembe rwhattheChineseconstitutionalpropositionwas.Onecountry,twosyst ems.AndI'lllayawagerthatbarelyanyoneintheWestbelievedthem."Wi ndowdressing.WhenChinagetsit'shandsonHongKong,thatwon'tbeth ecase."13yearson,thepoliticalandlegalsysteminHongKongisasdiffere ntnowasitwasin1997.Wewerewrong.Whywerewewrong?Wewerewr ongbecausewethought,naturallyenough,innationstateways.Thinkof Germanunification,1990.Whathappened?Well,basicallytheEastwass wallowedbytheWest.Onenation,onesystem.Thatisthenationstateme ntality.Butyoucan'trunacountrylikeChina,acivilizationstate,onthebas isofonecivilization,onesystem.Itdoesn'twork.Soactuallytheresponse ofChinatothequestionofHongKong--asitwillbetothequestionofTaiwa n--wasanaturalresponse:onecivilization,manysystems.Nowthegreatadvantageofthishistoricalexperiencehasbeenthat,with outtheHan,Chinacouldneverhaveheldtogether.TheHanidentityhasbe enthecementwhichhasheldthiscountrytogether.Thegreatdisadvanta geofitisthattheHanhaveaveryweakconceptionofculturaldifference.T heyreallybelieveintheirownsuperiority,andtheyaredisrespectfulofth osewhoarenot.Hencetheirattitude,forexample,totheUyghursandtot heTibetans.Orletmegiveyoumythirdbuildingblock,theChinesestate.Nowtherelati onshipbetweenthestateandsocietyinChinaisverydifferentfromthatin theWest.NowweintheWestoverwhelminglyseemtothink--intheseda ysatleast--thattheauthorityandlegitimacyofthestateisafunctionofde mocracy.TheproblemwiththispropositionisthattheChinesestateenjo ysmorelegitimacyandmoreauthorityamongsttheChinesethanistruew ithanyWesternstate.Andthereasonforthisisbecause--well,therearet woreasons,Ithink.Andit'sobviouslygotnothingtodowithdemocracy,b ecauseinourtermstheChinesecertainlydon'thaveademocracy.Andth ereasonforthisis,firstly,becausethestateinChinaisgivenaveryspecial--itenjoysaveryspecialsignificanceastherepresentative,theembodimentandtheguardianofChinesecivilization,ofthecivilizationstate.Thisisasc loseasChinagetstoakindofspiritualrole.Andthesecondreasonisbecause,whereasinEuropeandNorthAmerica, thestate'spoweriscontinuouslychallenged--ImeanintheEuropeantra dition,historicallyagainstthechurch,againstothersectorsofthearistocr acy,againstmerchantsandsoon--for1,000years,thepoweroftheChine sestatehasnotbeenchallenged.It'shadnoseriousrivals.Soyoucanseeth atthewayinwhichpowerhasbeenconstructedinChinaisverydifferentfr omourexperienceinWesternhistory.Theresult,bytheway,isthattheCh inesehaveaverydifferentviewofthestate.Whereaswetendtoviewitasa nintruder,astranger,certainlyanorganwhosepowersneedtobelimited ordefinedandconstrained,theChinesedon'tseethestatelikethatatall.T heChineseviewthestateasanintimate--notjustasanintimateactually,a samemberofthefamily--notjustinfactasamemberofthefamily,butasth eheadofthefamily,thepatriarchofthefamily.ThisistheChineseviewoft hestate--very,verydifferenttoours.It'sembeddedinsocietyinadifferen tkindofwaytowhatisthecaseintheWest.AndIwouldsuggesttoyouthatactuallywhatwearedealingwithhere,int heChinesecontext,isanewkindofparadigm,whichisdifferentfromanyt。
了解中国的崛起演讲稿
了解中国的崛起演讲稿Ｔhe world is changing with really remarkable speed. Ｉf you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Ｇoldman Ｓachs projections suggest that the Ｃhinese economy will be almost the same size as the Ａmerican economy. Ａnd if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Ｃhinese economy will be twice the size of the Ａmerican economy, and the Ｉndian economy will be almost the same size as the Ａmerican economy. Ａnd we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Ｗestern financial crisis. Ａ couple of weeks ago, Ｉ was looking at the latest projection by ＢＮＰＰaribas for when Ｃhina will have a larger economy than the Ｕnited Ｓtates. Ｇoldman Ｓachs projected 2027. Ｔhe post-crisis projection is 2020. Ｔhat's just a decade away. Ｃhina is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. Ｆirst of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.Ａnd within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Ｎever before in the modern era has the largest economy 1 / 13in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Ｓecondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which Ｉ think is what Ｃhina will become -- will be not from the Ｗest and from very, very different civilizational roots.Ｎow Ｉ know it's a widespread assumption in the Ｗest that, as countries modernize, they also Ｗesternize. Ｔhis is an illusion. Ｉt's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. Ｉt is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. Ｃhina is not like the Ｗest, and it will not become like the Ｗest. Ｉt will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Ｎow the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of Ｃhina? Ｈow do we try to understand what Ｃhina is? Ａnd the problem we have in the Ｗest at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Ｗestern terms, using Ｗestern ideas. Ｗe can't. Ｎow Ｉ want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what Ｃhina is like -- just as a beginning.Ｎow what is extraordinary about this is, what gives Ｃhina 2 / 13it's sense of being Ｃhina, what gives the Ｃhinese the sense of what it is to be Ｃhinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the Ｗest, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. Ｉ'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Ｃonfucian values and so on. Ｔhese are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. Ｉn other words, Ｃhina, unlike the Ｗestern states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. Ａnd there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Ｏf course we know Ｃhina's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. Ｗhat we often aren't really aware of is the fact that Ｃhina is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. Ｙou can't run a place on this scale simply from Ｂeijing, even though we think this to be the case. Ｉt's never been the case.Ｓo this is Ｃhina, a civilization state, rather than a nation 3 / 13state. Ａnd what does it mean? Ｗell Ｉ think it has all sorts of profound implications. Ｉ'll give you two quick ones. Ｔhe first is that the most important political value for the Ｃhinese is unity, is the maintenance of Ｃhinese civilization. Ｙou know, 2,000 years ago, Ｅurope: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Ｈoly Ｒoman Ｅmpire [Ｒoman Ｅmpire]. Ｉt divided, and it's remained divided ever since. Ｃhina, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.Ｔhe second is maybe more prosaic, which is Ｈong Ｋong. Ｄo you remember the handover of Ｈong Ｋong by Ｂritain to Ｃhina in 1997? Ｙou may remember what the Ｃhinese constitutional proposition was. Ｏne country, two systems. Ａnd Ｉ'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the Ｗest believed them. "Ｗindow dressing. Ｗhen Ｃhina gets it's hands on Ｈong Ｋong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Ｈong Ｋong is as different now as it was in 1997. Ｗe were wrong. Ｗhy were we wrong? Ｗe were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Ｔhink of Ｇerman unification, 1990. Ｗhat happened? Ｗell, basically the Ｅast 4 / 13was swallowed by the Ｗest. Ｏne nation, one system. Ｔhat is the nation state mentality. Ｂut you can't run a country like Ｃhina, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. Ｉt doesn't work. Ｓo actually the response of Ｃhina to the question of Ｈong Ｋong -- as it will be to the question of Ｔaiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Ｎow the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Ｈan, Ｃhina could never have held together. Ｔhe Ｈan identity has been the cement which has held this country together. Ｔhe great disadvantage of it is that the Ｈan have a very weak conception of cultural difference. Ｔhey really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Ｈence their attitude, for example, to the Ｕyghurs and to the Ｔibetans.Ｏr let me give you my third building block, the Ｃhinese state. Ｎow the relationship between the state and society in Ｃhina is very different from that in the Ｗest. Ｎow we in the Ｗest overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function 5 / 13of democracy. Ｔhe problem with this proposition is that the Ｃhinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Ｃhinese than is true with any Ｗestern state. Ａnd the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, Ｉ think. Ａnd it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Ｃhinese certainly don't have a democracy. Ａnd the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in Ｃhina is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Ｃhinese civilization, of the civilization state. Ｔhis is as close as Ｃhina gets to a kind of spiritual role.Ａnd the second reason is because, whereas in Ｅurope and Ｎorth Ａmerica, the state's power is continuously challenged -- Ｉ mean in the Ｅuropean tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Ｃhinese state has not been challenged. Ｉt's had no serious rivals. Ｓo you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in Ｃhina is very different from our experience in Ｗestern history. Ｔhe result, by the way, is that the Ｃhinese 6 / 13have a very different view of the state. Ｗhereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Ｃhinese don't see the state like that at all. Ｔhe Ｃhinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. Ｔhis is the Ｃhinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. Ｉt's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the Ｗest.Ａnd Ｉ would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Ｃhinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. Ｋnow that Ｃhina believes in the market and the state. Ｉ mean, Ａdam Ｓmith, already writing in the late 18th century said, "Ｔhe Ｃhinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Ｅurope." Ａnd, apart from the Ｍao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. Ｂut this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. Ｔhe state is everywhere in Ｃhina. Ｉ mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still 7 / 13publicly owned. Ｐrivate firms, however large they are, like Ｌenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Ｔargets for the economy and so on are set by the state. Ａnd the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.Ｍoreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. Ｉ mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Ｇreat Ｗall is one. Ｂut this is another, this is the Ｇrand Ｃanal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century Ｂ.Ｃ. and was finally completed in the seventh century Ａ.Ｄ. Ｉt went for 1,114 miles, linking Ｂeijing with Ｈangzhou and Ｓhanghai. Ｓo there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in Ｃhina, which Ｉ suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Ｔhree Ｇorges Ｄam and many other expressions of state competence within Ｃhina. Ｓo there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is Ｃhina -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.8 / 13Ａnd yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand Ｃhina by simply drawing on Ｗestern experience, looking at it through Ｗestern eyes, using Ｗestern concepts. Ｉf you want to know why we unerringly seem to get Ｃhina wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to Ｃhina are incorrect -- this is the reason. Ｕnfortunately Ｉ think, Ｉhave to say that Ｉ think attitude towards Ｃhina is that of a kind of little Ｗesterner mentality. Ｉt's kind of arrogant. Ｉt's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. Ａnd secondly, it's ignorant. Ｗe refuse to really address the issue of difference. Ｙou know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Ｐaul Ｃohen, the Ａmerican historian. Ａnd Ｐaul Ｃohen argues that the Ｗest thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. Ｂut it's not. Ｉn many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the Ｗest has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Ｂecause, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Ｗhereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, 9 / 13vis-a-vis the Ｗest, have been thereby forced to understand the Ｗest, because of the Ｗest's presence in those societies. Ａnd therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the Ｗest.Ｉ mean, take the question of Ｅast Ａsia. Ｅast Ａsia: Ｊapan, Ｋorea, Ｃhina, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. Ａnd Ｉ'll tell you now, that Ｅast Ａsianers, people from Ｅast Ａsia, are far more knowledgeable about the Ｗest than the Ｗest is about Ｅast Ａsia. Ｎow this point is very germane, Ｉ'm afraid, to the present. Ｂecause what's happening? Ｂack to that chart at the beginning -- the Ｇoldman Ｓachs chart. Ｗhat is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. Ｗe've seen this in terms of the Ｇ20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the Ｇ7, or the Ｇ8. Ａnd there are two consequences of this. Ｆirst, the Ｗest is rapidly losing its influence in the world. Ｔhere was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Ｃopenhagen, climate change conference. Ｅurope was not at the final negotiating table. Ｗhen did that last happen? Ｉ10 / 13would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. Ａnd that is what is going to happen in the future.Ａnd the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. Ａnd at last, Ｉ'm afraid -- take Ｅurope, Ａmerica is slightly different -- but Ｅuropeans by and large, Ｉ have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Ｓome people -- Ｉ've got an Ｅnglish friend in Ｃhina, and he said, "Ｔhe continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Ｗell, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration. Ｂut there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Ｅurope is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. Ｉ mean, Ｅurope once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. Ｔake the 19th century for example. Ｂut this, alas, is no longer true.Ｏkay, so how would Ｉ like to finish? Ｗell, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? Ｉ think there will be good things about 11 / 13it and there will be bad things about it. Ｂut Ｉ want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. Ｆor 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. Ｔhat's what Ｅurope and Ｎorth Ａmerica represented. Ｔhe arrival of countries like Ｃhina and Ｉndia -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Ｉndonesia and Ｂrazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Ｃivilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. Ａs humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. Ａnd we will have to learn about these civilizations.Ｔhis big ship here was the one sailed in by Ｚheng Ｈe in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the Ｓouth Ｃhina Ｓea, the Ｅast Ｃhina Ｓea and across the Ｉndian Ｏcean to Ｅast Ａfrica. Ｔhe little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Ｃhristopher Ｃolumbus crossed the Ａtlantic. (Ｌaughter) Ｏr, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ＺhuＺhou in 1368. Ｉ think they're playing 12 / 13golf. Ｃhrist, the Ｃhinese even invented golf. Ｗelcome to the future. Ｔhank you.13 / 13。
Martin Jacques：了解中国的崛起Understanding the Rise of China(中英对照)(word文档良心出品)
Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world which I think is China will become, will be not from the West, and from very very different civilizational roots.
Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of China
The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025 these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. We shouห้องสมุดไป่ตู้d bear in mind here these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crises.
Martin Jacques Understanding the rise of China TED演讲中文译文
马丁·杰克斯：直面中国的崛起译者：Winnie Shi 校对：Tony Yet原文网站/2011/02/13/martin_jacques_understanding_the_rise_of_c hina/演讲简介：在多数中国人的印象里，西方对中国的态度往往被两种极端情绪主导：要么畏其崛起而恐惧乃至责骂诽谤，要么为功夫和熊猫而狂热得难以理解。
鲜有能像马丁·杰克斯（Martin Jacques）那样的西方人从中国的历史本源与文化性格出发，客观而不失深刻，辛辣而不失真诚地告诉他的同胞们：你们误读了中国。
作为轰动一时的《当中国统治世界》（When China Rules the World）的作者，原《今日马克思主义》杂志的编辑，中国人民大学的客座教授，马丁·杰克斯在这篇演讲中向观众介绍了认识中国的三个基础，坦率地指出西方愈来愈偏狭的文化气度，并鼓励西方人直面这个变化发展的世界。
这世界正在以飞快的速度发生着改变。
如果你看这上面的图表，你会发现在2025年，据高盛的预测显示，中国经济体的规模几乎会与美国的一样大。
如果你来看这张2050年的图表，它预测届时中国经济体的规模将是美国的两倍，而印度经济体规模将与美国相近。
我们应该注意的是，这些预测是在西方金融危机发生之前做出的。
几周前，我在看法国巴黎银行做出的关于中国的经济体规模何时超越美国的最新预测。
高盛当时的预测是2027年。
而这份诞生于危机之后的报告的预测年份则是2020年。
这就是十年之后的事情了。
中国将要从两个最基本的方面改变世界。
首先，它是一个有着13亿人口的庞大的发展中国家，并已经以每年10%的经济增长速度腾飞了30多年。
而且在十年之内，它将会是世界最大的经济体。
在现代史上，还从未有过一个发展中国家，而不是发达国家，成为世界上最大的经济体。
第二，也是现代史上的第一次，世界上处主导地位的国家——我认为中国将居主导地位——不来自西方，而是来自于一个完全不同的文化根基。
TED演讲—Martin_Jacques《了解中国的崛起》（中英对照）
TED演讲—Martin_Jacques《了解中国的崛起》（中英对照）第一篇：TED演讲—Martin_Jacques《了解中国的崛起》(中英对照)Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of China The world is changing with really remarkable speed.If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025 these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy.And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy.We should bear in mind here these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crises.世界正在以惊人的速度飞快得改变着。
如果你看着这上方的图表,你会看到在2025年，高盛投资公司的这些预测表明中国经济规模会和美国经济几乎相当。
如果看2050年的图表，预测表明中国经济规模将会是美国经济的两倍，印度的经济规模将会和美国的经济几乎持平。
在这里，我们应该记住这些预测是在西方经济危机之前做出的。
A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP(Banque Nationale de Paris)PARIBAS for when China will have a larger economy than the United States.Goldman Sachs projected 2027.The post-crisis projection is 2010.That’s just a decade way.几周前，我查看法国巴黎银行的最近预测，中国在什么时候会超越美国经济，成为第一大经济体。
中国崛起的英文演讲
《中国崛起的英文演讲》摘要：演讲三国节日英演讲四国功夫英演讲五国崛起更多相关国崛起英演讲 r rbr,r l " r ll b l rl ,ll r l rr g l, rrkbl gvr l r rl , ll r "" r" bg rl r,r r rl r v r " r r bvl bll k " r rrg rrg, rr grg r,g rr " r r" r r gr rb l ll lg, r lr, rl,ll rrr l rr rlvr r, lrg br kr bl r ll vr rl, r kr r rg gr g lr r, r r rr l vg r rg r r, r, r vl,rkg rl r b r xr rk l r gbrg r,lg rbl kr ,b l ll r l r rg xx, b lg glbl rvr , rbl r rr rbl ll vlg r b l...35更多顶部国崛起英演讲二国崛起演讲三国节日英演讲四国功夫英演讲五国崛起更多相关国崛起英演讲 r rbr,r l " r ll b l rl ,ll r l rr g l, rrkbl g vr l r rl , ll r "" r" bg rl r,r r rl r v r " r r bvl bll k " r rrg rrg, rr grg r,g rr " r r" r r gr rb l ll lg, r lr, rl,ll r rr l rr rlvr r, lrg br kr bl r ll vr rl, r kr r rg gr g lr r, r r rr l vg r rg r r, r, r vl,rkg rl r b r xr rk l r gbrg r,lg rbl kr ,b l ll r l r rg xx, b lg glbl rvr , rbl r rr rbl ll vlg r b l, r , v b r l vl r r r, , rbb lvg r,b " g bl, ll gv r rl rl l l r r vrg rrrl gr, ll l r r, r l r rr k rl " vl l r r rl, r rk r r llg r ll r l r vl r lvg rg lg g l , ll rvgl ll l vl lvr lr v b rrg " k g , " r v vl r r," r r b g r lr rr rl罗伯特亲爱学们我讲话是国崛起将造福整世界几十年特别是改革和实施开放政策国各领域发生了显着变化并吸引了全世界关因全新单词“国崛起”正式bg世界舞台上有有两明显不r国r国观认主观和bll国崛起是令人震惊和担心他们释国不断增长怪物提出“国威胁论”以阻止或遏制这伟rb我拥有完全相反见国有勤奋智慧和魅力领导人重要是他们都是和平与繁荣坚定支持者rlvr年国将所有世界不稳定地区维和人员对量和国现有更多维和部队比任何其他rg国十分重视军事事其目只是进行卫和维护而不是侵略或威胁他人和平至济贸易今年以国济总量已超日位居二只已不仅成周边国包括韩国和日重要出口市场也是欧盟和美国特别是金融危机发生xx年国已领先全球济rvr与国是罕见责任识所有对发展国援助责任国已被无条件另方面国放弃对非洲亚洲加勒比和南太平洋地区几十国许多不发达国债国是爱和平国但是这并不味着获得和平与稳定将放弃其必要rl坚维护国核心r涉及到主权和领土完整国不会屈或妥协他们是如神圣任何国都不能干涉国明知它不能孤立地发展从世界其他地区所以国比任何国感到高兴谁愿要坚持政治信和相r积极支持通对话和谈判争端工作以和平方式将坚定不移地走和平发展道路保持开放和lvr领导人直重申我们现不称霸我们不会做它要么即使国是发达国总国崛起是定会更健康和更丰富世界成很机会二国崛起演讲你们是否还记得那辉煌灿烂华明曾傲然世界那地物博国屹立世界东方？你们是否还记得我们国孱弱候帝国侵略者铁蹄无情践踏着我们美丽山河？3你们是否还记得那曾是国附属贫乏国日开始觊觎国以武力侵略国而我们这曾泱泱国也只能任人欺侮？而你们是否又看到了看到了这沉睡国醒了龙传人再次向世界昭示我们伟国民族是不可能被摧毁不可能被战胜如今她又起了学们我们要做就是齐记住我们曾有辉煌和屈辱实现华夏明伟复兴国头威猛雄狮虽然他曾满目创伤虽然他曾疲惫不堪但是今天他苏醒了他再崛起他豪迈地走向世界向人们展示他王者风让世界拥抱了他??我们新世纪门楦xà蓦然回首看到崛起国又该体味怎样豪发出怎样感慨呢？30多年改革开放,国从落农业社会发展成现代商业社会,并着手开拓具有(请支持国特色社会主义道路, 我国综合国力不断增长,国际地位不断提高,参与国际合作,国际社会作用和影响逐渐加深,彻底改变了“弱国无外交”被动局面港澳回归,洗雪了华民族年耻辱,使海外华人扬吐气,台湾入公投失败,更使所有国人振!国维护华民族领土完整征程上又迈出了坚实步!我国科研军事实力迅猛增强,0年和0年我国先两次成功发射人航天飞船,0年发射首颗绕月探测卫星实现太空行走,今年天宫发射空建立奠定基础我国航天事业正蓬勃发展取得了令世界瞩目成就五星红旗飘扬高空我们以“米加步枪”夺得政权祖国首届国庆兵“万国牌”武器到现全产精良装备建国六十年兵式上国放军显示出飒爽英姿和军事力量可以让我们豪向世界宣告“国已强起了”国强也向世界传递着国维护世界和平理念体育方面 0年悉尼奥运会上我国金牌榜和奖牌榜夺得三0年雅奥运会我国争得二北京奥运会上我国以5枚金牌摘得桂冠让世界惊叹让每国人倍感豪与骄傲国已进入了史无前例体育高速发展代被体育深刻影响代国力增强国运昌盛国体育崛起提供了坚实保证和强动力国体育日益辉煌又国世界舞台上不断提升国形象增光添彩我国从建国初与7国建有外交关系到现00多国97年恢复合国成员地位；0年加入（世界贸易组织）；从申奥成功到举办奥运再到上海“世博会”国对世界影响越越国离不开世界世界也离不开国潘基说整世界都关着国作世界发展国世界发展快济体世界越越重要发展伙伴国合国议程扮演着领导角色作合国安全理事会五常任理事国国许多领域从预防冲突、参与维和行动到建设和平方面合国策都有着举足轻重地位国有五千年历史远流长今天国再次崛起我相信这将有利整世界伴随着发展和进步国也被寄予了巨期望肩了重责任我们国国防科技政治体育人们生活水平等方面都取得了质飞跃换了祖国现美春天当然我们无法回避我们不得不面对国社会还存很多问题今天国我们明建设仅仅成功是物质思想界有很脱节也许有人会说我们科学技术发展很可是创新精神不是促成它发展动力我们成就都是已知领域追赶取得国人创新精神还没有重新激发国教育始终没有把培育创新精神放首要位置总体上看国机遇与挑战并存但机遇挑战；原有矛盾与新产生矛盾并存但新产生矛盾多原有矛盾；有利条件与不利条件并存但有利条件多不利条件这与99年建立新国基条件和978年改革开始初始条件不我们了新历史起上60年对国说那简直是瞬即逝然而对国人民说是漫长国60年特别是近30年共产党正确领导下人民生活水平发生了翻天覆地变化从以前温饱问题到现康生活我们作这段历史见证者与国伟复兴创造者肩上也有重要责任我们作跨世纪新生代成长党和祖国温暖阳光下无风亦无浪就像生长温室花朵我们刻保持警惕能够认识到我们肩上担子有多重梁启超说“少年富则国富少年强则国强”江泽民主席也说国是属新青年代所以我们更应发奋图强努力奋斗学们国美靠我们创造祖国美丽蓝图让我们描绘泱泱国朗朗乾坤五千年华夏沃土哺育龙传人八代炎黄子孙共筑盛世长城；黄河长江巨浪滔滔昆仑珠峰耸入云霄华历史远流长曾记金戈铁马烽烟四起仁人志士云涌英雄豪杰辈出数不尽风流人物演绎华精彩道不完朝野演义谱写传世功勋曾记国难当头华如睡狮猛醒民众团结仇敌忾外争国权惩国贼曾记马列旗帜红遍华民主统火风涅盘烈变新生开天辟地建国兴业历沧桑巨变走坎坷岁月华渐变富强人民齐奔康今朝华与日俱进国泰民安政通人和姓友睦天下兴旺化繁荣科学发达有如鹏展翅、巨龙腾飞且看国民齐劳力坚持科学发展观党政条心促进西部开发众志成城携手奋进动历史车轮共创华辉煌回顾我们雄心激扬；展望我们豪情满怀祖国发展我成长我与祖国共奋进国加油我们加油演讲完毕三国节日英演讲g rg, vrb, vl , l bg xl , v llk vl r rl vl vl r ll k, vl r l’ vl l’ r r vl rg vl blz bgg r, bg vl rg vl g, r l rv r g br r ll " r" v" rr l r l g gr, g r r x , r l r’ , grg r vr r, vl rl lbr r blgg lbrr’ l v v r rvl , l g r bl l g rk, r, qr lbr l l l r x, l r lr, lr’ r g, lr l , b g g r b g r r lr lr’ l g g, b l l r k rk k l; r l lgr lr’ vl r vl, , vr k r , b g r blz r k l k ,b r l g r r lbr br r ll b l qr, l" rbl l lg vr r lg rg r r l l v v r r; l l rlx, rvl, vrlv l r g l brg 四国功夫英演讲建议做英语演讲学配合我上传起使用哦地开头语g rr l kg rl, r r rgr lr kg blv kg r lr r, lk br l, k , v, lk rg gr rg,kg v l rl grl v l g rl r rl r r ll gv br r rg kg 门派介绍 rl r brl r " rk " g gqgg ( l ) ggg ll r l r ( ), g gr ( gr ), lg v r ( ), rgg lgg ( g l ) g lv rl r rr z r, r r, k, r ll rl g,, r, ll r ll l r g z r " v bxg g " " g g, ll kll, bxg rl rg "g rl r lg r r g zg g g l, l grl r blz rl zg g "bk g" "rl" rl r r rl gr r r l vl q, xgq, bgzg l g rl r xr bl rl r r v, r, l,r rl r gr, k " rr l r r g"bl 5l r kgg , kgg rl r rl r rg kgg b r, r, rl kg , rl g, rl k rl r l lr kll r r kgg rl r "" (), blg 8 vr r, ll z, rr, b b r r, gr rr v g l kg q z l l brl z b, z lr r r, b rl b, z rg , bxg brv b , k, b b rg rl r r r vrg r r r l rv l, rg l结束语ll k gg rl lr rllz , rrr l lr l g k, lr l kg r lr; lr gg, lg q, 咏春 , l b r r lrrl ’ k gg, b l b gg r, br l李龙 r叶问,br l r rl gr , l rr rr lr r ( r kg v) r, r 叶问b r lrl vr gv , r g l v r r, l ll lr lg r r b, r ll rg l rk r r rv rl r rg b, k r rg r, r , blg rl , r ll r " ll k 五国崛起演讲简介多数国人印象里西方对国态往往被两种极端情绪主导要么畏其崛起而恐惧乃至责骂诽谤要么功夫和熊猫而狂热得难以理鲜有能像马丁·杰克斯（r q）那样西方人从国历史与化性格出发客观而不失深刻辛辣而不失真诚地告诉他胞们你们误了国这世界正以飞快速发生着改变如你看这上面图表你会发现0年据高盛预测显示国济体规模几乎会与美国样如你看这张0年图表它预测届国济体规模将是美国两倍而印济体规模将与美国相近我们应该是这些预测是西方金融危机发生前做出几周前我看法国巴黎银行做出关国济体规模何超越美国新预测高盛当预测是0年而这份诞生危机报告预测年份则是0年这就是十年事情了国将要从两基方面改变世界首先它是有着3亿人口庞发展国并已以每年0%济增长速腾飞了30多年而且十年它将会是世界济体现代史上还从有发展国而不是发达国成世界上济体二也是现代史上次世界上处主导地位国——我认国将居主导地位——不西方而是完全不化根基我知道现西方有非常流行观即认国现代化等西方化这是谬误这种观错误地认现代化仅单纯是竞争、市场和技术产物它不是它样是历史和化所塑造平等国不像西方国也永远不会与趋它会很多基方面保持不现问题显然是我们应该怎么懂国？怎样试着理国现状？而总体说现西方存问题是我们习惯用传统西方模式和思维理它我们不能这样“三基础理国明国邦而非民族国；汉民族主体；长式政府管理”现我希望提供给三认识基础理国崛起就像开始样国并不是民族国( )虽然它几年声称己是民族国但是对国历史稍有了人都知道它历史远长这是公元前年秦战国末期统国版图即现代国滥觞你可以看到它与现代国版图差别再看不久汉朝也是0年前它疆域基覆盖了现国东部地区那也是古以人口主要聚居地非常奇怪是真正给国民族感真正给国人身份认感并不像西方那样近几年民族国阶段而是明国邦（vlz ）（如可以这样说）那段历史具体包括祖先崇拜习俗对国不观念样地像对庭不观念社会上“关系”儒价值观念等这些例子这些都是从明国阶段形成换句话说不西方国和其他绝多数国国是因其对明归属感因其明国而非民族国历史存而存还有要补充我们当然知道不管从地理上还是人口上说国都是庞国有着十三亿人口但是我们常常忽略了国样非常多样与多元且很多方面非常分散你不能坐居北京而治理如国——即使我们就是这样认但是事实并非如所以这就是国明国邦而非民族国这味着什么？我认这有太多深远隐义我可以快速告诉你两首先对国人说重要政治观念就是团结是华明维护0年前欧洲崩塌了神圣罗马帝国分裂了并从以直四分五裂而国几乎相期却走上与欧洲截然相反道路艰难地将这庞明体凝聚起二可能更能反映事实就是香港你还记得997年香港从英国到国手上交接吗？你可能记得国就宪政理论国两制而且我打赌几乎不会有任何西方人认这能行得通“只是种噱头当香港真交到国手上事情不会是那样”3年了香港政治体制与司法体制997年样保持着独立性我们错了我们什么会错？因我们想当然地从民族国角考虑想想990年德国统可以说东德被西德侵吞了国种体制这是民族国思想方式但是你不能种明、种体制基础上管理像国这样明国邦这不管用所以国对香港问题答——这也将是它对台湾问题答——是然回应种明多种政体让我给你二试着了国基础吧——尽管也许并不太合适相比其他国国人有着非常不民族概念你知道吗3亿人口超90%人口属民族——汉族这与世界上其他人口国截然不印、美国、印尼、巴西——它们都是多民族国国人己并不想要这样但国其他民族人数仅仅是少数那么问题就是什么呢？我觉得这原因很程上仍旧应归咎它是明国邦至少0年历史充满征、占有、吸收、化等历史使得汉民族观念这程产生并被不断成长和壮化归属感所滋养这种历史验处就国想要凝聚起必须依靠汉族汉民族身份认感如水泥般将这国聚合起而这缺则是汉族人化差异观念很淡薄他们沉浸己优越感并且轻视其他民族人这就不难释他们对例如维吾尔族、藏族人态了那么让我给你三基础吧国政府（）国政府与社会关系与西方有很不现西方人普遍认——至少是目前——政府权威性与合法性民主运作这命题问题国政府比任何西方政府己国民都享有更多合法性与权威性原因是……我认有两原因且显然这和民主没有什么关系因我们看国人并不拥有民主政体首先国政府被赋予了非常……它作国民代表作华化及明国邦体现与捍卫者具有非寻常重要性这差不多成种精神代表二原因是与欧洲和北美政府权威总是持续地受到挑战不——欧洲历史上政府与教会、与世俗贵族势力、与商人斗争力量消彼长——千年国政府权威几乎没有被挑战它并没有遇到强敌所以你可以发现国权力结构构建与西方历史验有很不是这样结就是国人有非常不政府观即使我们常常将国政府视侵入者、陌生者、权力要被限制甚至压抑怪物国人己并不这样看他们政府国人将政府视亲切——甚至不仅是亲切而是像他们庭成员样亲密——又不仅仅是庭成员而是庭管理者是“长”这就是国人对政府观念——和我们非常不它以种与西方相径庭方式烙印国社会当我想提醒你我们现是国化背景下思考问题是全新式不以往我们所谈论所有要知道国样相信市场和政府亚当·斯密8世纪就已写到“国市场比欧洲任何地方都更、更发达且更复杂”除了毛泽东期这很程上就是事实但这是极其强且无所不政府管理下政府影响国无处不国龙头企业多数依旧是公有私营企业无论它们有多庞像想也依旧很多方面依仗政府支持济发展目标由政府制定政府控制力渗透入许多领域比如我们所熟悉计划生育政策再者政府直有（修建型基础工程）悠久传统这是古以治国要领如你想要例子万里长城修建就是还有另例子运河始建公元前5世纪完工公元7世纪它总长英里将北京与上海、杭州相连国政府兴重基础设施是古就有这就助我们理三峡坝及其他展现国力工程修建原因所以我们现已有三助我们理国差异性认识基础了明国邦、关民族概念、政府性质及其与社会关系“西方化可能是狭隘而东方化更具普世性”但是总说我们依旧执认我们能够靠西方验、从西方视角、运用西方观念懂国如你想知道什么我们总是理错国——我们对国发展预测总是错误——那这就是原因我必须说我认不幸是我们对国态有些偏向西方思维有些傲慢这种傲慢是因我们认己是我们掌握着普世裁判权二者有些无知我们拒绝涉及差异这领域问题保罗·科恩《美国历史学》有段非常有趣保罗·科恩说西方可能将己化看成是所有化普世了但它不是甚至很多方面西方化是狭隘因西方00年里都是世界主导它不要理其他化与明因不管怎样到它可以依靠武力捍卫己化然而其他化——事实上就是世界上其他部分——处弱势地位面对西方强及其社会生活渗透这些国被迫试着了西方因这样产生结就是这些化往往比西方化更具世界性举例子东亚问题东亚日、韩朝、国等聚集了世界三分人口也是现世界上济区域而且我要告诉你东亚人那些东亚人他们了西方程远西方了东亚这有很现实义恐怕就现说因现正发生什么？让我们回到开头那张图表——高盛那张图表正切实发生是就历史学角说世界正以极快速被发展国而非发达国所驱引与塑造我们可以看到g0正迅速地取代g7或g8地位这将导致两首先西方正飞速地失它对世界影响力年前哥哈根气候变化会就是绝佳例子欧洲不再是谈判桌上定者这种情景近次是什么候发生？我打赌那可能是00年前了这就是将将要发生事二影响就是这世界对我们说将不可避免地变得越越陌生因它正被我们并不了甚至精通化、历与历史所塑造我恐怕得说说欧洲了（美国稍不样）我必须说欧洲人总说是无知是对世界正发生改变方式迟钝些人——我有位国英国朋友说“这洲正梦游走向湮没”或许这是对或许这只是夸张但是这有另问题随产生欧洲正逐渐与世界脱离而这是种感知能力缺失我思是欧洲曾信满满地执牛耳想想9世纪欧洲吧而这盛景已不了如你想要感知如你想尝尝滋味试着了国吧——那有悠久儒化这是火车或许你们从见这样它甚至不像火车但这就是广州高铁建新火车国已有了世界铁路而且即将超世界上其他所有国总和或者看这这是新创但这创将很快北京郊区实施这是巨巴士上层能0名乘客它从铁轨上驶到郊区公路上机动车可以它下方行驶它可以达到每00英里这就是事物发展方向因国有其身特有麻烦不欧洲和美国——国有太多人与太少空所以这就是应对将国出现更多更多超0万人口城市方案怎么结束我演讲？当我们看到世界我们眼前急速发展我们该采取什么样态？我想对我们这有面也有不面但我想强调是总体说积极态面对世界00年世界基上被部分人所领导基欧洲和北美像国和印——占世界人口38%——还有其他像印尼、巴西等这些国崛起是近00年民主化历程重要那些被长久忽视那些长期没有发出己声音那些没有被倾听那些鲜人知明与化将世界格局代表完全不股力量作人道主义者我们当然必须欢迎这种巨变我们也将从这些明学习获益这艘船是5世纪郑和从南海、东海附近穿越印洋直达东非伟航行所驾驶而这前面船则是80年克里斯多夫·哥伦布横跨西洋驾驶（笑声）看仔细这丝制杆轴这是368年zz（不详应是明朝画）画我想他们应该是打高尔夫球吧上帝啊竟然是国人发明了高尔夫推荐。
了解中国的崛起演讲稿-精品文案范文
了解中国的崛起演讲稿了解中国的崛起演讲稿The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. Thepost-crisis projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.Now I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like theWest, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can't. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like -- just as a beginning.Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it's sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It's never been the case.So this is China, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire [Roman Empire]. It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. "Window dressing. When China gets it's hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation state mentality. But you can't run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this countrytogether. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It's had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder,a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West.And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. Know that China believes in the market and the state.I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, "The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe." And, apart from the Mao period, that has remained more-or-less the case ever since. But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- with something like the the one-child policy.Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C. and was finally completed in the seventh century A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijingwith Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is China -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society.And yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts. If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to China are incorrect -- this is the reason. Unfortunately I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It's kind of arrogant. It's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. And secondly, it's ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And Paul Cohen argues that the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it's not. In many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West, have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies. And therefore, they are, as a result, morecosmopolitan in many ways than the West.I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. -- a third of the world's population lives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I'll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present. Because what's happening? Back to that chart at the beginning -- the Goldman Sachs chart. What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. We've seen this in terms of the G20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table. When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiar with, or conversant with. And at last, I'm afraid -- take Europe, America is slightly different -- but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Some people -- I've got an English friend in China, and he said, "The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration. But there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Europe is increasingly out of touch withthe world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future.I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. Take the 19th century for example. But this, alas, is no longer true.Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That's what Europe and North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and so on, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. And we will have to learn about these civilizations.This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic. (Laughter) Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368.I think they're playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.Welcome to the future. Thank you.希望本文了解中国的崛起演讲稿能帮到你。
中国崛起的英文演讲原文
中国崛起的英文演讲原文中国崛起的英文演讲原文mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china's rise will benefit the whole world.in the past decades,especially after the implementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has witnessed remarkable changes in various fields and has attracted worldwide attention,so a wholly new word "china's rise"came into being.in the world arena,there are two apparently different viewpoints towards china's rise.some countries subjectively and baselessly think china's rise is horrifying and worrying,they interpret china as a growing monster,putting forward "china threat theory" to deter or contain this great country.but i hold the totally opposite opinion.china has diligent,wise and charismatic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous world.every year,china sends a large number of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the world,and china now has more peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just to carry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threatening others.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassed japan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in XX,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country with a rare sense ofresponsibility to all humanity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china waived many debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn't mean to gain peace and stability,it will give up necessary principles.it firmly upholds its national core interests.when it comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china will not yield or compromise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china knows perfectly that it can't develop in isolation from the rest of the world,so china is more than happy to work with any countries who are willing to adhere to political trust and mutual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful way,and it will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have been reiterating we don't seek hegemony now,and we won't do it either even when china is a developed country.in a word,china's rise is sure to be a good chance for a healthier and richer world.。
中国崛起的英文演讲原文
中国崛起的英文演讲原文中国崛起的英文演讲原文mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china's rise will benefit the whole world.in the past decades,especially after the implementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has witnessed remarkable changes in various fields and has attracted worldwide attention,so a wholly new word "china's rise"came into being.in the world arena,there are two apparently different viewpoints towards china's rise.some countries subjectively and baselessly think china's rise is horrifying and worrying,they interpret china as a growing monster,putting forward "china threat theory" to deter or contain this great country.but i hold the totally opposite opinion.china has diligent,wise and charismatic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous world.every year,china sends a large number of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the world,and china now has more peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just to carry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threatening others.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassed japan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in XX,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country with a rare sense ofresponsibility to all humanity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china waived many debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn't mean to gain peace and stability,it will give up necessary principles.it firmly upholds its national core interests.when it comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china will not yield or compromise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china knows perfectly that it can't develop in isolation from the rest of the world,so china is more than happy to work with any countries who are willing to adhere to political trust and mutual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful way,and it will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have been reiterating we don't seek hegemony now,and we won't do it either even when china is a developed country.in a word,china's rise is sure to be a good chance for a healthier and richer world.。
关于中国崛起的英文演讲范文.doc
关于中国崛起的英文演讲范文为中华之崛起而读书这是多少中华儿女的梦想，现在中国已经慢慢崛起了，你有什么感悟？今天我给大家带来的是关于中国崛起的英文演讲范文，大家可以进来看看！mr. robert,dear classmates:my speech is china's rise will benefit the whole world.in the past decades,especially after the implementation of reform and opening-up policy,china has witnessed remarkable changes in various fields and has attracted worldwide attention,so a wholly new word "china's rise"came into being.in the world arena,there are two apparently different viewpoints towardschina's rise.some countries subjectively and baselessly think china's rise is horrifying and worrying,they interpret china as a growing monster,putting forward "china threat theory" to deter or contain this great country.but i hold the totally opposite opinion.china has diligent,wise and charismatic leaders,and most importantly,all of them are staunch supporters of a peaceful and prosperous world.every year,china sends a large number of peacekeepers to unstable areas all over the world,and china now has more peacekeepers than any other country.though china attaches great significance to its military affairs,the purpose are just tocarry on self-defence and maintain peace instead of invading or threatening others.as to economy and trade,this year,china has surpassed japan in economic volume,ranking second merely after the us.china has became an important export market not only for its neighboring countries,including the republic of korea and japan,but also the eu and the us. especially after the financial crisis occuring in xx,china has been leading global economic recovery.in the meantime,china is a responsible country with a rare sense of responsibility to all humanity.its aid to developing countries has been unconditional,and on the other hand, china waived many debts of scores of least developed countries from africa, asia, the caribbean and the south pacific.china is a peace-loving country,but that doesn't mean to gain peace and stability,it will give up necessary principles.it firmly upholds its national core interests.when it comes to sovereignty and territorial integrity,china will not yield or compromise,they are so holy that no country can interfere.china knows perfectly that it can't develop in isolation from the rest of the world,so china is more than happy to work with any countries who are willing to adhere to political trust and mutual cooperation.china actively supports solving disputes through dialogue and negotiation in a peaceful way,and it willunswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and stay open and inclusive.our leaders have been reiterating we don't seek hegemony now,and we won't do it either even when china is a developed country.in a word,china's rise is sure to be a good chance for a healthier and richer world.。
【演讲稿】了解中国的崛起演讲稿
三一文库()/演讲稿范文/演讲稿〔了解中国的崛起演讲稿〕The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it'sa huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year.And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.Now I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that theconventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can't. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like -- just as a beginning.Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it's sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge,demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It's never been the case.So this is China, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. The first is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire [Roman Empire]. It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 1997? You may remember what the Chineseconstitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. "Window dressing. When China gets it's hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 1997. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation state mentality. But you can't run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis of one civilization, one system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weakconception of cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans.Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it's obviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It's had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all. The Chinese view the state as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West. And I would suggest to you that actually what we are。
了解中国的崛起演讲稿word精品文档12页
了解中国的崛起演讲稿The world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you'll see that in 2025, these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it's projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And we should bear in mind here that these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crisis.A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP Paribas for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2020. That's just a decade away. China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10 percent a year. And within a decade, it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country,rather than a developed country. Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world -- which I think is what China will become -- will be not from the West and from very, very different civilizational roots.Now I know it's a widespread assumption in the West that, as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It's an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition, markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach is that we understand it really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can't. Now I want to offer you three building blocks for trying to understand what China is like -- just as a beginning. Now what is extraordinary about this is, what gives China it's sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundredyears, not from the nation state period, which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I'm thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like guanxi, Confucian values and so on. These are all things that come from the period of the civilization state. In other words, China, unlike the Western states and most countries in the world, is shaped by its sense of civilization, its existence as a civilization state, rather than as a nation state. And there's one other thing to add to this, and that is this: Of course we know China's big, huge, demographically and geographically, with a population of 1.3 billion people. What we often aren't really aware of is the fact that China is extremely diverse and very pluralistic, and in many ways very decentralized. You can't run a place on this scale simply from Beijing, even though we think this to be the case. It's never been the case.So this is China, a civilization state, rather than a nation state. And what does it mean? Well I think it has all sorts of profound implications. I'll give you two quick ones. Thefirst is that the most important political value for the Chinese is unity, is the maintenance of Chinese civilization. You know, 2,000 years ago, Europe: breakdown, the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire [Roman Empire]. It divided, and it's remained divided ever since. China, over the same time period, went in exactly the opposite direction, very painfully holding this huge civilization, civilization state together.The second is maybe more prosaic, which is Hong Kong. Do you remember the handover of Hong Kong by Britain to China in 2019? You may remember what the Chinese constitutional proposition was. One country, two systems. And I'll lay a wager that barely anyone in the West believed them. "Window dressing. When China gets it's hands on Hong Kong, that won't be the case." 13 years on, the political and legal system in Hong Kong is as different now as it was in 2019. We were wrong. Why were we wrong? We were wrong because we thought, naturally enough, in nation state ways. Think of German unification, 1990. What happened? Well, basically the East was swallowed by the West. One nation, one system. That is the nation state mentality. But you can't run a country like China, a civilization state, on the basis ofone civilization, one system. It doesn't work. So actually the response of China to the question of Hong Kong -- as it will be to the question of Taiwan -- was a natural response: one civilization, many systems.Now the great advantage of this historical experience has been that, without the Han, China could never have held together. The Han identity has been the cement which has held this country together. The great disadvantage of it is that the Han have a very weak conception of cultural difference. They really believe in their own superiority, and they are disrespectful of those who are not. Hence their attitude, for example, to the Uyghurs and to the Tibetans. Or let me give you my third building block, the Chinese state. Now the relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that in the West. Now we in the West overwhelmingly seem to think -- in these days at least -- that the authority and legitimacy of the state is a function of democracy. The problem with this proposition is that the Chinese state enjoys more legitimacy and more authority amongst the Chinese than is true with any Western state. And the reason for this is because -- well, there are two reasons, I think. And it'sobviously got nothing to do with democracy, because in our terms the Chinese certainly don't have a democracy. And the reason for this is, firstly, because the state in China is given a very special -- it enjoys a very special significance as the representative, the embodiment and the guardian of Chinese civilization, of the civilization state. This is as close as China gets to a kind of spiritual role.And the second reason is because, whereas in Europe and North America, the state's power is continuously challenged -- I mean in the European tradition, historically against the church, against other sectors of the aristocracy, against merchants and so on -- for 1,000 years, the power of the Chinese state has not been challenged. It's had no serious rivals. So you can see that the way in which power has been constructed in China is very different from our experience in Western history. The result, by the way, is that the Chinese have a very different view of the state. Whereas we tend to view it as an intruder, a stranger, certainly an organ whose powers need to be limited or defined and constrained, the Chinese don't see the state like that at all. The Chinese view thestate as an intimate -- not just as an intimate actually, as a member of the family -- not just in fact as a member of the family, but as the head of the family, the patriarch of the family. This is the Chinese view of the state -- very, very different to ours. It's embedded in society in a different kind of way to what is the case in the West. And I would suggest to you that actually what we are dealing with here, in the Chinese context, is a new kind of paradigm, which is different from anything we've had to think about in the past. Know that China believes in the market and the state. I mean, Adam Smith, already writing in the late 18th century said, "The Chinese market is larger and more developed and more sophisticated than anything in Europe." And, apart from the Mao period, that has remainedmore-or-less the case ever since. But this is combined with an extremely strong and ubiquitous state. The state is everywhere in China. I mean, it's leading firms, many of them are still publicly owned. Private firms, however large they are, like Lenovo, depend in many ways on state patronage. Targets for the economy and so on are set by the state. And the state, of course, its authority flows into lots of other areas -- as we are familiar with -- withsomething like the the one-child policy.Moreover, this is a very old state tradition, a very old tradition of statecraft. I mean, if you want an illustration of this, the Great Wall is one. But this is another, this is the Grand Canal, which was constructed in the first instance in the fifth century B.C. and was finally completed in the seventh century A.D. It went for 1,114 miles, linking Beijing with Hangzhou and Shanghai. So there's a long history of extraordinary state infrastructural projects in China, which I suppose helps us to explain what we see today, which is something like the Three Gorges Dam and many other expressions of state competence within China. So there we have three building blocks for trying to to understand the difference that is China -- the civilization state, the notion of race and the nature of the state and its relationship to society. And yet we still insist, by-and-large, in thinking that we can understand China by simply drawing on Western experience, looking at it through Western eyes, using Western concepts. If you want to know why we unerringly seem to get China wrong -- our predictions about what's going to happen to China are incorrect -- this is the reason.Unfortunately I think, I have to say that I think attitude towards China is that of a kind of little Westerner mentality. It's kind of arrogant. It's arrogant in the sense that we think that we are best, and therefore we have the universal measure. And secondly, it's ignorant. We refuse to really address the issue of difference. You know, there's a very interesting passage in a book by Paul Cohen, the American historian. And Paul Cohen argues that the West thinks of itself as probably the most cosmopolitan of all cultures. But it's not. In many ways, it's the most parochial, because for 200 years, the West has been so dominant in the world that it's not really needed to understand other cultures, other civilizations. Because, at the end of the day, it could, if necessary by force, get its own way. Whereas those cultures -- virtually the rest of the world, in fact -- which have been in a far weaker position, vis-a-vis the West, have been thereby forced to understand the West, because of the West's presence in those societies. And therefore, they are, as a result, more cosmopolitan in many ways than the West.I mean, take the question of East Asia. East Asia: Japan, Korea, China, etc. -- a third of the world's populationlives there, now the largest economic region in the world. And I'll tell you now, that East Asianers, people from East Asia, are far more knowledgeable about the West than the West is about East Asia. Now this point is very germane, I'm afraid, to the present. Because what's happening? Back to that chart at the beginning -- the Goldman Sachs chart. What is happening is that, very rapidly in historical terms, the world is being driven and shaped, not by the old developed countries, but by the developing world. We've seen this in terms of the G20 -- usurping very rapidly the position of the G7, or the G8. And there are two consequences of this. First, the West is rapidly losing its influence in the world. There was a dramatic illustration of this actually a year ago -- Copenhagen, climate change conference. Europe was not at the final negotiating table. When did that last happen? I would wager it was probably about 200 years ago. And that is what is going to happen in the future.And the second implication is that the world will inevitably, as a consequence, become increasingly unfamiliar to us, because it'll be shaped by cultures and experiences and histories that we are not really familiarwith, or conversant with. And at last, I'm afraid -- take Europe, America is slightly different -- but Europeans by and large, I have to say, are ignorant, are unaware about the way the world is changing. Some people -- I've got an English friend in China, and he said, "The continent is sleepwalking into oblivion." Well, maybe that's true, maybe that's an exaggeration. But there's another problem which goes along with this -- that Europe is increasingly out of touch with the world -- and that is a sort of loss of a sense of the future. I mean, Europe once, of course, once commanded the future in it's confidence. Take the 19th century for example. But this, alas, is no longer true. Okay, so how would I like to finish? Well, what should our attitude be towards this world that we see very rapidly developing before us? I think there will be good things about it and there will be bad things about it. But I want to argue, above all, a big picture positive for this world. For 200 years, the world was essentially governed by a fragment of the human population. That's what Europe and North America represented. The arrival of countries like China and India -- between them 38 percent of the world's population -- and others like Indonesia and Brazil and soon, represent the most important single act of democratization in the last 200 years. Civilizations and cultures, which had been ignored, which had no voice, which were not listened to, which were not known about, will have a different sort of representation in this world. As humanists, we must welcome, surely, this transformation. And we will have to learn about these civilizations. This big ship here was the one sailed in by Zheng He in the early 15th century on his great voyages around the South China Sea, the East China Sea and across the Indian Ocean to East Africa. The little boat in front of it was the one in which, 80 years later, Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic. (Laughter) Or, look carefully at this silk scroll made by ZhuZhou in 1368. I think they're playing golf. Christ, the Chinese even invented golf.Welcome to the future. Thank you.。
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Martin Jacques: Understanding the rise of ChinaThe world is changing with really remarkable speed. If you look at the chart at the top here, you’ll see that in 2025 these Goldman Sachs projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. And if you look at the chart for 2050, it’s projected that the Chinese economy will be twice the size of the American economy, and the Indian economy will be almost the same size as the American economy. We should bear in mind here these projections were drawn up before the Western financial crises.世界正在以惊人的速度飞快得改变着。
如果你看着这上方的图表,你会看到在2025年，高盛投资公司的这些预测表明中国经济规模会和美国经济几乎相当。
如果看2050年的图表，预测表明中国经济规模将会是美国经济的两倍，印度的经济规模将会和美国的经济几乎持平。
在这里，我们应该记住这些预测是在西方经济危机之前做出的。
A couple of weeks ago, I was looking at the latest projection by BNP (Banque Nationale de Paris) PARIBAS for when China will have a larger economy than the United States. Goldman Sachs projected 2027. The post-crisis projection is 2010. That’s just a decade way.几周前，我查看法国巴黎银行的最近预测，中国在什么时候会超越美国经济，成为第一大经济体。
高盛投资公司预测2027年。
危机过后的预测是2020年。
这也不过只有10年的光景。
China is going to change the world in two fundamental respects. First of all, it's a huge developing country with a population of 1.3 billion people, which has been growing for over 30 years at around 10% a year. And within a decade it will have the largest economy in the world. Never before in the modern era has the largest economy in the world been that of a developing country, rather than a developed country.中国将在两个基本方面上改变世界。
首先，中国是一个幅员广大的发展中国家它有13亿人口，在过去30年间它以每年10%左右的经济增长率发展。
在未来10年间，它会有世界上最大的经济体。
在世界现代史中，以前从来都是发达国家还没有一个发展中的国家变成了世界上最大的经济体。
Secondly, for the first time in the modern era, the dominant country in the world which I think is China will become, will be not from the West, and from very very different civilizational roots.第二，在现代史中第一次在世界上，我认为中国会变成大国，它有别于西方国家而它是从非常，非常不同的文明根源发展起的大国。
Now I know it’s a widespread assumption in the West that as countries modernize, they also Westernize. This is an illusion. It’s an assumption that modernity is a product simply of competition markets and technology. It is not; it is also shaped equally by history and culture. China is not like the West, and it will not become like the West. It will remain in very fundamental respects very different. Now the big question here is obviously, how do we make sense of China? How do we try to understand what China is? And the problem we have in the West at the moment by-and-large is that the conventional approach isthat we understand i t really in Western terms, using Western ideas. We can’t. Now I want to offer you 3 building blocks for trying to understand what China is like just as a beginning.现在我知道西方国家有一个普遍的假设随着国家的现代化，它们也会西方化。
这是个幻想。
这是对于现代化仅仅是竞争，市场和技术的一种产品的假设。
中国的现代化不仅仅是这样的，也是由历史和文化共同作用下形成的。
中国不同于西方国家，它也不会变成和西方国家一样。
它会在非常基础的方面表现得非常不同。
现在这的大问题明显是，我们该怎样认识中国？我们该怎样了解中国？在西方我们现在的问题大体上是传统的方法我们用西方的术语，用西方的观点来了解真正的中国。
我们不能这样。
现在我想给大家3个基础理由来试着了解中国只是起个头。
The first is this, that China is not really a nation state. Okay, it's called itself a nation state for the last hundred years. But everyone who knows anything about China knows it’s a lot older than this. This was what China looked with the victory of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C. at the end of warring state period—the birth of modern China. And you can see it against the boundaries of modern China. Or immediately afterward, the Han Dynasty, still 2000 years ago, and you can see already it occupies most of what we now know as Eastern China which is where the vast majority of Chinese lived then and live now.首先是这个，中国事实上不是一个民族国家。
在过去的几百年，中国自称是一个民族国家。
但对中国很了解的人知道中国比这历史要悠久得多。
中国是在公元前221年也就在战国时期的末期从秦朝一统江山起，现代中国就诞生了。
你可以看到现代中国的边界线。
随之其后的汉朝，还在2000年前。
你可以看出中国已经占据我们现在所知的华东地区的大部分，绝大多数的中国人当时在那儿居住现在还生活在那儿。
Now what is extraordinary about this is what gives China it’s sense of being China, what gives the Chinese the sense of what it is to be Chinese, comes not from the last hundred years, not from the nation state period which is what happened in the West, but from the period, if you like, of the civilization state. I’m thinking here, for example, of customs like ancestral worship, of a very distinctive notion of the state, likewise, a very distinctive notion of the family, social relationships like “guanxi”, Confucian values and so on. The se are all things that come from the period of the civilization state.这点非同寻常的是，它赋予了中国做为中国的意义，也赋予了中国人成为他们中国人的意义，这不是从过去几百年，也不是从民族国家开始形成这种认识，这跟西方发展也不一样，而这一阶段，如果你喜欢，可以说是文明国家的阶段。