HARP-DISSERTATION 内部控制
内部控制的文献综述
内部控制的文献综述内部控制的定义最早出现在美国会计师协会发布的《注册会计师对财务报表的审查》文告中定义为保护其他资产和现金,检查簿记业务的准确性, 而在公司内部实施的手段和方法。
后来经过完善认为究其实用方面而论, 是为了达到确定的管理目标, 促进企业的业务有秩序有效率的进行, 保证资产的安全、会计记录的可靠性和及时提供准确的财务资料。
美国反对虚假财务报告委员会所属的内部控制专门研究委员会发起机构委员会(COSO)在进行了专门研究后提出来了《内部控制-整体框架》即COSO报告, 指出: 内部控制是由企业的董事会、管理层和其他员工实施的的, 为运营的效率和效果、财务报告的可靠性以及法律规章的遵循性提供合理保证的过程, 主要包括了: 控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息和交流、监督。
使在企业的风险偏好之内, 从而合理确保企业取得既定的目标。
哈米德阿拉德在《内部控制透视:理论与概念》中认为:内部控制是一个会计程序的设计, 提高效率、保证政策实施或维护资产或避免欺诈和错误。
内部控制是一个重要的组成部分管理组织。
它包括计划, 方法和程序, 用来满足任务, 目标, 和目标, 这样做, 支持基于业绩的管理。
内部控制与管理控制, 帮助管理人员实现期望的结果通过有效的资源管理。
内部控制应减少相关的风险与未被发现的错误或不规则, 但设计和建立有效的内部控制是一个不简单的任务, 不能通过一个短的快速修复。
最后从内部控制的不同方面进行了讨论。
米然, 赵栋在《浅议我国企业内部控制的现状、成因及对策》中提出, 从我国内部控制的理论研究和企业实践来看,企业的内部控制是一个薄弱环节,这已经成为制约我国经济和企业健康发展的障碍。
本文立足于我国企业内部控制现状及存在问题,就企业内部控制的外部环境因素和企业内部因素方面分析了问题产生的原因,对现状下政府部门如何发挥推动作用、强化外部监督、加强企业内部控制制度的建设与创新等方面做出相应的探讨并提出可行对策,以探索我国企业建立和有效实施内部控制的方法和途径。
内部控制英文文献翻译及参考文献-英语论文
内部控制英文文献翻译及参考文献-英语论文内部控制英文文献翻译及参考文献目录摘要 (1)1 选题背景 (2)2内部控制理论的概述 (3)2.1 内部控制的根本性质 (3)2.2内部控制的责任 (3)3 确保内部控制的充分性 (5)4 先天的内部控制 (9)5 结论 (11)Abstract (12)1 Background Topics (13)2 Internal control theory outlined (15)2.1 The Fundamental Nature Of Intaral Control (15)2.2 Responsibillty For Internal Control (15)3 Ensuring that the internal control adequacy (17)4 Inherent limitations of internal control (22)5 Conclusion (25)参考文献[1] 陈继云.COSO报告与内部控制研究[M].上海:上海会计.2002.06.[2] 陈敏圭.论改进企业报告一美国注册会计师协会财务报告特别委员会综合报告[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社.1997.[3] 楼德华,傅黎瑛.中小企业内部控制[M].上海:上海三联书店,2005.[4] 李亚.民营企业公司治理[M].北京:机械工业出版社.2006.[5] 张厚义,候光明,明立志,梁传运.中国私营企业发展报告[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社. 2005.[6] 娆贤涛,王连娟.中国家族企业现状、问题与对策[M].北京:企业管理出版社.2005.[7] Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Tready Commission(COSO)[D].Enterprise RiskManagement Framework.2003.[8] 陈冠任.中国私营企业如何做大做强做优[M].北京:北京工业大学出版社.2003.[9] 中国(海南)改革发展研究院.中小企业发展—挑战与对策[M].北京:中国经济出版社.2005.[10] 欧江波,唐碧海,邓晓蕾,江彩霞,雷宣云,张赛飞.促进我国中小企业发展政策研究[M].广州:中山大学出版.2002.[11] 李国盛.内部控制的现状、成因、对策及建议[J].北京:《四川会计》第2001第2期.[12] 徐根兴,陈勇鸣.民营企业加速发展期的运行方式[M].北京:中共中央党校出版社.2005.[13] 杨加陆,范军,方青云,袁蔚,孙慧.中小企业管理[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2004.[14] Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance [M].The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Gee Co.Ltd, London..[15] 李华刚.民营企业为何难长大[M].北京:民族与建设出版社.2004.[16] 张丽.W公司内部控制评估与设计[D].《中国优秀博硕士学位论文全文数据库》.2005年5月.[17] KPMG: Sarbanes_ Oxley section 404.management of internal control and the proposed auditing standards[S] .2002.[18] Foh,Noreen.Control Self-Assessment.A New Approach to Auditing,Ives Business Journal[J].Sep/Oct 2000.[19] 马云涛.XX民营高科技内部控制体系研究[D].[西北土业大学硕士学位论文]西安西北土业大学.2005-09.[20] 熊筱燕,罗建云,王殿龙.会计控制论[M].北京:新华出版社.2002. 1263内部控制英文文献翻译及参考文献摘要内部控制这个概念已经不是一个新概念。
内部控制外文文献及翻译
中文4500字本科生毕业设计(论文)外文原文及译文所在系管理系学生姓名郭淼专业会计学班级学号指导教师2013年6月外文文献原文及译文Internal ControlEmergence and development of the theory of the evolution of the internal controlInternal control in Western countries have a long history of development, according to the internal control characteristics at different stages of development, the development of internal control can be divided into four stages, namely the internal containment phase, the internal control system phase, the internal control structure phase, overall internal control framework stage.Internal check stages: infancy internal controlBefore the 1940s, people used to use the concept of internal check. This is the embryonic stage of internal control. "Keshi Accounting Dictionary" definition of internal check is "to provide effective organization and mode of operation, business process design errors and prevent illegal activities occur. Whose main characteristic is any individual or department alone can not control any part of one or the right way to conduct business on the division of responsibility for the organization, each business through the normal functioning of other individuals or departments for cross-examination or cross-control. designing effective internal check to ensure that all businesses can complete correctly after a specified handler in the process of these provisions, the internal containment function is always an integral part. "The late 1940s, the internal containment theory become important management methods and concepts. Internal check on a "troubleshooting a variety of measures" for the purpose of separation of duties and account reconciliation as a means to money and accounting matters and accounts as the main control object primary control measures. Its characteristics are account reconciliation and segregation of duties as the main content and thus cross-examination or cross-control. In general, the implementation of internal check function can be roughly divided into the following four categories: physical containment; mechanical containment; institutional containment; bookkeeping contain. The basic idea is to contain the internal "security is the result of checks and balances," which is based on two assumptions: First: two or more persons1西安交通大学城市学院本科毕业设计(论文)or departments making the same mistake unconsciously chance is very small; Second: Two or more the possibility of a person or department consciously partnership possibility of fraud is much lower than a single person or department fraud. Practice has proved that these assumptions are reasonable, internal check mechanism for organizations to control, segregation of duties control is the foundation of the modern theory of internal control.Internal control system phases:generating of internal controlThe late1940s to the early1970s, based on the idea of internal check, resulting in the concept of the internal control system, which is the stage in the modern sense of internal control generated. Industrial Revolution has greatly promoted the major change relations of production, joint-stock company has gradually become the main form of business organization of Western countries, in order to meet the requirements of prevailing socio-economic relations,to protect the economic interests of investors and creditors, the Western countries have legal requirements in the form of strengthen the corporate financial and accounting information as well as internal management of this economic activity.In 1934, the "securities and exchange act" issued by the U.S. government for the first time puts forward the concept of "internal accounting control", the implementation of general and special authorization book records, trading records, and compared different remedial measures such as transaction assets. In 1949, the American institute of certified public accountants (AICPA) belongs to the audit procedures of the committee (CPA) in the essential element of internal control: the system coordination, and its importance to management department and the independence of certified public accountants' report, the first official put forward the definition of internal control: "the design of the internal control includes the organization and enterprise to take all of the methods and measures to coordinate with each other. All of these methods and measures used to protect the property of the enterprise, to check the accuracy of accounting information, improve the efficiency of management, promote enterprise stick to established management guidelines." The definition from the formulation and perfecting the inner control of the organization, plan, method and measures such as rules and regulations to implement internal control, break through the limitation of control related to the financial and accounting department directly, the four objectives of internal control, namely the enterprise in commercial2外文文献原文及译文activities to protect assets, check the veracity and reliability of financial data, improve the work efficiency, and promote to management regulations. The definition of positive significance is to help management authorities to strengthen its management, but the scope of limitation is too broad. In 1958, the commission issued no. 29 audit procedures bulletin "independent auditors evaluate the scope of internal control", according to the requirements of the audit responsibility, internal control can be divided into two aspects, namely, the internal accounting control and internal management control. The former is mainly related to the first two of the internal control goal, the latter mainly relates to the internal control after two goals. This is the origin of the internal control system of "dichotomy". Because the concept of management control is vague and fuzzy, in the actual business line between internal control and internal accounting control is difficult to draw. In order to clear the relations between the two, in 1972 the American institute of certified public accountants in the auditing standards announcement no. 1, this paper expounds the internal management control and internal accounting control: the definition of "internal management control including, but not limited to organization plan, and the administrative department of the authorized approval of economic business decision-making steps on the relevant procedures and records. This authorization of items approved activities is the responsibility of management, it is directly related to the management department to perform the organization's business objectives, is the starting point of the economic business accounting control." At the same time, the important content of internal accounting control degree and protect assets, to ensure that the financial records credibility related institutions plans, procedures and records. After a series of changes and redefine the meaning of the internal control is more clear than before and the specification, increasingly broad scope, and introduces the concept of internal audit, has received recognition around the world and references, the internal control system is made.The internal control structure stage: development of the internal controlTheory of internal control structure formed in the 90 s to the 1980 s, this phase of western accounting audit of internal control research focus gradually from the general meaning to specific content to deepen. During this period, the system management theory has become the new management idea, it says: no physical objects in the world are composed of elements of3西安交通大学城市学院本科毕业设计(论文)system, due to the factors, there exists a complicated nonlinear relationship between system must have elements do not have new features, therefore, should be based on the whole the relationship between elements. System management theory will enterprise as a organic system composed of subsystems on management, pay attention to the coordination between the subsystems and the interaction with the environment. In the modern company system and system management theory, under the concept of early already cannot satisfy the need of internal control systems. In 1988, the American institute of certified public accountants issued "auditing standards announcement no. 55", in the announcement, for the first time with the word "internal control structure" to replace the original "internal control", and points out that: "the enterprise's internal control structure including provide for specific target reasonable assurance of the company set up all kinds of policies and procedures". The announcement that the internal control structure consists of control environment, accounting system (accounting system), the control program "three components, the internal control as a organic whole composed of these three elements, raised to the attention of the internal control environment.The control environment, reflecting the board of directors, managers, owners, and other personnel to control the attitude and behavior. Specific include: management philosophy and operating style, organizational structure, the function of the board of directors and the audit committee, personnel policies and procedures, the way to determine the authority and responsibility, managers control method used in the monitoring and inspection work, including business planning, budgeting, forecasting, profit plans, responsibility accounting and internal audit, etc.Accounting systems, regulations of various economic business confirmation, the collection, classification, analysis, registration and preparing method. An effective accounting system includes the following content: identification and registration of all legitimate economic business; Classifying the various economic business appropriate, as the basis of preparation of statements; Measuring the value of economic business to make its currency's value can be recorded in the financial statements; Determine the economic business events, to ensure that it recorded in the proper accounting period; Describe properly in the financial statements of4外文文献原文及译文economic business and related content.The control program, refers to the management policies and procedures, to ensure to achieve certain purpose. It includes economic business and activity approval; Clear division of the responsibility of each employee; Adequate vouchers and bills setting and records; The contact of assets and records control; The business of independent audit, etc. Internal structure of control system management theory as the main control thought, attaches great importance to the environmental factors as an important part of internal control, the control environment, accounting system and control program three elements into the category of internal control; No longer distinguish between accounting control and management control, and uniform in elements describe the internal control, think the two are inseparable and contact each other.Overall internal control framework stages: stage of internal controlAfter entering the 1990 s, the study of internal control into a new stage. With the improvement of the corporate governance institutions, the development of electronic information technology, in order to adapt to the new economic and organizational form, using the new management thinking, "internal control structure" for the development of "internal control to control the overall framework". In 1992, the famous research institutions internal control "by organization committee" (COSO) issued a landmark project - "internal control - the whole framework", also known as the COSO report, made the unification of the internal control system framework. In 1994, the report on the supplement, the international community and various professional bodies widely acknowledged, has wide applicability. The COSO report is a historical breakthrough in the research of internal control theory, it will first put forward the concept of internal control system of the internal control by the original planar structure for the development of space frame model, represents the highest level of the studies on the internal control in the world.The COSO report defines internal control as: "designed by enterprise management, to achieve the effect and efficiency of the business, reliable financial reporting and legal compliance goals to provide reasonable assurance, by the board of directors, managers and other staff to5西安交通大学城市学院本科毕业设计(论文)implement a process." By defining it can be seen that the COSO report that internal control is a process, will be affected by different personnel; At the same time, the internal control is a in order to achieve business objectives the group provides reasonable guarantee the design and implementation of the program. The COSO report put forward three goals and the five elements of internal control. The three major target is a target business objectives, information and compliance. Among them, the management goal is to ensure business efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control; Information goal is refers to the internal control to ensure the reliability of the enterprise financial report; Compliance goal refers to the internal controls should abide by corresponding laws and regulations and the rules and regulations of the enterprise.COSO report that internal control consists of five elements contact each other and form an integral system, which is composed of five elements: control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, monitoring and review.Control Environment: It refers to the control staff to fulfill its obligation to carry out business activities in which the atmosphere. Including staff of honesty and ethics, staff competence, board of directors or audit committee, management philosophy and management style, organizational structure, rights and responsibilities granted to the way human resources policies and implementation.Risk assessment: It refers to the management to identify and take appropriate action to manage operations, financial reporting, internal or external risks affecting compliance objectives, including risk identification and risk analysis. Risk identification including external factors (such as technological development, competition, changes in the economy) and internal factors (such as the quality of the staff, the company nature of activities, information systems handling characteristics) to be checked. Risk analysis involves a significant degree of risk estimates to assess the likelihood of the risk occurring, consider how to manage risk.Control activities: it refers to companies to develop and implement policies and procedures, and 6外文文献原文及译文to take the necessary measures against the risks identified in order to ensure the unit's objectives are achieved. In practice, control activities in various forms, usually following categories: performance evaluation, information processing, physical controls, segregation of duties.Information and communication: it refers to enable staff to perform their duties, to provide staff with the exchange and dissemination of information as well as information required in the implementation, management and control operations process, companies must identify, capture, exchange of external and internal information. External information, including market share, regulatory requirements and customer complaints and other information. The method of internal information including accounting system that records created by the regulatory authorities and reporting of business and economic matters, maintenance of assets, liabilities and owners' equity and recorded. Communication is so that employees understand their responsibilities to maintain control over financial reporting. There are ways to communicate policy manuals, financial reporting manuals, reference books, as well as examples such as verbal communication or management.Monitoring: It refers to the evaluation of internal controls operation of the quality of the process, namely the reform of internal control, operation and improvement activities evaluated. Including internal and external audits, external exchanges.Five elements of internal control system is actually wide-ranging, interrelated influence each other. Control environment is the basis for the implementation of other control elements; control activities must be based on the risks faced by companies may have a detailed understanding and assessment basis; while risk assessment and control activities within the enterprise must use effective communication of information; Finally, effective monitoring the implementation of internal control is a means to protect the quality. Three goals and five elements for the formation and development of the internal control system theory laid the foundation, which fully reflects the guiding ideology of the modern enterprise management idea that security is the result of systems management. COSO report emphasizes the integration framework and internal control system composed of five elements, the framework for the7西安交通大学城市学院本科毕业设计(论文)establishment of an internal control system, operation and maintenance of the foundation.In summary,because of social, economic and environmental change management, internal control functions along with the changes, in order to guide the evolution of the internal control theory. As can be seen from the history of the development of internal control theory, often derived from the internal control organizational change management requirements, from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy, innovation management methods and tools for the development of the power to bring internal controls.From the internal containment center,controlled by the internal organization of the mutual relations between the internal control of various subsystems and went to COSO as the representative to the prevention and management loopholes to prevent the goal, through the organization of control and information systems,to achieve the overall system optimization of modern internal sense of control theory, from Admiral time, corresponding to the two economic revolution.Therefore, in the analysis of foreign internal control theory and Its Evolution, requires a combination of prevailing socio-economic environment and business organization and management requirements, so as to understand the nature of a deeper internal control theory of development.8外文文献原文及译文译文:内部控制Ge.McVay一、内部控制理论的产生与发展演进内部控制在西方国家已经有比较长的发展历史,根据内部控制在不同发展阶段的特征,可以将内部控制的发展分为四个阶段,即内部牵制阶段、内部控制制度阶段、内部控制结构阶段、内部控制整体框架阶段。
内部控制缺陷披露国外文献综述
内部控制缺陷披露国外文献综述作者:孙斌来源:《财会通讯》2012年第35期一、引言在SOX法案颁布前,很少有内部控制方面的实证研究。
一个很重要的原因是,内部控制报告是自愿披露的,有关内部控制的公开信息太少(Hermanson,2000)。
在2002年后的几年中,研究主要集中在内部控制信息披露方面,有关SOX法案实施后内部控制质量的证据十分有限(Krishnan,2005)。
对西方(尤其是美国)内部控制理论框架介绍的论文很多,而内部控制的实证研究才刚刚兴起。
这些研究绝大多数都集中在内部控制信息披露方面。
当前,无论是管理层进行内部控制自我评价,还是注册会计师对内部控制出具鉴证报告,内部控制缺陷的认定都成为了核心和关键。
系统回顾国外相关研究结论、掌握前沿动态,对于内部控制理论与实践都具有现实意义。
二、内部控制缺陷披露与审计的关系Raghunandan & Rama(2006)的研究结果显示,2004年披露实质性漏洞的公司比没有类似披露的公司审计费用高出约43%。
Raniet al.(2008)的研究也表明审计费用与公司内部控制存在的问题的类型和严重程度有关。
Ettredge, Chan, & Sun(2006)研究了内部控制质量对审计报告延迟的影响。
他们发现,内部控制实质性漏洞的存在与审计延迟相关,若公司在人事、职责分工和结算过程中存在缺陷,则往往会经历较长的延迟。
Ettredge, Heintz & Chan (2006)的研究表明,收到注册会计师有关实质性漏洞反对意见报告的公司更可能更换注册会计师。
若注册会计师离任源于客户内部控制存在实质性漏洞,则“四大”较少可能更换注册会计师。
他们还发现,客户期望从继任审计方改善审计意见类型。
同时,管理层实施的自我评估和审计人员的鉴证之间有相互影响。
Smithetal.(2000)发现,内部控制的自我评价有助于审计师对管理层的控制系统是否有效的判断,减少审计师对管理舞弊的实质性测试程序,从而有效降低审计成本。
《企业内部控制优化研究国内外文献综述》4500字
企业内部控制优化研究国内外文献综述1 国外研究现状现代内部监督理论的发展离不开经济的发展。
为了解决实际问题,发达国家(如美国)通过专业团体、机构和其他机构的共同努力,对内部监督理论有较强的理解。
这些发展对我们做出了重大贡献。
“内部监督”的概念在国外出现已久,国外也相继出台了内部监督的法律法规。
1992年,美国的五个会计专业小组集中要求国家错误财务报告委员会(COSO)审查内部控制总的框架报告。
根据报告,内部控制包括五个相关的组成部分:控制环境、风险评估、控制措施、通知与沟通、控制。
风险管理与内部控制之间存在着一定的联系。
Turnbull Committee(2005)指出,风险管理在实现公司目标方面发挥着重要作用。
内部控制制度是风险管理的核心,公司管理者必须从更广阔的角度来考虑内部控制的组成部分,即风险管理。
南非King II(2002)的报告证明,传统的内部控制体系无法管理许多风险,如政治、法律和技术风险。
风险管理必须是管理和减轻风险的关键措施。
他们说,风险管理是一个更复杂的过程。
1995年11月,加拿大注册会计师协会监督标准委员会(coco-komitea)公布了以COSO报告为基础的监督标准,被认为是“内部控制”。
对于支持一系列要素以实现组织目标的组织,建议您可以看到一个公认的观点,内部控制包括风险管理。
Chandler(2000)认为运用内部控制来判断企业中存在的某些突出问题是有效的,内部控制可以帮助企业更加高效准确的发现企业生产经营存在的问题。
另外,基于外部单位的审计意见对企业事情趋于一致性的判断,可以更有效地发挥内部控制的作用,有效提高企业内部控制的效果。
Spire,LauraF(2007)认为,Turnbull 指南明确了企业内部控制与风险管理的关系,内部控制包含风险管理,风险管理是内部控制的可信赖程度。
Turnbull深入研究发现企业管理过程中应当将内部控制和风险管理结合起来,形成双方的相互牵制关系。
内部控制及其披露【外文翻译】
外文翻译Internal control and its disclosureMaterial Source:Laura F. Spira Author: Michael In this paper we explore the use of disclosure as a regulatory tool, using as an illustration the current UK requirements regarding the disclosure of informationabout internal control. After discussing the broad concept of regulation by disclosure, we trace the evolution of concepts of internal control and its reporting, describing the background to the Turnbull guidance for directors on internal control reporting, the basis of current UK requirements. We then examine recent examples of internal control disclosures, identifying the range of ways in which they address the disclosure requirements and considering the possible impact of the disclosure requirements on corporate behaviour and on the audiences for disclosure. We conclude with some reflections on the disclosure life cycle. The paper contributes to the literature on disclosure by specifically considering the role of disclosure as a regulatory tool and by examining the nature of specific disclosures in an area of continuing interest, that of internal control.In his analysis of the development of the role of audit, Power observes that internal control has become increasingly important as part of a system of regulation which relies on making internal mechanisms visible through forms of self-validation and disclosure. Corporate governance requirements have frequently been couched in the form of codes of practice on the principle of ‘comply or explain’ rather than prescriptive legislation. The monitoring role of the board of directors, which forms the apex of the internal control system of an organisation, has been emphasised. The influence of particular interest groups has been important in the negotiation of these developments. Auditors, both internal and external, can claim expertise in internal control, advancing their organisational position in the case of internal auditors (Spira and Page 2003) and increasing the potential for sales of specialised services in the case of external auditors. Regulators and legislators have focused on internal control issues as a policy response to crises (Cunningham 2004).The use of internal control as a corporate governance device reflects a subtle but signifi cant change in its conception, moving from the original ‘‘supportive’’notion that internal control systems were an integral part of the structure of an organisation which enabled its goals to be achieved, to the more recent view of internal control as a s ubstantially ‘‘preventive’’ system, designed to minimise obstructions to goal achievement and carrying significantly greater expectations of the effectiveness of such systems. As Page and Spira (2004) note, companies have also increasingly taken ‘risk-base d’ approaches to internal control because of the increased pace of organisational change—control systems change too fast to be rigidly documented and companies may not even have full documentation relating to some of their IT based systems. For these reasons there has been an increase in ‘delegation’ of control downwards in the organisation and there is likely to be no central record of control systems.The emergence of risk-based approaches to internal control has resulted in a confluence of internal control and risk management to the point that an influentialpublication (Jones and Sutherland 1999) issued at the same time as the Turnbull guidance referred frequently to ‘‘internal control and risk management’’ as a single concept in providing practical assistance for boards in complying with the Turnbull disclosure requirements.The demonstration of ‘‘good’’ corporate governance is a challenge for boards of directors but describing structural mechanisms such as internal control processes may be one way of meeting demands for transparency. Thus, what was once an internal interest becomes a means of demonstrating regulatory compliance.Concerns about internal control in the US and the UK arose initially from a desire to establish the boundaries of external auditor responsibility. The difficulties of defining internal control are illustrated in the earliest US experience, as summarised in a lecture by Mautz (1980). He quotes the 1949 AICPA definition: Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all of the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a business to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies.and describes the c oncern of firms’ legal counsel about the broadness of this definition. This concern led to a new definition issued in 1958 which split the four parts of the original definition between ‘‘accounting control’’ (safeguarding assets and checking reliability an d accuracy of accounting data) and ‘‘administrative control’’ (promotion of operational efficiency and encouragement of adherence to prescribed management policies) and defined auditors’ responsibility as reviewingaccounting controls only. A further narrowing took place in 1972 when the US auditing profession limited the two components of ‘‘accounting control’’ even more.Up to this point, the definition was really only of concern to companies and their auditors but the passing of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 changed this. The Act was passed in response to bribery scandals and for the first time envisaged the use of internal control as regulation. It was based on a narrow conception of internal control newly described as ‘‘internal accounting control’’. It also changed the focus of internal control: whereas the concerns of ‘‘accounting control’’ had been at low organisational levels and clerical procedures, the Act now shifted attention to controls at board level for the first time.Further concern about inadequacies in financial reporting led to a private sector initiative which established the Treadway Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 1987. Its recommendations included a call for a review of the varying concepts of internal control to develop a consistent approach. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO 1992) subsequently produced an integrated framework for internal control in 1992, defining internal control as:A process … designed to provide reasonable assurance regar ding theachievement of objectives in the following categories:• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations.• Reliability of financial reporting.• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations (COSO 1992, p. 9) However, the Sarbanes Oxley legislation of 2002 introduced a further definition: ‘‘internal control over financial reporting’’3 which suggests that consistency has not yet been achieved and ambiguity still exists.In the UK, internal control first entered the corporate governance agenda when the Cadbury Committee, reporting in 1992 on the financial aspects of corporate governance, adopted the view that directors’ responsibilities with regard to internal control should be clarified. They recommended that directors should report on the effectiveness of internal control systems and that auditors should report on that statement but passed responsibility for implementing this to the accountancy profession.In 1994 the Rutteman working party defined internal control using the US definition of 1958 and also replaced the Cadbury recommendation that directors should report on the effectiveness of internal controls with the suggestion that they may wish to do so. In 1998 the Hampel review of the Cadbury Code weakened thisrecommendation even further but, for the first time, suggested that internal control and risk management were related.This link was built on by the internal control working party chaired by Nigel Turnbull which was charged with producing guidance for directors in interpreting the Code’s req uirements for reporting on internal control, finally grasping the nettle avoided by Cadbury, Rutteman and Hampel. Using a broad definition of internal control, the Turnbull guidance views it as a key component of risk management. In terms of the apparent satisfaction of disclosers and their audiences, the guidance consultation initiated by the Financial Reporting Council Turnbull Review Group in 2005. The guidance has also been widely adopted in the public sector.The study reported in this paper uses disclosures required by the Turnbull guidance to illustrate aspects of the use of disclosure as a regulatory tool. Having outlined the background to current concerns about internal control disclosure, the next section considers theories of disclosure.译文内部控制及其披露资料来源:施普格林作者:迈克尔本文选取英国当前对于内部控制信息披露的规定作为案例,探讨了披露这项监管工具的使用。
内部控制英文文献目录
内部控制英文文献目录1.内部控制管制对盈余质量的影响:来自德国的证据(March 2008)The effect of internal control regulation on earnings quality: Evidence from Germany2.内部控制制度如何影响财务报告?(Altamuro,June 24, 2009)How Does Internal Control Regulation Affect Financial Reporting3.财务报告内部控制缺陷的决定因素(Doyle,May 15, 2006)Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting4.应计质量与财务报告内部控制(Doyle,January 24, 2007)Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting5.SOX内部控制缺陷对公司风险与权益资本成本的影响(Ashbaugh-Skaife,June 10, 2008)The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity6.审计委员会质量、审计师独立性与内部控制缺陷(Zhang)Audit Committee Quality, Auditor Independence, and Internal Control Weaknesses7.小企业受益于内部控制缺陷审计师认证吗Do Small Firms Benefit from Auditor Attestation of Internal Control Effectiveness8.内部控制缺陷的决定因素(Jahmani)Determinants of Internal Control Weaknesses In Accelerated Filers9.操控性应计项目能帮助区分内部控制缺陷和欺诈吗Do Discretionary Accruals Help Distinguish between Internal Control Weaknesses and Fraud10.财务报告质量对债务契约的影响:来自内部控制缺陷报告的证据(Costello,September 4, 2010)The impact of financial reporting quality on debt contracting: Evidence from internal control weakness reports11.重大内部控制缺陷与盈余管理Material Internal Control Weaknesses and Earnings Management in the Post-SOX Environment12.家族企业的内部控制(April 2013)Internal Controls in Family-Owned Firms()13.内部控制质量对企业并购绩效的影响研究Study on the Impact of the Quality of Internal Control on the Performance of M&A14.内部控制质量与信用违约互换利差(January 2014)Internal Control Quality and Credit Default Swap Spreads15.家族企业内部控制:特征和后果Internal Control in Family Firms: Characteristics and Consequences16.内部控制报告与会计信息质量:洞察”遵守或解释的“内部控制制度Internal control reporting and accounting quality:Insight "comply-or-explain" internal control regime 17.内部控制报告与会计稳健性Internal Control Reporting and Accounting Conservatism18.会计信息质量影响产品市场契约吗?来自政府合同授予的证据(March 2014)Does Accounting Quality Influence Product Market Contracting? Evidence from Government Contract Awards19.公司特征与财务报告质量:尼日利亚制造业上市公司的证据20.内部控制情况与专家审计师选择The Association between Internal Control Situations and Specialist Auditor Choices21.审计费用反应了控制风险的风险溢价吗(2013-07)Do Audit Fees Reflect Risk Premiums for Control Risk?22.内部控制质量与审计定价Internal Control Quality and Audit Pricing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act23.内部控制缺陷与权益资本成本:来自萨班斯法案404节披露的证据Internal Control Weakness and Cost of Equity: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures24.内部控制缺陷与信息不确定性Internal Control Weaknesses and Information Uncertainty25.重大内部控制缺陷与股票价格崩溃危险:来自404条款披露的证据(May 2013)Material Weakness i n Internal Control and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosure26.SOX内部控制缺陷对公司风险与权益资本成本的影响The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity27.信用评级、债务成本与内部控制信息披露:SOX302和SOX404法的比较28.萨班斯-奥克斯利法案对会计信息债务契约价值的影响The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on the Debt Contracting Value of Accounting Information29.财务报告内部控制的不利意见与审计师解聘/辞职Adverse Internal Control over Financial Reporting Opinions and Auditor Dismissals/Resignations30.新管理人员任命与随后的SOX法案404的意见Appointment of New Executives and Subsequent SOX 404 Opinion31.萨班斯奥克斯利:有关萨班斯法案404影响的证据Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of Sox 40432.内部控制有效性自愿披露的经济决定因素及后果:从首次公开发行的证据(March 2013)Economic Determinants and Consequences of Voluntary Disclosure of Internal Control Effectiveness: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings33.非营利组织中内部控制问题的原因和后果The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit Organizations34.SOX内部控制披露在公司控制权市场中的价值The Value of SOX Internal Control Disclosures in the Market for Corporate Control35.内部控制缺陷与销售、一般的及行政费用的非对称性行为Internal Control Weakness and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs 36.内部控制缺陷及补救措施披露对投资者感知的盈余质量的影响The Impact of Disclosures of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediation on Investor-Perceived Earnings Quality37.内部控制缺陷与美国上市的中国公司与美国公司的审计师SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Auditors of U.S.-Listed Chinese versus U.S. Firms38.内部控制信息披露与代理成本—来自瑞士的非金融类上市公司的证据(January 2013)Internal Control Disclosure and Agency Costs Evidence from Swiss listed non-financial Companies39.萨班斯奥克斯利法案与公司投资:来自自然实验的新证据The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Corporate Investment: New Evidence from a Natural Experiment40.国内投资者保护、所有权结构与交叉上市公司遵守SOX要求披露内部控制缺陷Home Country Investor Protection, Ownership Structure and Cross-Listed Firms’Compliance with SOX-Mandated Internal Control Deficiency Disclosure41.审计师对披露重大缺陷相关风险的看法Auditors’ Perceptions of the Risks Associated with Disclosing Material Weaknesses42.交叉上市公司提供与美国公司相同质量的披露?来自萨班斯-奥克斯利法案302条款下的内部控制缺陷信息披露的证据Do cross-listed firms provide the same quality disclosure as U.S. firms? Evidence from the internal control deficiency disclosure under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act43.内部控制缺陷与并购绩效Internal Control Weaknesses and Acquisition Performance44.萨班斯-奥克斯利法案302条款下的内部控制缺陷对审计费用的影响The Effect of Internal Control Weakness under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Audit Fees45.审计师对财务报告内部控制的评价对审计费用、债务成本及净遵从收益The Effect of Auditors’ Assessment of Internal Control of over Financial Reporting on Audit Fees, Cost of Debt and Net Compliance Benefit46.上市公司披露的信息含量与萨班斯-奥克斯利法案Information Content of Public Firm Disclosures and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act47.财务错报与股票市场的契约:从增发的证据Financial Misstatements and Contracting in the Equity Market: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings48.公司治理质量与SOX 302条款下内部控制报告Corporate Governance Quality and Internal Control Reporting Under Sox Section 30249.审计委员会质量、审计师独立性与内部控制缺陷Audit Committee Quality, Auditor Independence, and Internal Control Weaknesses50.SOX404条款的影响:成本,盈余质量与股票价格The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices51.内部控制缺陷与银行贷款契约:来自SOX404条款披露的证据Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures52.审计师对财务报告内部控制的决策:分析、综合和研究方向Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Decisions: Analysis, Synthesis, and Research Auditors’ Directions53.应计质量与财务报告内部控制(Doyle,The Accounting Review, forthcoming)Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting54.业绩基础CEO和CFO 薪酬对内部控制质量的影响The impact of performance-based CEO and CFO compensation on internal control quality55.内部控制重大缺陷与CFO 薪酬Internal Control Material Weaknesses and CFO Compensation56.财务报告内部控制缺陷的决定因素Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting57.内部控制与管理指南Internal Control and Management Guidance58.2002萨班斯-奥克斯利法案302条款下内部控制缺陷的市场反应以及这些缺陷的特征Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the Characteristics of those Weaknesses under Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 200259.自愿报告内部风险管理和控制系统的经济激励Economic Incentives for Voluntary Reporting on Internal Risk Management and Control Systems60.后萨班斯法案时代审计意见的信息含量The information content of audit opinions in the post-sox era61.上市公司披露的信息含量与萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(April, 2010)Information Content of Public Firm Disclosures and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act62.信息摩擦如何影响公司资产流动性的选择?萨班斯法案404条款的影响s Choice of Asset Liquidity? The Effect of SOX Section How d o Informational Frictions Affect the Firm’40463.已审计的信息披露给资本市场参与者带来利益是什么(December 19, 2013)What are the benefits of audited disclosures to equity market participants64.诉讼风险与审计定价:公众股权的作用(January 7, 2013)Litigation Risk and Audit Pricing: The Role of Public Equity65.萨班斯-奥克斯利法案对IPO和高收益债券发行人的影响The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on IPOs and High Yield Debt Issuers66.来自金融危机的公司治理的经验教训The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis67.谁对企业欺诈吹口哨Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud68.内部控制缺陷与现金持有价值Internal Control Weakness and Value of Cash Holdings69.民族文化和制度环境对内部控制信息披露的影响The impact of national culture and institutional Environment on internal control disclosures70.财务报告质量与权益资本成本之间联系的讨论:一些个人的意见(June 6, 2013)Some Personal Observations on the Debate on the Link between Financial Reporting Quality and theCost of Equity Capital71.使用盈利预测同时估计企业层面的权益资本成本和长期增长Using Earnings Forecasts to Simultaneously Estimate Firm-Specific Cost of Equity and Long-Term Growth72.高管薪酬差距与权益资本成本Executive Pay Disparity and the Cost of Equity Capital73.财务报告质量与公司债券市场(博士论文,Mingzhi Liu, 2011)Financial Reporting Quality and Corporate Bond MarketsReferencesAboody, D., J. 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内部控制国外学者发表的观点
内部控制国外学者发表的观点英文回答:Internal Control: Perspectives from International Scholars.Internal control is a critical component of any organization, as it helps to ensure the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting, safeguard assets, and promote operational efficiency. Over the years, numerous international scholars have conducted extensive research on internal control, offering valuable insights into its various aspects.Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)。
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is a renowned organization that has significantly contributed to the development ofinternal control frameworks. COSO's Internal Control Integrated Framework (IC-IF) provides a comprehensive model for evaluating and improving internal control systems. The IC-IF consists of five components: control environment,risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.International Internal Control Framework (IICF)。
哈药集团三精制药股份有限公司内部控制问题研究优秀毕业论文
学校代码:10213 密级:公开
工商管理硕士学位论文
哈药集团三精制药股份有限公司 内部控制问题研究
硕 士 研究生:苗 雨
导
师:韩东平教授
申 请 学 位:工商管理硕士
所 在 单 位:哈药集团股份有限公司
答 辩 日 期:2009 年 11 月
授予学位单位:哈尔滨工业大学
Classified Index: F230 U.D.C.: 657
- III -
哈尔滨工业大学工商管理硕士学位论文
目录
摘 要.................................................................................................................................I Abstract.......................................................................................................................... II
A Dissertation for the Degree of MBA
A STUDY ON THE INTERNAL CONTROL ISSUES OF HARBIN PHARMACEMACEUTICAL CO., LTD.
Candidate:
MiaoYu
哈尔滨工业大学工商管理硕士学位论文
摘要
随着社会主义市场经济体制和现代制度的确立,我国企业逐步发展成为自 主经营、自我约束、自我发展、自我完善的商品生产者和经营者。企业经营失 败、会计信息失真及不守法经营在很大程度上都可归结为企业内部控制的缺损 或失效。有效的内部控制是公司高效管理的必要组成部分。内部控制的概念正 被发达国家企业管理体系所强调,也越来越引起中国证券市场的关注和重视, 在 2005 年 11 月 2 日颁布的《国务院批转证监会<关于提高上市公司质量意见> 的通知》对上市公司内部控制提出了新的要求,越来越多的上市公司已经意识 到内控制度的完善与上市公司质量提高密不可分。根据证券市场发展情况以及 上市公司实践的要求,上海证券交易所于 2006 年 6 月发布了《上海证券交易 所上市公司内部控制制度指引》,其为上市公司建立和实施内部控制制度提供 指引,并针对上市公司内部控制的信息披露提出了要求。 研究内部控制,对于 促进上市公司经营管理水平的提高,保证会计信息的质量,完善公司治理结构 和信息披露制度,保护投资者的合法权益都有着非常重要的意义。
内部控制外文翻译资料
Internal management, establish a sound internal control system, enterprises and the needs for enterprises to face market risks and challenges. Only in accordance with the actual situation of their own, developed to meet the needs of internal management control system, and strictly follow the implementation can be sustained, steady and healthy development.内部管理,建立健全内部控制制度,企业和企业面临的市场风险和挑战的需要。
只有按照自己的实际情况,开发出满足内部管理控制系统的需求,并严格遵照执行能够持续,稳定和健康的发展。
The so-called internal control, the means by the enterprises board of directors, managers and other staff implementation, in order to ensure the reliability of financial reporting, operating efficiency and effectiveness of existing laws and regulations to follow, and so provide reasonable assurance that the purpose of the course. Internal controls related to enterprise production and management of the control environment, risk assessment, supervision and decision-making, information and transfer and self-examination, from a business perspective on the whole in all aspects of production. Their effective implementation will undoubtedly promote enterprise production and management to a new level, to promote the rationalization of business processes and standardization.所谓内部控制,董事会的企业董事会,经理和其他员工实施的,为保证财务报告的可靠性,现有的法律法规,经营的效率和效果跟踪,并提供合理的保证,本课程的教学目的。
企业内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文:内部控制环境外文翻译摘要:为了保证企业需求内部控制活动的有效性和信息的可靠性以及遵守法律的适用性,每个组织要选择最适合的控制系统。
因此,就必须考虑到意外事故的风险是否切合权变理论。
本文研究的是检视这些风险特点的选择是否适应他们公司内部控制结构和它是否会导致一些更加优惠的有效性的评估控制管理。
虽然内部控制的组成部分已进行单独控制,本文尝试阐明内部控制的关键点并将其放到更加广阔的背景中。
结果证明,基于对741家芬兰公司的调查研究,表明公司用内部控制结构来应对环境的不确定性,并观测控制的有效性的战略对其内部控制结构有着显著的效果。
关键词:内部控制、成效、权变理论、结构方块建模1.绪论人们普遍认为,一个内部控制系统可以帮助企业降低风险,并且使财务报表的可靠性得以保证。
因此,越来越多的企业在他们具体的操作环境下更多的关注自己的内部控制。
在巨大的管理压力下,如何提高内部控制的有效性以及董事会和股东之间的沟通效果,是目前企业亟待解决的重要问题。
由于内部控制可能会影响长期的报告,因此审计人员、供应商、客户都对内部控制关注相当。
Kinney在2000年指出,尽管内部控制对公司影响很大,但在组织环境中内部控制结构却无法实现。
虽然关于内部控制的文献在国际研究上已取得进展,但迄今为止,内部控制的研究数量有限。
在2004年Selte and Widener出版的专业文章中提出,在管理控制中研究较少的内部控制有着很强的实用性。
本文的研究结论有助于了解内部控制结构及其在公司环境中观察到对公司的效果。
即使内部控制结构框架中提出了一个标准化的结构和内部控制目标,但仍然需要注意的是,有效地内部控制是要根据公司的不同特点来制定的。
因此,即使是内部控制的框架中也无法提供一个企业的特点和其控制系统的关系。
因此,本研究利用一个应急方法,审查内部控制结构的设计,并且将其放到不同的环境下观察其效果。
公司内部控制与风险管理的理论与实践研究-以海尔集团为例
公司内部控制与风险管理的理论与实践研究——以海尔集团为例摘要社会经济学在不断发展,经济全球化进程正在加速,为了在日益激烈的市场环境中提高竞争力和地位,公司必须加强内部控制和风险管理。
为了不断增强风险防范能力,公司管理人员应认识到内部控制和风险管理的重要性,并使用先进的科学计算机网络技术来构建完善的风险管理信息系统,以便提升公司对风险的识别能力和对风险的管控能力。
外部信息可帮助内部管理人员识别市场中瞬息万变的信息,有效应对企业的潜在风险,不断提高公司在市场上的竞争力,并实现公司的可持续发展目标。
本文以海尔集团为例,首先介绍了内部控制与风险管理的基本概念,解释和分析了两者之间的关系,并试图从理论上对内部控制与风险管理的关系进行进一步的研究和探讨。
然后以海尔集团为例,通过对海尔集团的组织架构、经营情况等潜在的问题等,以分析海尔集团内部控制和风险管理中存在的问题,并在系统,员工和实践层面分析群体问题的内因和外因,提出针对性发展策略。
关键词:内部控制;风险管理;监督;资源;管理;系统The Theory and Practice of Corporate Internal Control and Risk Management- A study of Haier CompanyAbstractWith the development of Social Economics and the acceleration of economic globalization, companies must strengthen their internal controls and risk management in order to enhance their competitiveness and position in an increasingly competitive market environment. In order to enhance the ability of risk prevention, the managers of the company should realize the importance of internal control and risk management, and use advanced computer network technology to construct perfect risk management information system, so the company can analyze the company in a timely manner. External information can help internal managers to identify the rapidly changing information in the market, effectively deal with the potential risks of enterprises, constantly improve the competitiveness of the company in the market, and achieve the company's sustainable development goals. Taking Haier as an example, this paper first introduces the theory of internal control and risk management, explains the relationship between them, and analyzes the research of internal control and risk management conceptually. Then, to understand the potential of Haier's organizational structure, to analyze the internal control and risk management problems, and in the system, staff and practice level analysis of the internal and external causes of group issues, proposed targeted development strategies.Key words:Internal Control; Risk Management; supervision; resources; management; System目录摘要....................................... 错误!未定义书签。
内部控制外文翻译
外文翻译原文来源:Hammed Arad (philac). A Clear Look at Internal Controls [D].Theory and Concepts Research Paper, 2009内部控制透视:理论与概念环境需要新的业务控制变量不为任何潜在的股东和管理人士的响应因子为1,另外应执行/她组织了一个很大的控制权。
控制是管理活动的东西或以上施加控制。
思想的产生和近十年的发展需要有系统的商业资源和控制这种财富一个新的关注。
主题之一热一回合管制的商业资源是分析每个控制成本效益。
作为内部控制和欺诈的第一道防线,维护资产以及预防和侦查错误。
内部控制,我们可以说是一种控制整个系统的财务和其他方面的管理制定了为企业的顺利运行;它包括内部的脸颊,内部审计和其他形式的控制。
COSO的内部控制描述如下。
内部控制是一个客观的方法用来帮助确保实现。
在会计和组织理论,内部控制是指或目标目标的过程实施由组织的结构,工作和权力流动,人员和具体的管理信息系统,旨在帮助组织实现。
这是一种手段,其中一个组织的资源被定向,监控和测量。
它发挥着无形的(重要的作用,预防和侦查欺诈和保护组织的资源,包括生理(如,机械和财产)和乙二醇,声誉或知识产权,如商标)。
在组织水平,内部控制目标与可靠性的目标或战略的财务报告,及时反馈业务上的成就,并遵守法律,法规。
在具体的交易水平,内部控制是指第三方采取行动以实现一个具体目标(例如,如何确保本组织的款项,在申请服务提供有效的。
)内部控制程序reduce程变异,导致更加具有可预见性outcomes。
在业务实体内部控制也被称为业务控制。
它们是日常的工具使用的经理。
所有管理人员使用的内部控制,以帮助确保他们的经营单位,按照计划,他们使用的方法-政策、程序、组织设计和身体的障碍构成。
内部控制是对以下组合: 1、财务控制 2、其他控件。
根据内部控制研究所印度特许会计师是该组织计划和所有的方法和程序,通过了包括一个由管理机构,以协助实现业务管理的目的是确保尽可能高效有序进行可能的坚持管理政策,对资产的安全护卫预防和信息检测欺诈行为和错误的准确性和完整性的财务会计的可靠记录,及时编制,控制系统内部的事务以外延伸涉及到会计系统的功能。
内部控制外文文献及翻译
附录A关于内部控制的意见如果要证明功能扩展到包含内部控制的有效性,那么报告准则则必须制定,若干基本问题必须被解决。
随着日益频繁增长,审计员听取了他们应该发表的一个效力于客户的内部控制制度建议的意见。
这一证明功能扩展的主张者迅速指出,目前已经有了实例如独立审计师的报告公开他们的客户的内部控制制度和一些政府机构的成效,包括一些空置中的美国证券和交易委员会,都需要一个报告。
这些证实类型的反对者公布了任何关于内部控制的有效性,他们认为,目前有显着性差异监管机构的报告要求和提出意见的内部控制将会误导公众。
本文综述了目前报告的做法,考虑到理想状态相关的危害的特点,并最后提出了一些在任何给与最后判决之前必要的予以回答的问题。
现状报告虽然审计员的报告中的一些情况提及了内部控制的性质,但作出的本质陈述还有很大不同的效应。
大型银行。
关于对内部控制的观点事实上出现在一些大型银行和看法发行的年度报告中。
有时这些意见是被董事会要求的。
例如,下面的主张出现在1969年年度报告的一个大型纽约银行中,作为第3款的独立会计师的标准短形式的报告:我们的审核工作包括评价有效性,大块的内部会计控制,其中还包括内部审计。
我们认为,在于程序的影响下,再加上银行内部审计工作人员所进行的审核,这些构成一个有效的系统的内部会计控制。
意见被提供给几个其他银行,但它们基本上引用的意见是一样的。
美国证券交易委员会的规定。
美国证券交易委员会表格X-17A-5,要求独立审计师作出某些有关的内部控制陈述,并必须在每年的大多数成员国家与每一个证券经纪或注册的交易商根据1934年证券交易法第15条进行交流时。
此外,美国证券交易委员会的第17a-5(g)规定要求独立的核数师的报告要包含“一份如,是否会计师审查了程序,要安全措施保障客户的证券的声明中”此外,许多股票交易所要求该报告要表明审查已取得的“会计制度,内部会计控制和程序,是为维护证券,包括适当的测试它们对以后的期间,检验日期前”,很显然,美国证券交易委员会的工作人员更倾向于考虑,会计师包括了语言相似,所要求的所有报告的交流提交给证券交易委员会。
内部控制外文翻译
内部控制系统披露—一种可替代的管理机制塞尔吉奥-贝里塔会计部门博科尼大学根据代理理论,各种治理机制减少了投资者和管理者之间的代理问题(Jensen and Meckling,1976; Gillan,2006)。
传统上,治理机制已经被认定为内部或外部的。
内部机制包括董事会及其作用、结构和组成(Fama,1980;Fama and Jensen,1983),管理股权(Jensen and Meckling,1976)和激励措施,起监督作用的大股东(Demsetz and Lehn,1985),内部控制系统(Bushman and Smith,2001),规章制度和章程条款(反收购措施)和使用的债务融资(杰森,1993)。
外部控制是由公司控制权市场(Grossman and Hart,1980)、劳动力管理市场(Fama,1980)和产品市场(哈特,1983)施加的控制。
各种各样的金融丑闻,动摇了世界各地的投资者,公司治理最佳实践方式特别强调了内部控制系统在公司治理中起到的重要作用。
内部控制有助于通过提供保证可靠性的财务报告,和临时议会对可能会损害公司经营目标的事项进行评估和风险管理来保护投资者的利益。
这些功能已被的广泛普及内部控制系统架构设计的广泛认可,并指出了内部控制是用以促进效率,减少资产损失风险,帮助保证财务报告的可靠性和对法律法规的遵从(COSO,1992)。
尽管有其相关性,但投资者不能直接观察,因此也无法得到内部控制系统设计和发挥功能的信息,因为它们都是组织内的内在机制、活动和过程(Deumes and Knechel,2008)。
由于投资者考虑到成本维持监控管理其声称的(Jensen and Meckling,1976),内部控制系统在管理激励信息沟通上的特性,以告知投资者内部控制系统的有效性,是当其他监控机制(该公司的股权结构和董事会)比较薄弱,从而为其提供便捷的监控(Leftwich et等, 1981)。
内部控制—国外文献资料
内部控制文献综述摘要:上市公司在经营过程中频繁出现财务丑闻,如安然事件、世通事件,社会各界对企业的内部控制关注度日渐上升。
国外学术界比国内较早地开展了对内部控制研究,因此本文对国外近20多年关于内部控制的文献进行了归类综述,主要从内部控制的需求、质量及重大缺陷披露等方面进行了文献梳理。
最后,本文进行了文献评述,希望本研究能给国内的内部控制研究以启示,帮助企业经营管理者制定出一套符合自身需要的内部控制体系。
关键词:内部控制;重大缺陷披露;文献综述内部控制是一个会计程序或系统,旨在提高效率确保政策的实施、捍卫资产、避免欺诈和错误(Hamed Arad和Babak Jamshedy-Navid,2009)。
现今,内部控制是学术界研究的热点问题,同时也引起了政府、企业参与者的广泛关注。
国内关于内部控制的研究和实务都还处于起步阶段,因此特别需要借鉴国外的经验,在国外学者研究成果的基础上结合我国的国情进行研究具有重大意义。
20年前,国外学者率先开展了对内部控制的研究,研究内容广泛,研究方法丰富,取得了许多具有重要价值的研究成果。
一、内部控制文献综述(一)内部控制管理报告McMullen,D.A.和K.Raghunandan和 D.V.Rama.(1996)通过对具有内部控制管理报告的公司进行实证研究发现,相对于大公司来说,小公司在没有内部控制管理报告的情况下更可能出现财务报告问题,即是强制性内部控制管理报告的收益对小公司来说更大。
Hermanson(2000)调查了9个不同的财务报表使用团体以分析对内部控制报告的需求。
结果表明所有使用团体都认为内部控制报告很重要,并且发现自愿内部控制管理报告提升了内部控制质量,提供了超出审计财务报表的额外信息;内部控制管理报告为公司的长期发展提供指引;而大家对于强制性内部控制管理报告的信息内容没有太多的反应,与个体投资者和内部审计员相比,经理人员更不可能认同强制性内部控制管理报告的价值。
后萨班斯法案时代内部控制实证研究_回顾与展望
【改革发展】后萨班斯法案时代内部控制实证研究:回顾与展望●陈少华,陈爱华(厦门大学管理学院会计系,福建厦门 361005)内容提要:本文对国外(美国为主)近年来内部控制实证研究主题及研究结论进行了回顾与总结,并结合我国财政部等五部委2010年4月颁布《企业内部控制配套指引》,展望我国内部控制实证研究未来方向。
关键词:内部控制;实证研究;回顾展望中图分类号:F270 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1003-4161(2011)01-0147-03 一、导言2002年爆发的安然事件,引发了美国乃至全球对内控机制的极大重视,内部控制也由一项自发性的治理机制演化为一种政府监管强力推动的制度建设,典型表现为美国的S OX法案中强制要求上市公司披露内部控制信息的302、404节条款。
302条款要求SEC会员公司的高管层应证实他们已经评估了财务报告内部控制的有效性,如果高管层认定内部控制存在重大缺陷,他们就不能认定内部控制有效,并强制披露认定的重大缺陷; 404条款要求公司应聘请审计师对年度报告出具鉴证意见。
强制性的内部控制信息披露不但极大地促进了企业内部控制制度的建设与完善,也催生了一大批以实证方法研究内部控制相关问题的文章,它们对世界各国内部控制监管政策的制定和内部控制理论研究的未来发展,具有重要的参考价值。
2010年4月26日,财政部等五部委联合发布了《企业内部控制配套指引》,连同2008年联合发布的《企业内部控制基本规范》,标志着适应我国企业实际情况、融合国际先进经验的中国企业内部控制规范体系基本建成。
本文在广泛收集国际顶尖杂志上已公开发表的内部控制实证研究文献以及在社会科学研究网(SSRN)上公布的工作论文的基础上,对萨班斯法案开始执行起至今国外内部控制实证研究的代表性文献进行总结,并展望我国内部控制实证研究的方向。
二、国外内部控制实证研究回顾(一)内部控制自愿披露的影响因素及披露水平由于公司管理者和外部投资者之间存在信息不对称和代理成本,所以需要披露内部控制信息,同时公司披露内部控制是管理层权衡成本和收益的产物,披露能够减少信息和代理问题导致的效率损失。
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Internal Control Weaknesses and Acquisition PerformancebyNancy Harp, BSA DissertationInBUSINESS ADMINISTRATION - ACCOUNTINGSubmitted to the Graduate Facultyof Texas Tech University inPartial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements forthe Degree ofDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYApprovedDr. Derek OlerChair of CommitteeDr. Steve BuchheitDr. Denton CollinsDr. Ryan WhitbyPeggy Gordon MillerDean of the Graduate SchoolMay, 2012Copyright 2012, Nancy HarpA CKNOWLEDGMENTSI am greatly indebted to my dissertation chair, Derek Oler, for his continued support, guidance, and patience. He has generously given of his time and talents to help me develop as a researcher, for which I am truly grateful. I also gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance and insights provided by my committee members, Steve Buchheit, Denton Collins, and Ryan Whitby.I thank workshop participants at Bucknell University, Clemson University, Texas Tech University, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, and Washington and Lee University for their helpful comments. I especially thank Larry Abbott for his particularly insightful workshop comments. Finally, I would like to sincerely thank my husband, Jon Harp, for his unwavering support and encouragement. His support, along with that of my family and friends, has played a fundamental role in the successful completion of this dissertation.iiT ABLE OF C ONTENTSA CKNOWLEDGMENTS (ii)A BSTRACT (v)L IST OF T ABLES (vi)L IST OF F IGURES (vii)I NTERNAL C ONTROL WEAKNESSES AND ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE (1)I. Introduction (1)II. Background on SOX Requirements and Literature Review (5)III. Hypotheses Development (9)IV. Research Method (16)Sample Selection (17)Research Design (18)Descriptive Statistics (25)V. Results (27)VI. Sensitivity Tests and Additional Analyses (33)Sensitivity Tests (33)Additional Analyses (37)VII. Conclusion (45)REFERENCES (66)A PPENDICES (70)A. Examples of Sections 302 and 404 Material Weakness Disclosures (70)B. Variable Definitions (73)C. Sample Selection Bias (75)iiiD. Corporate Governance Alternative Explanation (88)ivA BSTRACTThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) requires most publically traded firms to periodically disclose information about their internal control environments. I study a previously unexplored context where SOX internal control disclosures should be relevant; mergers and acquisitions transactions. Poor internal control quality at the acquiring firm is likely to impact acquisition profitability through a pre-merger “decision effect” and/or a post-merger “integration effect.” Weak internal controls at an acqui ring firm suggest that management’s decision to acquire a particular firm is based on less timely/less accurate internal reports and projections – information crucial to selection of profitable acquisitions. Once an acquisition is made, weak internal cont rols may then impair the acquirer’s ability to quickly and effectively integrate the target to capture anticipated synergies.I expect that these internal control problems will affect acquisition performance, and accordingly I predict that lower internal control quality at the acquiring firm will lead to poorer acquisition performance in both operating performance and stock returns. I find that lower internal control quality predicts significantly lower post-acquisition operating performance. Investors seem to partially understand and anticipate the impact of internal control quality on acquisition performance, as I find a significant relationship between internal control quality and announcement period abnormal returns. However, investors apparently do not fully anticipate the implications of internal control information; I find that SOX material weakness information available pre-announcement predicts significant negative post-acquisition abnormal returns. My findings contribute to both the mergers and acquisitions literature and the SOX cost-benefit debate.vL IST OF T ABLES1 Sample Selection Procedure (50)2 Descriptive Statistics – Acquirer Internal Control Qualityand Acquirer RNOA Sample (52)3 Descriptive Statistics – Acquirer Internal Control Qualityand Acquirer Returns Sample (53)4 Correlations – Acquirer Internal Control Quality andAcquirer RNOA Sample (54)5 Regression Results – Acquirer RNOA on AcquirerInternal Control Quality (59)6 Regression Results – Acquirer Announcement PeriodReturns on Acquirer Internal Control Quality (61)7 Regression Results – Acquirer Interim Period Returns onAcquirer Internal Control Quality (62)8 Regression Results – Acquirer Post-Acquisition Returnson Acquirer Internal Control Quality (63)9 Regression Results – Acquirer RNOA and Post-Acquisition Returns on Internal Control Quality –Additional Analyses (64)C.1 Sample Selection Bias Analyses - RNOA Testing (81)C.2 Sample Selection Bias Analyses - Returns Testing (84)D.1 Corporate Governance Analyses – RNOA Testing (93)D.2 Corporate Governance Analyses – Announcement PeriodReturns Testing (96)D.3 Corporate Governance Analyses –Interim Period ReturnsTesting (99)D.4 Corporate Governance Analyses –Post-Acquisition PeriodReturns Testing (102)viL IST OF F IGURES1 Returns Measurement Windows. (49)viiI NTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES AND ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE I. IntroductionJust after signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act” or “SOX”) into law, President Bush described the Act as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Del ano Roosevelt” (Bumiller 2002, 1). Researchers have been studying the effects of SOX for nearly a decade, and overall find that it provides mixed benefits to investors.1 However, the impact of SOX within the context of merge rs and acquisitions (“M&A”) has received very little academic attention. Examining the impact of SOX in an M&A context is important because acquisitions represent significant investments by acquirers with billions of dollars spent on acquisitions in the U.S. each year; $996.5 billion was spent in the U.S. onM&A transactions in 2011 (Ovide 2011). And, while M&A activity had slowed amidst the recent financial crisis, the combined dollar value of U.S. M&A deals in 2011 increased 12 percent over 2010 (Ovide 2011). The objective of this dissertation is to understand the role that internal control quality plays in M&A transactions. Specifically, I examine how SOX internal control weaknesses at the acquiring firm may affect the acquirer‟s fundamental performan ce and stock performance.I investigate the potential influence that SOX internal control weaknesses have on M&A for at least two reasons. First, my research contributes to the ongoing debate1 For example, Jain et al. (2008) find that market liquidity improved from pre-SOX to post-SOX period. Cohen et al. (2008) find that accruals-based earnings management declined significantly post-SOX, but real earnings management increased significantly post-SOX. Beneish et al. (2008) find that only SOX Section 302 material weaknesses (but not the more costly, audited Section 404 disclosures) are informative to the market.1regarding the costs and benefits of SOX. Much of the debate focuses on Section 404 of SOX, which requires annual disclosure of material internal control weaknesses and an independent audit opinion on the effectiveness of the internal control environment. The results of several archival studies call into question the benefits of making costly Section 404 material weakness disclosures to investors (e.g. Doyle et al. 2007a; Ogneva et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008). However, disclosures about the quality of a firm‟s internal control environment may be especially info rmative within the M&A context, since poor quality internal control systems may impede a quick and effective integration of the target firm. Finding evidence of the relationship I predict in this study between internal control quality and M&A performance can be interpreted as an unanticipated benefit of SOX internal control disclosures, since these disclosures may be helpful to investors as they try to predict the success of acquisitions. My findings are valuable to practitioners, academic researchers, and regulators seeking to understand and evaluate the benefits and costs to making SOX internal control quality disclosures.Second, M&A transactions have typically been characterized as value- destructive for the acquiring firm‟s shareholders, although some acquirers are able to achieve value-enhancement for their shareholders (see Moeller et al. 2005; also see Haleblian et al. 2009 for a literature review). Extant research has identified several variables that appear to improve acquisition performance for acquiring firm shareholders. I posit that the internal control environment of acquiring firms is an important firm-specific characteristic that impacts the value of an acquisition to2acquirer shareholders. Thus, I contribute to the subset of the acquisitions literature that “importantly reveals conditions and situations under which acquisitions do benefit acquirers” (Haleblian et al. 2009, 470). My results on the moderating impact of acquiring firms‟ internal control environments should be informativ e to managers, investors, and academic researchers.I study acquisitions for which a U.S. public firm purchased a U.S. target from August 29, 2002 to December 31, 2009.2 I predict that the acquisition value to acquirer shareholders will be negatively related to material weaknesses reported by the acquirer. The primary underlying support for my hypothesis is that firms with poorer internal controls may make poorer decisions and they may experience more difficulty integrating the target quickly to achieve synergies. Moody‟s Investors Services warns the presence of certain “company-level” material weaknesses reported under SOX “call into question not only management‟s ability to prepare accurate financial reports, but also its ability to control the business” (Doss and Jonas 2004, 1). Feng et al. (2009) also suggest that internal control quality impacts the quality of internal reports which in turn impacts the quality of a variety of management decisions, including merger and acquisitions decisions. If Mood y‟s concerns and Feng et al.‟s (2009) suggestions are valid, then acquiring firms with low quality internal control environments will make relatively poorer acquisition decisions and have more post-2 Section 302 of SOX was effective for all U.S. publically-traded firms as of August 29, 2002. Compliance with Section 404 was required beginning with fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004 and is only required for accelerated filers. I form a Section 302 and a Section 404 sample and test all my hypotheses on both samples, since prior research suggests that Section 302 weaknesses may be more influential than Section 404 (e.g., Beneish et al. 2008). The Section 404 sample is significantly more restricted both by years of available disclosures and by the number of firms required to comply.3merger difficulties. I examine the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirers and measure acquisition value to acquirer shareholders by examining abnormal returns over the announcement period, the interim period, and the post-acquisition period as suggested by Oler (2008) because the implications of internal control information may not be immediately and fully impounded into stock prices at the announcement date. I more fully develop the logic behind my predictions in the Hypotheses Development Section.I find that poor internal control quality of the acquiring firm pre-acquisition is predictive of significantly lower post-acquisition operating performance. This finding holds regardless as to whether Section 302 or Section 404 material weaknesses are used to proxy for internal control quality. I find that investors appear to use Section 302 internal control disclosures to anticipate the poorer post-acquisition operating performance of material weakness acquirers as evidenced through their significantly negative response in the announcement period. My findings in the post-acquisition period suggest that investors‟ response to internal control information during the announcement period is incomplete. I find a significantly negative relationship between post-acquisition abnormal returns and pre-announcement Section 302 disclosures. My findings provide evidence of another benefit of SOX internal control disclosures, and they also contribute to the M&A literature by identifying a new firm-specific characteristic that moderates acquisition performance.The investor response to the more costly Section 404 material weaknesses in both the announcement period and the post-acquisition period is also negative, but4overall only marginally significant. The lack of strong results when using Section 404 versus Section 302 is consistent with prior research finding Section 302 disclosures to be more informative (e.g., Beneish et al. 2008; Ogneva et al. 2007). It is also consistent with the notion that audited Section 404 material weaknesses may be less severe and less detrimental to a firm than unaudited Section 302 material weaknesses (identified by management) because auditors may apply a lower materiality threshold than management when assessing internal control quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; Beneish et al. 2008).In the next section I provide a brief background on the SOX requirements for internal control reporting along with a summary of the SOX internal control literature.I develop my hypotheses in the following section. The Research Method Section follows with a discussion of my data collection and research methods. The next section presents the results. A Sensitivity Tests and Additional Analyses section follows and then I conclude.II. Background on SOX Requirements and Literature ReviewThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was signed into law on July 30, 2002 “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes” (U.S. House of Representatives 2002, 1). Academic researchers have studied the effectiveness of the Act in broadly achieving these goals. For example, Jain et al. (2008) find that market liquidity improved from pre-SOX to post-SOX and interpret these results as evidence that investors‟ confidence increa sed after SOX and public information was perceived5as more reliable. Other researchers focus on the specific effects of two of the most controversial sections within the Act – Section 302 and Section 404.Section 302 and Section 404 both require management (and auditors under Section 404) to communicate information to the public about the overall effectiveness of the company‟s internal controls over financial reporting. Prior to SOX, this information was not required to be disclosed to the public. Internal control weaknesses reported under Section 302 and Section 404 suggest problems that could potentially lead to undetected misstatements in the firm‟s financial statements. Appendix A provides examples of Section 302 and Section 404 material weakness disclosures taken from selected acquiring firms in my sample.While both Section 302 and Section 404 disclosures provide information on internal control quality, there are important differences between these two sections that may impact their ability to inform investors. Section 302 disclosures represent management‟s unaudited assessment of internal control quality, whereas Section 404 disclosures represent audited disclosures. The distinction between audited and unaudited is important because some have suggested that auditors may apply a lower materiality threshold when assessing internal control quality as compared to management; thus, audited disclosures under Section 404 may include material weaknesses that would not have been considered material by management in their unaudited Section 302 disclosures (Doyle et al. 2007a; Beneish et al. 2008).3 Another 3 Supporting this notion, a recent SEC study analyzing research on internal control issues found that “the majority of internal control deficiencies that were classified by the auditor as a significant deficiency or a material weakness were initially classified by the issuer as less severe” (“SEC Report” 2011).6significant difference between the sections is the difference in the size of companies that are required to comply. All U.S. public firms must comply with Section 302 whereas only the larger, accelerated filers must comply with Section 404. Some evidence suggests that internal control quality information may be more informative to market participants for smaller firms (i.e. those subject to Section 302, but not Section 404) because these smaller firms operate in less rich information environments that inherently present higher information uncertainty to investors (Beneish et al. 2008).As Section 302 and Section 404 of SOX are costly for public companies to comply with, a debate arose on whether disclosures made in accordance with these sections are informative to investors and offer sufficient benefits to warrant these costs. Consistent with the suggested materiality differences and company size effect arguments discussed above, researchers generally find that internal control disclosures made in accordance with Section 302 are more informative than the audited Section 404 internal control disclosures. Beneish et al. (2008) find that companies disclosing material weaknesses under Section 302 experience statistically significant abnormal negative returns around the disclosure time, an abnormal increase in their implied cost of capital, and abnormal negative earnings forecast revisions. However, they do not find any of these results for the companies disclosing Section 404 material weaknesses. Likewise, Ogneva et al. (2007) are not able to find a statistically significant relationship between Section 404 internal control weaknesses and higher costs of equity. Hammersley et al. (2008) find that the severity of the internal control7problem disclosed under Section 302 is also informative, as they find larger negative abnormal returns for more severe weaknesses.Other studies focus on the relationship between earnings quality and Section 302 and Section 404 internal control weaknesses. Doyle et al. (2007a) find a negative association between Section 302 material weaknesses and accruals quality, but a negative association between Section 404 material weaknesses and accruals quality only when the weaknesses are classified as company-wide. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) examine changes in internal control quality reported under both Section 302 and 404, and find that improvements in accruals quality are associated with remediation of material weaknesses.While SOX internal control assessments made under both Sections 302 and 404 are limited to controls that prevent or detect material misstatements in external financial reporting, there is some evidence to suggest that internal control problems reported under SOX may also indicate lower quality internal financial reports. Specifically, Feng et al. (2009) suggest that firms with SOX Section 404 material weaknesses may have lower quality internal financial reports used by management to make projections and operational decisions. Consistent with this proposed relationship, they find lower management forecast accuracy for firms with Section 404 material weaknesses.4 The authors suggest that the lower internal control quality in these firms leads to managers using “lower quality financial inputs to form this4 Feng et al. (2009) focus primarily on Section 404 material weaknesses; however, they replicate their analyses using Section 302 material weaknesses. Though tables are not presented, the authors report in footnotes 9 and 21 that the results from their analyses using Section 302 material weaknesses are consistent with their Section 404 results.8guidance.” They also suggest that weak internal controls have the potential to impact important management decisions, including mergers and acquisitions.III. Hypotheses DevelopmentPoor internal control quality at the acquiring firm may impact acquisition profitability through two possible mechanisms: a pre-acquisition “decision effect” and a post-acquisition “integration effect.” The “decision effect” arises because of a reliance on poorer quality internal information to make an acquisition decision. When contemplating an acquisition, acquirer managers use internal financial reports, projections, and other internal operational reports to determine whether a particular acquisition should be undertaken. Some suggest and provide empirical evidence that internal control weaknesses disclosed under Section 404 of SOX negatively impact the quality of these internal reports used by management to make decisions. For example, Moody‟s Investors Services questions the “quality of internal data that management uses to make decisions” for companies that report “company-wide” material weaknesses under Section 404 of SOX (Doss and Jonas 2004, 1). Feng et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence regarding the impact of SOX internal control problems on internal reports. They find a significantly negative relationship between management forecast accuracy and SOX Section 404 material weaknesses, and conclude that “internal control quality has an economically significant effect on internal management reports and thus decisions based on the se figures” (Feng et al. 2009, 190). Thus, I expect that acquiring firms with internal control quality problems will have less reliable, less accurate, and/or less timely internal information needed to9make sound acquisition decisions.5 Therefore, all else equal, the lack of high quality internal reports should lead to poorer, more value-destructive acquisition decisions.The “integration effect” of internal control problems on acquisition performance arises after the acquisition deal closes. Acquirer firms with poorer internal control quality may experience more problems carrying out their post-merger integration plans and achieving necessary synergies with the target firm after acquisition; these potential operational problems could impact the value of the acquisition for acquiring firm shareholders. Achieving quick integration and synergies is commonly considered as one of the most crucial factors in an acquisition‟s profitability. A professional publication on M&A by Bruner (2004, 7) cautions that “no matter how good the deal design, implementing the merger integration is where the hypothesiz ed deal benefits are won or lost.” Several companies also describe the importance of a quick integration process. For example, Dow Chemical‟s Randy Croyle described the role of speed in its acquisition integration process as follows: Speed is one of the key elements for us…the way we have speed is to have areally robust implementation plan…speed is a way of synergy capture…to getcosts out of the system as quickly as we can (Saint-Onge and Chatzkel 2009,211).5 As an illustration of how SOX material weaknesses might impact the quality of internal reports used to make operational decisions, consider the examples of Section 302 and Section 404 material weaknesses provided in Appendix A. The disclosures describe problems in both preparation and review of financial information due to limited or strained finance/accounting personnel. It is likely that these limitations within the finance/accounting departments impact the ability of the company to produce accurate and timely reports used for internal purposes.10Tony Kuhel of BP has a similar view of the role of speed in an integration which he described during a discussion of BP‟s acquisition of Amoco:The number one priority was speed. For BP, [our goal] was very simple: Get through integration as fast as possible (Saint-Onge and Chatzkel 2009, 217). Ogneva et al. (2007, 1256) suggest that internal control weaknesses “may be symptomatic of poor management controls in general.” Likewise, in a special comment on SOX Section 404 reports, Moody‟s Investors Service warns that company-wide material weaknesses in internal control raise concerns over the management‟s “ability to control the business” (Doss and Jonas 2004, 1). While Moody‟s does not directly elaborate on how these internal control problems may harm management‟s abilities, it is clear that the ratings agency perceives a connection between weak internal controls and management‟s operational prowess. One possibility is that internal control problems at the acquiring firm impact the quality of acquisition performance because upper management is distracted by internal control issues.6 Coates (2007) contends that the disclosure of internal control weaknesses required by Section 404 creates strong incentives to remediate these problems, even if the cost of remediating exceeds the expected benefits. Engel et al. (2007, 121) also warn that CEO and CFO certifications of financial statements required by SOX “may divert the attention of these decision-makers from other aspects of the business.” If the certification process is made more difficult by material weaknesses in controls that 6 For example, in 2005 the Federal Reserve banned Citigroup from major M&A activity until it improved its internal controls. The Fed justified this ban by saying that it was “important that management‟s attention not be diverted from these efforts by the demands that mergers and acquisitions plac e on management resources” (Reuters 2005).11may result in undetected material misstatements, then CEOs and CFOs should be even more distracted from other business activities in the presence of poor internal control quality. Thus, relative to firms with better internal control quality, management at firms with internal control problems may not be able to focus as much energy and resources on post-acquisition integration/operational tasks due to internal control distractions.7 This leads to my first hypothesis:H1: Controlling for other factors that impact post-acquisition return on net operating assets, there is a negative association between material weaknesses reported by the acquirer in accordance with Sections 302 and 404 of SOX and post-acquisition return on net operating assets.Assuming that the market anticipates poorer post-acquisition operating performance for acquirers with SOX internal control problems (as predicted in H1) and quickly impounds this information into stock price, my second hypothesis follows:H2: Controlling for other factors that impact acquirer announcement period returns, pre-announcement material weaknesses reported by an acquirer in accordance with Sections 302 and 404 of SOX are negatively associated with announcement period returns to acquirer shareholders.7 The SOX material weaknesses described in Appendix A exemplify how poor internal control quality might negatively impact post-merger integration activities. The selected SOX disclosures indicate that the companies are struggling to meet their current financial reporting needs; integrating another company into the acquirer will put additional strain on already overly burdened finance/accounting personnel. Additionally, both acquirers described remediation plans in their SEC filings, thus management will likely be juggling post-merger integration and internal control remediation efforts.12Although H2 assumes that the market quickly impounds the potential negative effects of poor internal control quality into price, I examine multiple periods and measures of acquisition value because investors may not fully impound internal control information into stock price during various periods. Associations between internal control quality and acquirer value detected in different periods have different interpretations. Of course, a failure to detect a significant association in any of the three periods could mean that there is severe measurement error in my proxy for internal control quality or that internal control quality has no effect on acquisition value. I discuss the specific interpretations of finding (or failing to find) associations in each period after each hypothesis.One explanation for a failure to fully impound information quickly into stock price is the limited attention hypothesis suggested by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Their model suggests that if time and attention are costly to investors, then it is rational for investors to ignore the implications of public information that is less salient and more difficult to process. Oler (2008) finds evidence of limited investor attention to pre-announcement cash level in acquiring firms, in that cash level can be used to predict post-acquisition returns. Accordingly, I examine acquisition value creation or destruction for acquirers in three distinct periods: the announcement period, the interim period, and the post-acquisition period. Figure 1 depicts the three time periods I examine. Oler (2008, 281) recommends using this empirical analysis in situations where “information is revealed to the market at a specific date, but where the market may fail to fully impou nd all implications of that information until later.”13。