大摩的企业并购,中文版

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万达并购AMC1案例说明书“从万达并购AMC看我国企业跨国并购”案例说明书

万达并购AMC(1)案例说明书“从万达并购AMC看我国企业跨国并购”案例说明书本案例要解决的关键问丿本案例要实现的教学LI标在于：引导学员理解企业并购的内涵、动因和整合。

即：第一，并购的实质是什么？企业并购的方式有哪些？第二，企业并购的一般程序是什么？第三，企业为什么要进行并购，它的动因是什么？第四，什么是并购整合？并购整合的原则是什么？过程是什么？二、案例讨论的准备工作为了有效实现本案例口标，应该具备下列相关知识背景：1、并购的内涵企业并购(Mergers and Acquisitions, M&A)包括兼并和收购两层含义、两种方式。

国际上习惯将兼并和收购合在一起使用，统称为H&A,在我国称为并购。

即企业之间的兼并与收购行为，是企业法人在平等自愿、等价有偿基础上，以一定的经济方式取得其他法人产权的行为，是企业进行资本运作和经营的一种主要形式。

企业并购主要包括公司合并、资产收购、股权收购三种形式。

公司令迸是指两个或两个以上的公司依照公司法规定的条件和程序，通过订立合并协议，共同组成一个公司的法律行为。

公司的合并可分为吸收合并和新设合并两种形式。

吸收合并乂称存续合并，它是指通过将一个或一个以上的公司并入另一个公司的方式而进行公司合并的一种法律行为。

并入的公司解散，其法人资格消失。

接受合并的公司继续存在，并办理变更登记手续。

新设合并是指两个或两个以上的公司以消灭各自的法人资格为前提而合并组成一个公司的法律行为。

其合并结果，原有公司的法人资格均告消灭。

新组建公司办理设立登记手续取得法人资格。

资产收购是指一家公司以有偿对价取得另外一家公司的全部或者部分资产的民事法律行为。

资产收购是公司寻求其他公司优质资产、调整公司经营规模、推行公司发展战略的重要措施。

股权收购（share acquisition）是指以LI标公司股东的全部或部分股权为收购标的的收购。

控股式收购的结果是A公司持有足以控制其他公司绝对优势的股份，并不影响B公司的继续存在，其组织形式仍然保持不变，法律上仍是具有独立法人资格。

大摩尽职调查范本国际并购重组

• 中国吸引外商直接投资的形式已由较原始的合资合作逐步向更高级的收购与兼并转变。内向并购金额占外商直接投资的比例近年来不断上升，从1995年的1.1%上升到 2005年的21.5%
• 然而，这一比例和全球58.7% 的平均水平来比较，还有很大的差距。这也证明中国的并购活动仍存在很大的发展空间
中国并购交易的发展趋势
外向并购趋势
中国公司活动愈加频繁
• 从2000年的起步阶段开始，中国公司外向型并购交易量于 2005年达到64亿美元，其中还不包括如中海油竞标尤尼科、中国移动竞标巴基斯坦电信、中国移动竞标 Millicom、海尔竞标美泰（Maytag）等未完成的交易
• 能源和高科技公司是外向型并购的主流力量，主要出于丰富能源储备、业务纵向整合和获得技术优势等战略考虑
• 从90年代的单一项目合资公司到现在的全方位收购，中国继续保持着吸引外商直接投资最多国家的地位
之前很多行业都受到产业目录对外商投资的限制
一般采用新建合资合作项目公司的形式
外国投资者只在中国建立单个项目型的公司
投资A股上市公司受到合格的境外投资者的资格限制
跨国收购中只允许用现金作为支付手段
交易数量 5.1
1.1 5
2000
1.2
5 2001
1.7 10
2002
24 2003
2.5 11 2004
3.4 15
2005
资料来源 Thompson Financial
2021年8月13日10时53 分
外向并购
十亿美元
2 0.4 2000
1 0.1
2001
7 3.2
2002
6
1.0 2003

中金大摩并购尽职调查操作指引

财务顾问尽职调查的关注要点（续）
一、中金的并购尽职调查
1、尽职调查概述
一、中金的并购尽职调查
二、Morgan Stanley的并购尽职调查一、中金的并购尽职调查
财务顾问尽职调查的方式
尽职调查的流程主要包括：背景调查、两阶段的尽职调查以及跟进和总结。
3、在并购项目中的风险因素及控制
理解公司业务和运营的各主要方面，从侧面验证公司的优势和不足以及公司发展战略的有效性，对兼并收购后所能产生的收入和成本
2、财务顾问尽职调查的限制因素
财务顾问尽职调查的方式（续）
财务顾问尽职调查的目的和主要领域
2、财务顾问尽职调查的限制因素
二、Morgan Stanley的并购尽职调查
尽职调查，需要公司的项目小组、财务顾问、法律顾问、会计师以及其他顾问通力协作。
二、Morgan Stanley的并购尽职调查
一、中金的并购尽职调查
一、中金的并购尽职调查
1、尽职调查概述
3、在并购项目中的风险因素及控制
2、财务顾问尽职调查的限制因素财务顾问在并购项目中的风险因素
财务顾问尽职调查的方式（续）
尽职调查就其范围而言需对公司的业务、财务、法律等各方面作全面的评估，从而降低交易的风险，减小交易的成本。
对目标公司的调查之所以重要，其原因是，如果不进行调查，收购中所固有的风险就会迅速增加，在缺少充分信息的情况下购买一个
一、中金的并购尽职调查
3、在并购项目中的风险因素及控制一些操作经验及建议
二、Morgan Stanley的并购尽职调查
1、尽职调查的范围尽职调查是买方认知卖方的过程，虽然第一阶段和第二阶段的尽职调查工
作比较繁重，但其实尽职调查工作贯穿于整个并购交易的始末。示意性的并购交易流程图

企业并购中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The choice of payment method in European M & A Global M&A activity has grown dramatically over the last ten years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control of economic activity around the world. Yet, there is much about the M&A process that we do not fully understand, including the choice of payment method. Given the large size of many M&A transactions, the financing decision can have a significant impact on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, and subsequent financing decisions. The financing decision can also have serious corporate control, risk bearing, tax and cash flow implications for the buying and selling firms and shareholders.In making an M&A currency decision, a bidder is faced with a choice between using cash and stock as deal consideration. Given that most bidders have limited cashand liquid assets, cash offers generally require debt financing. As a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces the choice of debt or equity financing, which can involve a tradeoff between corporate control concerns of issuing equity and rising financial distress costs of issuing debt. Thus, a bidder’s M&A currency decision can be strongly influenced by its debt capacity and existing leverage. It can also be strongly influenced by management’s desire to maintain the existing corporate governance structure. In contrast, a seller can be faced with a tradeoff between the tax benefits of stock and the liquidity and risk minimizing benefits of cash consideration. For example, sellers may be willing to accept stock if they have a low tax basis in the target stock and can defer their tax liabilities by accepting bidder stock as payment. On the other hand, sellers can prefer cash consideration to side step the risk of becoming a minority shareholder in a bidder with concentrated ownership, thereby avoiding the associated moral hazard problems. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this seller trade off can not be easily measured.Under existing theories of capital structure, debt capacity is a positive function of tangible assets, earnings growth and asset diversification and a negative function of asset volatility. Firms with greater tangible assets can borrow more privately from banks and publicly in the bond market. Since larger firms are generally more diversified, we expect them to have a lower probability of bankruptcy at a given leverage ratio and thus, greater debt capacity. These financing constraint and bankruptcy risk considerations can also reduce a lenders willingness to finance a bidder’s cash bid, especially in relatively large deals.In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our focus is on a bidder’s M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an M&A deal. However,if a target’s financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed M&A transaction is likely to be aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own terms. For a deal to succeed, the bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal.Bidder and target considerations:* Corporate ControlBidders controlled by a major shareholder should be reluctant to use stock financing when this causes the controlling shareholder to risk losing control. Assuming control is valuable, the presence of dominant shareholder positions should be associated with more frequent use of cash, especially when the controlling shareholder’s position is threatened. To capture this effect, we use the ultimate vo ting stake held by the largest controlling shareholder.A bidder with diffuse or highly concentrated ownership is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. In line with this argument, Martin (1996) documents a significantly negative relationship between the likelihood of stock financing and managerial ownership only over the intermediate ownership range. Therefore, we incorporate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the method of payment and the voting rights of a bidder’s controlling shareholder by estimating both a linear and cubic specification for the ultimate voting control percentage of the bidder’s largest shareholder. In our robustness analysis, we also estimate a spline function for this variable.Corporate control concerns in M&A activity can manifest themselves in more subtle ways. Concentrated ownership of a target means that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threatening the corporate governance of the acquirer. If the seller is closely held or is a corporation disposing of a division, then ownership concentration tends to be very concentrated. This implies that financing the M&A deal with stock can create a new blockholder in the bidder. While the risk of creating a new bidder blockholder with stock financing is higher when a target has a concentrated ownership structure, this is especially ture when relative size of the deal is large. To capture the risk of creating a large blockholder when buying a target with stock financing, we employ CONTROL LOSS, the product between the target’s contr ol block and the deal’s ralative size. The relative deal size is computed as the ratio of offer size (excluding assumed liabilities) to the sum of a bidder’s equity pre-offer capitalization plus the offe r size. The target’s controlling blockholder is assumed to have 100 % ownership for unlisted targets and subsidiary targets.* Collateral, Financial Leverage and Debt CapacityWe use the fraction of tangible assets as our primary measure of a bidder’s ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowing. COLLATERAL is measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to book value of total assets. Myers (1977) argues that debtholders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cost of debt, often making stock more attractive. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman(2001) find that a firm’s percentage of tangible assets has a strong positive influence on its debt level.We also control for a bidder’s financial condition with its leverage ratio, FIN’L LEVERAGE. Since cash is primarily obtained by issuing new debt, highly levered bidders are constrained in their ability to issue debt and as a consequence use stock financing more fr equently. A bidder’s financial leverage is measured by the sum of the bidder’s face value of debt prior to the M&A announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the book valve of total assets prior to the announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities). This captures the bidder’s post-deal leverage if the transaction is debt financed. This measure differs from Martin(1996) who uses a pre-deal bidder leverage measure adjusted for industry mean and reports an insignificant effect.Bidder size is likely to influence its financing choices. Larger firms are more diversified and thus, have proportionally lower expected bankruptcy costs. They also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access to debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. Thus, cash financing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. Larger firms are also more apt to choose cash financing in smaller deals due to its ease of use, provided they have sufficient unused debt capacity or liquid assets. Further, the use of cash allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of obtaining shareholder approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of stock offers. We measure bidder assets size by the log of pre-merger book value of assets in dollars(total assets). In addition to bidder control and financing considerations, we need to take into account several other bidder characteristics.* Relative Deal Size, Bidder Stock Price Runup and Asymmetric InformationHansen (1987) predicts that bidders have greater incentives to finance with stock when the asymmetric information about target assets is high. This information asymmetry is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder. Yet, stock is used in relatively larger deals, it produces more serious dilution of a dominant shareholder’s control position. Finally, as bidder equity capitalization rises, concern about its financing constraint falls, since there is a relatively smaller impact on its overall financial conditon. We proxy for these effects with REL SIZE, which is computed as the ratio of deal offer size (excluding assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the deal’s offer size plus the bidder’s pre-offer market capitalization at the year-end prior to the bid.Both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hansen (1987) predict that bidders will prefer to finance with stock when they consider their stock overvalued by the market and prefer to finance with cash when they consider their stock undervalued. As uncertainty about bidder asset value rises, this adverse selection effect is exacerbated. Martin (1996) finds evidence consistent with this adverse selection prediction. For a sample of publicly traded targets, Travlos (1987) finds that stock financed M&A deals exhibit much larger negative announcement effects than cash financed deals. He concludes this is consistent with the empirical validity of an adverse selection effect. We use as a proxy for bidder overvaluation (or undervaluation), calculated from a bidder’s buy and hold cumulative stock return over the year preceding the M&A announcement month.In addition to bidder considerations, we need to take into account typical target considerations. These preferences are related to risk, liquidity, asymmetric information and home bias.T1. Unlisted Targets and Subsidiary TargetsWe use an indicator variable, UNLISTED TARGET, to control for listing status where the variable takes a value of one if the target is a stand-alone company, not listed on any stock exchange and is zero for listed targets and unlisted subsidiaries. When an M&A deal involves an unlisted target, a seller’s consumption/liquidity needs are also likely to be important considerations. These sellers are likely to prefer cashgiven the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often impending retirement of a controlling shareholder-manager. Likewise, corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire to restructure toward their core competency. In either case, there is a strong preference for cash consideration to realize these financial or asset restructuring goals. A likely consequence is a greater use of cash in such deals, since bidders are frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or reduce their debt burden. As noted earlier, these two target ownership structures are also likely to elicit bidder corporate control concerns given their concentrated ownership. Thus, bidders are likely to prefer cash financing of such deals, especially as they become relatively large.T2. Cross-Industry Deals and Asymmetric InformationSeller reluctance to accept bidder stock as payment should rise as the asymmetric information problem worsens with greater uncertainty about bidder equity value and future earnings. This problem is also likely to be more serious for conglomerate mergers. In contrast, sellers are more apt to accept a continuing equity position in an intra–industry merger, where they are well acquainted with industry risks and prospects.T3. Cross-Border Deals, Local Exchange Listing and Home BiasIn cross border deals, selling stock to foreign investors can entail several problems. We are concerned with the possibility that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in Coval and Moskowitz (1999), French and Poterba (1991) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2001), among others. This can reflect a foreign stock’s g reater trading costs, lower liquidity, exposure to exchange risk and less timely, more limited access to firm information.T4. Bidder Investment OpportunitiesHigh growth bidders can make an attractive equity investment for selling shareholders. MKTTO-BOOK, defined as a market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, measures a bidder’s investment in growth opportunities.We expect a higher market tobook ratio to increase a bidde r stock’s attractiveness as M&A consideration. High market to book is also correlated with high levels of tax deductible R&D expenditures, along with low current earnings and cash dividends. These firm attributes lower a bidder’s need for additional debt tax shield, making cash financing less attractive. These attributes are also attractive to high income bracket sellers due to their tax benefits. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) document a higher incidence of stock financing for higher market to book buyers.译文：并购支付方式在欧洲的选择在过去的十年，全球并购活动已显著增长,同时带来组织的重大改变和在世界各地的经济活动的控制。

企业并购培训课件

管理一体化
功能一体化
文化一体化
实证： •惠普与康柏合并 •“雪地”啤酒与“金种子”集团合并 •奔驰与克莱斯勒合并
六、投资银行为反并购提供的服务
股份回购和寻找白衣骑士焦土战术金降落伞、灰色降落伞和锡降落伞毒丸条款绿色勒索帕克门策略聘用鲨鱼观察者利用诉讼阻止并购
第四节杠杆收购
整合难度大，组织、文化冲突可能断送并购的成果,
实现真正整合后的协同效应所要求的条件比较高。
伴随不必要的附属繁杂业务，
收购企业往往需做出重大承诺并承担大量义务。
企业并购中的七大风险Fra bibliotek风险类型简要情况
政治环境风险并购在相当程度上受制于政治环境。如石油业的并购就与中东局势有关。
法律风险信息风险
资产价值基础法
资产价值基础法指通过对目标企业的资产进行估价来评估其价值的方法。确定目标企业资产的价值，关键是选择合适的资产评估价值标准。目前国际上通行的资产评估价值标准主要有以下三种：
账面价值
市场价值
清算价值
收益法
收益法就是根据目标企业的收益和市盈率确定其价值的方法，也可称为市盈率模型。
中国产业面临双重任务：分拆与整合相辅相承（电力、电信、航空、石化······）。
分拆
整合
• 打破行政垄断格局，引入市场竞争
• 主辅分离和企业办社会的剥离
• 共同的目标是：塑造市场主体，发育市场机制
• 让产业资源和市场份额向优势企业集中
• 优化资源配置结构 • 造就产业领袖 • 维护产业秩序和效率 • 领导产业升级换代
第七章企业并购
• 第一节企业并购概论 • 第二节企业并购的理论基础 • 第三节企业并购业务的基本流程 • 第四节杠杆收购 • 第五节跨国并购 • 本章小结 • 思考题

企业并购外文翻译文献

企业并购外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)外文:Mergers and Acquisitions Basics :All You Need To KnowIntroduction to Mergers and AcquisitionsThe first decade of the new millennium heralded an era of global mega-mergers. Like the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) frenzy of the 1980s and 1990s, several factors fueled activity through mid-2007: readily available credit, historically low interest rates, rising equity markets, technological change, global competition, and industry consolidation. In terms of dollar volume, M&A transactions reached a record level worldwide in 2007. But extended turbulence in the global credit markets soon followed.The speculative housing bubble in the United States and elsewhere, largely financed by debt, burst during the second half of the year. Banks,concerned about the value of many of their own assets, became exceedingly selective and largely withdrew from financing the highly leveraged transactions that had become commonplace the previous year. The quality of assets held by banks through out Europe and Asia also became suspect, reflecting the global nature of the credit markets. As credit dried up, a malaise spread worldwide in the market for highly leveraged M&A transactions.By 2008, a combination of record high oil prices and a reduced availability of credit sent most of the world’s economies into recession, reducing global M&A activity by more than one-third from its previous high. This global recession deepened during the first half of 2009—despite a dramatic drop in energy prices and highly stimulative monetary and fiscal policies—extending the slump in M&A activity.In recent years, governments worldwide have intervened aggressively in global credit markets (as well as in manufacturing and other sectors of the economy) in an effort to restore business and consumer confidence, restore credit market functioning, and offset deflationary pressures. What impact have such actions had on mergers and acquisitions? It is too early to tell, but the implications may be significant.M&As are an important means of transferring resources to where they are most needed and of removing underperforming managers. Government decisions to save some firms while allowing others to fail are likely to disrupt this process. Such decisions are often based on the notion that some firms are simply too big to fail because of their potential impact on the economy—consider AIG in the United States. Others are clearly motivated by politics. Such actions disrupt the smooth functioning of markets, which rewards good decisions and penalizes poor ones. Allowing a business to believe that it can achieve a size “too big t o fail” may create perverse incentives. Plus, there is very little historical evidence that governments are better than markets at deciding who shouldfail and who should survive.In this chapter, you will gain an understanding of the underlying dynamics of M&As in the context of an increasingly interconnected world. The chapter begins with a discussion of M&As as change agents in the context of corporate restructuring. The focus is on M&As and why they happen, with brief consideration given to alternative ways of increasing shareholder value. You will also be introduced to a variety of legal structures and strategies that are employed to restructure corporations.Throughout this book, a firm that attempts to acquire or merge with another company is called an acquiring company, acquirer, or bidder. The target company or target is the firm being solicited by the acquiring company. Takeovers or buyouts are generic terms for a change in the controlling ownership interest of a corporation.Words in bold italics are the ones most important for you to understand fully;they are all included in a glossary at the end of the book. Mergers and Acquisitions as Change AgentsBusinesses come and go in a continuing churn, perhaps best illustrated by the ever-changing composition of the so-called Fortune 500—the 500 largest U.S. corporations. Only 70 of the firms on the original 1955 list of 500 are on today’s list, and some 2,000 firms have appeared on the list at one time or another. Most have dropped off the list either through merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, downsizing, or some other form of corporate restructuring. Consider a few examples: Chrysler, Bethlehem Steel, Scott Paper, Zenith, Rubbermaid, Warner Lambert. The popular media tends to use the term corporate restructuring to describe actions taken to expand or contract a firm’s basic operations or fundamentally change its asset or financial structure. ···································································································SynergySynergy is the rather simplistic notion that two (or more) businesses in combination will create greater shareholder value than if they are operated separately. It may be measured as the incremental cash flow that can be realized through combination in excess of what would be realized were the firms to remain separate. There are two basic types of synergy: operating and financial.Operating Synergy (Economies of Scale and Scope)Operating synergy comprises both economies of scale and economies of scope, which can be important determinants of shareholder wealth creation. Gains in efficiency can come from either factor and from improved managerial practices.Spreading fixed costs over increasing production levels realizes economies of scale, with scale defined by such fixed costs as depreciation of equipment and amortization of capitalized software; normal maintenance spending; obligations such as interest expense, lease payments, and long-term union, customer, and vendor contracts; and taxes. These costs are fixed in that they cannot be altered in the short run. By contrast, variable costs are those that change with output levels. Consequently, for a given scale or amount of fixed expenses, the dollar value of fixed expenses per unit of output and per dollar of revenue decreases as output and sales increase.To illustrate the potential profit improvement from economies of scale, let’s consider an automobile plant that c an assemble 10 cars per hour and runs around the clock—which means the plant produces 240 cars per day. The plant’s fixed expenses per day are $1 million, so the average fixed cost per car produced is $4,167 (i.e., $1,000,000/240). Now imagine an improved assembly line that allows the plant t o assemble 20 cars per hour, or 480 per day. The average fixed cost per car per day falls to $2,083 (i.e., $1,000,000/480). If variable costs (e.g., direct labor) per car do not increase, and the selling price per car remains the same for each car, the profit improvement per car due to the decline in averagefixed costs per car per day is $2,084 (i.e., $4,167 – $2,083).A firm with high fixed costs as a percentage of total costs will have greater earnings variability than one with a lower ratio of fixed to total costs. Let’s consider two firms with annual revenues of $1 billion and operating profits of $50 million. The fixed costs at the first firm represent 100 percent of total costs, but at the second fixed costs are only half of all costs. If revenues at both firms increased by $50 million, the first firm would see income increase to $100 million, precisely because all of its costs are fixed. Income at the second firm would rise only to $75 million, because half of the $50 million increased revenue would h ave to go to pay for increased variable costs.Using a specific set of skills or an asset currently employed to produce a given product or service to produce something else realizes economies of scope, which are found most often when it is cheaper to combine multiple product lines in one firm than to produce them in separate firms. Procter & Gamble, the consumer products giant, uses its highly regarded consumer marketing skills to sell a full range of personal care as well as pharmaceutical products. Honda knows how to enhance internal combustion engines, so in addition to cars, the firm develops motorcycles, lawn mowers, and snow blowers. Sequent Technology lets customers run applications on UNIX and NT operating systems on a single computer system. Citigroup uses the same computer center to process loan applications, deposits, trust services, and mutual fund accounts for its bank’s customers.Each is an example of economies of scope, where a firm is applying a specific set of skills or assets to produce or sell multiple products, thus generating more revenue.Financial Synergy (Lowering the Cost of Capital)Financial synergy refers to the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the cost of capital of the acquiring firm or newly formed firm resulting from a merger or acquisition. The cost of capital is the minimum return required by investors and lenders to induce them to buy a firm’s stock orto lend to the firm.In theory, the cost of capital could be reduced if the merged firms have cash flows that do not move up and down in tandem (i.e., so-called co-insurance), realize financial economies of scale from lower securities issuance and transactions costs, or result in a better matching of investment opportunities with internally generated funds. Combining a firm that has excess cash flows with one whose internally generated cash flow is insufficient to fund its investment opportunities may also result in a lower cost of borrowing. A firm in a mature industry experiencing slowing growth may produce cash flows well in excess of available investment opportunities. Another firm in a high-growth industry may not have enough cash to realize its investment opportunities. Reflecting their different growth rates and risk levels, the firm in the mature industry may have a lower cost of capital than the one in the high-growth industry, and combining the two firms could lower the average cost of capital of the combined firms.DiversificationBuying firms outside a company’s current prima ry lines of business is called diversification, and is typically justified in one of two ways. Diversification may create financial synergy that reduces the cost of capital, or it may allow a firm to shift its core product lines or markets into ones that have higher growth prospects, even ones that are unrelated to the firm’s current products or markets. The extent to which diversification is unrelated to an acquirer’s current lines of business can have significant implications for how effective management is in operating the combined firms.·················································································A firm facing slower growth in its current markets may be able to accelerate growth through related diversification by selling its current products in new markets that are somewhat unfamiliar and, therefore, mor risky. Such was the case when pharmaceutical giant Johnson &Johnson announced itsultimately unsuccessful takeover attempt of Guidant Corporation in late 2004. J&J was seeking an entry point for its medical devices business in the fast-growing market for implantable devices, in which it did not then participate. A firm may attempt to achieve higher growth rates by developing or acquiring new products with which it is relatively unfamiliar and then selling them in familiar and less risky current markets. Retailer JCPenney’s acquisition of the Eckerd Drugstore chain or J&J’s $16 billion acquisition of Pfizer’s consumer health care products line in 2006 are two examples of related diversification. In each instance, the firm assumed additional risk, but less so than unrelated diversification if it had developed new products for sale in new markets. There is considerable evidence that investors do not benefit from unrelated diversification.Firms that operate in a number of largely unrelated industries, such as General Electric, are called conglomerates. The share prices of conglomerates often trade at a discount—as much as 10 to 15 percent—compared to shares of focused firms or to their value were they broken up. This discount is called the conglomerate discount or diversification discount. Investors often perceive companies diversified in unrelated areas (i.e., those in different standard industrial classifications) as riskier because management has difficulty understanding these companies and often fails to provide full funding for the most attractive investment opportunities.Moreover, outside investors may have a difficult time understanding how to value the various parts of highly diversified businesses.Researchers differ on whether the conglomerate discount is overstated.Still, although the evidence suggests that firms pursuing a more focused corporate strategy are likely to perform best, there are always exceptions.Strategic RealignmentThe strategic realignment theory suggests that firms use M&As to makerapid adjustments to changes in their external environments. Although change can come from many different sources, this theory considers only changes in the regulatory environment and technological innovation—two factors that, over the past 20 years, have been major forces in creating new opportunities for growth, and threatening, or making obsolete, firms’ primary lines of business.Regulatory ChangeThose industries that have been subject to significant deregulation in recent years—financial services, health care, utilities, media, telecommunications, defense—have been at the center of M&A activity because deregulation breaks down artificial barriers and stimulates competition. During the first half of the 1990s, for instance, the U.S. Department of Defense actively encouraged consolidation of the nation’s major defense contractors to improve their overall operating efficiency.Utilities now required in some states to sell power to competitors that can resell the power in the utility’s own marketplace respond with M&As to achieve greater operating efficiency. Commercial banks that have moved beyond their historical role of accepting deposits and g ranting loans are merging with securities firms and insurance companies thanks to the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, which repealed legislation dating back to the Great Depression.The Citicorp–Travelers merger a year earlier anticipated this change, and it is probable that their representatives were lobbying for the new legislation. The final chapter has yet t o be written: this trend toward huge financial services companies may yet be stymied by new regulation passed in 2010 in response to excessive risk taking.The telecommunications industry offers a striking illustration. Historically, local and long-distance phone companies were not allowed t o compete against each other, and cable companies were essentially monopolies. Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996, local and long-distance companies are actively encouraged to compete in eachother’s markets, and cable companies are offering both Internet access and local telephone service. When a federal appeals court in 2002 struck down a Federal Communications Commission regulation prohibiting a company from owning a cable television system and a broadcast TV station in the same city, and threw out the rule that barred a company from owning TV stations that reach more than 35 percent of U.S.households, it encouraged new combinations among the largest media companies or purchases of smaller broadcasters.Technological ChangeTechnological advances create new products and industries. The development of the airplane created the passenger airline, avionics, and satellite industries. The emergence of satellite delivery of cable networks t o regional and local stations ignited explosive growth in the cable industry. Today, with the expansion of broadband technology, we are witnessing the convergence of voice, data, and video technologies on the Internet. The emergence of digital camera technology has reduced dramatically the demand for analog cameras and film and sent household names such as Kodak and Polaroid scrambling to adapt. The growth of satellite radio is increasing its share of the radio advertising market at the expense of traditional radio stations.Smaller, more nimble players exhibit speed and creativity many larger, more bureaucratic firms cannot achieve. With engineering talent often in short supply and product life cycles shortening, these larger firms may not have the luxury of time or the resources to innovate. So, they may look to M&As as a fast and sometimes less expensive way to acquire new technologies and proprietary know-how to fill gaps in their current product portfolios or to enter entirely new businesses. Acquiring technologies can also be a defensive weapon to keep important new technologies out of the hands of competitors. In 2006, eBay acquired Skype Technologies, the Internet phone provider, for $3.1 billion in cash, stock, and performance payments, hoping that the move would boosttrading on its online auction site and limit competitors’ access to the new technology. By September 2009, eBay had to admit that it had been unable to realize the benefits of owning Skype and was selling the business to a private investor group for $2.75 billion.Hubris and the “Winner’s Curse”Managers sometimes believe that their own valuation of a target firm is superior to the market’s valuation. Thus, the acquiring company tends to overpay for the target, having been overoptimistic when evaluating petition among bidders also is likely to result in the winner overpaying because of hubris, even if significant synergies are present. In an auction environment with bidders, the range of bids for a target company is likely to be quite wide, because senior managers t end to be very competitive and sometimes self-important. Their desire not to lose can drive the purchase price of an acquisition well in excess of its actual economic value (i.e., cash-generating capability). The winner pays more than the company is worth and may ultimately feel remorse at having done so—hence what has come to be called the winner’s curse.Buying Undervalued Assets (The Q-Ratio)The q-ratio is the rat io of the market value of the acquiring firm’s stock to the replacement cost of its assets. Firms interested in expansion can choose to invest in new plants and equipment or obtain the assets by acquiring a company with a market value less than what it would cost to replace the assets (i.e., q-ratio＜1). This theory was very useful in explaining M&A activity during the 1970s, when high inflation and interest rates depressed stock prices well below the book value of many firms. High inflation also caused the replacement cost of assets to be much higher than the book value of assets. Book value refers to the value of assets listed on a firm’s balance sheet and generally reflects the historical cost of acquiring such assets rather than their current cost.When gasoline refiner Valero Energy Corp. acquired Premcor Inc. in 2005, the $8 billion transaction created the largest refiner in NorthAmerica. It would have cost an estimated 40 percent more for Valero to build a new refinery with equivalent capacity.Mismanagement (Agency Problems)Agency problems arise when there is a difference between the interests of incumbent managers (i.e., those currently managing the firm) and the firm’s shareholders. This happens when management owns a small fraction of the outstanding shares of the firm. These managers, who serve as agents of the shareholder, may be more inclined to focus on their own job security and lavish lifestyles than on maximizing shareholder value. When the shares of a company are widely held, the cost of such mismanagement is spread across a large number of shareholders, each of whom bears only a small portion. This allows for toleration of the mismanagement over long periods. Mergers often take place to correct situations in which there is a separation between what managers and owners (shareholders) want. Low stock prices put pressure on managers to take actions to raise the share price or become the target of acquirers, who perceive the stock to be undervalued and who are usually intent on removing the underperforming management of the target firm.Agency problems also contribute to management-initiated buyouts, particularly when managers and shareholders disagree over how excess cash flow should be used.Managers may have access to information not readily available to shareholders and may therefore be able to convince lenders to provide funds to buy out shareholders and concentrate ownership in the hands of management.From: Donald DePamphilis. Mergers and acquisitions basics:All you need to know America :Academic Press. Oct，2010，P1-10翻译:并购基础知识：一切你需要知道的并购新千年的第一个十年,预示着全球大规模并购时代的到来。

产业并购基金说明书

大摩产业并购基金说明书二零一三年十二月1财务顾问出资有限合伙人承担有限责任，总数不超过49个《财务顾问协议》普通合伙人并购基金合伙企业托管机构《资金托管协议》承担无限责任……并购基金采用有限合伙制，委托财务顾问管理投资业务工商银行基金投资人通过签订协议，委托财务顾问管理等事宜机构投资者一机构投资者二机构投资者三个人投资者一个人投资者二个人投资者三……+所有合伙人共同签署《合伙协议》利润2基金条款摘要●占据细分行业的龙头优势或有垄断性战略资源的企业●在国内市场有明显竞争优势，具有较高市场占有率，或其核心业务具备获取关键性市场份额的特性和技术优势，拥有领先的技术、市场整合能力和领导市场变革的创新能力的企业●经过检验的商业模式，业务模式具有可持续性的企业●具有持续的现金流和利润增长的机会的企业●具备长期的战略性价值和资本市场投资价值的企业●现实的业务计划和具有说服力的为实现该计划的战略与措施的企业●良好的过往业绩和信誉，具备商业经营能力，可信赖程度高的企业●有一支具备管理才能、专业技能、富有经验并且尽责的管理团队，财务顾问可与之发展有效的工作关系的企业●具备后续的首次公开发行或交易出售的良好潜力的企业被投资企业条件遴选 ●认购起点为3000万元；募集规模不低于10亿元投资起点与规模●5年，普通合伙人可依情形决定延长两次，每次延长1年基金存续期限●大摩金融控股公司；主要职责包括推荐投资项目、尽职调查、合同谈判、退出方案设计等财务顾问●大摩产业并购基金合伙企业（有限合伙）基金名称●基金采取有限合伙制，合伙人数不超过50个；XXXX 公司或自然人担任普通合伙人，投资人以有限合伙人身份参与投资，有限合伙人不参与日常管理与投资决策投资架构及参与形式3基金条款摘要（续）●退出的主要方式有IPO 、股权转让给第三方、公司管理层回购或者其他方式退出方式●基金收益按年单利10%以上的收益部分由有限合伙人和财务顾问按照80% ：20%的比例进行分配收益分配●基金年管理费为实缴出资额的2.0%/年；如合伙企业延期，延期期间的财务顾问管理费应为实际对外投资尚未退出投资额×2.0%×延期天数/365基金费率●投资于一家未上市公司股权的投资额，不得超过该企业实收资本的20%●投资于一家未上市公司股权的比例，不得超过该合伙企业实收资本的10%●非运用于并购的合伙企业资金任何时候应不少于合伙企业实收资本的5%，以用于合伙企业费用的支付●合伙企业成立三年后合伙企业剩余资金不得再运用于未上市企业并购。

企业并购案例尽职调查及效应分析

中粮集团并购蒙牛案例分析引言：中粮集团有限企业(简称“中粮”、“中粮集团”, 英文简称COFCO)于1952年在北京成立, 是一家集贸易、实业、金融、信息、服务和科研为一体旳大型企业集团, 横跨农产品、食品、酒店、地产等众多领域。

1994年以来, 一直名列美国《财富》杂志全球企业500强。

蒙牛是一家总部位于中华人民共和国内蒙古旳乳制品生产企业, 蒙牛是中国大陆生产牛奶、酸奶和乳制品旳领头企业之一, 1999年成立, 至2023年时已成为中国奶制品营业额第二大旳企业, 其中液态奶和冰激凌旳产量都居全中国第一。

中粮和蒙牛, 一种是中国粮食食品界旳龙头老大, 一种是中国奶制品领域旳头把交椅。

两者之间旳一举一动不仅吸引着无数国人旳注意, 更牵动着中国经济旳神经。

实际上, 作为国内食品行业龙头老大旳当家人, 宁高宁在资本运作和产业链整合方面旳长袖善舞是有口碑旳。

其入住中粮之后, 继续着他旳并购与整合旳风格, 将中粮打导致一种“全产业链粮油食品企业”帝国, 不过在乳业领域, 中粮一直没有很大旳动作。

而中粮假如当真收购蒙牛, 这将会完毕宁高宁旳食品产业帝国在乳业方面最重要旳一块拼图。

中粮集团并购蒙牛乳业究竟是我旳一厢情愿还是两大巨头旳最终归宿？这种大胆猜测与否具有操作上旳可行性？下面我将对次并购行为进行分析。

一.中粮集团旳乳业发展战略作为世界500强企业中为数不多旳食品企业, 中粮集团确立了“集团有限有关多元化、业务单元专业化”旳发展战略。

董事长宁高宁对这个战略进行理解释: 所谓“有限”, 就是中粮此后不搞过度多元化, 集团旳第一要务是发展好主营业务。

所谓“有关”, 就是中粮旳业务虽然有分类和多元, 但行业之间要具有有关、协同性, 要有逻辑关系, 能互相支持, 形成合力。

而“专业化”则是每一种业务单元要形成自身发展目旳和行业竞争战略, 寻求符合自身发展旳商业模式, 在所在行业中形成行业领导地位。

中粮旗下食品业务覆盖了包括粮油、面粉、糖、番茄制品、冷鲜肉、罐头酒类和休闲食品在内旳产业链, 但却一直没有染指乳业。

企业并购契约模板全版本

企业并购契约模板全版本一、前言本企业并购契约模板（以下简称"本契约"）旨在规范双方（以下简称"转让方"和"受让方"）在并购过程中的权利、义务和责任，确保并购活动的顺利进行。

二、定义与解释1. 本契约中所涉及的术语和定义如下：（1）"企业"：指转让方和受让方所指的具体企业。

（2）"并购"：指受让方以某种方式取得转让方企业的全部或部分股权，从而实现对企业的控制。

（3）"股权"：指转让方和受让方在企业中所持有的股份。

（4）"转让价格"：指受让方应支付给转让方的并购对价。

2. 本契约中的词语，除非上下文明确指出，否则其含义应按照通常的理解进行解释。

三、并购条款1. 股权转让（1）转让方同意将其持有的企业股权全部或部分转让给受让方。

（2）受让方同意购买并持有转让方所持有的企业股权。

2. 转让价格与支付方式（1）转让价格为本契约签署之日的企业净资产值的某一比例，具体比例由双方协商确定。

（2）受让方应在签署本契约之日起一定期限内，向转让方支付全部转让价格。

支付方式可以为现金、转账或其他双方约定的方式。

3. 股权交割（1）转让方应在收到全部转让价格后，将所持有的企业股权转让给受让方。

（2）股权交割事项应由双方共同向企业办理，并依法办理变更登记手续。

四、陈述与保证1. 转让方保证：（1）其为企业之合法股东，拥有合法的股权。

（2）其所持有的股权未设定任何权利负担。

（3）其向受让方提供的企业相关信息真实、准确、完整。

2. 受让方保证：（1）其具备并购企业的合法资格。

（2）其向转让方支付的转让价格系真实、合法来源。

五、违约责任1. 若转让方违反本契约的约定，导致并购无法完成，转让方应向受让方支付违约金，违约金金额为本契约签署之日的企业净资产值的某一比例。

2. 若受让方违反本契约的约定，导致并购无法完成，受让方应向转让方支付违约金，违约金金额为本契约签署之日的企业净资产值的某一比例。

上市公司并购操作指南2024版协议样本版B版

20XX 专业合同封面COUNTRACT COVER甲方：XXX乙方：XXX上市公司并购操作指南2024版协议样本版B版本合同目录一览1. 并购双方1.1 并购方1.2 被并购方2. 并购目的和原则2.1 并购目的2.2 并购原则3. 并购方式3.1 收购股份3.2 收购资产3.3 合并方式4. 并购价格和支付方式4.1 并购价格4.2 支付方式4.3 价格调整机制5. 并购协议的生效和终止5.1 生效条件5.2 终止条件6. 并购后的经营管理6.1 管理层安排6.2 经营策略调整7. 并购双方的义务和责任7.1 并购方的义务和责任7.2 被并购方的义务和责任8. 并购双方的保密协议8.1 保密内容8.2 保密期限9. 争议解决方式9.1 协商解决9.2 调解解决9.3 仲裁解决10. 合同的修改和补充10.1 修改条件10.2 补充内容11. 合同的解除11.1 解除条件11.2 解除程序12. 法律适用和争议解决12.1 法律适用12.2 争议解决13. 合同的生效、终止和解除 13.1 生效时间13.2 终止条件13.3 解除条件14. 其他约定14.1 附加条款14.2 附件说明第一部分：合同如下：第一条并购双方1.1 并购方1.1.1 并购方的名称：1.1.2 并购方的住所：1.1.3 并购方的法定代表人：1.2 被并购方1.2.1 被并购方的名称：1.2.2 被并购方的住所：1.2.3 被并购方的法定代表人：第二条并购目的和原则2.1 并购目的2.1.1.1 目标一：2.1.1.2 目标二：2.1.1.3 目标三：2.2 并购原则2.2.1 并购方和被并购方应遵循平等、自愿、诚实信用的原则进行并购。

2.2.2 并购方和被并购方应遵守相关法律法规和政策规定，确保并购的合法性、合规性。

第三条并购方式3.1.1 收购被并购方的股份，具体股份比例为：3.1.2 收购被并购方的资产，具体资产清单详见附件一。

《企业并购：逻辑与趋势》——过火的交易：杀手收购案例

《企业并购：逻辑与趋势》——过火的交易：杀手收购案例由于规模经济、交易成本、价值低估以及代理理论等的长足发展，使得企业并购理论和实践的发展非常迅速，成为西方经济学最活跃的领域之一。

《企业并购：逻辑与趋势》一书系统地介绍了并购动机、并购支付方式、并购效应、并购的经济哲学和经济法学等并购活动中的关键主题。

书中将并购理论与并购案例分析相结合，同时大量的实证分析贯穿其中，具有较强的实战性。

该书中文版由巴曙松研究员、周沅帆博士等翻译，由北京大学出版社出版发行。

文/格雷戈里奥（Greg N. Gregoriou）；纽豪瑟（Karyn L. Neuhauser）一.引言并购长期以来一直是金融世界的宠儿，而且似乎将来可能依然如此。

学者思考这些交易的理论动机并评估其影响，实践者致力于推动一种已然势不可挡的蓬勃力量。

这两种努力合流的结果就产生了一个未解却很重要的悖论。

许多对并购感兴趣的研究者都对进行收购交易的基本原理深表怀疑，他们认为假如并购的真正目的是创造股东价值，那么这种并购事件就应该比现在少得多。

他们也收集了大量经验证据，这些证据至少对收购能否为买方创造价值提出了严肃的质疑。

这并不是说关于收购的文献没有给出这样的案例，证明收购明显是有良好动机的，或与动机无关，收购依然呈现出导致对于收购方的经济福利的净增加。

事实上，近期的一些分析认为，对并购交易的业绩效果的实证研究结果始终暗淡，原因主要有三点：第一，研究了错误的交易——研究者使用的数据中把许多小型交易排除在外；第二，运用了错误的业绩衡量方法；第三，采用了错误的时间范围衡量方法。

尽管如此，我们并不转向对收购交易中创造价值的先决条件进行考察。

相反，我们将着重对以下这类交易进行研究，这些交易不仅仅引起收购方的价值浪费，而且交易的完成事实上导致了一个新的扩张企业陷入财务困境和可能的清算境地这样深远的负面影响。

我们把这种问题称为“杀手收购问题”。

尽管以前的文献已经列举了一系列因素以区分失败（价值破坏）的收购交易与成功的收购交易之间的特征差异，这些因素包括目标公司和收购公司的相对规模、策略关联度、收购公司业绩记录、合并公司的市场力量、国内收购或国际收购以及对价形式，不一而足，但对那些可能关乎收购公司灾难性后果的因素却鲜有研究。

企业并购权益让渡协议范本2024版B版

20XX 专业合同封面COUNTRACT COVER甲方：XXX乙方：XXX企业并购权益让渡协议范本2024版B版本合同目录一览1. 协议背景与定义1.1 背景说明1.2 术语解释2. 权益让渡2.1 让渡的权益内容2.2 权益让渡的范围2.3 权益让渡的程序3. 并购方义务3.1 支付对价3.2 保证业务连续性3.3 保密义务4. 让渡方义务4.1 提供必要文件4.2 协助并购完成4.3 不再干预业务5. 协议的生效与终止5.1 生效条件5.2 终止条件5.3 终止后的处理6. 违约责任6.1 并购方的违约责任6.2 让渡方的违约责任7. 争议解决7.1 协商解决7.2 调解解决7.3 法律途径8. 适用法律8.1 法律适用8.2 司法管辖9. 其他条款9.1 通知与送达9.2 合同的修改与补充9.3 独立条款10. 附件10.1 附件清单10.2 附件效力11. 签署11.1 签署日期11.2 签署地点11.3 签署人12. 生效日期12.1 签署后的效力12.2 过渡期安排13. 保密协议13.1 保密内容13.2 保密期限13.3 泄密后果14. 后继协商14.1 定期评估14.2 协商修改14.3 续签事宜第一部分：合同如下：1. 协议背景与定义1.1 背景说明本协议是甲乙双方在平等、自愿、公平、诚实信用的原则基础上，就甲方将其持有的X公司股权及相应的权益让渡给乙方，乙方予以收购的事宜，经充分协商，达成一致意见而订立的书面协议。

1.2 术语解释1.2.1 甲方：指持有X公司股权的股东。

1.2.2 乙方：指收购X公司股权的股东。

1.2.3 X公司：指由甲方持有的目标公司。

1.2.4 股权：指甲方持有的X公司的股份。

1.2.5 权益：指与股权相关的所有可转让权益，包括但不限于分红权、决策权等。

2.1 让渡的权益内容甲方同意将其持有的X公司股权及相应的权益全部让渡给乙方，包括但不限于分红权、决策权等。

企业并购投行大辞典

投行大辞典企业兼并根据1989年2月19日国家体改委、国家计委、财政部、国家国有资产管理局联合发布的《关于企业兼并的暂行办法》第1条：“本办法所称企业兼并，是指一个企业购买其他企业的产权，使其他企业失去法人资格或改变法人实体的一种行为，不通过购买方式实行的企业之间的合并，不属本办法规范。

”公司合并根据1994年7月1日起生效的《中华人民共和国公司法》第184条第1、2、4款的规定公司合并可分为吸收合并和新设合并两种形式。

一个公司吸收其他公司为吸收合并，被吸收的公司解散，这种情形类似于英文中的“Merger”。

两个以上公司合并设立一个新的公司为新设合并,合并后各方解散,这种情形则类似于“Consolidation”。

无论是吸收合并还是新设合并，合并各方的债权、债务，应当由合并后存续的公司或者新设的公司承担。

上市公司的收购根据国务院1993年4月22日发布的《股票发行与交易管理暂行条例》第4章的规定，指任何法人通过获取上市公司发行在外的普通股而取得该上市公司控制权的行为。

该暂行条例第51条第1款规定，收购要约期满，收购要约人持有的普通股达到该上市公司发行在外的普通股总数的50％或以上的，方为收购成功。

善意收购（Friendly acquisition)当猎手公司有理由相信猎物公司的管理层会同意并购时，向猎物公司的管理层提出友好的收购建议。

彻底的善意收购建议由猎手公司方私下而保密地向猎物公司方提出，且不被要求公开披露。

非杠杆收购指不用目标公司自有资金及营运所得来支付或担保支付并购价金的收购方式，早期并购风潮中的收购形式多属此类。

但非杠杆收购并不意味着收购公司不用举债即可负担并购价金，实践中，几乎所有的收购都是利用贷款完成的，所不同的只是借贷数额的多少而已。

杠杆收购（LBO或Leveraged Buyout）也译作凭债收购,它是一种全盘收购公共企业（PUBLICCOMPANY）的方式。

其本质是举债收购，即以债务资本为主要融资工具，这些债务资本多以猎物公司资产为担保而得以筹集。

企业并购与整合实务-人大-handout

➢ 创立合并结束后，原来的各企业均失去法人资格，由新成立的企业统一从事生产经营活动
➢ A公司+B公司+C公司=D公司
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控股合并
➢ 也称取得控制权，指一个企业通过发行股票、支付现金或发行债券等方式取得另一企业全部/部分有表决权的股份
➢ 取得控制权后，原来的企业仍以各自独立法律实体从事生产经营活动
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协议收购/要约收购/举牌收购
协议收购是指收购人与目标公司或其股东私下直接协商目标公司的资产或股权的转让，以获得目标公司或其转让资产的实际控制权的交易。
示例：2004年联想收购IBM个人电脑业务
要约收购是依法直接向目标公司的全体股东发出公开要约，在一定时期内以特定的价格收购他们所持有的该公司全部或部分股份，以获得在该公司中的控股地位的行为。
值
值
8000 7000
流动资产
长期负债
20000 20000
现金
4000 4000 流动负债
应收款 15000 13000 应付款
13000 13000
存货
13000 12000 短期借款
14000 14000
资产合计 55000 54000 权益负债合计 55000 54000
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如：受突发事件影响，不能东山再起
创业者突然离去，没有合适人选接替
➢ 买方作为“抄底渔夫”，其收购的目的主要是为了以较低的代价取得目标企业的控制权，将资产盘活
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资产法举例：某公司资产负债表估值调整
资产固定资产
帐面价值
23000
评估价值

永乐--摩根对赌协议

对赌局：大摩操控国美永乐并购案李凌永乐宿命永乐给中国企业界上了生动的一课。

它彻底打破了长期以来扎根于企业决策者们脑海中的关于“财务投资者不会干涉企业运营和战略”的观念。

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────陈晓摩根士丹利（以下全文简称“大摩”）在中国投资似乎总有妙手“点石成金”，在中国家电连锁行业的老大国美、老二苏宁分别盘踞香港和国内资本市场的情况下，投资老三永乐，并大力促成永乐成功登陆香港资本市场。

作为财务投资者，大摩并未到此见好就收。

从永乐上市后，到其持有的股票锁定期结束前，由其研究部门现身，给予永乐“增持”的评级，并调高永乐目标价，成为永乐股价大幅上升的重要推动力量。

而在其第一个股票锁定期到期的当天，大摩减持了一半的永乐股份（另一半股份还在锁定期），并几乎同时下调永乐的评级。

而当永乐难以达到当初双方签订的“对赌协议”之时，大摩更是像一部庞大而精密的机器积极运转，展开了一系列看似独立实则环环相扣的操作，一方面利用减持永乐的行动，引致其他投资者跟风抛售，使永乐股价走低，市值大幅缩水，并客观上使得基于换股方式的永乐对大中的合并基本告吹。

同时，大摩又调高永乐竞争对手国美的评级并增持国美，并公开发表言论支持国美并购永乐。

可以说，在国内家电连锁业这起并购案中，永乐更大程度上像是舞台上的拉线木偶，一步步被动地走向被国美并购的结局，而操控的线就掌握在大摩手里。

本文力图揭示大摩等国际投行投资中国企业的“游戏规则”：对大摩等投资者而言，对赌协议无非是要保护自己的投资收益，无可厚非，而对企业来说，对赌协议是把双刃剑——在蒙牛，对赌协议成了激励企业超常规扩张的催化剂，而在永乐，对赌协议却成了一道“催命符”。

但是，企业当然不能因为对赌协议的“不对称”而拒绝大摩这样的国际投资者，而是要熟悉其游戏规则，并且客观把握企业自身的经营状况及所处的行业背景，在博弈中最大限度地利用好自己的优势，维护企业利益。