组织经济学与管理学ch06 Hidden action problem
合集下载
组织经济学与管理学ch05 Principal agent models
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Two motivation / incentive problems
• Hidden action problems • Hidden characteristics problems
Hidden action and hidden characteristics problems are usually analysed with a principalagent model.
exchange.
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Conflict of Interests
There is a conflict of interests when the increase of a variable benefits one party
and goes at the expense of the other party.
Firm
Truckers
Others
Investors
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Figure 5.9: View of the firm in complete contracting theory
Part III: Nexus of complete contracts
What is wrong with the fundamental welfare theorem /
Coase theorem?
Nothing, but not all assumptions are satisfied, e.g. asymmetric information.
Two motivation / incentive problems
• Hidden action problems • Hidden characteristics problems
Hidden action and hidden characteristics problems are usually analysed with a principalagent model.
exchange.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Conflict of Interests
There is a conflict of interests when the increase of a variable benefits one party
and goes at the expense of the other party.
Firm
Truckers
Others
Investors
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Figure 5.9: View of the firm in complete contracting theory
Part III: Nexus of complete contracts
What is wrong with the fundamental welfare theorem /
Coase theorem?
Nothing, but not all assumptions are satisfied, e.g. asymmetric information.
组织经济学与管理学ch15 Complementarity
X1
L
‘Buy’
S ‘Buy’
‘Make’ ‘Make’
NL
Y ‘Make’ H
‘Buy’
X3
X2
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2.2. Law of large numbers
Variance of sample average decreases when the sample size
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Organisations can be analysed as systems of attributes which have to be
aligned.
Organisational consistency / coherence becomes the
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Real organisations have many more attributes than just inventories and
Economics and of
Chapter 15
Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy Complementarity
George Hendrikse
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uncertainty? No.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Nash equilibria / Profit maximising strategy
Either all production is to inventory or all is to order.
L
‘Buy’
S ‘Buy’
‘Make’ ‘Make’
NL
Y ‘Make’ H
‘Buy’
X3
X2
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
2.2. Law of large numbers
Variance of sample average decreases when the sample size
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Organisations can be analysed as systems of attributes which have to be
aligned.
Organisational consistency / coherence becomes the
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Real organisations have many more attributes than just inventories and
Economics and of
Chapter 15
Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy Complementarity
George Hendrikse
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
uncertainty? No.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Nash equilibria / Profit maximising strategy
Either all production is to inventory or all is to order.
组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch02 Positioning
Strategy
A specification of an action/choice for each possible history/contingency/
situation which might occur, given the information structure. or
Specification of an action/choice for each observable history of the game.
situations
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Non-cooperative game theory
A non-cooperative game consists of 5 ingredients: 1. Players 2. Actions 3. Payoffs 4. Information structure 5. Rules of the game
Extensive form
Frank
C
N
Cookie ?
R SR
Ann
S
Run ?
-11
-1 -10
0
-4
1 -5
0
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Ann
(R, R) (R, S) (S, R) (S, S)
Frank
C (-11, -4) (-11, -4) (-1, 1) (-1, 1)
2. Actions / strategies
Environmental pollution game
Firm
P
C
Pollute ?
管理信息系统原理与应用(第三版)ch06简明教程PPT课件
收集现有文档、表格及数据库的样本
系统分析人员应该收集的第一个文档是企业的组织结构图。 然后应该了解导致该项目的原因。为了完成这些工作，系 统分析人员应该收集和评审下面的文档：
– 会议记录、调查、笔记、顾客投诉以及描述问题的各种报告。 – 会计记录、性能检查、工作度量检查以及其他已经完成的经营报 告。 – 所有的管理信息系统项目请求。
2015年6月16日
第6章
管理信息系统分析技术
第11页
观察工作环境的主要缺点
一般正在工作的员工不喜欢他人观看他的工作， 因此当其他人员观看他的工作时，他所作的工作 可能与平时的工作表现不同。 有可能出现这种情况，平时某项工作的操作非常 复杂，但是观察时正好观察到操作比较简单的情 况。 有些系统的活动只能在某些特定时间操作，安排 系统分析人员观察这些工作时，非常繁琐。 正在观察的工作出现了故障。 有些任务不可能总是按照观察人员观察时看到的 样式执行。
2015年6月16日
第6章
管理信息系统分析技术
第3页
教学内容
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 需求发现方法和技术概述 事实发现技术 数据建模和分析技术 流程建模和分析技术
2015年6月16日
第6章
管理信息系统分析技术
第4页
6.1 需求发现方法和技术概述
无论在准备阶段、调查阶段，还是在问题分析阶 段及需求分析阶段，甚至在决策分析阶段，都需 要使用需求发现方法和技术。需求发现包含了一 系列的方法、技术和活动，系统分析人员可以使 用这些方法、技术和活动确认用户企业系统或业 务系统中存在的问题以及解决这些问题的方法。 一般地，需求发现包括下面4个活动：
第6章 管理信息系统分析技术
管理与组织经济学
管理与组织经济学管理与组织经济学是现代企业管理的基础理论和方法，它研究组织如何有效地利用资源以达到组织的目标。
在当今竞争激烈的商业环境中，管理与组织经济学对企业的成功至关重要。
本文将探讨管理与组织经济学的概念、原理和应用，并分析其在现代企业管理中的重要性。
一、管理与组织经济学的概念管理与组织经济学是一门综合性的学科，它结合了管理学和经济学的理论和方法，在组织中实施和运用经济学原理来管理和决策。
管理与组织经济学的研究范围广泛，涉及到组织的设计、资源的配置、决策的制定以及绩效评估等方面。
管理与组织经济学的核心理论包括成本理论、供需理论、边际分析等，这些理论为管理者提供了分析和决策的方法和工具。
通过运用这些理论和方法，管理者可以更好地理解组织内外部环境的变化，并进行有效的决策。
二、管理与组织经济学的原理1.边际分析原理边际分析原理是管理与组织经济学中的核心概念之一。
该原理指出，在决策过程中，管理者需要考虑每一项决策对整体效益的边际影响。
边际分析原理告诉我们，只有当边际成本等于边际收益时，决策才是最优的。
2.成本效益原理成本效益原理是管理与组织经济学中另一个重要的原理。
该原理要求管理者在决策时要权衡成本和效益，并选择成本效益最大化的方案。
通过运用成本效益原理，管理者能够最大限度地利用有限的资源，并实现组织目标。
3.供需理论供需理论是管理与组织经济学中研究市场运作的重要理论。
根据供需理论，当供求关系发生变化时，市场价格也会相应调整。
管理者可以通过了解市场供需状况，来制定合理的定价策略，从而提高市场竞争力。
三、管理与组织经济学的应用1.组织设计管理与组织经济学为管理者提供了组织设计的原则和方法。
管理者可以根据组织的目标和需求，设计合理的组织结构和工作流程。
通过合理的组织设计，可以提高员工的工作效率和组织的运作效果。
2.资源配置管理与组织经济学通过成本效益分析和资源评估，帮助管理者合理分配有限的资源。
管理者需要根据不同的业务需求和资源可行性，制定资源配置方案，并确保资源的最优利用。
组织经济学与管理学ch14 Coordination-精品文档41页
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Norwegian Dream Panamese Containership
Stop
Stop (3, -7)
Go
(2, -1)
Go (4, 3) (-5, -10)
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
One equilibrium emerges
Economics and Management of Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy
Chapter 14
Coordination
George Hendrikse
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
There are many coordination mechanisms / devices which might resolve the coordination problem.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Criteria for evaluating coordination devices / mechanisms) value of the design variable. 3. Yes, conductor is very flexible
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Surplus maximising choice
Conductor
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Example: Norwegian Dream
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Norwegian Dream Panamese Containership
Stop
Stop (3, -7)
Go
(2, -1)
Go (4, 3) (-5, -10)
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
One equilibrium emerges
Economics and Management of Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy
Chapter 14
Coordination
George Hendrikse
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
There are many coordination mechanisms / devices which might resolve the coordination problem.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Criteria for evaluating coordination devices / mechanisms) value of the design variable. 3. Yes, conductor is very flexible
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Surplus maximising choice
Conductor
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Example: Norwegian Dream
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
组织经济学与管理学ch07 Hidden characteristics problem
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Pareto inefficiency:
adverse selection
The adverse selection model consists of three stages: 1. Nature chooses the type (ability) of the
-6 0 -3 0 1 0 4 0 Payoff principal 7 0 4 0 0 0 -3 0 Payoff agent
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Complete contingent contract
A contract can and will specify a price for each state / type. A
-6 0 -3 0 1 0 4 0 Payoff principal 7 0 4 0 0 0 -3 0 Payoff agent
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Complete contract
Insurance company can not make price dependent on type because the characteristic is not observable (i.e. hidden). A contract will specify only one price! The contract is [P].
Two hidden characteristics problems
• Adverse selection • Misrepresentation
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Pareto inefficiency:
adverse selection
The adverse selection model consists of three stages: 1. Nature chooses the type (ability) of the
-6 0 -3 0 1 0 4 0 Payoff principal 7 0 4 0 0 0 -3 0 Payoff agent
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Complete contingent contract
A contract can and will specify a price for each state / type. A
-6 0 -3 0 1 0 4 0 Payoff principal 7 0 4 0 0 0 -3 0 Payoff agent
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Complete contract
Insurance company can not make price dependent on type because the characteristic is not observable (i.e. hidden). A contract will specify only one price! The contract is [P].
Two hidden characteristics problems
• Adverse selection • Misrepresentation
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
管理学基础——习题答案 何海军 ch06 实施控制职能
模块六实施控制职能一、填空题1 .确立标准、衡量成效、纠正偏差2 .顺序执行、分支控制、循环控制3 .固定预算、零基预算、滚动预算、弹性预算4 .答案略5 .答案略6 .例外、战略要点、关键因素、有计划的控制7 .组织绩效、部门绩效、个人绩效8 .系统9 .组织、个人、管理流程、业务流程10 .答案略I1答案略12 .财务、客户、内部运营、学习与成长13 .德、能、勤、绩、个性14 .答案略15 .答案略16 .答案略17 .答案略18 .全过程、全企业、全员19 .计划、执行、检查、处理20 .文化、共同价值、群体规范二、选择题1-5AB.ABCDACDxABCDE>ACD6-10ACDE、BCEBDE>ACD>ABDE11-15BDE›ABCDE>CDE>BD.BCD三、简答题1.简述企业控制工作的必要性。
控制是管理工作的最重要职能之一。
它是企业计划与实际作业动态相适应的管理职能。
控制工作的主要内容包括确立标准、衡量绩效和纠正偏差。
2.何为预算控制?预算控制的方法有哪些？根据预算规定的收入与支出标准来检验和监督各个部门的生产经营活动以保证各种活动或各个部门在充分达成既定目标、实现利润的过程巾对经营资源的利用从而费用的支出受到严格有效的约束。
不同企业由于生产活动的特点不同预算表中的项目会有不同程度的差异。
但一般来说预算控制的方法要涉及以下五个方面：收入预算支出预算、现金预算、资金支出预算和资产负债预算。
3.简述绩效管理的作用与意义。
绩效管理的作用是：（1）推进改革管理观念的不断创新；（2）提升企业计划管理的有效性；（3）促使管理者提高管理技能；（4）有助于开发员工:能力和职业。
4.简述绩效评价与考核的基本程序。
制定绩效评价计划做好考核评价准备搜集信息衡量与判断评价结构的运用。
5.简述现场检查评价方法的要领。
检查与碍做忘凋班八彬绰彬碧镑扮充分准备选择适当的检查方式要端正检查者的态度要采用科学的检查方法与手段深入分析，得出结论及时反馈，迅速落实。
组织经济学与管理学ch11 Strategy typology
The reaction function has a positive slope when there is price competition
p2 R1
p1
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Nash-equilibrium in a market with quantity competition
Hard Soft
Strategic substitutes Yes
Strategic complements
Strategic substitutes No
Strategic complements
Strategic substitutes
Yes Strategic complements
Strategic substitutes No
location of R1 in the third stage of the game.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
If entry is inevitable, then the investment choice of the incumbent has to be such that nice / passive behaviour is elicited by
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
If entry can be deterred, then the incumbent has to invest in an aggressive
profile in order to make the market unattractive for the entrant.
组织经济学与管理学ch02 Positioning
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Game theory
A unified analytical structure for studying all situations of conflict and cooperation
or A tool for modelling multiperson decision
Problem
Players Choices Information structure Payoffs Rules
Behavioural assumptions
Degree of rationality Behavioural hypotheses
Equilibrium
Descriptive analysis Testable hypotheses
2. Actions / strategies
Environmental pollution game
Firm
P
C
Pollute ?
Government
I
NI
N Inspect ?
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The game tree
A Node indicates that a player has to make a decision.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Possible strategies of the firm are: •P •C
Possible strategies of the government are: • (I, I) • (I, N) • (N, I) • (N, N)
Game theory
A unified analytical structure for studying all situations of conflict and cooperation
or A tool for modelling multiperson decision
Problem
Players Choices Information structure Payoffs Rules
Behavioural assumptions
Degree of rationality Behavioural hypotheses
Equilibrium
Descriptive analysis Testable hypotheses
2. Actions / strategies
Environmental pollution game
Firm
P
C
Pollute ?
Government
I
NI
N Inspect ?
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The game tree
A Node indicates that a player has to make a decision.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Possible strategies of the firm are: •P •C
Possible strategies of the government are: • (I, I) • (I, N) • (N, I) • (N, N)
组织经济学与管理学ch08 Transaction and influence costs-94页文档资料
Choice of governance structure
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Possible governance structures
• Market • Hierarchy, e.g. firm, cooperative • Hybrid, e.g. long term contract,
just as I can fire or sue my grocer by stopping purchasing from him or sue him
for delivering faulty products.”
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
A realistic organisation theory is not possible with complete (contingent)
• Asset specificity • Frequency • Uncertainty
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Transaction costs
• Costs of collecting information • Time spend on enforcing contracts • Costs of preventing non-compliance
Figure 8.3: Contract prices before and after the fundamental transformation
Contract price
ex ante
2Hale Waihona Puke 0ex post 190©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
组织经济学与管理学ch10 Selfenforcing contracts-17页文档资料
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The Folk theorem resolves the prisoners dilemma
The Folk theorem is able to resolve the prisoners dilemma because it changes the rules of the game by playing the prisoners dilemma repeatedly. It entails that current
bad behaviour can be punished in the future.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Figure 10.1: Folk theorem
Payoff player 2 (-1,3)
(2,2)
Payoff player 1 0 (3,-1)
Additional payoff with strategy T
0
1
2
3
4
5
t
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The Folk theorem and long term relationships
According the Folk theorem the stability of long term relationships is determined by: • the history of the relationship • observability of decisions • costs and benefits of finishing a relationship
The Folk theorem resolves the prisoners dilemma
The Folk theorem is able to resolve the prisoners dilemma because it changes the rules of the game by playing the prisoners dilemma repeatedly. It entails that current
bad behaviour can be punished in the future.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Figure 10.1: Folk theorem
Payoff player 2 (-1,3)
(2,2)
Payoff player 1 0 (3,-1)
Additional payoff with strategy T
0
1
2
3
4
5
t
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The Folk theorem and long term relationships
According the Folk theorem the stability of long term relationships is determined by: • the history of the relationship • observability of decisions • costs and benefits of finishing a relationship
组织经济学与管理学ch09 Property rights theory
• Second stage: Investment choice • Third stage: Honour contract choice
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The choice of governance structure determines the bargaining strength / power, which is summarised by the
Division of quasi-surplus in governance structure
• Forward integration: 100 – 0 • Vertical integration: 50 – 50 • Backward integration: 0 – 100
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Firm
A collection of physical assets that are jointly owned.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Ownership entails the possession of the residual decision rights.
Downstream party Honour contract ?
0 0
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Property rights theory
Grossman and Hart (1986) Hart and Moore (1990)
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Bargaining positions after fundamental transformation
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The choice of governance structure determines the bargaining strength / power, which is summarised by the
Division of quasi-surplus in governance structure
• Forward integration: 100 – 0 • Vertical integration: 50 – 50 • Backward integration: 0 – 100
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Firm
A collection of physical assets that are jointly owned.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Ownership entails the possession of the residual decision rights.
Downstream party Honour contract ?
0 0
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Property rights theory
Grossman and Hart (1986) Hart and Moore (1990)
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Bargaining positions after fundamental transformation
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©The 2003
It is also possible that the agent does accept the assignment, but shows bad
performance (‘Moral Hazard’).
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
This conflict of interest contrast may result in non acceptance of the contract by the
agent, even though executing the transaction would create a surplus.
circumstances.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Example: Tonsils and open-heart surgery
A surgeon paid per open-heart surgery does twice as many operations than a surgeon with a fixed salary.
averse.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Efficient performance incentives entail that the agent is stimulated to perform well. This happens in the model above, when the agent is rewarded on the basis of realised outcomes. This goes with uncertainty for the agent because the result is also determined by external
Principal Payment to agent
10- y y- 0
30- z 10- y z- 0 y- 1
30- z z- 1
Payoff principal Payoff agent
than a high effort (e=1).
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The conflict of interests expresses itself in the fact that an increase in e, which is unattractive for the agent, means that p=30 becomes more likely, which is attractive for the principal.
[y,z]
[y1 , z1]
A
R
0
1
e=0 e=1
R=10
R=30 R=10
R=30
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
y
z
y
z
Principal Choice of contract
Agent Acceptance decision
Agent Effort decision
Nature Choice of circumstances
An efficient allocation of risk implies that the principal bears all the uncertainty, i.e.
paying a fixed salary, because the principal is risk-neutral and the agent risk-
Principal Choice of contract
Agent Acceptance decision
Agent Effort decision
Nature Choice of circumstances
Principal Payment to agent
Payoff principal Payoff agent
Incentives
Behavioural
Hypothesis
Degree of
Opportunistic Self
Utopian
Rationality
Interested
Complete
Hidden action
Bounded Procedural
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Figure 6.1: Decision order and complete information
{a,b}
{a1, b 1}
A
R
0 e=0 e=1 1
R=10
R=30 R=10
R=30
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
a
a
b
b
10- a a- 0
30- a 10- b a- 0 b- 1
30- b b- 1
A surgeon paid per tonsils surgery, does 15 times as many operations than a surgeon with a fixed salary.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Figure 6.7: Decision order and asymmetric information
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
The principal values a good result (p=30) more than a bad result (p=10), whereas the agent rather delivers a low effort (e=0)
Economics and Management of Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy
Chapter 6
Hidden action problem
George Hendrikse
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
It is also possible that the agent does accept the assignment, but shows bad
performance (‘Moral Hazard’).
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
This conflict of interest contrast may result in non acceptance of the contract by the
agent, even though executing the transaction would create a surplus.
circumstances.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Example: Tonsils and open-heart surgery
A surgeon paid per open-heart surgery does twice as many operations than a surgeon with a fixed salary.
averse.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Efficient performance incentives entail that the agent is stimulated to perform well. This happens in the model above, when the agent is rewarded on the basis of realised outcomes. This goes with uncertainty for the agent because the result is also determined by external
Principal Payment to agent
10- y y- 0
30- z 10- y z- 0 y- 1
30- z z- 1
Payoff principal Payoff agent
than a high effort (e=1).
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The conflict of interests expresses itself in the fact that an increase in e, which is unattractive for the agent, means that p=30 becomes more likely, which is attractive for the principal.
[y,z]
[y1 , z1]
A
R
0
1
e=0 e=1
R=10
R=30 R=10
R=30
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
y
z
y
z
Principal Choice of contract
Agent Acceptance decision
Agent Effort decision
Nature Choice of circumstances
An efficient allocation of risk implies that the principal bears all the uncertainty, i.e.
paying a fixed salary, because the principal is risk-neutral and the agent risk-
Principal Choice of contract
Agent Acceptance decision
Agent Effort decision
Nature Choice of circumstances
Principal Payment to agent
Payoff principal Payoff agent
Incentives
Behavioural
Hypothesis
Degree of
Opportunistic Self
Utopian
Rationality
Interested
Complete
Hidden action
Bounded Procedural
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Figure 6.1: Decision order and complete information
{a,b}
{a1, b 1}
A
R
0 e=0 e=1 1
R=10
R=30 R=10
R=30
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
a
a
b
b
10- a a- 0
30- a 10- b a- 0 b- 1
30- b b- 1
A surgeon paid per tonsils surgery, does 15 times as many operations than a surgeon with a fixed salary.
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
Figure 6.7: Decision order and asymmetric information
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The principal values a good result (p=30) more than a bad result (p=10), whereas the agent rather delivers a low effort (e=0)
Economics and Management of Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy
Chapter 6
Hidden action problem
George Hendrikse
©The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003