哈佛最受欢迎公开课～正义.ppt
哈佛大学公开课公正justice10TheGoodCitizenFree
Justice 10 The Good Citizen / Freedom vs. Fit 好市民/自由与适应We turn to Aristotle after examining theories, modern theories, of justice that try to detach considerations of justice and rights from questions of moral desert and virtue.Aristotle disagrees with Kant and Rawls.Aristotle argues that justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve.And the central idea of Aristotle's theory of justice is that in reasoning about justice and rights we have, unavoidably, to reason about the purpose, or the end, or the telos, of social practices in institutions.Yes, justice requires giving equal things to equal persons, but the question immediately arises, in any debate about justice, equal in what respect?And Aristotle says we need to fill in the answer to that question by looking to the characteristic end, or the essential nature, or the purpose, of the thingwe're distributing.And so we discussed Aristotle's example of flutes; who should get the best flutes.And Aristotle's answer was the best flute-players.The best flute-player should get the best flute because that's the way of honoring the excellence of flute playing.It's a way of rewarding the virtue of the great flute-player.What's interesting though, and this is what we are going to explore today, is that it's not quite so easy to dispense with teleological reasoning when we're thinking about social institutions and political practices.In general it's hard to do without teleology when we're thinking about ethics, justice, and moral argument.At least that is Aristotle's claim.And I would like to bring out the force in Aristotle's claim by considering two examples.One is an example that Aristotle spends quite a bit of time discussing; the case of politics.How should political offices and honors, how should political rule be distributed?The second example is a contemporary debate about golf and whether the Professional Golfers Association should be required to allow Casey Martin, a golfer with a disability, to ride in a golf cart.Both cases bring out a further feature of Aristotle's teleological way of thinking about justice.And that is that when we attend to the telos, or the purpose, sometimes we disagree and argue about what the purpose of a social practice really consists in.And when we have those disagreements part of what's at stake in those disagreements is not just who will get what, not just a distributive question, but also an honorific question.What qualities, what excellences, of persons will be honored?Debates about purpose and telos are often, simultaneously, debates about honor.Now, let's see how that works in the case of Aristotle's account of politics.When we discuss distributive justice these days we're mainly concerned with the distribution of income and wealth and opportunity.Aristotle took distributive justice to be mainly not about income and wealth but about offices and honors.Who should have the right to rule?Who should be a citizen?How should political authority be distributed?Those were his questions.How did he go about answering those questions?Well, in line with his teleological account of justice, Aristotle argues that to know how political authority should be distributed we have, first, to inquire into the purpose, the point, the telos, of politics.So, what is politics about?And, how does this help us decide who should rule?Well, for Aristotle the answer to that question is, politics is about forming character, forming good character.It's about cultivating the virtue of citizens.It's about the good life.The end of the State, the end of the political community, he tells us in Book Three of the Politics, is not mere life, it's not economic exchange only, it's not security only, it's realizing the good life.That's what politics is for according to Aristotle.Now, you might worry about this.You might say, "Well, maybe this shows us why those modern theorists of justice, and of politics, are right".Because remember, for Kant and for Rawls, the point of politics is not to shape the moral character of citizens.It's not to make us good.It's to respect our freedom to choose our goods, our values, our ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others.Aristotle disagrees."Any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness.Otherwise political association sinks into a mere alliance.Law becomes a mere covenant, a guarantor of man's rights against one another, instead of being - as it should be - a way of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just." That's Aristotle's view."A polis is not an association for residents on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange." Aristotle writes."The end and purpose of a polis is the good life, and the institutions of social life are means to that end." Now, if that's the purpose of politics, of the polis, then, Aristotle says, we can derive from that the principles of distributive justice; the principles that tell us who should have the greatest say, who should have the greatest measure of political authority.And what's his answer to that question?Well, those who contribute the most to an association of this character, namely an association that aims at the good, should have a greater share in political rule and in the honors of the polis.And the reasoning is, they are in a position to contribute most to what political community is essentially about.Well, so you can see the link that he draws between the principle of distribution for citizenship and political authority and the purpose of politics."But why," you'll quickly ask, "Why does he claim that political life, participation in politics, is somehow essential to living a good life?" "Why isn'tit possible for people to live perfectly good lives, decent lives, moral lives, without participating in politics?" Well, he gives two answers to that question.He gives a partial answer, a preliminary answer, in Book One of the Politics where he tells us that only by living in a polis, and participating in politics, do we fully realize our nature as human beings.Human beings are, by nature, meant to live in a polis.Why?It's only in political life that we can actually exercise our distinctly human capacity for language, which Aristotle understands is this capacity to deliberate about right and wrong, the just and the unjust.And so, Aristotle writes in Book One of the Politics, that the polis, the political community, exists by nature and is prior to the individual.Not prior in time, but prior in its purpose.Human beings are not self-sufficient, living by themselves, outside a political community."Man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or who has no need to share, because he's alreadyself-sufficient, such a person must be either a beast or a god." So we only fully realize our nature, we only fully unfold our human capacities, when we exercise our faculty of language, which means when we deliberate with our fellow citizens about good and evil, right and wrong, just and the unjust."But why can we only exercise our capacity for language in political community?" you might ask.Aristotle gives a second part, a fuller part, of his answer in the Nichomachean Ethics; an excerpt of which we have among the readings.And there he explains that political deliberation, living the life of a citizen, ruling and being ruled in turn, sharing in rule, all of this is necessary to virtue.Aristotle defines happiness not as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain but as an activity, an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.And he says that every student of politics must study the soul because shaping the soul is one of the objects of legislation in a good city.But why is it necessary to live in a good city in order to live a virtuous life?Why can't we just learn good moral principles at home or in a philosophy class or from a book, live according to those principles, those rules, those precepts, and leave it at that?Aristotle says virtue isn't acquired that way.Virtue is only something we can acquire by practicing, by exercising the virtues.It's the kind of thing we can only learn by doing.It doesn't come from book learning.In this respect, it's like flute playing; you couldn't learn how to play a musical instrument well just by reading a book about it.You have to practice, and you have to listen to other accomplishedflute-players.There are other practices and skills of this type.Cooking; there are cookbooks but no great chef ever learns how to cook by reading a cookbook only.It's the kind of thing you only learn by doing.Joke-telling is probably another example of this kind.No great comedian learns to be a comedian just by reading a book on the principles of comedy.It wouldn't work.Now, why not?What do joke-telling and cooking and playing a musical instrument have in common such that we can't learn them just by grasping a precept or a rule that we might learn from a book or a lecture?What they have in common is that they are all concerned with getting the hang of it.But also what is it we get the hang of when we learn how to cook, or play a musical instrument, or tell jokes well?Discerning particulars, particular features of a situation.And no rule, no precept, could tell the comedian or the cook or the great musician how to get in the habit of, the practice of, discerning the particular features of a situation.Aristotle says virtue is that way too.Now, how does this connect to politics?The only way we can acquire the virtues that constitute the good life is to exercise the virtues, to have certain habits inculcated in us, and then to engage in the practice of deliberating with citizens about the nature of the good.That's what politics is ultimately about.The acquisition of civic virtue, of this capacity to deliberate among equals, that's something we couldn't get living a life alone outside of politics.And so, that's why, in order to realize our nature, we have to engage in politics.And that's why those who are greatest in civic virtue, like Pericles, are the ones who properly have the greatest measure of offices and honors.So, the argument about the distribution of offices and honors has this teleological character, but also an honorific dimension.Because part of the point of politics is to honor people like Pericles.It isn't just that Pericles should have the dominant say because he has the best judgment, and that will lead to the best outcomes, to the best consequences for the citizens.That's true, and that's important.But a further reason people like Pericles should have the greatest measure of offices, and honors, and political authority, and sway in the polis, is that part of the point of politics is to single out and honor those who posses the relevant virtue, in this case civic virtue, civic excellence, practical wisdom, to the fullest extent.That's the honorific dimension bound up with Aristotle's account of politics.Here's an example that shows the link in a contemporary controversy; the link to which Aristotle draws our attention between arguments about justice and rights on the one hand and figuring out the telos or the purpose of a social practice on the other.Not only that, the case of Casey Martin and his golf cart also brings out the link between debates about what the purpose of a social practice or a game is, on the one hand and the question of what qualities should be honored on the other; the link between teleology and honor-based principles of distributive justice.Who was Casey Martin?Well, Casey Martin is a very good golfer.Able to compete at the highest levels of golf but for one thing; he has a rare circulatory problem in his leg that makes it very difficult for him to walk; not only difficult but dangerous.And so he asked the PGA, which governs the pro tour in golf, to be able to use a golf cart when he competed in professional tournaments.PGA said no, and he sued under the Americans for Disabilities Act; he sued in a case that went all the way to the United States Supreme Court.The question the Supreme Court had to answer was, does Casey Martin have a right that the PGA provide him, allow him, to use a golf cart on the tour, or not?How many here think that, from a moral point of view, Casey Martin should have a right to use a golf cart?And how many think that he should not have a right to a golf cart, in the tournaments?So the majority are sympathetic to Casey Martin's right, though a substantial minority disagree.Let's first hear from those of you who would rule against Casey Martin.Why would you not say that the PGA must give him a golf cart?Yes.Since the inception of golf, because it has been part of the sport it is now intrinsically part of golf; walking the course.And thus, because it's intrinsic to golf, I'd argue that not being able to walk the course is just not being able to perform an aspect of the sport, which is necessary to performing at a professional level.Good.Stay there for a minute.What's your name?Tommy.Are you a golfer, by the way, Tom?Not so much but, yeah, a little bit.Are there any golfers here, I mean, real golfers?Thank you, professor, that was...No, no.I'm just taking your word for it.Is there someone here on the golf team?Yes?Tell us your name, and tell us what you think.My name is Michael and I usually take a cart.So . . .I'm probably the wrong person to ask.Is that why your hand went up slowly when I asked?Yes.Alright, but Tom is saying, Tom said a minute ago that at least at the professional level walking the course is essential to the game.Do you agree?I would, yes.You do?Then why do you take a cart?And you call yourself a golfer?No, no, no.I'm kidding, I'm kidding.What do you say to that?When I have walked the course it does add tremendously to the game.It makes it a lot harder.It really does.Yeah?Alright let's hear, Michael and Tom stay there, let's hear from people who say that he should have a right to a golf cart.Why? Who is prepared to defend that position?Yes.Well, I think the PGA should definitely be required to give him a golf cart because they argue in the decision that it's not just a matter of, he's not experiencing fatigue.For him he's still walking about a mile, the cart can't go everywhere with him, and in that mile he is still experiencing more fatigue and pain than a healthy player would.So, it's not as if you're removing the disadvantage.What's your name?Riva.Riva, what do you say to Tom's point that walking the course is essential to the game?It would be as if a disabled player could play in the NBA but not have to run up and down the court.Well, I think there are two responses to that.First, I don't think it's essential to the game, because most golfers who play, particularly recreationally, play with a cart.-- Like Michael.And on several of the tours you can play with a cart; on the Senior PGA Tour, on the Nike Tour, in a lot of the college events.And those events are just as competitive and just as high level as the PGA Tour.So, really it's just a matter of selective reasoning if you argue it as an important part of the sport.But, even if it is he still does have to walk, he still plays golf standing up, it's not as if he's playing golf from a wheelchair.Alright.Who else?Go ahead.I think the whole point of a competition is that it calls out the best, you know, from the second best or from the third best.And when we're talking about the national level, we're talking about the highest of the highest.I think what they're arguing about here is the purpose of competition.And I think in the sake of competition you can't change the rules.So, the purpose of the competition includes walking?That's an essential, you agree with Tom.And what's your name?David.The Supreme Court ruled that the PGA did have to accommodate Casey Martin and they did it on grounds that Riva mentioned, that walking isn't really part of, an essential part of the game.They cited testimony saying that walking the court consumes no more calories than you get eating a Big Mac.That's what walking is in golf, according to the majority.Scalia was in dissent.Justice Scalia agreed with David.He said there is no purpose, and it's certainly not your course to try to figure out the essential purpose of golf.Golf is like any game, it's strictly for amusement.And if there's a group that wants to have one version of the game they can have that version of the game.And the market can decide whether people are amused and like and show up for that and watch the television broadcasts.Scalia's dissent was an anti-Aristotelian dissent, because notice two things about the argument; first we're thrust into a discussion about what the essential nature, or purpose, or telos of golf really is.Does it include walking?And, here's something I think is rumbling beneath the surface of this debate, whether walking partly determines whether golf is really an athletic competition.After all, the ball sits still.You have to put it in a hole.Is it more like basketball, baseball, and football?Golf, an athletic competition?Or is it more like billiards?The ball sits still there too.You can be out of shape and succeed.It involves skill but not athletic skill.Could it be that those professional golfers, who excel at golf, have a stake in golf being honored and recognized as an athletic event, not just a game of skill like billiards?And if that's what's at stake, then we have a debate about the purpose, the teleological dimension, and also a debate about honor.What virtues, really, does the game of golf honor and recognize?Two questions to which Aristotle directs our attention.We'll continue on this case next time.What's strange and seems paradoxical to me about Aristotle's view point is that if you walk like a pirate and you talk like a pirate you shouldn't be an investment banker, because that's not what you're inherently supposed to do.If you have a peg leg and an eye patch and a disgruntled disposition, you know, you should be on a pirate ship on the high seas.So he doesn't . . .Some would say that the distinction between the two vocations is not as clear as you suggest.When we ended last time we were talking about whether Casey Martin has a right to ride in a golf cart in the PGA Tournament.And it's worth remembering how we got into this debate and what's at stake for an understanding of political philosophy.Remember, we were looking at Aristotle's theory of justice and one way of describing his approach to justice, we've called it 'teleological'.Teleological, because he says to allocate rights we first have to figure out the purpose, or the end, of the social practice in question.Another way of describing Aristotle's account of Justice is that justice is, for him, a matter of fit; it's a matter of fitting persons with their virtues and excellences to the appropriate roles.Now, I want to finish our discussion about Casey Martin and his claim for a golf cart, and then go back to one more consequential application in Aristotle, namely, the question of slavery.What do you think about Casey Martin's request?Should there be an accommodation or not, given the nature of the game and of the tournament and its purposes?"Isn't it discrimination if he's not provided the golf cart as an accommodation", say some.Others reply, "No, if he got a cart it would be unfair to the other golfers because they exert themselves, become winded, fatigued, walking the course".That's where we left it.What about the fairness argument?OK, Jenny.My question was why doesn't the PGA just make the option of a cart available to all golfers?From our readings I learned that there are many golf tournaments, other than the PGA, where using a cart is not prohibited.For instance, the Seniors Tournament it's even allowed and encouraged.So why doesn't the PGA just do that?Let everybody use a cart?Give everyone the option of using a cart and let them pick.So then the traditionalists can then still say, "Well, I still choose to walk the course but I do that knowing that I will be more tired at the end than the people who took the cart." Good.Alright, so what about Jenny's solution?For the sake of fairness, don't give Casey Martin an advantage, if indeed there is an advantage to riding in a cart.Let everyone who wants to use a cart.Is everyone happy with that solution?Does it put to rest this whole dilemma?Who has an answer for Jenny?Yes.As was brought up last time, if you do that you kind of ruin some of the spirit of golf as a lot of people like to see it.If you let everybody take a cart.Even though it gives everybody the same playing field now, it sort of makes golf less of an athletic game, like people pointed out last class.It's just like if someone decides to go into another sport and they want an advantage.Like, if you have swimming and then you say, "OK, he wants flippers so why don't we just allow everyone to have flippers when they're swimming?" And what would that do to the Olympic Swimming Competition, if people were free to use, Jenny, we better let Jenny reply to this.Da says it would sort of spoil the spirit of the athletic competition as if in Olympic swimming you let anyone who wanted to swim with flippers.Alright, Jenny, what do you say to Da?It would spoil the spirit of it.You're also ruining the spirit of golf by not letting people who are really passionate about the game, and very good at it, compete simply because of an aspect of golf which is not, the main point of golf is you use the club to make strokes and hit it into a hole.I'm sorry, I'm not a golfer but that's basically the gist of the game from what I see it.And I was reading the PGA versus Casey Martin decision that was one of the sentences that they said is because walking the course is not an inherent part of golf, only swinging the club is.Good. So, Jenny replies to Da, well, it isn't really essential anyhow to walk the course.So, we're back to the purpose.I mean, I'm sure there are, like wheelchair basketball, there are certain different competitions that can be made for people who may only be able to use their arms.Right. Yes.Michael what do you think?Jenny just said that there is stuff like wheelchair basketball where if you can't play basketball there is another option.I think there are other options in the PGA Tour.But the PGA Tour is the best, is the pinnacle, and you have to have certain requirements fulfilled to perform.Alright, Michael, you want to say to Casey Martin there is such a thing as a Special Olympics for those who are disabled.Go play in the golfing version of the Special Olympics.That's what you would say Michael?-- Yeah.I think that walking is part of the sport of golf.And Casey Martin, you know if he can't walk the course then I don't think he should be able to play in the PGA.Alright, well thank you very much for that exchange.What comes out of this exchange that goes back to Aristotle's theory of justice?Well, one thing is the question, is walking an essential part of golf?And the very fact that deciding whether there is a right for Casey Martin that the PGA must respect, seems to depend, as Aristotle suggests it must, on debating and resolving the question, is walking essential to the game of golf?That's one moral of the story.But there's a second moral to the story from an Aristotelian point of view.What's at stake here, this is the second Aristotelian stake in this debate, is honor.Casey Martin wants the accommodation so that he can compete for the honor of winning the best tournaments.Now, why is it that the professional golfers, the great golfers, testified in this case - Jack Nicklaus, Tom Kite - in the readings, against letting him use a cart and they, I would suspect, would be equally vehement, Jenny, in opposing your suggestion of letting everyone ride in a cart, and this goes back, in a way, to Da's point.How to put this gently?Professional golfers are sensitive about whether their sport is really a sport.Because if everyone rode around in a cart, or could, then it would become clear, or clearer, depending on your point of view, that golf is not really an athletic competition but rather a game; a game of skill but not a sport.And so not only the question of debating the purpose, the teleological feature, but also from the standpoint of viewing debates about the purpose of golf.What's essential to golf?Those debates, Aristotle suggests, inevitably are also debates about the allocation of honor.Because part of the purpose of golf is not just to amuse spectators; Scalia's wrong about that, from Aristotle's point of view.It's not just to provide entertainment, it's not just to make people happy.It's not a mere amusement.It's honoring, it's rewarding, it's recognizing a certain kind of athletic excellence, at least those who have achieved the highest honors have a powerful stake in maintaining that view.Now, some of you took the position the Scalia position."This is an incredibly difficult and silly question", Scalia said."What is the essential nature of golf?" It's not the kind of thing that the United States Supreme Court is equipped to decide, or should decide.That's Scalia.But he only he says that because he takes a very strong, and as it happens, anti-Aristotelian position on what a game is."It is the very nature of a game to have no object," no point, "except amusement" says Scalia, "That is what distinguishes games" he says, "From productive activity." You can just imagine what kind of sports fan Scalia must be."And so", he says, "It's impossible to say that any of the game's arbitrary rules is essential." And then he quotes Mark Twain's disparaging remark about golf.He says, "Many consider walking to be the central feature of golf.Hence, Mark Twain's classic criticism of the sport 'a good walk spoiled'." But Scalia misses an important feature of games and the arguments about rights and fairness that arise from games, when he casts games, sports, athletic competitions, as solely for the sake of amusement; as solely an utilitarian activity.But an Aristotelian view of sports says, no it's not just about amusement, real sports, real athletic events, are also about appreciation, not just amusement.And people who follow sports and care about sports and play sports know this.Which is another way of saying, there's a difference between a sport and a mere spectacle.And the difference is that a sport is a practice that calls forth and honors and prizes certain excellences, certain virtues.。
哈佛大学公开课-公正-justice 02-Putting a Price Tag on Life How to Measure Pleasure 给生命一个价格标
Justice 02 Putting a Price Tag on Life / How to Measure Pleasure 给生命一个价格标签/如何衡量快乐Last time, we argued about the case of The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea.And with the arguments about the lifeboat in mind, the arguments for and against what Dudley and Stephens did in mind, let's turn back to the philosophy, the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.Bentham was born in England in 1748.At the age of 12, he went to Oxford.At 15, he went to law school.He was admitted to the Bar at age 19 but he never practiced law.Instead, he devoted his life to jurisprudence and moral philosophy.Last time, we began to consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism.The main idea is simply stated and it's this: The highest principle of morality, whether personal or political morality, is to maximize the general welfare, or the collective happiness, or the overall balance of pleasure over pain; in a phrase, maximize utility.Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning: We're all governed by pain and pleasure, they are our sovereign masters, and so any moral system has to take account of them.How best to take account?By maximizing.And this leads to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.What exactly should we maximize?Bentham tells us happiness, or more precisely, utility - maximizing utility as a principle not only for individuals but also for communities and for legislators."What, after all, is a community?" Bentham asks.It's the sum of the individuals who comprise it.And that's why in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding what's just, citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question if we add up all of the benefits of this policy and subtract all of the costs, the right thing to do is the one that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering.That's what it means to maximize utility.Now, today, I want to see whether you agree or disagree with it, and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis, which is used by companies and by governments all the time.And what it involves is placing a value, usually a dollar value, to stand for utility on the costs and the benefits of various proposals.Recently, in the Czech Republic, there was a proposal to increase the excise tax on smoking.Philip Morris, the tobacco company, does huge business in the Czech Republic.They commissioned a study, a cost-benefit analysis of smoking in the Czech Republic, and what their cost-benefit analysis found was the government gains by having Czech citizens smoke.Now, how do they gain?It's true that there are negative effects to the public finance of the Czech government because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related diseases.On the other hand, there were positive effects and those were added up on the other side of the ledger.The positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government derives from the sale of cigarette products, but it also included health care savings to the government when people die early, pension savings -- you don't have to pay pensions for as long - and also, savings in housing costs for the elderly.And when all of the costs and benefits were added up, the Philip Morris study found that there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic of $147,000,000, and given the savings in housing, in health care, and pension costs, the government enjoys savings of over $1,200 for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking.Cost-benefit analysis.Now, those among you who are defenders of utilitarianism may think that this is an unfair test.Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and they issued an apology for this heartless calculation.You may say that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can easily incorporate, namely the value to the person and to the families of those who die from lung cancer.What about the value of life?Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate a measure for the value of life.One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case.Did any of you read about that?This was back in the 1970s.Do you remember what the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car?Anybody?It was a small car, subcompact car, very popular, but it had one problem, which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car and in rear collisions, the fuel tank exploded and some people were killed and some severely injured.Victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue.And in the court case, it turned out that Ford had long since known about the vulnerable fuel tank and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it to put in a special shield that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding.They did a cost-benefit analysis.The cost per part to increase the safety of the Pinto, they calculated at $11.00 per part.And here's -- this was the cost-benefit analysis that emerged in the trial.Eleven dollars per part at 12.5 million cars and trucks came to a total cost of $137 million to improve the safety.But then they calculated the benefits of spending all this money on a safer car and they counted 180 deaths and they assigned a dollar value, $200,000 per death, and then the costs to repair, 105 the replacement cost for 2,000 vehicles, it would be destroyed without the safety device $700 per vehicle.So the benefits turned out to be only $49.5 million and so they didn't install the device.Needless to say, when this memo of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came out in the trial, it appalled the jurors, who awarded a huge settlement.Is this a counterexample to the utilitarian idea of calculating?Because Ford included a measure of the value of life.Now, who here wants to defend cost-benefit analysis from this apparent counterexample?Who has a defense?Or do you think this completely destroys the whole utilitarian calculus?Yes?Well, I think that once again, they've made the same mistake the previous case did, that they assigned a dollar value to human life, and once again, they failed to take account things like suffering and emotional losses by the families.I mean, families lost earnings but they also lost a loved one and that is more valued than $200,000.Right and -- wait, wait, wait, that's good. What's your name?Julie Roteau .So if $200,000, Julie, is too low a figure because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one and the loss of those years of life, what would be - what do you think would be a more accurate number?I don't believe I could give a number.I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to issues of human life.I think it can't be used monetarily.So they didn't just put too low a number, Julie says.They were wrong to try to put any number at all.All right, let's hear someone who - You have to adjust for inflation.You have to adjust for inflation.All right, fair enough.So what would the number be now?This was 35 years ago.Two million dollars.Two million dollars?You would put two million?And what's your name?Voytek Voytek says we have to allow for inflation.We should be more generous.Then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question?I guess, unfortunately, it is for - there needs to be a number put somewhere, like, I'm not sure what that number would be, but I do agree that there could possibly be a number put on the human life.All right, so Voytek says, and here, he disagrees with Julie.Julie says we can't put a number on human life for the purpose of acost-benefit analysis.Voytek says we have to because we have to make decisions somehow.What do other people think about this?Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit analysis here as accurate as desirable?Yes? Go ahead.I think that if Ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis, they'd eventually go out of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable and millions of people wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table, to feed their children.So I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed, the greater good is sacrificed, in this case.All right, let me add.What's your name?Raul.Raul, there was recently a study done about cell phone use by a driver when people are driving a car, and there was a debate whether that should be banned.Yeah.And the figure was that some 2,000 people die as a result of accidents each year using cell phones.And yet, the cost-benefit analysis which was done by the Center for Risk Analysis at Harvard found that if you look at the benefits of the cell phone use and you put some value on the life, it comes out about the same because of the enormous economic benefit of enabling people to take advantage of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals and talk to friends and so on whilethey're driving.Doesn't that suggest that it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions of human life?Well, I think that if the great majority of people try to derive maximum utility out of a service, like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones provide, that sacrifice is necessary for satisfaction to occur.You're an outright utilitarian.Yes. Okay.All right then, one last question, Raul.- Okay.And I put this to Voytek, what dollar figure should be put on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell phones?Well, I don't want to arbitrarily calculate a figure, I mean, right now.I think that - You want to take it under advisement?Yeah, I'll take it under advisement.But what, roughly speaking, would it be?You got 2,300 deaths. - Okay.You got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by banning the use of cell phones in cars. - Okay.So what would your hunch be?How much? A million?Two million?Two million was Voytek's figure. - Yeah.Is that about right?- Maybe a million.A million?- Yeah.You know, that's good.Thank you. -Okay.So, these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis, especially those that involve placing a dollar value on everything to be added up.Well, now I want to turn to your objections, to your objections not necessarily to cost-benefit analysis specifically, because that's just one version of the utilitarian logic in practice today, but to the theory as a whole, to the idea that the right thing to do, the just basis for policy and law is to maximize utility.How many disagree with the utilitarian approach to law and to the common good?How many agree with it?So more agree than disagree.So let's hear from the critics.Yes?My main issue with it is that I feel like you can't say that just because someone's in the minority, what they want and need is less valuable than someone who is in the majority.So I guess I have an issue with the idea that the greatest good for the greatest number is okay because there are still - what about people who are in the lesser number?Like, it's not fair to them.They didn't have any say in where they wanted to be.All right.That's an interesting objection.You're worried about the effect on the minority.Yes.What's your name, by the way?Anna.Who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority?What do you say to Anna?Um, she said that the minority is valued less.I don't think that's the case because individually, the minority's value is just the same as the individual of the majority.It's just that the numbers outweigh the minority.And I mean, at a certain point, you have to make a decision and I'm sorry for the minority but sometimes, it's for the general, for the greater good.For the greater good.Anna, what do you say?What's your name?Yang-Da.What do you say to Yang-Da?Yang-Da says you just have to add up people's preferences and those in the minority do have their preferences weighed.Can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried about utilitarianism violating the concern or respect due the minority?And give an example.Okay. So, well, with any of the cases that we've talked about, like for the shipwreck one, I think the boy who was eaten still had as much of a right to live as the other people and just because he was the minority in that case, the one who maybe had less of a chance to keep living, that doesn't mean that the others automatically have a right to eat him just because it would give a greater amount of people a chance to live.So there may be certain rights that the minority members have, that the individual has that shouldn't be traded off for the sake of utility?Yes.Yes, Anna? You know, this would be a test for you.Back in Ancient Rome, they threw Christians to the lions in the Colosseum for sport.If you think how the utilitarian calculus would go, yes, the Christian thrown to the lions suffers enormous excruciating pain.But look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans!Yang-Da.Well, in that time, I don't -- if -- in modern day of time, to value the -- to give a number to the happiness given to the people watching, I don't think any, like, policymaker would say the pain of one person, of the suffering of one person is much, much -- is, I mean, in comparison to the happiness gained, it's - No, but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious enough with happiness, it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of Christians thrown to the lion.So we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism.One has to do with whether utilitarianism adequately respects individual rights or minority rights, and the other has to do with the whole idea of aggregating utility or preferences or values.Is it possible to aggregate all values to translate them into dollar terms?There was, in the 1930s, a psychologist who tried to address this second question.He tried to prove what utilitarianism assumes, that it is possible to translate all goods, all values, all human concerns into a single uniform measure, and he did this by conducting a survey of young recipients of relief, this was in the 1930s, and he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences and he asked them, "How much would you have to be paid to undergo the following experiences?" and he kept track.For example, how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out?Or how much would you have to be paid to have one little toe cut off?Or to eat a live earthworm six inches long?Or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas?Or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands?Now, what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list? - Kansas!Kansas?You're right, it was Kansas.For Kansas, people said they'd have to pay them - they have to be paid $300,000.What do you think was the next most expensive?Not the cat.Not the tooth.Not the toe.The worm!People said you'd have to pay them $100,000 to eat the worm.What do you think was the least expensive item?Not the cat.The tooth.During the Depression, people were willing to have their tooth pulled for only $4,500.What?Now, here's what Thorndike concluded from his study.Any want or a satisfaction which exists exists in some amount and is therefore measurable.The life of a dog or a cat or a chicken consists of appetites, cravings, desires, and their gratifications.So does the life of human beings, though the appetites and desires are more complicated.But what about Thorndike's study?Does it support Bentham's idea that all goods, all values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value?Or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list suggest the opposite conclusion that maybe, whether we're talking about life or Kansasor the worm, maybe the things we value and cherish can't be captured according to a single uniform measure of value?And if they can't, what are the consequences for the utilitarian theory of morality?That's a question we'll continue with next time.All right, now, let's take the other part of the poll, which is the highest experience or pleasure.How many say Shakespeare?How many say Fear Factor?No, you can't be serious.Really?Last time, we began to consider some objections to Jeremy Bentham's version of utilitarianism.People raised two objections in the discussion we had.The first was the objection, the claim that utilitarianism, by concerning itself with the greatest good for the greatest number, fails adequately to respect individual rights.Today, we have debates about torture and terrorism.Suppose a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th and you had reason to believe that the suspect had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over 3,000 people and you couldn't extract the information.Would it be just to torture the suspect to get the information or do you say no, there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights?In a way, we're back to the questions we started with about Charlie Carson organ transplant.So that's the first issue.And you remember, we considered some examples of cost-benefit analysis, but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis when it came to placing a dollar value on human life.And so that led us to the second objection.It questioned whether it's possible to translate all values into a single uniform measure of value.It asks, in other words, whether all values are commensurable.Let me give you one other example of an experience.This actually is a true story.It comes from personal experience that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without loss into utilitarian terms.Some years ago, when I was a graduate student, I was at Oxford in England and they had men's and women's colleges.They weren't yet mixed and the women's colleges had rules against overnight male guests.By the 1970s, these rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, or so I was told.By the late 1970s, when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College, which was one of these all-women's colleges.The older women on the faculty were traditionalists.They were opposed to change unconventional moral grounds.But times have changed and they were embarrassed to give the true grounds for their objection and so they translated their arguments into utilitarian terms."If men stay overnight", they argued, "the costs to the college will increase." "How?" you might wonder."Well, they'll want to take baths and that'll use up hot water," they said.Furthermore, they argued, "We'll have to replace the mattresses more often." The reformers met these arguments by adopting the following compromise.Each woman could have a maximum of three overnight male guests each week.They didn't say whether it had to be the same one or three different provided, and this was the compromise, provided the guest paid 50 pence to defray the cost to the college.The next day, the national headline in the national newspaper read, "St. Anne's Girls, 50 Pence A Night." Another illustration of the difficulty of translating all values, in this case, a certain idea of virtue, into utilitarian terms.So, that's all to illustrate the second objection to utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection, that questions whether utilitarianism is right to assume that we can assume the uniformity of value, the commensurability of all values and translate all moral considerations into dollars or money.But there is a second aspect to this worry about aggregating values and preferences.Why should we weigh all preferences that people have without assessing whether they're good preferences or bad preferences?Shouldn't we distinguish between higher pleasures and lower pleasures?Now, part of the appeal of not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of the appeal is that it is nonjudgmental and egalitarian.The Benthamite utilitarian says everybody's preferences count and they count regardless of what people want, regardless of what makes different people happy.For Bentham, all that matters, you'll remember, are the intensity and the duration of a pleasure or pain.The so-called "higher pleasures or nobler virtues" are simply those, according to Bentham, that produce stronger, longer pleasure.Yet a famous phrase to express this idea, the quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry.What was pushpin?It was some kind of a child's game, like tiddlywinks."Pushpin is as good as poetry", Bentham says.And lying behind this idea, I think, is the claim, the intuition, that it's a presumption to judge whose pleasures are intrinsically higher or worthier or better.And there is something attractive in this refusal to judge.After all, some people like Mozart, others Madonna.Some people like ballet, others bowling.Who's to say, a Benthamite might argue, who is to say which of these pleasures, whose pleasures are higher, worthier, nobler than others?But is that right, this refusal to make qualitative distinctions?Can we altogether dispense with the idea that certain things we take pleasure in are better or worthier than others?Think back to the case of the Romans in the Colosseum.One thing that troubled people about that practice is that it seemed to violate the rights of the Christian.Another way of objection to what's going on there is that the pleasure that the Romans take in this bloody spectacle, should that pleasure, which is abased, kind of corrupt, degrading pleasure, should that even be valorized or weighed in deciding what the general welfare is?So here are the objections to Bentham's utilitarianism and now, we turn to someone who tried to respond to those objections, a latter-day utilitarian, John Stuart Mill.So what we need to examine now is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply to these objections to utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill was born in 1806.His father, James Mill, was a disciple of Bentham's, and James Mill set about giving his son, John Stuart Mill, a model education.He was a child prot®¶g®¶, John Stuart Mill.He knew Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight, and age 10, he wrote "A History of Roman Law." At age 20, he had a nervous breakdown.This left him in a depression for five years, but at age 25, what helped lift him out of this depression is that he met Harriet Taylor.She and Mill got married, they lived happily ever after, and it was under her influence that John Stuart Mill tried to humanize utilitarianism.What Mill tried to do was to see whether the utilitarian calculus could be enlarged and modified to accommodate humanitarian concerns, like theconcern to respect individual rights, and also to address the distinction between higher and lower pleasures.In 1859, Mill wrote a famous book on liberty, the main point of which was the importance of defending individual rights and minority rights, and in 1861, toward the end of his life, he wrote the book we read as part of this course, "Utilitarianism." He makes it clear that utility is the only standard of morality, in his view, so he's not challenging Bentham's premise.He's affirming it.He says very explicitly, "The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it." So he stays with the idea that our de facto actual empirical desires are the only basis for moral judgment.But then, page eight, also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish higher from lower pleasures.Now, for those of you who have read Mill already, how, according to him, is it possible to draw that distinction?How can a utilitarian distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures from lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones? Yes?If you've tried both of them and you prefer the higher one, naturally, always.That's great.That's right.What's your name?- John.So as John points out, Mill says here's the test.Since we can't step outside actual desires, actual preferences that would violate utilitarian premises, the only test of whether a pleasure is higher or lower is whether someone who has experienced both would prefer it.And here, in chapter two, we see the passage where Mill makes the point that John just described."Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it -- in other words, no outside, no independent standard -- then, that is the more desirable pleasure." What do people think about that argument?Does it succeed?How many think that it does succeed of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures?How many think it doesn't succeed?I want to hear your reasons.But before we give the reasons let's do an experiment of Mill's claim.In order to do this experiment, we're going to look at three short excerpts of popular entertainment.The first one is a Hamlet soliloquy.It'll be followed by two other experiences.See what you think.What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god!The beauty of the world, the paragon of animals - and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?Man delights not me.Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality.Ahh! They're biting me!Each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three extreme stunts.Ow!These stunts are designed to challenge the contestants both physically and mentally.Six contestants, three stunts, one winner.Yes! Whooo!Fear Factor.Hi-diddily-ho, pedal-to-the-metal-o-philes.Flanders, since when do you like anything cool?Well, I don't care for the speed but I can't get enough of that safety gear.Helmets, roll bars, caution flags...I like the fresh air...and looking at the poor people in the infield.Dang, Cletus, why'd you have to park by my parents?Now, Honey, they's my parents too.I don't even have to ask which one you liked most.The Simpsons, how many liked The Simpsons most?How many Shakespeare?What about Fear Factor?How many preferred Fear Factor?。
哈佛公开课-公正课中英字幕_第一课
制作人：心舟 QQ:1129441083第一讲《杀人的道德侧面》这是一门讨论公正的课程This is a course about justice我们以一则故事作为引子and we begin with a story.假设你是一名电车司机\Suppose you're the driver of a trolley car你的电车以60英里小时的速度\and your trolley car is hurtling down the track 在轨道上飞驰\at 60 miles an hour.突然发现在轨道的尽头\And at the end of the track you notice有五名工人正在施工\five workers working on the track.你无法让电车停下来\You try to stop but you can't因为刹车坏了\your brakes don't work.你此时极度绝望\You feel desperate因为你深知\because you know如果电车撞向那五名工人\that if you crash into these five workers他们全都会死\they will all die.假设你对此确信无疑\Let's assume you know that for sure.你极为无助\And so you feel helpless直到你发现在轨道的右侧until you notice that there is off to the right有一条侧轨\ a side track而在侧轨的尽头\and at the end of that track只有一名工人在那施工\there is one worker working on the track.而你的方向盘还没坏\Your steering wheel works只要你想\so you can turn the trolley car就可以把电车转到侧轨上去\if you want to onto the side track牺牲一人挽救五人性命\killing the one but sparing the five.下面是我们的第一个问题:\Here's our first question:何为正确的选择\what's the right thing to do?换了你会怎么做\What would you do?我们来做个调查\Let's take a poll.有多少人会把电车开到侧轨上去\How many would turn the trolley car onto the side track?请举手\Raise your hands.有多少人会让电车继续往前开\How many wouldn't? How many would go straight ahead? 选择往前开的请不要把手放下\Keep your hands up those of you who would go straight ahead.只有少数人选择往前开\A handful of people would绝大多数都选择转弯\the vast majority would turn.我们先来听听大家的说法\Let's hear first探究一下为何\now we need to begin to investigate the reasons你们会认为这是正确的选择\why you think it's the right thing to do.先从大多数选择了转向侧轨的同学开始\Let's begin with those in the majority whowould turn to go onto the side track.为何会这样选择\Why would you do it?理由是什么\What would be your reason?有没有自告奋勇的\Who's willing to volunteer a reason?你来站起来告诉大家\Go ahead. Stand up.我认为当可以只牺牲一个人时\Because it can't be right to kill five people牺牲五人不是正确之举\when you can only kill one person instead.当可以只牺牲一人时牺牲五人不是正确之举\It wouldn't be right to kill five if you could kill one person instead.这理由不错\That's a good reason.不错\That's a good reason.还有其他人吗\Who else?人人都赞同这个理由\Does everybody agree with that reason?你来\Go ahead.我认为这和9·11的时候是一种情况\Well I was thinking it's the same reason on9 11 那些让飞机在宾州坠毁的人被视为英雄\with regard to the people who flew the plane into the Pennsylvania field as heroes因为他们选择了牺牲自己\because they chose to kill the people on the plane而不是让飞机撞向大楼牺牲更多人\and not kill more people in big buildings.这么看来这条原则和9·11的是一样的\So the principle there was the same on 9 11. 虽然是悲剧\It's a tragic circumstance但牺牲一人保全五人依然是更正确的选择\but better to kill one so that five can live 这就是大多数人选择把电车开上侧轨的理由吗\is that the reason most of you had those of you who would turn? Yes?现在我们来听听少数派的意见\Let's hear now from those in the minority那些选择不转弯的\those who wouldn't turn.你来\Yes.我认为这与为种族灭绝以及极权主义正名\Well I think that's the same type of mentality that justifies genocide是同一种思维模式\and totalitarianism.为了一个种族能生存下来\In order to save one type of race以灭绝另一个种族为代价\you wipe out the other.那换了是你在这种情况下会怎么做\So what would you do in this case?为了避免骇人听闻的种族灭绝\You would to avoid the horrors of genocide你打算直接开上去把这五个人撞死吗\you would crash into the five and kill them? 大概会吧\Presumably yes.-真的会吗 -对\- You would? - Yeah.好吧还有谁\Okay. Who else?很有勇气的回答谢谢\That's a brave answer. Thank you.我们来考虑一下另一种情况的例子\Let's consider another trolley car case看看你们\and see whether大多数的人\those of you in the majority会不会继续坚持刚才的原则\want to adhere to the principle即"牺牲一人保全五人是更好的选择"\"better that one should die so that five should live."这次你不再是电车司机了\This time you're not the driver of the trolley car只是一名旁观者\you're an onlooker.你站在一座桥上俯瞰着电车轨道\You're standing on a bridge overlooking a trolley car track.电车沿着轨道从远处驶来\And down the track comes a trolley car轨道的尽头有五名工人\at the end of the track are five workers电车刹车坏了\the brakes don't work这五名工人即将被撞死\the trolley car is about to careen into the five and kill them.但你不是电车司机你真的爱莫能助\And now you're not the driver you really feel helpless直到你发现在你旁边\until you notice standing next to you靠着桥站着的\leaning over the bridge是个超级大胖子\is a very fat man.你可以选择推他一把\And you could give him a shove.他就会摔下桥\He would fall over the bridge onto the track正好摔在电车轨道上挡住电车\right in the way of the trolley car.他必死无疑但可以救那五人的性命\He would die but he would spare the five. 现在\Now有多少人会选择把那胖子推下桥\how many would push the fat man over the bridge?请举手\Raise your hand.有多少人不会\How many wouldn't?大多数人不会这么做\Most people wouldn't.一个显而易见的问题出现了\Here's the obvious question.我们"牺牲一人保全五人"的这条原则\What became of the principle到底出了什么问题呢\"better to save five lives even if it means sacrificing one?" 第一种情况时\What became of the principle大多数人赞同的这条原则怎么了\that almost everyone endorsed in the first case? 两种情况中都属多数派的人你们是怎么想的\I need to hear from someone who was in the majority in both cases.应该如何来解释这两种情况的区别呢\How do you explain the difference between the two?你来\Yes.我认为第二种情况\The second one I guess牵涉到主动选择推人\involves an active choice of pushing a person down而被推的这个人\which I guess that person himself本来跟这事件一点关系都没有\would otherwise not have been involved in thesituation at all.所以从这个人自身利益的角度来说\And so to choose on his behalf I guess他是被迫卷入这场无妄之灾的\to involve him in something that he otherwise would have escaped is而第一种情况不同\I guess more than what you have in the first case第一种情况里的三方电车司机及那两组工人\where the three parties the driver and the two sets of workers之前就牵涉进这事件本身了\are already I guess in the situation.但在侧轨上施工的那名工人\But the guy working the one on the track off to the side 他并不比那个胖子更愿意牺牲自我不是吗\he didn't choose to sacrifice his life any more than the fat man did he?对但谁让他就在那侧轨上而且...\That's true but he was on the tracks and... 那胖子还在桥上呢\This guy was on the bridge.如果你愿意可以继续说下去\Go ahead you can come back if you want.好吧这是一个难以抉择的问题\All right. It's a hard question.你回答得很不错\You did well. You did very well.真的难以抉择\It's a hard question.还有谁能来为两种情况中\Who else can find a way of reconciling大多数人的不同选择作出合理解释\the reaction of the majority in these two cases? 你来\Yes.我认为在第一种情况中是撞死一个还是五个\Well I guess in the first case where you have the one worker and the five你只能在这两者中选择\it's a choice between those two不管你做出的是哪一个选择\and you have to make a certain choice总得有人被电车撞死\and people are going to die because of the trolley car而他们的死并非你的直接行为导致\not necessarily because of your direct actions.电车已失控而你必须在那一瞬间做出选择\The trolley car is a runaway thing and you're making a split second choice.而反之把胖子推下去则是你自己的直接谋杀行为\Whereas pushing the fat man over is an actual act of murder on your part.你的行为是可控的\You have control over that而电车则是不可控的\whereas you may not have control over the trolley car.所以我认为这两种情况略有不同\So I think it's a slightly different situation. 很好有没谁来回应的有人吗\All right who has a reply? That's good. Who has a way?有人要补充吗刚才那个解释合理吗\Who wants to reply? Is that a way out of this? 我认为这不是一个很好的理由\I don't think that's a very good reason因为不论哪种情况你都得选择让谁死\because you choose to- either way you have to choose who dies或者你是选择转弯撞死一名工人\because you either choose to turn and kill theperson这种转弯就是种有意识的行为\which is an act of conscious thought to turn或者你是选择把胖子推下去\or you choose to push the fat man over这同样是一种主动的有意识的行为\which is also an active conscious action.所以不管怎样你都是在作出选择\So either way you're making a choice.你有话要说吗\Do you want to reply?我不太确定情况就是这样的\I'm not really sure that that's the case.只是觉得似乎有点不同\It just still seems kind of different.真的动手把人推到轨道上让他死的这种行为\the act of actually pushing someone over onto the tracks and killing him就等于是你亲手杀了他\you are actually killing him yourself.你用你自己的手推他\You're pushing him with your own hands.是你在推他这不同于\You're pushing him and that's different操控方向盘进而导致了他人死亡...\than steering something that is going to cause death into another...现在听起来好像不太对头了\You know it doesn't really sound right saying it now. 不你回答得不错叫什么名字\No no. It's good. It's good. What's your name? 安德鲁\Andrew.我来问你一个问题安德鲁\Andrew. Let me ask you this question Andrew.您问\Yes.假设我站在桥上胖子就在我旁边\Suppose standing on the bridge next to the fat man我不用去推他\I didn't have to push him假设他踩在一扇活板门上方\suppose he was standing over a trap door而活板门可以通过转动方向盘来开启\that I could open by turning a steering wheel like that.你会转动方向盘吗\Would you turn?出于某种原因我觉得这样似乎错上加错\For some reason that still just seems more wrong.是吗\Right?如果是你不小心靠着方向盘导致活门开启\I mean maybe if you accidentally like leaned into the steering wheel或是发生之类的情况\or something like that.但是...或者是列车飞驰而来时\But... Or say that the car is hurtling正好可以触发活门开关\towards a switch that will drop the trap.-那我就赞同 -没关系好了\- Then I could agree with that. - That's all right. Fair enough.反正就是不对\It still seems wrong in a way而在第一种情况这样做就是对的是吧\that it doesn't seem wrong in the first case to turn you say.换个说法就是在第一种情况中\And in another way I mean in the first situation你是直接涉及其中的\you're involved directly with the situation.而第二种情况中你只是旁观者\In the second one you're an onlooker as well.-好了 -所以你有权选择是否把胖子推下去\- All right. - So you have the choice of becoming involved or not-从而牵涉其中 -好了\- by pushing the fat man. - All right.先不管这个情况\Let's forget for the moment about this case.你们很不错\That's good.我们来想象一个不同的情况\Let's imagine a different case.这次你是一名急诊室的医生\This time you're a doctor in an emergency room有天送来了六个病人\and six patients come to you.他们遭受了一次严重的电车事故\They've been in a terrible trolley car wreck.其中五人伤势不算严重\Five of them sustain moderate injuries另外一人受重伤你可以花上一整天时间\one is severely injured you could spend all day来医治这一名受重伤的病人\caring for the one severely injured victim但那另外五个病人就会死\but in that time the five would die.你也可以选择医治这五人\Or you could look after the five restore them to health 但那样的话那名受重伤的病人就会死\but during that time the one severely injured person would die.有多少人会选择救那五人\How many would save the five?作为医生又有多少人选择救那一人\Now as the doctor how many would save the one? 只有极少数人\Very few people just a handful of people.我猜理由还是一样\Same reason I assume.牺牲一个保全五个\One life versus five?现在来考虑一下另外一种情况\Now consider another doctor case.这次你是一名器官移植医生你有五名病人\This time you're a transplant surgeon and you have five patients每名病人都急需器官移植才能存活\each in desperate need of an organ transplant in order to survive.分别需要心脏移植肺移植肾移植\One needs a heart one a lung one a kidney肝移植以及胰腺移植\one a liver and the fifth a pancreas.没有器官捐赠者\And you have no organ donors.你只能眼睁睁看他们死去\You are about to see them die.然后你突然想起\And then it occurs to you在隔壁病房\that in the next room有个来做体检的健康人\there's a healthy guy who came in for a check-up.而且他...\And he's...你们喜欢这剧情吧\you like that...而且他正在打盹\... and he's taking a nap你可以悄悄地进去取出那五个器官\you could go in very quietly yank out the five organs这人会死但你能救那另外五人\that person would die but you could save the five. 有多少人会这么做\How many would do it?有吗\Anyone?选择这么做的请举手\How many? Put your hands up if you would do it.楼座上的呢\Anyone in the balcony?我会\I would.你会吗小心别太靠着那栏杆\You would? Be careful don't lean over too much.有多少人不会\How many wouldn't?很好你来\All right. What do you say?楼座上那位\Speak up in the balcony就是支持取出那些器官的为什么这么做\you who would yank out the organs. Why? 其实我想知道可否稍微变通一下\I'd actually like to explore a slightly alternate possibility就是选择五人中最先死的那人\of just taking the one of the five who needs an organ who dies first利用他的器官来救其他四人\and using their four healthy organs to save the other four.这想法很赞\That's a pretty good idea.想法不错\That's a great idea只不过\except for the fact你避开了我们今天要谈论的哲学问题\that you just wrecked the philosophical point. 让我们暂时先不忙讨论这些故事以及争论\Let's step back from these stories and these arguments来关注一下这些争论是怎样展开的\to notice a couple of things about the way the arguments have begun to unfold.某些道德原则已经随着我们讨论的展开\Certain moral principles have already begun to emerge逐渐开始浮现出来了\from the discussions we've had.我们来细想下这些道德原则都是怎样的\And let's consider what those moral principles look like.在讨论中出现的第一条道德原则\The first moral principle that emerged in the discussion正确的选择道德的选择\said the right thing to do the moral thing to do取决于你的行为所导致的后果\depends on the consequences that will result from your action.最终结论: 牺牲一人保全五人是更好的选择\At the end of the day better that five should live even if one must die.这是后果主义道德推理的一则例子\That's an example of consequentiality moral reasoning.后果主义道德推理\Consequentiality moral reasoning认为是否道德取决于行为的后果\locates morality in the consequences of an act取决于你的行为对外界所造成的影响\in the state of the world that will result from the thing you do.但随着谈论的深入我们发现在其他情况中\But then we went a little further we considered those other cases人们不再对后果主义道德推理那么确定了\and people weren't so sure about consequentialist moral reasoning.当人们开始犹豫是否要推胖子下桥\When people hesitated to push the fat man over the bridge或者是否切取无辜病人的器官时\or to yank out the organs of the innocent patient 他们更倾向于去评判行为本身的动机\people gestured toward reasons having to do with the intrinsic quality of the act itself而不是该行为的后果\consequences be what they may.人们动摇了\People were reluctant.他们认为杀掉一个无辜的人\People thought it was just wrong categorically wrong 是绝对错误的\to kill a person an innocent person哪怕是为了拯救五条生命\even for the sake of saving five lives.至少在每个故事的第二种情况中是这样认为的\At least people thought that in the second version of each story we considered.这表明有第二种绝对主义方式的道德推理\So this points to a second categorical way of thinking about moral reasoning.绝对主义道德推理认为\Categorical moral reasoning是否道德取决于特定的绝对道德准则\locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements取决于绝对明确的义务与权利\certain categorical duties and rights而不管后果如何\regardless of the consequences.我们将用以后的几天到几周时间来探讨\We're going to explore in the days and weeks to come后果主义与绝对主义道德原则的差别\the contrast between consequentiality and categorical moral principles.后果主义道德推理中最具影响的就是功利主义\The most influential example of consequential moral reasoning is utilitarianism由18世纪英国政治哲学家杰里米·边沁提出\a doctrine invented by Jeremy Bentham18th century English political philosopher而绝对主义道德推理中最为著名的\The most important philosopher of categorical moral reasoning则是18世纪德国哲学家康德\is the18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. 我们将着眼于这两种迥异的道德推理模式\So we will look at those two different modes of moral reasoning评价它们还会考虑其他模式\assess them and also consider others.如果你有留意教学大纲就能发现\If you look at the syllabus you'll notice教学大纲里列出了不少人的著作\that we read a number of great and famous books包括亚里士多德约翰·洛克伊曼努尔·康德\books by Aristotle John Locke Immanuel Kant约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒及其他哲学家的著作\John Stewart Mill and others.在教学大纲中还能看到\You'll notice too from the syllabus我们不仅要读这些著作\that we don't only read these books;还会探讨当代政治及法律争议\we also take up contemporary political and legal controversies所引发的诸多哲学问题\that raise philosophical questions.我们将讨论平等与不平等\We will debate equality and inequality平权行动自由言论与攻击性言论同性婚姻\affirmative action free speech versus hate speech same-sex marriage兵役制等一系列现实问题\military conscription a range of practical questions. 为什么呢\Why?不仅是为了将这些深奥抽象的著作形象化\Not just to enliven these abstract and distant books还为了让我们通过哲学辨明\but to make clear to bring out what's at stake日常生活包括政治生活中什么才是最关键的\in our everyday lives including our political lives for philosophy.所以我们要读这些著作讨论这些议题\And so we will read these books and we will debate these issues并了解两者是怎样互相补充互相阐释的\and we'll see how each informs and illuminates the other.也许听起来蛮动人不过我要事先提个醒\This may sound appealing enough but here I have to issue a warning.那就是通过用这样的方式阅读这些著作\And the warning is thisto read these books in this way来训练自我认知\as an exercise in self knowledge必然会带来一些风险\to read them in this way carries certain risks包括个人风险和政治风险\risks that are both personal and political每位学政治哲学的学生都知道的风险\risks that every student of political philosophy has known.这风险源自于以下事实\These risks spring from the fact即哲学就是让我们面对自己熟知的事物\that philosophy teaches us and unsettles us 然后引导并动摇我们原有的认知\by confronting us with what we already know.这真是讽刺\There's an irony.这门课程的难度就在于\The difficulty of this course consists in the fact传授的都是你们已有的知识\that it teaches what you already know.它将我们所熟知的毋庸置疑的事物\It works by taking what we know from familiar unquestioned settings变得陌生\and making it strange.正如我们刚举的例子\That's how those examples worked那些严肃而又不乏趣味的假设性问题\the hypotheticals with which we began with their mix of playfulness and sobriety.这些哲学类著作亦然\It's also how these philosophical books work.哲学让我们对熟知事物感到陌生\Philosophy estranges us from the familiar不是通过提供新的信息\not by supplying new information而是通过引导并激发我们用全新方式看问题\but by inviting and provoking a new way of seeing但这正是风险所在\but and here's the risk一旦所熟知的事物变得陌生\once the familiar turns strange它将再也无法回复到从前\it's never quite the same again.自我认知就像逝去的童真 \Self knowledge is like lost innocence不管你有多不安\however unsettling you find it;你已经无法不去想或是充耳不闻了\it can never be un-thought or un-known.这一过程会充满挑战又引人入胜\What makes this enterprise difficult but also riveting因为道德与政治哲学就好比一个故事\is that moral and political philosophy is a story你不知道故事将会如何发展\and you don't know where the story will lead.你只知道这个故事与你息息相关\But what you do know is that the story is about you. 以上为我提到的个人风险\Those are the personal risks.那么政治风险是什么呢\Now what of the political risks?介绍这门课程时可以这样许诺:\One way of introducing a course like this would be to promise you通过阅读这些著作讨论这些议题\that by reading these books and debating these issues你将成为更优秀更有责任感的公民\you will become a better more responsible citizen;你将重新审视公共政策的假定前提\you will examine the presuppositions of public policy你将拥有更加敏锐的政治判断力\you will hone your political judgment你将更有效地参与公共事务\you will become a more effective participant in public affairs.但这一许诺也可能片面而具误导性\But this would be a partial and misleading promise.因为绝大多数情况下政治哲学\Political philosophy for the most part并不是那样的\hasn't worked that way.你们必须承认政治哲学\You have to allow for the possibility可能使你们成为更糟的公民\that political philosophy may make you a worse citizen 而不是更优秀的\rather than a better one至少在让你成为更优秀公民前先让你更糟\or at least a worse citizen before it makes you a better one因为哲学使人疏离现实甚至可能弱化行动力\and that's because philosophy is a distancing even debilitating activity.追溯到苏格拉底时代就有这样一段对话\And you see this going back to Socrates there's a dialogue在《高尔吉亚篇》中苏格拉底的一位朋友\the Gorgias in which one of Socrates' friends《高尔吉亚篇》柏拉图著古希腊哲学家卡里克利斯试图说服苏格拉底放弃哲学思考\Callicles tries to talk him out of philosophizing.他告诉苏格拉底:\Callicles tells Socrates如果一个人在年轻时代\"Philosophy is a pretty toy有节制地享受哲学的乐趣那自然大有裨益\if one indulges in it with moderation at the right time of life.但倘若过分沉溺其中那他必将走向毁灭\But if one pursues it further than one should it is absolute ruin."听我劝吧卡里克利斯说收起你的辩论\"Take my advice" Callicles says "abandon argument.学个谋生的一技之长\Learn the accomplishments of active life别学那些满嘴谬论的人\take for your models not those people who spend their time on these petty quibbles要学那些生活富足声名显赫及福泽深厚的人\but those who have a good livelihood and reputation and many other blessings."言外之意则是\So Callicles is really saying to Socrates放弃哲学现实一点去读商学院吧\"Quit philosophizing get real go to business school."卡里克利斯说得确有道理\And Callicles did have a point.因为哲学的确将我们与习俗\He had a point because philosophy distances us from conventions既定假设以及原有信条相疏离\from established assumptions and from settled beliefs.以上就是我说的个人以及政治风险\Those are the risks personal and political. 面对这些风险有一种典型的回避方式\And in the face of these risks there is a characteristic evasion.这种方式就是怀疑论大致的意思是\The name of the evasion is skepticism it's the idea...It goes something like this.刚才争论过的案例或者原则\We didn't resolve once and for all没有一劳永逸的解决方法\either the cases or the principles we were arguing when we began如果亚里士多德洛克康德以及穆勒\and if Aristotle and Locke and Kant and Mill 花了这么多年都没能解决这些问题\haven't solved these questions after all of these years那今天我们齐聚桑德斯剧院\who are we to think that we here in Sanders Theatre 仅凭一学期的课程学习就能解决了吗\over the course of a semester can resolve them?也许这本就是智者见智仁者见仁的问题\And so maybe it's just a matter of each person having his or her own principles多说无益也无从论证\and there's nothing more to be said about it no way of reasoning.这就是怀疑论的回避方式\That's the evasion the evasion of skepticism对此我给予如下回应\to which I would offer the following reply.诚然这些问题争论已久\It's true these questions have been debated for a very long time但正因为这些问题反复出现\but the very fact that they have recurred and persisted也许表明虽然在某种意义上它们无法解决\may suggest that though they're impossible in one sense但另一种意义上却又无可避免\they're unavoidable in another.它们之所以无可避免无法回避\And the reason they're unavoidable the reason they're inescapable是因为在日常生活中我们一次次地在回答这些问题\is that we live some answer to these questions every day.因此怀疑论让你们举起双手放弃道德反思\So skepticism just throwing up your hands and giving up on moral reflection这绝非可行之策\is no solution.康德曾很贴切地描述了怀疑论的不足\Immanuel Kant described very well the problem with skepticism他写道怀疑论是人类理性暂时休憩的场所\when he wrote "Skepticism is a resting place for human reason}参见康德的《纯粹理性批判》是理性自省以伺将来做出正确抉择的地方\where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings但绝非理性的永久定居地\but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement." 康德认为简单地默许于怀疑论\"Simply to acquiesce in skepticism" Kant wrote 永远无法平息内心渴望理性思考之不安\"can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason."以上我是想向大家说明这些故事和争论\I've tried to suggest through these stories and these arguments展示的风险与诱惑挑战与机遇\some sense of the risks and temptations of the perils and the possibilities.简而言之这门课程旨在\I would simply conclude by saying that the aim of this course唤醒你们永不停息的理性思考探索路在何方\is to awaken the restlessness of reasonand to see where it might lead.谢谢\Thank you very much.在那样的绝境之下\Like in a situation that desperate为了生存你不得不那样做\you have to do what you have to do to survive.。
哈佛公开课 公平
Harvard University - Justice Michael Sandel哈佛大学公开课----公平迈克尔·桑代尔教授主讲Y our trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 Mph.你的电车正以每小时60英里行驶。
Now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think is the right thing to do.我们还要研究你这样做的原因.Who is willing to volunteer a reason?谁愿意说说你的想法？Better to save five lives even if it means to sacrifice one.牺牲一个，救活更多人。
What became of the principle that almost everyone endorse in the first case?第一种情况几乎每个人都赞同，原因何在？Is there a way out of this?是否有更好的办法？Let‘s just forget a moment about this case.让我们暂时搁下这个故事。
Don‘t lean over.不要摔下来哦。
Let‘ step back from these stories, these arguments.让我们回过头来看这些故事和争论。
Certain moral principles have already begun to emerge from discussion we had.我们的谈论已经涉及到了一些道德的原则.Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act in the state of the rule that we resolve from the thing you do.结果主义的道德推理取决于道德行为的后果,它取决于我们最后的结果。
公正 该如何做是好
该不该向富人实行高税率税收
从比尔·盖茨那里拿走100万美元分给100个穷人，盖 茨也许几乎想不起这笔钱，但这100个穷人都得到了莫大 的喜悦。
• 反对者1（来自功利主义的思考）：高税率会降低人们工作和 投资的动机，从而导致生产力的下降。如果这个经济的大蛋糕 缩水了，再分配就减少了，总体的功利水平也会下降。
• 如果你在桥上，发现电车失控了，同样前方有5个人在工作，这时 候你旁边有一个强壮的人，把他推下去就能阻止电车的前进并拯救 那5个人（你自己不够强壮到能阻止电车），你会把那个人推下去 吗？
• 如果你是一个医生，来了五位被电车撞伤的病人，都迫切需要器官 移植，一个需要肺，两个需要肾脏，一个需要肝脏，一个需要胰腺， 但是医院没有合适的器官，这时候你发现隔壁房间有个健康的人在 打瞌睡，你会选择取他的器官来救这五个病人吗？
三、公正涉及培养德性和推理共同善。 为了形成一个公正的社会，我们不得不共同推理良善生活的意义，
不得不创造一种公共文化以容纳那些不可避免要产生的各种分歧。
总结
公正不可避免地具有判断性。 公正不仅仅包括国内生产总值的数量和 分配，它还包括更高的道德目的。 道德参与的政治不仅仅是一种更加激动 人心的理想，它也为公正社会提供了一种更 有希望的基础。
• 对比1（道德） • 义务vs倾向
• 对比2（自由） • 自律vs他律
• 对比3（理性） • 绝对命令vs假言命令
如果我们出于某些动机——如自我利益—— 而不是义务去行动的话，那么我们的行为就缺乏 道德价值。康德将这种动机称之为“倾向的动 机”，他认为，只有出于义务动机的行为，才具 有道德价值
只有当我的意志是被自律所决定、受我自己 给定的法则所支配的时候，我才是自由的。
• 想要获得自律意义上的自由，就需要我并 不是出于一个假言命令去行动，而是出于 绝对命令去行动。
哈佛大学公开课Justice-What's the right thing to do 08
Justice 08 What’s a Fair Start? / What Do We Deserve?Today, we turn to the question of distributive justice.How should income in wealth and power and opportunities be distributed?According to what principles?John Rawls offers a detailed answer to that question.And we're going to examine and assess his answer to that question, today.We put ourselves in a position to do so last time.By trying to make sense of why he thinks that principles of justice are best derived from a hypothetical contract.And what matters is that the hypothetical contract be carried out in an original position of equality, behind, what Rawls calls, the veil of ignorance.So that much is clear?Alright, then let's turn to the principles that Rawls says would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.First, he considered some of the major alternatives.What about utilitarianism?Would the people in the original position choose to govern their collective lives utilitarian principles, the greatest good for the greatest number?No, they wouldn't, Rawls says.And the reason is, that behind the veil of ignorance, everyone knows that once the veil goes up, and real life begins, we will each want to be respected with dignity.Even if we turn out to be a member of a minority.We don't want to be oppressed.And so we would agree to reject utilitarianism, and instead to adopt as our first principle, equal basic liberties.Fundamental rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like.We wouldn't want to take the chance that we would wind up as members of an oppressed or a despised minority with the majority tyrannizing over us.And so Rawls says utilitarianism would be rejected."Utilitarianism makes the mistake", Rawls writes, "of forgetting, or at least not taking seriously, the distinction between persons." And in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, we would recognize that and reject utilitarianism.We wouldn't trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.Second principle has to do with social and economic inequalities.What would we agree to?Remember, we don't know whether we're going to wind up rich or poor.Healthy or unhealthy.We don't know what kind of family we're going to come from.Whether we're going to inherit millions or whether we will come from an impoverished family.So we might, at first thought, say, "Well let's require an equal distribution of income and wealth." Just to be on the safe side.But then we would realize, that we could do better than that.Even if we're unlucky and wind up at the bottom.We could do better if we agree to a qualified principle of equality.Rawls calls it "the Difference Principle".A principle that says, only those social and economic inequalities will be permitted that work to the benefit of the least well off.So we wouldn't reject all inequality of income and wealth.We would allow some.But the test would be, do they work to the benefit of everyone including those, or as he specifies, the principle, especially those at the bottom.Only those inequalities would be accepted behind the veil of ignorance.And so Rawls argues, only those inequalities that work to the benefit of the least well off, are just.We talked about the examples of Michael Jordan making 81 Of Bill Gates having a fortune in the tens of billions.Would those inequalities be permitted under the difference principle?Only if they were part of a system, those wage differentials, that actually work to the advantage of least well off.Well, what would that system be?Maybe it turns out that as a practical matter you have to provide incentives to attract the right people to certain jobs.And when you do, having those people in those jobs will actually help those at the bottom.Strictly speaking, Rawls's argument for the difference principle is that it would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.behind the veil of ignorance.Is there anyone who disagrees that they would be chosen?Alright, let's start up in the balcony, if that's alright.Go ahead.OK, your argument depends upon us believing that we would argue in said policy, or justice from a bottom.For the disadvantaged.And I just don't see from a proof standpoint, where we've proven that.Why not the top?Right, and what's your name?- Mike.Mike, alright, good question.Put yourself behind the veil of ignorance.Enter into the thought experiment.What principles would you choose?How would you think it through?Well, I would say things like, even Harvard's existence is an example of preaching toward the top.Because Harvard takes the top academics.And I didn't know when I was born how smart I would be.But I worked my life to get to a place of this caliber.Now, if you had said Harvard's going to randomly take 1600 people of absolutely no qualification, we'd all be saying, "There's not much to work for." And so what principle would you choose?In that situation I would say a merit based one.One where I don't necessarily know, but I would rather have a system that rewards me based on my efforts.So you, Mike, behind the veil of ignorance, would choose a merit-based system, where people are rewarded according to their efforts?Alright, fair enough.What would you say?Go ahead.My question is, if the merit-based argument is based on when everyone is at a level of equality?Where from that position, you're rewarded to where you get, or is it regardless of what advantages you may have when you began your education to get where you are here?I think what the question you're asking is saying that if we want to look at, whatever, utilitarianism, policy, do you want to maximize world wealth.And I think a system that rewards merit is the one that we've pretty much all established, is what is best for all of us.Despite the fact that some of us may be in the second percentile and some may be in the 98th percentile.At the end of the day it lifts that lowest based level, a community that rewards effort as opposed to an differences.But, I don't understand how you're rewards someone's efforts who clearly has had, not you, but maybe myself, advantages throughout, to get where I am here.I mean, I can't say that somebody else who maybe worked as hard as I did would have had the same opportunity to come to a school like this.Alright, let's look at that point.What's your name?Kate. -Kate, you suspect that the ability to get into top schools may largely depend on coming from an affluent family.Having a favorable family background, social, cultural, economic advantages and so on?I mean, economic, but yes, social, cultural.All of those advantages, for sure.Someone did a study, of the 146 selective colleges and universities in the United States.And they looked at the students in those colleges and universities to try to find out what their background was, their economic background.What percentage do you think, come from the bottom quarter of the income scale?You know what the figure is?Only three percent of students, at the most selective colleges and universities come from poor backgrounds.Over 70 percent come from affluent families.Let's go one step further then, and try to address Mike's challenge.Rawls actually has two arguments, not one, in favor of his principles of justice.And in particular, of the difference principle.One argument is the official argument, what would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Some people challenge that argument, saying, "Maybe people would want to take their chances.Maybe people would be gamblers behind the veil of ignorance.Hoping that they would wind up on top." That's one challenge that has been put to Rawls. But backing up the argument from the original position is the second argument.And that is the straightforwardly moral argument.And it goes like this, it says, the distribution of income and wealth and opportunities should not be based on factors for which people can claim no credit.It shouldn't be based on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice.He begins with the theory of justice that most everyone these days would reject.A feudal aristocracy.What's wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy?Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is that people's life prospects are determined by the accident of birth.Are you born to a noble family or to a family of peasants and serfs?And that's it.You can't rise.It's not your doing where you wind up or what opportunities you have.But that's arbitrary from a moral point of view.And so that objection to feudal aristocracy leads, and historically has lead, people to say, careers should be open to talents.There should be formal equality of opportunity regardless of the accident of birth.Every person should be free to strive, to work, to apply for any job in the society.And then, if you open up jobs, and you allow people to apply, and to work as hard as they can, then the results are just.So it's more or less the libertarian system that we've discussed in earlier weeks.What does Rawls think about this?He says it's an improvement.It's an improvement because it doesn't take as fixed the accident of birth.But even with formal equality of opportunity the libertarian conception doesn't extend that, doesn't extend its insight far enough.Because if you let everybody run the race, everybody can enter the race, but some people start at different starting points, that race isn't going to be fair.Intuitively, he says, the most obvious injustice of this system is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors arbitrary from a moral point of view.Such as, whether you got a good education or not.Whether you grew up in a family that support you and developed in you a work ethic and gave you the opportunities.So that suggests moving to a system of fair equality of opportunity.And that's really the system that Mike was advocating earlier on.What we might call a merit-based system.A meritocratic system.In a fair meritocracy the society sets up institutions to bring everyone to the same starting point before the race begins.Equal educational opportunities.Head start programs, for example.Support for schools in impoverished neighborhoods.So that everyone, regardless of their family background, has a genuinely fair opportunity. Everyone starts from the same starting line.Well, what does Rawls think about the meritocratic system?Even that, he says, doesn't go far enough in remedying, or addressing, the moral arbitrariness of the natural lottery.Because if you bring everyone to the same starting point and begin the race, who's going to win the race?Who would win?To use the runners example.The fastest runners would win.But is it their doing that they happen to be blessed with athletic prowess to run fast?So Rawls says, "Even the principle of meritocracy, where you bring everyone to the same starting point, may eliminate the influence of social contingencies and upbringing, ...but it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents." And so he thinks that the principle of eliminating morally arbitrary influences in the distribution of income and wealth requires going beyond what Mike favors, the meritocratic system.Now, how do you go beyond?Do you bring everyone to the same starting point and you're still bothered by the fact that some are fast runners and some are not fast runners, what can you do?Well, some critics of a more egalitarian conception say the only thing you can do is handicap the fast runners.Make them wear lead shoes.But who wants to do that?That would defeat the whole point of running the race.But Rawls says, you don't have to have a kind of leveling equality, if you want to go beyond a meritocratic conception.You permit, you even encourage, those who may be gifted, to exercise their talents.But what you do, is you change the terms on which people are entitled to the fruits of the exercise of those talents.And that really is what the difference principle is.You establish a principle that says, people may benefit from their good fortune, from their luck in the genetic lottery, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.And so, for example, Michael Jordan can make 290 only under a system that taxes away a chunk of that to help those who lack the basketball skills that he's blessed with.Likewise, Bill Gates.He can make his billions.But he can't think that he somehow morally deserves those billions."Those who have been favored by nature, may gain from their good fortune but only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out." That's the difference principle.And it's an argument from moral arbitrarianists.Rawls claims, that if you're bothered by basing distributive shares on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view, you don't just reject a feudal aristocracy for a free market.You don't even rest content with a meritocratic system that brings everyone to the same starting point.You set up a system, where everyone, including those at the bottom, benefit from the exercise of the talents held by those who happen to be lucky.What do you think?Is that persuasive?Who finds that argument unpersuasive?The argument for moral arbitrarianists.Yes.I think that in the egalitarian proposition the more talented people, I think it's very optimisticto think that they would still work really hard, even if they knew that part of what they made would be given away.So I think that the only way for the more talented people to exercise their talents to the best of their ability is in the meritocracy.And in a meritocracy, what's your name?Kate.Kate, does it bother you, and Mike, does it bother you, that in a meritocratic system, that even with fair equality of opportunity, people get ahead, people get rewards that they don't deserve simply because they happen to be naturally gifted.What about that?I think that it is arbitrary.Obviously it's arbitrary.But I think that correcting for it would be detrimental.Because it would reduce incentives, is that why?It would reduce incentives, yeah.Mike, what do you say?We're all sitting in this room and we have undeserved, we have undeserved glory of some sort.So you should not be satisfied with the process of your life.Because you have not created any of this.And I think, from a standpoint of, not just this room, us being upset, but from a societal standpoint we should have some kind of a gut reaction to that feeling.The guy who runs the race, he doesn't...He actually harms us as opposed to maybe makes me run that last ten yards faster.And that makes the guy behind me run ten yards faster and the guy behind him ten yards faster.Alright, so Mike, let me ask you.You talked about effort before.Effort.Do you think when people work hard to get ahead, and succeed, that they deserve the rewards that go with effort?Isn't that the idea behind your defense?I mean, of course, bring Michael Jordan here, I'm sure you can get him, and have him come and defend himself about he makes 31 million dollars.And that we are basically being the majority oppressing the minority in a different light.It's very easy to pick on him.Very easy.Alright, effort.You've got...I've got a few. I've got a few.But that's about it.Effort, you know what Rawls's answer to that is?Even the effort that some people expend, conscientious driving, the work ethic, even effort depends a lot on fortunate family circumstances.For which you, we, can claim no credit.Let's do the test.Let's do a test here.Never mind economic class, those differences are very significant.Put those aside.Psychologists say that birth order makes a lot of difference in work ethic, striving, effort. How many here, raise your hand, those of you here, who are first in birth order.I am too by the way.Mike, I noticed you raised your hand.If the case for the meritocratic conception is that effort should be rewarded, doesn't Rawls have a point that even effort striving, work ethic is largely shaped even by birth order?Is it your doing?Mike, is it your doing that you were first in birth order?Then why, Rawls says, of course not.So why should income and wealth and opportunities in life be based on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view?That's the challenge that he puts to market societies, but also to those of us at places like this.A question to think about for next time.A justice of the United States Supreme Court, what do they make?But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.Do you know who it is?- Judge Judy?Judge Judy.How did you know that?Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?$25 million.Now, is that just?Is it fair?We ended last time with that remarkable poll, do you remember?The poll about birth order.What percentage of people in this room raised their hands, was it, to say that they were the first born?403 And what was the significance of that?If you're thinking about these theories of distributive justice.Remember, we were discussing three different theories of distributive justice.Three different ways of answering the question, "How should income and wealth and opportunities and the good things in life, be distributed?" And so far we've looked at the libertarian answer.That says, the just system of distribution is a system of free exchange, a free market economy.Against a background of formal equality.Which simply means, that jobs and careers are open to anyone.Rawls says that this represents an improvement over aristocratic and caste systems, because everyone can compete for every job.Careers open to talents.And beyond that, the just distribution is the one that results from free exchange.Voluntary transactions.No more, no less.Then Rawls argues, if all you have is formal equality, jobs open to everyone, the result is not going to be fair.It will be biased in favor of those who happen to be born to affluent families, who happen to have the benefit of good educational opportunities.And that accident of birth is not a just basis for distributing life chances.And so, many people who notice this unfairness, Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity.That leads to the meritocratic system.Fair equality of opportunity.But Rawls says, even if you bring everyone to the same starting point in the race, what's going to happen?Who's going to win?The fastest runners.So once you're troubled by basing distributive shares on morally arbitrary contingencies, you should, if you reason it through, be carried all the way to what Rawls calls, "the democratic conception".A more egalitarian conception of distributive justice that he defines by the difference principle.Now, he doesn't say that the only way to remedy or to compensate for differences in natural talents and abilities is to have a kind of, leveling equality.A guaranteed equality of outcome.But he does say there's another way to deal with these contingencies.People may gain, may benefit from their good fortune, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.And so, we can test how this theory actually works by thinking about some paid differentials that arise in our society.What does the average school teacher make in the United States, do you suppose?Roughly.-$35,000.It's a little more, 40, $42,000.What about David Letterman?How much do you think David Letterman makes?More than a school teacher?$31 million.David Letterman.Is that fair?That David Letterman makes that much more than a school teacher?Well, Rawls's answer would be, it depends whether the basic structure of society is designed in such a way that Letterman's $31 million is subject to taxation so that some of those earnings are taken to work for the advantage of the least well off.One other example of a paid differential.A justice of the United States Supreme Court.What do they make?It's just under $200,000.Here's Sandra Day O'Connor, for example. There she is.But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.Do you know who it is?- Judge Judy.Judge Judy.How did you know that?You watch?You're right.Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?There she is.$25 million.Now, is that just?Is it fair?Well, the answer is, it depends on whether this is against a background system in line with the difference principle.Where those who come out on top, in terms of income and wealth are taxed in a way that benefits the least well off members of society.Now, we're going to come back to these wage differentials, pay differentials, between a real judge and a TV judge.The one Marcus watches all the time.What I want to do now, is return to these theories and to examine the objections to Rawls's more egalitarian theory.The difference principle.There are at least three objections to Rawls's difference principle.One of them came up last time in the discussion and a number of you raised this worry.What about incentives?Isn't there the risk, if taxes reach 506 that Michael Jordan won't play basketball?That David Letterman won't do late night comedy?Or that CEOs will go into some other line of work?Now, who among those who are defenders of Rawls who has an answer to this objection about the need for incentives?Yes. Go ahead, stand up.Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference that it helps the least well off the most.So if there's too much equality, then the least well off might not be able to watch late night TV, or might not have a job because their CEO doesn't want to work.So you need to find the correct balance where taxation still leaves enough incentive to least well off to benefit from the talents.- Good.And what's your name?- Tim.Tim. Alright, so Tim is saying, in effect, that Rawls is taking count of incentives.And could allow for pay differentials and for some adjustment in the tax rate to take account of incentives.But, Tim points out, the standpoint from which the question of incentives needs to be considered is not the effect on the total size of the economic pie.But instead from the standpoint of the effect of incentives, or disincentives, on the well-being of those on the bottom.Right?Good. Thank you.I think that is what Rawls would say.In fact, if you look in section 17, where he describes the difference principle, he allows for incentives."The naturally advantaged are not gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help less fortunate as well." So you can have incentives.You can adjust the tax rate.If taking too much from David Letterman or from Michael Jordan, or from Bill Gates, winds up actually hurting those at the bottom.That's the test.So incentives, that's not a decisive objections against Rawls's difference principle.But there are two weightier, more difficult objections.One of them comes from defenders of a meritocratic conception.The argument that says, what about effort?What about people working hard having a right to what they earn because they've deserved it.They've worked hard for it.That's the objection from effort and moral desert.Then there's another objection.That comes from libertarians.And this objection has to do with reasserting the idea of self-ownership.Doesn't the difference principle, by treating our natural talents and endowments as common assets, doesn't that violate the idea that we own ourselves?Now, let me deal first, with the objection that comes from the libertarian direction.Milton Friedman writes, in his book, "Free to Choose," "Life is not fair.And it's tempting to believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned." But his answer is, "The only way to try to rectify that is to have a leveling equality of outcome." Everyone finishing the race at the same point.And that would be a disaster.This is an easy argument to answer.And Rawls addresses it.In one of the most powerful passages, I think, of the theory of justice.It's in Section 17."The natural distribution", and here he's talking about the natural distribution talents and endowments."...is neither just nor unjust."Nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position.These are simply natural facts.What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts." That's his answer to libertarian laissez faire economists like Milton Friedman who say, "Life is unfair but get over it." Get over it and let's see if we can, at least, maximize the benefits that flow from it.But the more powerful libertarian objection to Rawls is not libertarian from the libertarian economists like Milton Friedman.It's from the argument about self-ownership.Developed as we saw, in Nozick.And from that point of view, yes, it might be a good thing, to create head start programs and public schools so that everyone can go to a decent school and start the race at the same starting line.That might be good.But if you tax people to create public schools, if you tax people against their will, you coerce them.It's a form of theft.If you take some of Letterman's $31 million, tax it away to support public schools, against his will, the state is really doing no better than stealing from him.It's coercion.And the reason is, we have to think of ourselves as owning our talents and endowments.Because otherwise we're back to just using people and coercing people.That's the libertarian reply.What's Rawls's answer to that objection?He doesn't address the idea of self-ownership directly.But the effect, the moral weight of his argument for the difference principle is, maybe we don't own ourselves in that thoroughgoing sense after all.Now, he says, this doesn't mean that the state is an owner in me, in the sense that it can simply commandeer my life.Because remember, the first principle we would agree to behind the veil of ignorance, is the principle of equal basic liberties.Freedom of speech, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like.So the only respect in which the idea of self-ownership must give way, comes when we're thinking about whether I own myself in the sense that I have a privileged claim on the benefits that come from the exercise of my talents in a market economy.And Rawls says, on reflection, we don't.We can defend rights.We can respect the individual.We can uphold human dignity.Without embracing the idea of self-possession.That, in effect, is his reply to the libertarian.I want to turn now, to his reply to the defender of a meritocratic conception.Who invokes effort as the basis of moral desert.People who work hard to develop their talents deserve the benefits that come from the exercise of their talents.Well, we've already seen the beginning of Rawls's answer to that question.And it goes back to that poll we took about birth order.His first answer is even the work ethic, even the willingness to strive conscientiously, depends on all sorts of family circumstances and social and cultural contingencies for which we can claim no credit.You can't claim credit for the fact that you, most of you, most of us, happen to be first in birth order.And that for some complex psychological and social reasons that seems to be associated with striving, with achieving, with effort.。
哈佛大学公开课justice整理版
This is a course about justice and we begin with a story.这是一堂关于公平与正义的公共课，让我们先从一个故事讲起Suppose you’re the driver of a trolley car, and your trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 miles an hour.假设你现在是一辆有轨电车的司机而你的电车正在铁轨上以时速60英里疾驶And at the end of the track you notice five workers working on the track. 在铁轨末端，你发现有五个工人在铁轨上工作You try to stop but you can't, your brakes don’t work.你尽力想停下电车, 但是你做不到，电车的刹车失灵了You feel desperate because you know that if you crash into these five workers, they will all die.你觉得十分绝望,因为你知道如果你就这样撞向这5个工人,他们必死无疑Let’s assume you know that for sure. 假定你很清楚这一点And so you feel helpless until you notice that there is, off to the right, a side track and at the end of that track, there is one worker, working on the track.正当你感到无助的时候, 你突然发现就在右边一条岔道,那根轨道的尽头只有一个工人在那里工作Your steering wheel works, so you can turn the trolley car, if you want to, onto the side track killing the one but sparing the five.你的方向盘没有失灵, 只要你愿意你可以让电车转向到那条分叉铁轨上撞死一个工人但却因此救了另外5个人Here’s our first question: what’s the ri ght thing to do?现在提出第一个问题,我们该怎么做才对?What would you do? Let’s take a poll.你会怎么做? 我们做个调查看看How many would turn the trolley car onto the side track? Raise your hands.有多少人会选择让电车转向到分叉铁轨上,请举手How many wouldn’t? How many would go straight ahead?多少人不会?多少人选择就这样笔直开下去?Keep your hands up those of you, who would go straight ahead. 选笔直开下去的人先别放手A handful of people would, 少数人会the vast majority would turn.大多数人选择转向Let’s hear first, now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think让我们先听听看现在我们研究下你为什么觉得it's the right thing to do. 这样做是正确的Let’s begin with those in the majority who would turn to go让我们先从大多数人开始吧,谁选择转向的?onto the side track. Why would you do it? 你为什么这么选?What would be your reason? Who’s willing to volunteer a reason?你的理由是什么?谁愿意给我一个理由的?Go ahead. Stand up. 站起来说吧Because it can't be right to kill five people when you can only kill one person instead. 因为当你可以只撞死一个人时却去撞死5个人肯定是不对的It wouldn’t be right to kill five if you could kill one person instead. That’s a good reason.当可以只撞死一个人时却去撞死5个人肯定不对这是个好理由That’s a good reason. Who else?这是个好理由其他人呢?Does everybody agree with that reason? Go ahead.每个人都同意刚刚那个理由么? 你来Well I was thinking it’s the same reason on 9/11 with regard to the people who flew the plane into the Pennsylvania field as heroes because they chose to kill the people on the plane and not kill more people in big buildings.我觉得这和9.11的一项事件是同样原因,我们把那些将飞机撞向宾夕法尼亚空地的人视为英雄.因为他们选择只牺牲飞机里的人从而拯救了大楼里的更多生命So the principle there was the same on 9/11.所以原因和9.11事件中那些人的选择是相同的It’s a tragic circumstance but better to kill one so that five can live, is that the reason most of you had, those of you who would turn? Yes?虽然一定会发生悲剧但只撞死一个人好过撞死五个你们大多数人是不是都这么想选择转向的各位,是么?Let’s hear now from those in the minority, those who wouldn’t turn. Yes.现在让我们听听那些少数人的想法选择直行的人……Well, I think that’s the same type of mentality that justifies genocide and totalitarianism.我觉得这和对种族灭绝与极权主义的诡辩相似In order to save one type of race, you wipe out the other. So what would you do in this case?为了拯救一个种族,你抹去了其他的种族，那么在这个事例中你会怎么做?You would, to avoid the horrors of genocide, you would crash into the five and kill them?你会,为了避免骇人的种族灭绝主义而选择撞死那5个人么?Presumably, yes. 理论上,是这样You would? 真的?-Yeah. 是Okay. Who else? That’s a brave answer. 好吧,还有谁?这是个大胆的想法Thank you. 谢谢Let’s consider another trolley car case 让我们再考虑另一个有关电车的例子and see whether those of you in the majority want to adhere to the principle “better that one should die so that five should live.”看看是不是那些占多数的人仍然会坚持刚才的原则“牺牲一个人总好过撞死5个人.”This time you’re not the driver of the trolley car, 这次你不是电车的司机了you’re an onlooker. You’re standing on a bridge overlooking a trolley car track.你是个旁观者,你站在桥上俯瞰桥下电车的铁轨And down the track comes a trolley car, at the end of the track are five workers, the brakes don’t work, the trolley car is about to careen into the five and kill them.此时电车开过铁轨尽头有5个工人刹车失灵，电车马上就要冲向那5个人了And now, you’re not the driver, you really feel helpless until you notice standing next to you, leaning over the bridge is a very fat man.而这次,你不是司机你真的感到毫无办法直到你突然发现,你旁边一个非常非常胖的人靠在桥上And you could give him a shove. 你可以推他一下He would fall over the bridge onto the track right in the way of the trolleycar.他会摔下桥而且挡住电车的去路He would die but he would spare the five. 虽然他会被压死,但因此另外五个人将得救.Now, how many would push the fat man over the bridge? 这次,多少人会推一把桥上的胖子Raise your hand. 举起你的手How many wouldn’t? 多少人不会这样做?Most people wouldn’t. Here’s the obvious question. 绝大多数人不会问题显而易见What became of the principle “better to save five lives even if it means sacrificing one?” 刚才的原则发生了什么?牺牲一个人总比牺牲5个人好?What became of the principle that almost everyone endorsed in the first case? I need to hear from someone刚才第一个事例里几乎每个人都赞同的原则怎么了么?我要听听。
哈佛公开课-公正课-第五课双语字幕
公正课\N迈克尔·桑德尔教授主讲第五讲《选择的自由》上节课结束时\When we finished last time,我们讲到约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒试图回应\we were looking at John Stuart Mill's attempt to reply对边沁功利主义的批判\to the critics of Bentham's Utilitarianism.在穆勒的《功利主义》中\In his book Utilitarianism,他试图证明与批判者所言相反\Mill tries to show that critics to the contrary在功利主义的框架下\it is possible within the utilitarian framework是能区分高级和低级快乐的\to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures.是能对价值进行定性区分的\It is possible to make qualitative distinctions of worth. 我们用《辛普森一家》\And we tested that idea和莎士比亚作品检验了这一观点\with the Simpsons and the Shakespeare excerpts. 检验结果\And the results of our experiment却似乎让我们质疑穆勒的区分\seem to call into question Mill's distinction因为在座大多数\because a great many of you都表示更喜欢《辛普森一家》\reported that you prefer the Simpsons却仍然认为莎士比亚的作品\but that you still consider Shakespeare能带来更高级更有价值的快乐\to be the higher or the worthier pleasure.这就是我们的检验中穆勒的观点所遭遇的困境\That's the dilemma with which our experiment confronts Mill.那么穆勒在《功利主义》\What about Mill's attempt to account第五章中提到的\for the especially weighty character of个人权利和公正重要性的解释又是否成立呢\individual rights and justice in chapter five of Utilitarianism.他想说明个人权利\He wants to say that individual rights值得特别的尊重\are worthy of special respect.实际上他甚至声称\In fact, he goes so far as to say that公正是道德中最神圣\justice is the most sacred part和最不可或缺的部分\and the most incomparably binding part of morality.但穆勒的这番辩护面临着同样质疑\But the same challenge could be put to this part of Mill's defense.为何公正是道德中最主要\Why is justice the chief part最不可或缺的部分\and the most binding part of our morality?他说因为从长远看\Well, he says because in the long run,如果我们秉持公正尊重权利\if we do justice and if we respect rights,社会整体会发展得更好\society as a whole will be better off in the long run.这能令人信服吗\Well, what about that?如果有个特例\What if we have a case where making an exception侵犯个人权利\and violating individual rights actually长远来看反而让人们获益更多呢\will make people better off in the long run?那样就可以利用人了吗\Is it all right then to use people?还有另一个能更深入地\And there is a further objection驳斥穆勒有关公正和权利的观点\that could be raised against Mill's case for justice and rights.假设如他所说长远来看\Suppose the utilitarian calculus in the long run功利主义演算真能实现\works out as he says it will即尊重个人权利\such that respecting people's rights从长远来看真的能让大家都获益\is a way of making everybody better off in the long run.这理由说得过去吗\Is that the right reason?这就是我们该尊重别人的唯一理由吗\Is that the only reason to respect people?如果那位医生\If the doctor goes in偷摘走那位来体检的\and yanks the organs from the healthy patient健康人的器官\who came in for a checkup去挽救另外五人\to save five lives,这事从长远来看会有负面影响\there would be adverse effects in the long run.人们终会得知此事\Eventually, people would learn about this而不再去医院体检\and would stop going in for checkups.这理由说得过去吗\Is it the right reason?这就是唯一原因\Is the only reason让你作为医生\that you as a doctor不会偷摘取体检病人的器官吗\won't yank the organs out of the healthy patient因为你认为如果你这样利用他\that you think, well, if I use him in this way,长远来看会导致更多人丧命\in the long run more lives would be lost?还是有另一原因\Or is there another reason这其实跟在本质上尊重每个个体有关\having to do with intrinsic respect for the person as an individual?如果其中确有这一原因\And if that reason matters那隐约可以看出\and it's not so clear即便是穆勒的功利主义也考虑了这点\that even Mill's utilitarianism can take account of it,为了全面检视对穆勒的这两点\fully to examine these two worries or objections,质疑或担忧\to Mill's defense我们需要更进一步\we need to push further.我们要问就更高的或更有价值的快乐而言\And we need to ask in the case of higher or worthier pleasures是否存在"良善生活"的理论\are there theories of the good life that能为快乐的价值\can provide independent moral standards提供独立的道德标准\for the worth of pleasures?如果存在那会是怎样的理论\If so, what do they look like?这是一个问题\That's one question.就公正和权利而言如果我们怀疑\In the case of justice and rights, if we suspect that 穆勒其实也隐约靠向了个人尊严\Mill is implicitly leaning on notions of human dignity或尊重个人的观点\or respect for person而严格说来这不属于功利主义范畴\that are not strictly speaking utilitarian,我们就需要看看\we need to look to see有没有更强有力的权利理论\whether there are some stronger theories of rights能解释穆勒的这点隐约的直觉\that can explain the intuition which even Mill shares, 即尊重个人不利用个人的理由\the intuition that the reason for respecting individuals and not using them甚至胜过了长远看来的功利\goes beyond even utility in the long run.今天我们讨论其中一项强有力的权利理论\Today, we turn to one of those strong theories of rights.这些强有力的权利理论认为\Strong theories of rights say个人很重要不仅仅是用来\individuals matter not just as instruments实现更高社会目标的工具\to be used for a larger social purpose或为了实现功利最大化的工具\or for the sake of maximizing utility,个人是独立的存在\individuals are separate beings有独立的生命值得尊重\with separate lives worthy of respect.这些强有力的权利理论认为\And so it's a mistake,下列看法是错误的\according to strong theories of rights, it's a mistake不该只以偏好和价值的加总\to think about justice or law来考虑公正或法律\by just adding up preferences and values.我们今天要讨论的权利理论是自由主义\The strong rights theory we turn to today is libertarianism.自由主义非常重视个人权利\Libertarianism takes individual rights seriously.它被称为自由主义\It's called libertarianism是因为它宣称个人的基本权利是自由权\because it says the fundamental individual right is the right to liberty就因为我们都是独立存在的个体\Precisely because we are separate individualbeings,我们不能被利用\we're not available to any use去满足社会可能的需求\that the society might desire or devise就因为我们是独立存在的个体\Precisely because we are individual separate human beings,我们享有自由的基本权利\we have a fundamental right to liberty,即我们有权自由选择\and that means a right to choose freely,过自己喜欢的生活\to live our lives as we please只要尊重他人同等的权利\provided we respect other people's rights to do the same. 这是它的基本理念\That's the fundamental idea.罗伯特·诺齐克\Robert Nozick,本课涉及到的一位自由主义哲学家\one of the libertarian philosophers we read是这样说的\for this course, puts it this way:个人有权利\Individuals have rights.这些权利如此强大如此深远\So strong and far reaching are these rights以至引发一个问题如果有的话政府可以做什么\that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state may do.自由主义对于政府或国家的角色\So what does libertarianism say有什么看法呢\about the role of government or of the state?大部分当代政府所做的三种事\Well, there are three things that most modern states do在自由主义理论看来是不合法\that on the libertarian theory of rights不公正的\are illegitimate or unjust.第一家长式的立法\One of them is paternalist legislation.即制定保护人们免受自身行为伤害的法律\That's passing laws that protect people from themselves,诸如系安全带骑摩托车带头盔的法规\seatbelt laws, for example, or motorcycle helmet laws.自由主义者说系安全带也许是件好事\The libertarian says it may be a good thing if people wear seatbelts但这应由人们自己作主\but that should be up to them政府没有资格\and the state, the government, has no business用法律来强迫人们系安全带\coercing them, us, to wear seatbelts by law.这是强迫\It's coercion,所以第一点不应有家长式的立法\so no paternalist legislation, number one.第二点不应有道德式的立法\Number two, no morals legislation.很多法律试图提高公民的品德\Many laws try to promote the virtue of citizens或者试图树立\or try to give expression to the moral values整个社会的道德标准\of the society as a whole.自由主义者说这也违反了个人的自由权\Libertarian say that's also a violation of the right to liberty.举一个经典的例子\Take the example of, well, a classic example以弘扬传统道德之名立法\of legislation authored in the name of promoting morality 历来都有法律\traditionally have been laws禁止同性恋性行为\that prevent sexual intimacy between gays and lesbians.自由主义者认为\The libertarian says其他人没有因此受到伤害也没被侵权\nobody else is harmed,nobody else's rights are violated,所以政府不应该插手此事\so the state should get out of the business entirely of不该试图立法弘扬道德\trying to promote virtue or to enact morals legislation.第三种不被自由主义认同的\And the third kind of law or policy法律或政策是\that is ruled out on the libertarian philosophy任何为了劫富济贫进行收入或财富再分配\is any taxation or other policy that serves the purpose而制定的税收或其他政策\of redistributing income or wealth from the rich to the poor.仔细想想再分配这个概念\Redistribution is a - if you think about it,按自由主义者的话来说就是强迫\says the libertarian is a kind of coercion.它相当于政府施行的盗窃\What it amounts to is theft by the state若是民主政府的话则是大多数人施行的盗窃\or by the majority, if we're talking about a democracy,其对象是工作出色而赚得大钱的人\from people who happen to do very well and earn a lot of money.诺齐克和其他自由主义者认为\Now, Nozick and other libertarians allow that可以有这样一种"小政府"\there can be a minimal state它的税收只用来提供所有人都需要的服务\that taxes people for the sake of what everybody needs,包括国防治安\the national defense, police force,强制履约和保护产权的司法系统\judicial system to enforce contracts and property rights,不过仅此而已\but that's it.我想听听你们对\Now, I want to get your reactions自由主义第三种观点的态度\to this third feature of the libertarian view.看看你们当中谁赞同\I want to see who among you agree with that idea谁不赞同以及为什么\and who disagree and why.但为了更形象看看问题何在\But just to make it concrete and to see what's at stake,以美国的财富分配状况为例\consider the distribution of wealth in the United States. 在所有发达的民主国家之中\United States is among the most inegalitarian society as far as{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}该图为美国10%的人口占据了70%的社会财富美国财富分配不均的问题最为严重\the distribution of wealth of all the advanced democracies.这样是否公平\Now, is this just or unjust?自由主义者们怎么说\Well, what does the libertarian say?他们说你不能仅从这个事实来判断\Libertarian says you can't know just from the facts I've just given you.你无法判断财富分配是否公平\You can't know whether that distribution is just or unjust.你不能仅凭分配格局\Y ou can't know just by looking at a pattern或分配结果\or a distribution or result来判断其是否公平\whether it's just or unjust.你得知道它是怎么来的\You have to know how it came to be.不能只关注最终结果\Y ou can't just look at the end stage or the result.{\an8}诺齐克收入分配怎样才公平你得考虑两个原则\You have to look at two principles.第一个原则诺齐克称之最初占有的公正原则\The first he calls justice in acquisition or in initial holdings.这很简单就是说\And what that means simply is人们是否公平地获得生产资料\did people get the things they used to make their money fairly?我们需要了解最初的占有是否来得公平\So we need to know was there justice in the initial holdings?让他们赚到钱的土地工厂或者商品\Did they steal the land or the factory or the goods这些生产资料是不是偷来的\that enabled them to make all that money?如果不是偷来的如果他们\If not, if they were entitled to whatever it was有权享有那些生产资料\that enabled them to gather the wealth,那就算符合第一条原则\the first principle is matched.第二条原则财富的分配是否\The second principle is did the distribution arise基于自由达成的交易\from the operation of free consent,基于自由市场的买卖\people buying and trading on the market?可以看出自由主义眼中的公平\As you can see, the libertarian idea of justice相当于自由市场理念下的公平\corresponds to a free market conception of justice只要生产资料的获取是公平的\provided people got what they used fairly,不是偷来的\didn't steal it,只要分配的结果是出自\and provided the distribution results自由市场上个体的自由选择\from the free choice of individual's buying and selling things,这样的分配就是公平的\the distribution is just.反之则不公平\And if not, it's unjust.为了进一步限定讨论的话题\So let's, in order to fix ideas for this discussion,我们举个真实的例子\take an actual example.美国最有钱的人是谁\Who's the wealthiest person in the United States -全世界最有钱的人是谁比尔·盖茨\wealthiest person in the world? Bill Gates.的确是没错这就是他\It is. That's right. Here he is.要是你你也会很开心的\You'd be happy, too.他的净资产有多少有人知道吗\Now, what's his net worth? Anybody have any idea? {\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}净资产400亿美元[《福布斯》2009年数据]数字非常巨大\That's a big number.克林顿当政期间\During the Clinton years,有个竞价捐款记得吧\remember there was a controversy donors?参与的大手笔捐款人都被邀请\Big campaign contributors were invited to在白宫的林肯卧室留宿一晚\stay overnight in the Lincoln bedroom at the White House?你要是捐到2.5万美元以上也可以啊\I think if you've contributed twenty five thousand dollars or above.有人算出来\Someone figured out at按能受邀在林肯卧室留宿一夜\the median contribution that got you invited所需捐款额的中位数计算\to stay a night in the Lincoln bedroom,比尔·盖茨完全付得起在林肯卧室\Bill Gates could afford to stay in the Lincoln bedroom every night住上6万6千年\for the next sixty six thousand years.还有人算出了\Somebody else figured out,他一个小时能挣多少钱\how much does he get paid on an hourly basis?他们算出自从他创立了微软\And so they figured out, since he began Microsoft,假设他每天工作14个小时合理的猜测\I suppose he worked, what 14 hours per day, reasonable guess,然后你算算他的净资产\and you calculate this net wealth,结果算出他的工资率在150美元以上\it turns out that his rate of pay is over 150 dollars,不是每小时也不是每分钟\not per hour, not per minute而是每秒钟150美元以上\150 dollars, more than 150 dollars per second这意味着如果盖茨在上班路上\which means that if on his way to the office,就算看到地上有一张百元大钞\Gates noticed a hundred dollar bill on the street,都不值得他停下来去捡\it wouldn't be worth his time to stop and pick it up.你们很多人会说\Now, most of you will say这么有钱的人我们当然可以向他收税\someone that wealthy surely we can tax them 以满足那些得不到教育\to meet the pressing needs of people who lack in education 缺乏食物或者无家可归者的迫切需求\or lack enough to eat or lack decent housing. 他们比他更需要这些钱\They need it more than he does.如果你是个功利主义者你会怎么办\And if you were a utilitarian, what would you do?你会制定怎样的税收政策\What tax policy would you have?你会马上进行再分配对吧\You'd redistribute in a flash, wouldn't you?因为作为一个优秀的功利主义者你知道\Because you would know being a good utilitarian that收走一些对他们来说根本无关痛痒的钱\taking some, a small amount, he'd scarcely going to notice it,却能大大改善社会底层那些人的生活\but it will make a huge improvement in the lives增加他们的福利\and in the welfare of those at the bottom.但是记住\But remember,自由主义理论说\the libertarian theory says我们不能那样\we can't just add up简单加总偏好和满足\an aggregate preferences and satisfactions that way.我们必须要尊重个人\We have to respect persons and如果他公平地赚到钱\if he earned that money fairly没有侵犯到他人权利\without violating anybody else's rights完全遵守了那两条公正原则\in accordance with the two principles最初占有公正原则和转让公正原则\of justice in acquisition and in justice in transfer,那么向他多征税就是错的\then it would be wrong,这无异于强取豪夺\it would be a form of coercion to take it away.迈克尔·乔丹没有比尔·盖茨那么富有\Michael Jordan is not as wealthy as Bill Gates 但他也自有一番成就\but he did pretty well for himself.想看迈克尔·乔丹这就是他\You wanna see Michael Jordan. There he is.他一年的收入有3100万\His income alone in one year was 31 million dollars另外他为耐克和其他公司代言\and then he made another 47 million dollars又能赚4700万\in endorsements for a Nike and other companies.所以他一年的总收入有7800万\So his income was, in one year, $78 million.假设让他拿出三分之一的收入\To require him to pay, let's say, a third of his earnings交给政府来支持公益事业\to the government to support good causes为穷人提供食物医疗保障住房和教育\like food and health care and housing and education for the poor,这就是强迫是不公平的\that's coercion, that's unjust.侵犯了他的权利\That violates his rights.正因如此再分配是错误的\And that's why redistribution is wrong.有多少人同意自由主义者的这一驳论\Now, how many agree with that argument,认为为了帮助穷人\agree with the libertarian argument that redistribution进行财富再分配不对\for the sake of trying to help the poor is wrong?有多少人不同意这个观点\And how many disagree with that argument?好我们先从那些不同意的人开始\All right, let's begin with those who disagree.自由主义者反对再分配怎么不对了\What's wrong with the libertarian case against redistribution?请说\Yes.我认为像迈克尔·乔丹这样的人\I think these people like Michael Jordan have received在社会中工作\we're talking about working within a society他们从社会中得到的更多\and they received larger gift from the society因此他们该承担更大的责任\and they have a larger obligation通过财富再分配来回报社会\in return to give that through redistribution, you know, 你可以说乔丹也许和那些\you can say that Michael Jordan may work just as hard as some who works,一天洗12甚至14小时衣服的人一样辛苦\you know, doing laundry 12 hours, 14 hours a day,但他得到的更多\but he's receiving more.如果说这都是靠他自己辛苦挣来的\I don't think it's fair to say that, you know, it's all on him,是他天赋所赐我觉得这不算公平\on his, you know, inherent, you know, hard work. 好我们来听听自由主义者的辩护\All right, let's hear from defenders of libertarianism.为何向富人征税救济穷人在原则上是错的\Why would it be wrong in principle to tax the rich to help the poor?说吧\Go ahead.我名叫乔我收集滑板\My name is Joe and I collect skateboards.我已经买了100个滑板了\I've since bought a hundred skateboards.我居住的社区有一百人\I live in a society of a hundred people.我是唯一有滑板的人\I'm the only one with skateboards.突然大家都想要滑板了\Suddenly, everyone decides they want a skateboard.他们跑到我家来\They come to my house,拿走了我的99个滑板\they take my they take 99 of my skateboards.我觉得这是不公平的\I think that is unjust.我认为在某些情况下\Now, I think in certain circumstances我们需要忽视这种不公平\it becomes necessary to overlook that unjustness,容忍这种不正义\perhaps condone that injustice例如在救生艇里被当作食物的男孩\as in the case of the cabin boy being killed for food.如果人们在死亡边缘挣扎\If people are on the verge of dying,也许忽视这样的不公平是必要的\perhaps it is necessary to overlook that injustice, 但我认为即使这样我们依然要铭记\but I think it's important to keep in mind我们的行为不公正\that we're still committing injustice这是在占有他人的财物或资产\by taking people's belongings or assets.你是说按33%的税率向乔丹征税\Are you saying that taxing Michael Jordan, say, at a 33 percent tax rate来支持公益事业解决温饱是盗窃行为吗\for good causes to feed the hungry is theft? 我觉得这不公正\I think it's unjust.我确实认为这是盗窃\Y es, I do believe it's theft但也许我们有必要容忍它\but perhaps it is necessary to condone that theft.但它依然是盗窃\But it's theft.是的\Yes.为什么是盗窃呢乔\Why is it theft, Joe?因为\Because --为什么这和你收集滑板有相同之处呢\Why is it like your collection of skateboards? 这是盗窃是因为至少在我看来\It's theft because, or at least, in my opinion在自由主义者的观点看来\and by the libertarian opinion他公平地取得收入这些收入都是属于他的\he earned that money fairly and it belongs to him.拿走他的收入毫无疑问就是盗窃\So to take it from him is by definition theft.有人想反驳乔吗你请说\Who wants to reply to Joe? Yes, go ahead.我觉得他的例子不恰当\I don't think this is necessarily a case不是你有99个滑板而政府...\in which you have 99 skateboards and the government...或你有100个滑板\or you have a hundred skateboards而政府收走99个\and the government is taking 99 of them.恰当的例子是你的滑板多到\It's like you have more skateboards每天用一个都不重样\than there are days in a year.你的滑板多到\You have more skateboards一辈子也用不完\than you're going to be able to use in your entire lifetime而政府只是拿走其中的一些\and the government is taking part of those.如果你生活在一个那样的社会\And I think that if you are operating in a society in which这个社会中\the government's not,政府不进行财富再分配\in which the government doesn't redistribute wealth,就等于允许一些人无限累积过多的财富\then that allows for people to amass so much wealth以至于那些不在同一起跑线的人\that people who haven't started from this very the equal footing当然这只是假设\in our hypothetical situation,现实中是不存在的\that doesn't exist in our real society他们将余生都将没有机会翻身\get undercut for the rest of their lives.所以你担心\So you're worried that如果没有一定程度的再分配\if there isn't some degree of redistribution of some照顾社会底层\or left at the bottom,就不会有名副其实的机会均等\there will be no genuine equality of opportunity.很好关于税收是盗窃这个观点\All right, the idea that taxation is theft,诺齐克要更进一步\Nozick takes that point one step further.他同意这是盗窃而且比乔苛刻\He agrees that it's theft. He's more demanding than Joe.乔说这是盗窃但在极端情况下也许可以原谅\Joe says it is theft, maybe in an extreme case it's justified,例如为了养活饥饿的家人\maybe a parent is justified in stealing a loaf of bread而去偷面包的家长\to feed his or her hungry family.乔你会如何称呼自己\So Joe I would say, what would you call yourself,慈悲的自由主义者吗\a compassionate quasi-libertarian?仔细想想\Nozick says, if you think about it,诺齐克说征税相当于强占收入\taxation amounts to the taking of earnings.换句话说就是\In other words, it means强占劳动果实\taking the fruits of my labor.但如果政府有权\But if the state has the right强占我的收入或劳动果实\to take my earning or the fruits of my labor,这在道义上不就等同于\isn't that morally the same政府有权\as according to the state the right让我做部分义务劳动吗\to claim a portion of my labor?所以实际上\So taxation actually征税道义上等同于强迫劳动\is morally equivalent to forced labor因为强迫劳动会强占我的\because forced labor involves the taking of闲暇时间还有努力\my leisure, my time, my efforts,就像征税会强占我的劳动所得一样\just as taxation takes the earnings that I make with my labor.所以对诺齐克和其他自由主义者来说\And so, for Nozick and for the libertarians, 再分配的税收是盗窃就像乔说的\taxation for redistribution is theft, as Joe says,但不仅如此\but not only theft is morally equivalent盗窃还在道义上等同于\to laying claim to certain hours强占生命和劳动的时间\of a person's life and labor,因此等于强迫劳动\so it's morally equivalent to forced labor.如果政府有权强占我的劳动果实\If the state has a right to claim the fruits of my labor,这就说明它确实有权强迫我劳动\that implies that it really has an entitlement to my labor itself.什么是强迫劳动\And what is forced labor?诺齐克指出强迫劳动就是奴役\Forced labor, Nozick points out, is what, is slavery, 因为如果我连对自己劳动的独占权都没有\because if I don't have the right, the sole 这就说明\then that's really to say政府或是政治共同体\that the government or the political community是我的部分主人\is a part owner in me.政府是我的部分主人又意味着什么呢\And what does it mean for the state to be a part owner in me?仔细想想这就意味着我是一个奴隶\If you think about it, it means that I'm a slave, 我不是自己的主人\that I don't own myself.这些推理把我们带回到\So what this line of reasoning brings us to自由主义的权利主张\is the fundamental principle所隐含的基本原则\that underlies the libertarian case for rights.那是什么原则呢\What is that principle?我是我自己主人的原则\It's the idea that I own myself.是尊重人权\It's the idea of self possession自然会接受自我拥有的原则\if you want to take right seriously.如果你不想只把人看成是各种偏好的集合\If you don't want to just regard people ascollections of preferences,那你必将走向\the fundamental moral idea这一基本道德理念\to which you will be lead is the idea我们是自己的主人\that we are the owners or the propietors of our own person,功利主义的问题就出在这里\and that's why utilitarianism goes wrong.这也是为什么\And that's why it's wrong摘取健康人的器官是错的\to yank the organs from that healthy patient.你这么做仿佛他的器官属于你或这个社会\You're acting as if that patient belongs to you or to the community.但我们只属于我们自己\But we belong to ourselves.也正是出于这一理由\And that's the same reason才不该制定法律保护我们免受自己伤害\that it's wrong to make laws to protect us from ourselves或告诉我们该如何生活\or to tell us how to live,该秉持怎样的道德规范\to tell us what virtues we should be governed by,这也是为什么向富人征税来救济穷人不对\and that's also why it's wrong to tax the rich to help the poor就算是为了公益事业\even for good causes,就算是为了帮助卡特里娜飓风的灾民\even to help those who are displaced by the Hurricane Katrina.请富人去搞慈善活动吧\Ask them to give charity.但如果对他们征税就成了强迫劳动\But if you tax them, it's like forcing them to labor.你能强迫乔丹放弃下周的比赛\Could you tell Michael Jordan he has to skip the next week's games必须下灾区去帮助卡特里娜飓风的灾民吗\and go down to help the people displaced by Hurricane Katrina?道义上说两者是一样\Morally, it's the same.因此利害关系很分明的\So the stakes are very high.我们现在已经听了一些对自由主义的反对声\So far we've heard some objections to the libertarian argument.但要想驳倒自由主义\But if you want to reject it,你就得打破它的这个推理过程\you have to break in to this chain of reasoning which goes,强占我的收入就是强迫劳动\taking my earnings is like taking my labor,强迫劳动就是让我做奴隶\but taking my labor is making me a slave.不同意这一点的\And if you disagree with that,你肯定相信自我拥有的原则\you must believe in the principle of self possession.不同意的收集下反对意见\Those who disagree, gather your objections。
哈佛公开课
哈佛公开课：公正1--案例引发的思考(2011-11-30 10:46:55)关于公正与思考，我相信99%的中国人没有听说过这堂课的故事，也没有真正思考过公正的形式与意义。
这正是中国文化和思想所缺失的东西。
故事在下面的字幕里都很详细了，但比较多，看起来也乱些。
如果没有耐心就不要看啦。
先说那几个故事吧：第一版的故事这是一门讨论公正的课程。
我们以一则故事作为引子，假设你是一名电车司机，你的电车以60英里/小时的速度在轨道上飞驰。
突然发现在轨道的尽头有五名工人正在施工，你无法让电车停下来，因为刹车坏了。
你此时极度绝望，因为你深知，如果电车撞向那五名工人他们全都会死。
假设你对此确信无疑，你极为无助。
直到你发现在轨道的右侧有一条侧轨，而在侧轨的尽头只有一名工人在那施工，而你的方向盘还没坏，只要你想，就可以把电车转到侧轨上去----牺牲一人挽救五人性命。
如果你就是这个司机，你会怎么选择？为什么？第二版的故事这次你不再是电车司机了，只是一名旁观者。
你站在一座桥上俯瞰着电车轨道，电车沿着轨道从远处驶来，轨道的尽头有五名工人，电车刹车坏了，这五名工人即将被撞死。
但你不是电车司机你真的爱莫能助，直到你发现在你旁边靠着桥站着的是个超级大胖子，你可以选择推他一把，他就会摔下桥，正好摔在电车轨道上挡住电车。
他必死无疑但可以救那五人的性命。
如果你就是这个旁观者，你会如何选择？为什么？第三版的故事现在来考虑一下另外一种情况：这次你是一名器官移植医生你有五名病人，每名病人都急需器官移植才能存活。
分别需要心脏移植肺移植肾移植肝移植以及胰腺移植，没有器官捐赠者，你只能眼睁睁看他们死去。
然后你突然想起，在隔壁病房有个来做体检的健康人而且他...你们喜欢这剧情吧...而且他正在打盹，你可以悄悄地进去取出那五个器官，这人会死但你能救那另外五人。
如果你就是这个医生，你会怎么选择？为什么？来关注一下这些争论是怎样展开的某些道德原则已经随着我们讨论的展开逐渐开始浮现出来了我们来细想下这些道德原则都是怎样的在讨论中出现的第一条道德原则正确的选择道德的选择取决于你的行为所导致的后果最终结论:牺牲一人保全五人是更好的选择这是后果主义道德推理的一则例子后果主义道德推理认为是否道德取决于行为的后果取决于你的行为对外界所造成的影响但随着谈论的深入我们发现在其他情况中人们不再对后果主义道德推理那么确定了当人们开始犹豫是否要推胖子下桥或者是否切取无辜病人的器官时他们更倾向于去评判行为本身的动机而不是该行为的后果人们动摇了他们认为杀掉一个无辜的人是绝对错误的哪怕是为了拯救五条生命至少在每个故事的第二种情况中是这样认为的这表明有第二种绝对主义方式的道德推理绝对主义道德推理认为是否道德取决于特定的绝对道德准则取决于绝对明确的义务与权利而不管后果如何我们将用以后的几天到几周时间来探讨后果主义与绝对主义道德原则的差别后果主义道德推理中最具影响的就是功利主义教授介绍：字幕：第一讲《杀人的道德侧面》这是一门讨论公正的课程。
哈佛大学公开课Justice-What's the right thing to do 07
Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a DealFunding for this program is provided by Additional funding provided by Last time we began trying to we began by trying to navigate our way through Kant's moral theory.Now, fully to make sense of Kant moral theory in the groundwork requires that we be able to answer three questions.How can duty and autonomy go together?What's the great dignity in answering to duty?It would seem that these two ideas are opposed duty and autonomy.What's Kant's answer to that?Need someone here to speak up on Kant's behalf.Does he have an answer?Yes, go ahead, stand up.Kant believes you the only act autonomously when you are pursuing something only the name of duty and not because of your own circumstances such as ®C like you're only doing something good and moral if you're doing it because of duty and not because something of your own personal gain.Now why is that acting°≠what's your name?My name is Matt.Matt, why is that acting on a freedom?I hear what you're saying about duty?Because you choose to accept those moral laws in yourself and not brought on from outside upon onto you.Okay, good.Because acting out of duty ®C Yeah.- is following a moral law That you impose on yourself.That you impose on yourself.That's what makes duty compatible with freedom.- Yeah.Okay, that's good Matt.That is Kant's answer. That's great.Thank you. So, Kant's answer is it is not in so far as I am subject to the law that I have dignity but rather in so far as with regard to that very same law, I'm the author and I am subordinated to that law on that ground that I took it as much as at I took it upon myself.I willed that law.So that's why for Kant acting according to duty and acting freely in the sense of autonomously are one and the same.But that raises the question, how many moral laws are there?Because if dignity consists and be governed by a law that I give myself, what's to guarantee that my conscience will be the same as your conscience?Who has Kant's answer to that? Yes?Because a moral law trend is not contingent upon seductive conditions.It would transcend all particular differences between people and so would be a universal law and in this respect there'd only be one moral law because it would be supreme.Right. That's exactly right.What's your name?Kelly.Kelly. So Kelly, Kant believes that if we choose freely out of our own consciences, the moral law we're guarantee to come up with one and the same moral law. -Yes.And that's because when I choose it's not me, Michael Sandel choosing.It's not you, Kelly choosing for yourself?What is it exactly?Who is doing the choosing?Who's the subject? Who is the agent?Who is doing the choosing?Reason? - Well reason°≠Pure reason.Pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly?Well pure reason is like we were saying before not subject to any external conditions that may be imposed on that side.Good that's' great.So, the reason that does the willing, the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law for yourself and that's why it's possible to act autonomously to choose for myself, for each of us to choose for ourselves as autonomous beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law, the categorical imperative.But then there is one big and very difficult question left even if you accept everything that Matt and Kelly had said so far.How is a categorical imperative possible?How is morality possible?To answer that question, Kant said we need to make a distinction.We need to make a distinction between two standpoints, two standpoints from which we can make sense of our experience.Let me try to explain what he means by these two standpoints.As an object of experience, I belong to the sensible world.There my actions are determined by the laws of nature and by the regularities of cause and effect.But as a subject of experience, I inhabit an intelligible world here being independent of the laws of nature I am capable of autonomy, capable of acting according to a law I give myself.Now Kant says that, "Only from this second standpoint can I regard myself as free for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world is to be free." If I were holy and empirical being as the utilitarian assume, if I were a being holy and only subject to the deliverances of my senses, to pain and pleasure and hunger and thirst and appetite, if that's all there were to humanity, we wouldn't be capable of freedom, Kant reasons because in that case every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object.In that case all choice would be heteronomous choice governed by the pursued of some external end."When we think of ourselves as free," Kant writes, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will." That's the idea of the two standpoints.So how are categorical imperatives possible?Only because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world?Now Kant admits we aren't only rational beings.We don't only inhabit the intelligible world, the realm of freedom.If we did -- if we did, then all of our actions would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will.But precisely because we inhabit simultaneously the two standpoints, the two realms, the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity precisely because we inhabit both realms there is always potentially a gap between what we do and what we ought to do between is and ought.Another way of putting this point and this is the point with which Kant concludes the groundwork, morality is not empirical.Whatever you see in the world, whatever you discover through science can't decide moral questions.Morality stands at a certain distance from the world, from the empirical world.And that's why no science could deliver moral truth.Now I want to test Kant's moral theory with the hardest possible case, a case that he raises, the case of the murderer at the door.Kant says that lying is wrong.We all know that.We've discussed why. Lying is at odds with the categorical imperative.A French Philosopher, Benjamin Constant wrote an article responding to the groundwork where he said, "This absolute probation online What if a murderer came to your door looking for your friend who was hiding in your house?And the murderer asked you point blank, "Is your friend in your house?" Constant says, "It would be crazy to say that the moral thing to do in that case is to tell the truth." Constant says the murderer certainly doesn't deserve the truth and Kant wrote to reply.And Kant stuck by his principle that lying even to the murderer at the door is wrong.And the reason it's wrong, he said is once you start taking consequences into account to carve out exceptions to the categorical imperative, you've given up the whole moral framework.You've become a consequentialist or maybe a rule utilitarian.But most of you and most to our Kant's readers think there's something odd and impossible about this answer.I would like to try to defend Kant on this point and then I want to see whether you think that my defense is plausible, and I would want to defend him within the spirit of his own account of morality.Imagine that someone comes to your door.You were asked that question by this murder.You are hiding your friend.Is there a way that you could avoid telling a lie without selling out your friend?Does anyone have an idea of how you might be able to do that?Yes? Stand up.I was just going to say if I were to let my friend in my house to hide in the first place, I'd probably make a plan with them so I'd be like, "Hey I'll tell the murderer you're here, but escape," and that's one of the options mentioned.But I'm not sure that's a Kantian option.You're still lying though.No because he's in the house but he won't be.Oh I see. All right, good enough.One more try.If you just say you don't know where he is because he might not be locked in the closet.He might have left the closet.You have no clue where he could be.So you would say, I don't know which wouldn't actually be a lie because you weren't at that very moment looking in the closet.Exactly.-So it would be strictly speaking true.Yes.And yet possibly deceiving, misleading.-But still true.What's your name?-John.John. All right, John has...now John may be on to something.John you're really offering us the option of a clever evasion that is strictly speaking true. This raises the question whether there is a moral difference between an outright lie and a misleading truth.From Kant's point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie and a misleading truth.Why is that even though both might have the same consequences?But then remember Kant doesn't base morality on consequences.He bases it on formal adherence to the moral law.Now, sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against lying with the white lie.What is a white lie?It's a lie to make...you're well to avoid hurting someone's feelings for example.It's a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences.Now Kant could not endorse a white lie but perhaps he could endorse a misleading truth. Supposed someone gives you a tie, as a gift, and you open the box and it's just awful. What do you say? Thank you.You could say thank you.But they're waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you what do you think of it?You could tell a white lie and say it's beautiful.But that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's point of view.Could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth, you open the box and you say, "I've never seen a tie like that before.Thank you." You shouldn't have.That's good.Can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged...you can?Who are you thinking of?You remember the whole carefully worded denials in the Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton.Now, those denials actually became the subject of very explicit debate in argument during the impeachment hearings.Take a look at the following excerpts from Bill Clinton.Is there something do you think morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and a misleading carefully couched truth?I want to say one thing to the American people.I want you to listen to me.I'm going to say this again.I did not have sexual relations with that woman Miss Lewinsky.I never told anybody to lie not a single time, never. These allegations are false.Did he lie to the American people when he said I never had sex with that woman?You know, he doesn't believe he did and because of the °≠Well he didn't explain it.He did explain that, explain congressman.What he said was to the American people that he did not have sexual relations and I understand you're not going to like this congressman because you will see it as a hair-splitting evasive answer.But in his own mind his definition was not...Okay, I understand that argument.-Okay.All right, so there you have the exchange.Now at the time, you may have thought this was just a legalistic hair-splitting exchange between a Republican who wanted to impeach Clinton and a lawyer who is trying to defend him.But now in the light of Kant, do you think there is something morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and an evasion, a true but misleading statement?I'd like to hear from defenders of Kant.People who think there is a distinction.Are you ready to defend Kant?Well I think when you try to say that lying and misleading truths are the same thing; you're basing it on consequentialist argument which is that they achieve the same thing.But the fact to the fact to the matter is you told the truth and you intended that people wouldbelieve what you are saying which was the truth which means it is not morally the same as telling a lie and intending that they believe it is the truth even though it is not true.Good. What's your name?-Diana.So Diana says that Kant has a point here and it's a point that might even come to the aid of Bill Clinton and that is °≠well what about that?There's someone over here.For Kant motivation is key, so if you give to someone because primarily you want to feel good about yourself Kant would say that has no moral worth.Well with this, the motivation is the same.It's to sort of mislead someone, it's to lie, it's to sort of throw them off the track and the motivation is the same.So there should be no difference.Okay, good. So here isn't the motive the same Diana?What do you say to this argument that well the motive is the same in both cases there is the attempt or at least the hope that one's pursuer will be misled?Well that ®C you could look it that way but I think that the fact is that your immediate motive is that they should believe you.The ultimate consequence of that is t hat they might be deceived and not find out what was going on.But that your immediate motive is that they should believe you because you're telling the truth.May I help a little?-Sure.You and Kant. Why don't you say...and what's your name, I'm sorry?Wesley.Why don't you say to Wesley it's not exactly the case that the motive in both cases is to mislead?They're hoping, they're hoping that the person will be misled by the statement "I don't know where they are" or "I never had sexual relations." You're hoping that they will be misled but in the case where you're telling the truth, you're motive is to mislead while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative.I think Kant's answer would be Diana, yes?-Yes.You like that?-I do.Okay. So I think Kant's answer would be unlike a falsehood, unlike a lie, a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty.And the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of even the work of the evasion.And so there is something, some element of respect for the dignity of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an outright lie but he didn't.And so I think Kant's insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion.There is a kind of homage to the dignity of the moral law that is not present in the outright lie and that, Wesley, is part of the motive.It's part of the motive.Yes, I hope he will be misled.I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking for my friend instead at the closet.I hope that will be the effect.I can't control that.I can't control the consequences.But what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends, I hope will unfold to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the moral law.Wesley, I don't think, is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out, this discussion brings out some of what it's at stake, what's morally at stake in Kant's notion of the categorical imperative.As long as any effort this involved I would say that the contract is valid then.It should take effect.But why? What was...what morally can you point to?For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly called the other in two minutes say I changed my mind.Does the contract have obligation on both sides?Well I am tempted to say no.Fine.Last time we talked about Kant's categorical imperative and we considered the way he applied the idea of the categorical imperative to the case of lying.I want to turn briefly to one other application of Kant's moral theory and that's his political theory.Now Kant says that just laws arise from a certain kind of social contract.But this contract he tells us is of an exceptional nature.What makes the contract exceptional is that it is not an actual contract that happens when people come together and try to figure out what the constitution should be.It's not an actual contract among actual men and women gathered in a constitutional convention.Why not?I think Kant's reason is that actual men and women gathered in real constitutional convention would have different interests, values, aims, and it would also be differences of bargaining power and differences of knowledge among them.And so the laws that would result from their deliberations wouldn't necessarily be just, wouldn't necessarily conform to principles of right but would simply reflect the differences a bargaining power, the special interests the fact that some might know more than others about law or about politics.So Kant says, "A contract that generates principles of right is merely an idea of reason but it has undoubted practical reality because it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation." So Kant is a contractarian, but he doesn't trace the origin or the rightness of law to any actual social contract.This contrives to an obvious question.What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract, a contract that never happened?That's the question we take up today but in order to investigate it, we need to turn to a modern philosopher, John Rawls, who worked out in his book, A Theory of Justice, in great detail and account of a hypothetical agreement as the basis for justice.Rawls' theory of justice in broad outline is parallel to Kant's in two important respects.Like Kant, Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism."Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice," Rawls' writes, "that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus social interests." The second respect in which Rawls' theory follows Kant's is on the idea that principles of justice properly understood can be derived from a hypothetical social contract. Not an actual one.And Rawls works this out in fascinating detail with the device of what he calls the "veil of ignorance".The way to arrive at the rights...the basic rights that we must respect, the basic framework of rights and duties is to imagine that we were gathered together trying to choose the principles to govern our collective lives without knowing certain important particular fact about ourselves.That's the idea of the veil of ignorance.Now what would happen if we gather together just as we are here and try to come up with principles of justice to govern our collective life?There would be a cacophony of proposals of suggestions reflecting people's different interests, some are strong, some are weak, some are rich, some are poor.what assures the equality is the veil of ignorance.Imagine that we are all behind a veil of ignorance which temporarily abstracts from or brackets, hides from us who in particular we are.Our race, our class, our place in society, our strengths, our weaknesses, whether we're healthy or unhealthy, then and only then Rawls says, the principles we would agree to would be principles of justice.That's how the hypothetical contract works.What is the moral force of this kind of hypothetical agreement?Is it stronger or weaker than a real agreement, an actual social contract?In order to answer that question, we have to look hard at the moral force of actual contracts.There are really two questions here.One of them is how do actual contracts bind me or obligate me?Question number one.And question number two, how do actual real life contracts justify the terms that they produce?If you think about it and this is in line with Rawls and Kant, the answer to the second question, how do actual contracts justify the terms that they produce, the answer is they don't.At least not on their own.Actual contracts are not self-sufficient moral instruments of any actual contract or agreement.It can always be asked, is it fair what they agreed to?The fact of the agreement never guarantees the fairness of the agreement and we know this by looking at our own constitutional convention.It produced a constitution that permitted slavery to persist.It was agreed to.It was an actual contract but that doesn't establish that the laws agreed to all of them were just.Well then what is the moral force of actual contracts?To the extent that they bind us, they obligate in two ways.Suppose, maybe here it would help to take an example.We make an agreement, a commercial agreement.I promise to pay you $100 if you will go harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters.We make a deal.You go out and harvest them and bring them to me.I eat the lobsters, served them to my friends, and then I don't pay.And you say, "But you're obligated." And I say, "Why?" What do you say? "Well we had a deal." And you benefited.You ate all those lobsters.Well that's a pretty strong argument.It's an argument that depends though and the fact that I benefited from your labor So, contracts sometimes bind us in so far as they are instruments of mutual benefit.I ate the lobsters. I owe you the $100 for having gathered them.But suppose, now take a second case.We make this deal, I'll pay you $100 for 380 before you've gone to any work I call you back and say I've changed my mind.Now, there's no benefit.There's no work on your part so there's no element of reciprocal exchange.What about in that case, do I still owe you merely in virtue of the fact that we had an agreement?Who says those of you who say, yes, I still owe you? Why? Okay, stand up.Why do I owe you?I called you back after two minutes.You haven't done any work.I think I spent the time and effort in drafting this contract with you and also have emotional expectation that I go through the work.So you took time to draft the contract but we did it very quickly.We just chatted on the phone.That wouldn't be a formal form of contract though.Well I faxed at you.It only took a minute.As long as any effort is involved, I would say that the contract is valid then.It should take effect.But why? What was...what morally can you point to that obligates me?I admit that I agreed but you didn't go to any work. I didn't enjoy any benefit.Because one might mentally go through all the work of harvesting the lobsters.You mentally went through the work of harvesting the lobsters.That's nothing is it?It's not much.Is it worth $100 that you were imagining yourself going and collecting lobsters?It may not worth $100, but it may worth something to some people.All right, I'll give you a buck for that.But what I ®C so you're still pointing...what's interesting you're still pointing to the reciprocal dimension of contracts.You did or imagined that you did or looked forward to doing something that might be had. For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly calls the other in two minutes say, I've changed my mind, does the contract have obligation on both sides? Nobody has done any work or nobody has benefited yet.Well I'm tempted to say no.Fine.All, right. What's your name?-Julian.Thank you Julian.All right, that was good.Now is there anyone who has who agrees with Julian that I still owe the money?For any other reason now I have °≠go ahead, stand up.I think if you back out it sort of cheapens the institution of contracts.Good but why? Why does it?Well I think is kind of Kantian, but there's in almost there's a certain intrinsic value in being able to make contracts and having, you know, knowing people will expect that you'll go through with that.Good, there is some...it would cheapen the whole idea of contracts which has to do with taking in obligation on myself. Is that the idea?Yeah, I think so.What's your name?-Adam.So Adam points instead not to any reciprocal benefit or mutual exchange but to the mere fact of the agreement itself.We see here there are really two different ways in which actual contracts generate obligations.One has to do with the active consent as a voluntary act and it points...Adam said this was a Kantian idea and I think he is right because it points to the ideal of autonomy.When I make a contract, the obligation is one that is self-imposed and that carries a certain moral weight, independent of other considerations.And then there's a second element of the moral force of contract arguments which has to do with the sense in which actual contracts are instruments of mutual benefit and this points toward the ideal of reciprocity that obligation can arise, I can have an obligation to you in so far as you do something for me.Now, when investigating the moral force and also the moral limits of actual contracts and here I would like to advance an argument about the moral limits of actual contracts now that we know what moral ingredients do the work when people come together and say, "I will do this if you do that." I would like to argue first that the fact that two people agreed to some exchange does not mean that the terms of their agreement are fair.When my two sons were young they collected baseball cards and traded them.And one was...there was a two-year aged...there is a two-year aged difference between them and so I had to institute a rule about the trades that no trade was complete until I had approved it and the reason is obvious.The older one knew more about the value of these cards and so would take advantage of the younger one.So that's why I had to review it to make sure that the agreements were fair.Now you may say, "Well this is paternalism." Of course it was. That's what paternalism is for that kind of thing.So what does this show?What is the baseball cards example show?The fact of an agreement is not sufficient to establish the fairness of the terms.I read some years ago of a case in Chicago there was an elderly widow, an 84-year-old widow named Rose who had a problem in her apartment with a leaky toilet and she signed a contract with an unscrupulous contractor, who offered to repair her leaky toilet in exchange for $50,000.But she had agreed she was of sound mind, maybe terribly naive and unfamiliar with the price of plumbing, she had made this agreement.Luckily, it was discovered.She went to the bank and asked to withdraw $25,000.And the teller said, "Why do you need all of that money for?" And she said, "Well, I have a leaky toilet." And the teller called authorities and they discovered this unscrupulous contractor.。
哈佛大学公开课-公正-该如何做是好？
哈佛大学公开课公平与正义，该如何做是好？主讲：迈克尔·桑德尔迈克尔·桑德尔第一讲：谋杀的道德侧面教授：这是一堂关于公平与正义的公共课。
让我们先从一个故事讲起，假设你现在是一辆有轨电车的司机。
你的电车正在铁轨上以每小时60英里的速度疾驶。
在铁轨末端，你发现有五个工人在铁轨上工作。
你尽力想停下电车, 但是你做不到，电车的刹车失灵了。
你觉得十分绝望，因为你知道如果你就这样撞向这5个工人他们必死无疑，假定你很清楚这一点。
正当你感到无助的时候, 你突然发现就在右边另一根铁轨的尽头只有一个工人在那里工作。
你的方向盘没有失灵, 只要你愿意你可以让电车转向到那条分叉铁轨上撞死一个工人，但却因此救了另外5个人。
那我们的第一个问题就来了，现在我们该怎么做才对?你会怎么做? 我们做个调查，看看有多少人会选择让电车转向到分叉铁轨上，举起你的手，多少人不会?多少人选择就这样笔直开下去?选笔直开下去的人先别放手。
少数人会，大多数人选择转向。
让我们先听听看。
现在我们研究下，你为什么觉得这样做是正确的?让我们先从大多数人开始吧。
谁选择转向的?你为什么这么选？你的理由是什么？谁愿意给我一个理由的？站起来说吧。
学生：因为当你可以只撞死一个人时却去撞死5个人肯定是不对的。
教授：当可以只撞死一个人时却去撞死5个人肯定不对，这是个好理由。
这是个好理由。
其他人呢？每个人都同意刚刚那个理由么?你来。
学生：我觉得这和9.11的一项事件是同样原因。
我们把那些将飞机撞向宾夕法尼亚空地的人视为英雄，因为他们选择只牺牲飞机里的人从而拯救了大楼里的更多生命。
所以原因和9.11事件中那些人的选择是相同的。
虽然一定会发生悲剧，但只撞死一个人好过撞死五个。
教授：你们大多数人是不是都这么想，选择转向的各位，是么？现在让我们听听那些少数人的想法，选择直行的人学生：我觉得这和对种族灭绝与极权主义的诡辩相似。
为了拯救一个种族你抹去了其他的种族。
教授：那么在这个事例中你会怎么做？你会，为了避免恐怖的种族灭绝主义而选择撞死那5个人么?学生：理论上，是这样。
哈佛公开课-公正课中英字幕 第三节
制作人：心舟 QQ：1129441083 欢迎交流公正课\N迈克尔·桑德尔教授主讲第三讲《给生命标价》上节课我们讨论了\Last time, we argued about女王诉达德利和斯蒂芬斯案\the case of Queen versus Dudley and Stevens,即救生艇的案例\the lifeboat case,海上食人惨案\the case of cannibalism at sea.带着对救生艇上发生事件的讨论\And with the arguments about the lifeboat in mind,即对达德利和斯蒂芬斯行为赞同与否的讨论\the arguments for and against what Dudley and Stephens did in mind,让我们再回归\let's turn back to the philosophy,杰里米·边沁的功利主义哲学\the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.边沁 1748年生于英格兰\Bentham was born in England in 1748.12岁进入牛津大学\At the age of 12, he went to Oxford.15岁入读法学院\At 15, he went to law school.19岁取得律师资格\He was admitted to the Bar at age 19但从没当过律师\but he never practiced law.而是将毕生精力献给了法学和道德哲学\Instead, he devoted his life to jurisprudence and moral philosophy.上节课我们开始\Last time, we began to思考边沁的功利主义\consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism.他的主要观点简单明确就是\The main idea is simply stated and it's this:道德的最高准则\The highest principle of morality,无论是个人道德还是政治道德\whether personal or political morality,都是最大化公共福利或曰集体幸福感\is to maximize the general welfare, or the collective happiness,或者说权衡苦乐将幸福最大化\or the overall balance of pleasure over pain;一句话功利最大化\in a phrase, maximize utility.边沁是这样论证这一原则的\Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning: 我们都受到痛苦和快乐的支配\We're all governed by pain and pleasure,苦乐是我们至高无上的主宰\they are our sovereign masters,因此任何道德体系都应考虑到它们\and so any moral system has to take account of them.最好怎样考虑呢通过最大化\How best to take account? By maximizing.从而引出"为最多的人谋求最大的幸福"这一原则\And this leads to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.我们到底该最大化什么呢\What exactly should we maximize?边沁说应最大化幸福\Bentham tells us happiness,或更精确来说最大化功利\or more precisely, utility功利最大化原则不只针对个人\maximizing utility as a principle not only for individuals也适用于共同体及立法者\but also for communities and for legislators.边沁问到底什么是共同体\"What, after all, is a community?" Bentham asks.共同体是其成员的集合\It's the sum of the individuals who comprise it.所以在制定最优政策时\And that's why in deciding the best policy,制定法律时决定何谓公正时\in deciding what the law should be, in deciding what's just,公民和立法者应扪心自问这个问题\citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question 当用政策带来的总效益\if we add up all of the benefits of this policy减去总成本\and subtract all of the costs,正确的选择应该是\the right thing to do is the one减去苦难后幸福最大化的那一个\that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering.这就是所谓功利最大化\That's what it means to maximize utility.今天我想听听\Now, today, I want to see你们是否赞同这点\whether you agree or disagree with it,功利主义的逻辑\and it often goes, this utilitarian logic,通常被称作成本效益分析\under the name of cost-benefit analysis,一再被企业和政府运用\which is used by companies and by governments all the time.其做法包括作出估价\And what it involves is placing a value,通常是估计出金额来代表功利\usually a dollar value, to stand for utility即分别列出成本和各项收益的金额\on the costs and the benefits of various proposals.最近捷克共和国\Recently, in the Czech Republic,有一个增加香烟消费税的提案\there was a proposal to increase the excise tax on smoking.烟草公司菲利普·莫里斯公司\Philip Morris, the tobacco company,在捷克共和国的生意做得很大\does huge business in the Czech Republic.他们资助了一项研究\They commissioned a study,进行在捷克吸烟的成本效益分析\a cost-benefit analysis of smoking in the Czech Republic,分析结果显示\and what their cost-benefit analysis found was让捷克人民吸烟能让政府获利\the government gains by having Czech citizens smoke.那政府如何获利呢\Now, how do they gain?它确实会对捷克政府的\It's true that there are negative effects公共财政产生负效应\to the public finance of the Czech government因为吸烟造成的疾病\because there are increased health care costs会增加医疗支出\for people who develop smoking-related diseases.但另一方面也有正效应\On the other hand, there were positive effects它们被记在账目的另一侧\and those were added up on the other side of the ledger.正效应主要来自\The positive effects included, for the most part,销售香烟为政府带来的\various tax revenues that the government derives各项税收\from the sale of cigarette products,但还包括\but it also included人们早逝为政府节省的医疗支出\health care savings to the government when people die early,免去的养老金\pension savings...政府不需要继续支付养老金\you don't have to pay pensions for as long还省去了老年人的住房开支\and also, savings in housing costs for the elderly.当把总成本和各项收益分别加总\And when all of the costs and benefits were added up,菲利普·莫里斯公司的研究表明\the Philip Morris study found that捷克共和国公共财政将获得\there is a net public finance gain一亿四千七百万的净收益\in the Czech Republic of $147,000,000,算上住房医疗养老金方面节省的开支\and given the savings in housing,in health care, and pension costs,政府从每个因吸烟早逝的人身上\the government enjoys savings of over $1,200 for each person赚得超过1200美元\who dies prematurely due to smoking.成本效益分析\Cost-benefit analysis.在座功利主义的支持者们\Now, those among you who are defenders of utilitarianism可能觉得这个研究不公\may think that this is an unfair test.菲利普·莫里斯公司遭到媒体谴责\Philip Morris was pilloried in the press他们为这项冷血的计算公开道歉\and they issued an apology for this heartless calculation.你也许会说\You may say这里无疑忽略了\that what's missing here is something功利主义者认为应当包含的部分\that the utilitarian can easily incorporate,即那些死于肺癌的患者本身\namely the value to the person加上其家属的价值\and to the families of those who die from lung cancer.怎么能忽略生命的价值呢\What about the value of life?有些成本效益分析\Some cost-benefit analyses确实计算了生命的价值\incorporate a measure for the value of life.其中最著名的是福特平托的案例\One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case. 有人读过吗\Did any of you read about that?当时是二十世纪七十年代\This was back in the 1970s.还有人知道福特平托是什么车吗\Do you remember what the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car? Anybody? 它是一种小型次紧凑型车风靡一时\It was a small car, subcompact car, very popular,但它有一个缺陷\but it had one problem,油箱装在车的尾部\which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car发生追尾时油箱就会爆炸\and in rear collisions, the fuel tank exploded造成了严重伤亡\and some people were killed and some severely injured.受害者一纸诉状将福特告上了法庭\Victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue.案件审理中发现\And in the court case, it turned out福特早就知道油箱的缺陷\that Ford had long since known about the vulnerable fuel tank还进行了成本效益分析\and had done a cost-benefit analysis来决定是否值得装上一面特殊的隔板\to determine whether it would be worth it to put in a special shield以保护油箱防止油箱爆炸\that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding.该分析指出\They did a cost-benefit analysis.能增加平托安全性的隔板\The cost per part to increase the safety of the Pinto,每块成本是11美元\they calculated at $11.00 per part.这就是审判时发现的成本效益分析\And here's... this was the cost-benefit analysis that emerged in the trial.给1250万辆轿车和卡车配上11美元的隔板\Eleven dollars per part at 12.5 million cars and trucks提高安全性共需花费一亿三千七百万美元\came to a total cost of$137 million to improve the safety. 但接着又算出\But then they calculated花这些钱提高安全性能带来的收益\the benefits of spending all this money on a safer car预计可减少180例死亡\and they counted 180 deaths因车祸死亡预计每条人命20万美元\and they assigned a dollar value, $200,000 per death,可减少180例伤残每例67000美元\180 injuries, $67,000,加上车辆维修费用\and then the costs to repair,无此安全装置车会完全损毁\the replacement cost for 2,000 vehicles,所以需算上2000辆汽车的重置成本每辆700美元\it would be destroyed without the safety device $700 per vehicle.收益最后只有4950万\So the benefits turned out to be only $49.5 million因此他们没有安装该装置\and so they didn't install the device.不用说\Needless to say,当福特汽车公司的这份成本效益分析备忘录\when this memo of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis在审理时被公之于众\came out in the trial,陪审团大为震怒判定巨额赔偿\it appalled the jurors, who awarded a huge settlement.这算是功利主义计算思路的反例吗\Is this a counterexample to the utilitarian idea of calculating? 因为福特计算了生命的价值\Because Ford included a measure of the value of life.现在就这个明显的反例\Now, who here wants to defend cost-benefit analysis有谁想为成本效益分析辩护\from this apparent counter example?有谁辩护\Who has a defense?还是你们认为它完全推翻了\Or do you think this completely destroys功利主义的演算\the whole utilitarian calculus?请说\Yes?我觉得他们犯了与前面案例\Well, I think that once again, they've made the same mistake相同的错误\the previous case did,量化了生命的价值\that they assigned a dollar value to human life,但同样的\and once again,他们没有考虑受害者家人承受的\they failed to take account things like suffering痛苦和精神损失\and emotional losses by the families.他们不但家庭收入受损还丧失了亲人\I mean, families lost earnings but they also lost a loved one 那损失远不止20万美元\and that is more valued than $200,000.没错等等说得好你叫什么名字\Right and... wait, wait, wait, that's good. What's your name? 朱莉·罗托\Julie Roteau .朱莉要是20万美金不够\So if $200,000, Julie, is too low a figure因为没有算丧失亲人\because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one和生命的损失\and the loss of those years of life,那你认为什么数目更合适\what would be what do you think would be a more accurate number?我无法给出数目\I don't believe I could give a number.我觉得这种分析\I think that this sort of analysis不应该用在人的生命这个问题上\shouldn't be applied to issues of human life.人命不能用金钱衡量\I think it can't be used monetarily.所以朱莉认为他们不是定价太低\So they didn't just put too low a number, Julie says.他们压根就不该定价\They were wrong to try to put any number at all.那好让我们听听别人...\All right, let's hear someone who...你必须考虑通胀\You have to adjust for inflation.你必须考虑通胀\You have to adjust for inflation.行啊有道理\All right, fair enough.那如今应该是多少\So what would the number be now?那是35年前\This was 35 years ago.两百万美元\Two million dollars.两百万美元你会定价两百万吗\Two million dollars? You would put two million?你叫什么名字\And what's your name?佛伊泰克\Voytek佛伊泰克说我们必须考虑通胀\Voytek says we have to allow for inflation.应该更慷慨些\We should be more generous.这样你就满意了吗\Then would you be satisfied that这样思考这个问题就可以了吗\this is the right way of thinking about the question?我觉得不幸的是...\I guess, unfortunately, it is for...有时确实需要标价\there needs to be a number put somewhere,不过我不确定具体数字\like, I'm not sure what that number would be,但我确实认同\but I do agree that人的生命也许可以被标价\there could possibly be a number put on the human life.很好所以佛伊泰克不同意朱莉的看法\All right, so Voytek says, and here, he disagrees with Julie. 朱莉认为我们不该为了成本效益分析\Julie says we can't put a number on human life给人的生命标价\for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis.佛伊泰克认为我们别无选择\Voytek says we have to因为不管怎样我们必须做出决定\because we have to make decisions somehow.别的人怎么看\What do other people think about this?有没人来赞同成本效益分析的\Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit analysis here认为它精确合宜吗你说\as accurate as desirable? Yes? Go ahead.我觉得要是福特和其他汽车公司\I think that if Ford and other car companies不使用成本效益分析的话\didn't use cost-benefit analysis,他们最后就会倒闭\they'd eventually go out of business因为他们无法盈利\because they wouldn't be able to be profitable这样就会有数百万人无法开车上班\and millions of people wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs,没法赚钱养不起小孩\to put food on the table, to feed their children.所以我认为此种情况下如果不用成本效益分析\So I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed,会牺牲更多人的利益\the greater good is sacrificed, in this case.很好我加一句你叫什么名字\All right, let me add. What's your name?劳尔\Raul.劳尔最近有一项\Raul, there was recently a study done关于司机开车时使用手机的研究\about cell phone use by a driver when people are driving a car, 关于是否应该禁止此行为有一场争论\and there was a debate whether that should be banned.数据显示每年有2000人左右\And the figure was that some 2,000 people因开车时使用手机而死于车祸\die as a result of accidents each year using cell phones.而目前哈佛风险分析中心\And yet, the cost-benefit analysis which was done作出的成本效益分析表明\by the center for Risk Analysis at Harvard found that如果考虑使用手机带来的效益\if you look at the benefits of the cell phone use并与生命的价值做比较\and you put some value on the life,就会得出同样的结论\it comes out about the same因为这样做经济效益巨大\because of the enormous economic benefit of可以使人们更有效地利用时间\enabling people to take advantage of their time,不浪费时间边开车边谈生意\not waste time, be able to make deals边和朋友聊天等\and talk to friends and so on while they're driving.这不就表明\Doesn't that suggest that用金钱衡量人的生命是个错误吗\it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions of human life?我觉得如果绝大多数人想要\Well, I think that if the great majority of people try to从某项服务中获得最大功利\derive maximum utility out of a service,比如使用手机享受手机所带来的便利\like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones provide,那么为了满足需求这种牺牲就是必要的\that sacrifice is necessary for satisfaction to occur. 你是个彻底的功利主义者嘛\You're an outright utilitarian.是的可以这么说\Yes. Okay.好那么最后一个问题劳尔\All right then, one last question, Raul.我也问过佛伊泰克\And I put this to Voytek,在决定是否禁止使用手机这件事时\what dollar figure should be put on human life人命应该如何定价\to decide whether to ban the use of cell phones?我不想武断地算出一个数字\Well, I don't want to arbitrarily calculate a figure,我是指马上就算出我觉得...\I mean, right now. I think that...你想要深思熟虑之后再决定\You want to take it under advisement?对我会深思熟虑\Yeah, I'll take it under advisement.但大概有多少\But what, roughly speaking, would it be?会死2300人\You got 2,300 deaths.你必须用金钱来衡量\You got to assign a dollar value to know是否需要禁止司机使用手机\whether you want to prevent those deaths by来避免此类事件发生\banning the use of cell phones in cars.那你感觉是多少钱一百万\So what would your hunch be? How much? A million?两百万佛伊泰克觉得是两百万\Two million? Two million was Voytek's figure.-这么多可以吗 -也许一百万吧\- Is that about right? - Maybe a million.-一百万 -对\- A million? - Yeah.很好谢谢\You know, that's good. Thank you.以上即为近来对成本效益分析\So, these are some of the controversies that arise these days引发的一些争论\from cost-benefit analysis,尤其是其中那些\especially those that involve认为可以用金钱衡量一切的观点\placing a dollar value on everything to be added up.现在我想听听反对意见\Well, now I want to turn to your objections, to your objections不一定仅仅针对成本效益分析\not necessarily to cost-benefit analysis specifically,因为那只是功利主义逻辑现今的实践之一\because that's just one version of the utilitarian logic in practice today,而是针对整个功利主义理论\but to the theory as a whole,针对那些认为正确之举\to the idea that the right thing to do,就是以功利最大化作为政策法律基础的观点\the just basis for policy and law is to maximize utility. 有多少人不同意\How many disagree功利主义在法律及公共利益方面的做法\with the utilitarian approach to law and to the common good? 有多少人同意\How many agree with it?看来多数表示同意\So more agree than disagree.我们来听听批判声吧请说\So let's hear from the critics. Yes?我对此的异议是\My main issue with it is我觉得不能因为一些人占少数\that I feel like you can't say that just because someone's in the minority,就断定他们的需要和欲望不如多数人的重要\what they want and need is less valuable than someone who's in the majority所以我反对\So I guess I have an issue with the idea"为最多的人谋求最大的幸福"这一观点\that the greatest good for the greatest number is okay因为还有...\because there are still...占少数的人怎么办呢\what about people who are in the lesser number?这对他们不公平\Like, it's not fair to them.他们对此没有发言权\They didn't have any say in where they wanted to be.很好这是个有趣的异议\All right. That's an interesting objection.你担心其对少数人的影响\You're worried about the effect on the minority.是的\Yes.顺便问一句你叫什么名字\What's your name, by the way?安娜\Anna.谁能回答\Who has an answer to安娜对于少数人影响的担心\Anna's worry about the effect on the minority?你怎么回答安娜\What do you say to Anna?她说少数人的价值被低估了\Um, she said that the minority is valued less.我认为事实并非如此因为\I don't think that's the case because少数人当中每个个体的价值\individually, the minority's value is just和多数人的个体价值是一样的\the same as the individual of the majority.只不过多数在数量上胜过少数\It's just that the numbers outweigh the minority.有时你必须做出选择\And I mean, at a certain point, you have to make a decision我对少数表示遗憾\and I'm sorry for the minority但有时这是牺牲小我成全大我\but sometimes, it's for the general, for the greater good.成全大我安娜你怎么看\For the greater good. Anna, what do you say?你叫什么名字\What's your name?杨达\Yang-Da.你怎么反驳杨达\What do you say to Yang-Da?杨达说必须总体考虑人们的选择\Yang-Da says you just have to add up people's preferences而其中少数人的选择其实也被衡量过了\and those in the minority do have their preferences weighed. 你能举个你所担心的类似例子吗\Can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about 即你所说的担心\when you say you're worried about功利主义缺少对少数的关心和尊重\utilitarianism violating the concern or respect due the minority?举个例子\give an example.我就举一个我们讨论过的案例\Okay. So, well, with any of the cases that we've talked about,比如海上食人惨案中我认为被吃的男孩\like for the shipwreck one, I think the boy who was eaten 仍然与其他人享有相等的生存权\still had as much of a right to live as the other people仅仅因为他是少数\and just because he was the minority in that case,他存活的机率可能最小\the one who maybe had less of a chance to keep living,并不意味着其他人就自然而然有权利吃他\that doesn't mean that the others automatically have a right to eat him就为了让多数人有存活的机会\just because it would give a greater amount of people a chance to live.所以可能少数人\So there may be certain rights或个体的某些权利\that the minority members have that the individual has不该为了功利最大化而被牺牲\that shouldn't be traded off for the sake of utility?是的\Yes.是吗安娜下面这个例子我来考考扬达\Yes, Anna? You know, this would be a test for you.在古罗马\Back in Ancient Rome,基督徒被扔去斗兽场与狮子搏斗\they threw Christians to the lions in the Colosseum for sport. 如果以功利主义方式演算\If you think how the utilitarian calculus would go,没错丢给狮子的基督徒\yes, the Christian thrown to the lions确实经历了撕心裂肺的剧痛\suffers enormous excruciating pain.但看看罗马人共同的心醉神迷啊\But look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans!杨达\Yang-Da.在那个时代我不... 要是如今\Well, in that time, I don't...if in modern day of time,衡量观众获得的快乐\to give a number to the happiness given to the people watching,我觉得没有任何政策制定者会认为\I don't think any policymaker would say一个人的痛苦煎熬会比\the pain of one person, of the suffering of one person is much, much... 众人因之获得的快感更...\is, I mean, in comparison to the happiness gained, it's不但你必须承认\No, but you have to admit that要是有足够多的罗马人对这种快感足够狂热\if there were enough Romans delirious enough with happiness,那就会胜过\it would outweigh even the少数几个被丢给狮子的基督徒承受的极端剧痛\most excruciating pain of a handful of Christians thrown to the lion.因此我们确实对功利主义有两点异议\So we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism.一点是关于功利主义\One has to do with whether utilitarianism是否充分尊重个体和少数的权利\adequately respects individual rights or minority rights,另一点是关于\and the other has to do with加总功利或偏好或价值的看法\the whole idea of aggregating utility or preferences or values. 所有的价值都有可能用金钱衡量吗\Is it possible to aggregate all values to translate them into dollar terms?二十世纪三十年代\There was, in the 1930s,有位心理学家试图解决第二个问题\a psychologist who tried to address this second question.他试图证明功利主义者的假设\He tried to prove what utilitarianism assumes,所有的利益价值人类的心声\that it is possible to translate all goods, all values,都可能被统一衡量\into a single uniform measure,并通过对年轻的救济金领取者的调查来证明此点\and he did this by conducting a survey of young recipients of relief,当时是二十世纪三十年代\this was in the 1930s, and he asked them,他给了他们一张不愉快经历的清单问他们\he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences and he asked them,给你多少钱你就愿意忍受以下经历\"How much would you have to be paid to undergo the following experiences?"并作了记录\and he kept track.比如给你多少钱\For example, how much would you have to be paid你才愿意拔掉自己的一颗门牙\to have one upper front tooth pulled out?抑或给你多少钱\Or how much would you have to be paid你才愿意砍掉一根小脚趾\to have one little toe cut off?抑或吃一条六英寸长的蚯蚓\Or to eat a live earthworm six inches long?抑或后半生居住在堪萨斯农场\Or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas?{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}堪萨斯位于美国西部平原\N1930年代遭受重大自然灾害抑或亲手掐死一只流浪猫\Or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands?你们觉得清单里的哪一项最贵\Now, what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list? 堪萨斯\Kansas?没错是堪萨斯\You're right, it was Kansas.他们认为余生都住堪萨斯农场\For Kansas, people said they'd have to pay them至少得给他们30万美元\they have to be paid $300,000.你们觉得第二贵的是什么\What do you think was the next most expensive?不是猫\Not the cat.也不是门牙\Not the tooth.也不是脚趾\Not the toe.是蚯蚓\The worm!他们说给10万美元才肯吃蚯蚓\People said you'd have to pay them $100,000 to eat the worm.你们觉得最便宜的是哪项\What do you think was the least expensive item?不是猫\Not the cat.是门牙\The tooth.大萧条时期\During the Depression,人们愿意为了区区4500美元拔掉自己的牙\people were willing to have their tooth pulled for only $4,500.什么\What?桑代克得出的结论是\Now, here's what Thorndike concluded from his study.任何需求或满足都能有个价钱\Any want or a satisfaction which exists exists in some amount 因此能用金钱衡量\and is therefore measurable.狗猫小鸡的生命\The life of a dog or a cat or a chicken都充斥着各类嗜好渴望欲望以及满足感\consists of appetites, cravings, desires, and their gratifications.人亦如此\So does the life of human beings,只是人的嗜好和欲望更加复杂罢了\though the appetites and desires are more complicated.但桑代克的研究说明了什么呢\But what about Thorndike's study?它是不是支持了边沁的观点\Does it support Bentham's idea认为所有利益所有价值都可以\that all goods, all values can be captured用统一的方式衡量\according to a single uniform measure of value?抑或清单上那些荒谬的项目\Or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list恰恰揭示了相反的结论\suggest the opposite conclusion也许\that maybe,不论是生命堪萨斯还是蚯蚓\whether we're talking about life or Kansas or the worm,还是我们重视珍爱的东西\maybe the things we value and cherish都是不能用统一方式衡量的?\can't be captured according to a single uniform measure of value? 如果不能\And if they can't,那么功利主义道德理论意义何在\what are the consequences for the utilitarian theory of morality? 我们下次将会继续探讨这一问题\That's a question we'll continue with next time.{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}公正课下讲预告好现在我们再投个票\All right, now, let's take the other part of the poll,哪个是最高级的体验或快乐\which is the highest experience or pleasure.{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}第四讲《如何衡量快乐》多少人认为是莎士比亚\How many say Shakespeare?多少人认为是《挑战恐惧极限》\How many say Fear Factor?你开玩笑的吧是吧\No, you can't be serious. Really?上节课我们开始思考一些\Last time, we began to consider some objections to对杰里米·边沁功利主义的反对观点\Jeremy Bentham's version of utilitarianism.讨论中提出了两点异议\People raised two objections in the discussion we had.第一点异议是说功利主义\The first was the objection, the claim that utilitarianism,只关注"为最多的人谋求最大的幸福"\by concerning itself with the greatest good for the greatest number,没有充分地尊重个人权利\fails adequately to respect individual rights.今天我们要讨论严刑拷打和恐怖主义\Today, we have debates about torture and terrorism.假设一名恐怖主义嫌犯在9丒11慜堦揤旐曔\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}Suppose a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th你桳棟桼憡怣\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}and you had reason to believe这柤寵斊彾埇椆\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}that the suspect had crucial information彨导抳3000恖嬾难揑嫲晐袭击揑廳梫忣报\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over 3,000 people你撬晄开懠揑岥\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}and you couldn't extract the information.为椆漒摓忣报帶对懠严孻崏懪惀斲崌棟\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}Would it be just to torture the suspect to get the information梷埥你晄赞摨\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}or do you say no,你认为桳懜廳槩恖权棙揑绝对摴 责擟\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights?朸种掱搙忋変们枖夞摓椆嵟弶揑问题\N{\fn曽惓综艺简懱}{\fs14}{\b0}{\c&HFFFFFF&}{\3c&H2F2F2F&}{\4c&H000000&}In a way, we're back to thequestions we started with。
justice 08-哈佛大学公开课-公正What’s a Fair Start What Do We Deserve 什么是公平的起点？我们该得到
Justice 08 What’s a Fair Start? / What Do We Deserve? 什么是公平的起点？/我们该得到什么？Today, we turn to the question of distributive justice.How should income in wealth and power and opportunities be distributed? According to what principles?John Rawls offers a detailed answer to that question.And we're going to examine and assess his answer to that question, today.We put ourselves in a position to do so last time.By trying to make sense of why he thinks that principles of justice are best derived from a hypothetical contract.And what matters is that the hypothetical contract be carried out in an original position of equality, behind, what Rawls calls, the veil of ignorance.So that much is clear?Alright, then let's turn to the principles that Rawls says would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.First, he considered some of the major alternatives.What about utilitarianism?Would the people in the original position choose to govern their collective lives utilitarian principles, the greatest good for the greatest number?No, they wouldn't, Rawls says.And the reason is, that behind the veil of ignorance, everyone knows that once the veil goes up, and real life begins, we will each want to be respected with dignity.Even if we turn out to be a member of a minority.We don't want to be oppressed.And so we would agree to reject utilitarianism, and instead to adopt as our first principle, equal basic liberties.Fundamental rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like.We wouldn't want to take the chance that we would wind up as members of an oppressed or a despised minority with the majority tyrannizing over us.And so Rawls says utilitarianism would be rejected."Utilitarianism makes the mistake", Rawls writes, "of forgetting, or at least not taking seriously, the distinction between persons." And in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, we would recognize that and reject utilitarianism.We wouldn't trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.That's the first principle.Second principle has to do with social and economic inequalities.What would we agree to?Remember, we don't know whether we're going to wind up rich or poor.Healthy or unhealthy.We don't know what kind of family we're going to come from.Whether we're going to inherit millions or whether we will come from an impoverished family.So we might, at first thought, say, "Well let's require an equal distribution of income and wealth." Just to be on the safe side.But then we would realize, that we could do better than that.Even if we're unlucky and wind up at the bottom.We could do better if we agree to a qualified principle of equality.Rawls calls it "the Difference Principle".A principle that says, only those social and economic inequalities will be permitted that work to the benefit of the least well off.So we wouldn't reject all inequality of income and wealth.We would allow some.But the test would be, do they work to the benefit of everyone including those, or as he specifies, the principle, especially those at the bottom.Only those inequalities would be accepted behind the veil of ignorance.And so Rawls argues, only those inequalities that work to the benefit of the least well off, are just.We talked about the examples of Michael Jordan making 81 Of Bill Gates having a fortune in the tens of billions.Would those inequalities be permitted under the difference principle?Only if they were part of a system, those wage differentials, that actually work to the advantage of least well off.Well, what would that system be?Maybe it turns out that as a practical matter you have to provide incentives to attract the right people to certain jobs.And when you do, having those people in those jobs will actually help those at the bottom.Strictly speaking, Rawls's argument for the difference principle is that it would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Let me hear what you think about Rawls's claim that these two principles would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Is there anyone who disagrees that they would be chosen?Alright, let's start up in the balcony, if that's alright.Go ahead.OK, your argument depends upon us believing that we would argue in said policy, or justice from a bottom.For the disadvantaged.And I just don't see from a proof standpoint, where we've proven that.Why not the top?Right, and what's your name?- Mike.Mike, alright, good question.Put yourself behind the veil of ignorance.Enter into the thought experiment.What principles would you choose?How would you think it through?Well, I would say things like, even Harvard's existence is an example of preaching toward the top.Because Harvard takes the top academics.And I didn't know when I was born how smart I would be.But I worked my life to get to a place of this caliber.Now, if you had said Harvard's going to randomly take 1600 people of absolutely no qualification, we'd all be saying, "There's not much to work for." And so what principle would you choose?In that situation I would say a merit based one.One where I don't necessarily know, but I would rather have a system that rewards me based on my efforts.So you, Mike, behind the veil of ignorance, would choose a merit-based system, where people are rewarded according to their efforts?Alright, fair enough.What would you say?Go ahead.My question is, if the merit-based argument is based on when everyone is at a level of equality?Where from that position, you're rewarded to where you get, or is it regardless of what advantages you may have when you began your education to get where you are here?I think what the question you're asking is saying that if we want to look at, whatever, utilitarianism, policy, do you want to maximize world wealth.And I think a system that rewards merit is the one that we've pretty much all established, is what is best for all of us.Despite the fact that some of us may be in the second percentile and some may be in the 98th percentile.At the end of the day it lifts that lowest based level, a community that rewards effort as opposed to an differences.But, I don't understand how you're rewards someone's efforts who clearly has had, not you, but maybe myself, advantages throughout, to get where I am here.I mean, I can't say that somebody else who maybe worked as hard as I did would have had the same opportunity to come to a school like this.Alright, let's look at that point.What's your name?Kate. -Kate, you suspect that the ability to get into top schools may largely depend on coming from an affluent family.Having a favorable family background, social, cultural, economic advantages and so on?I mean, economic, but yes, social, cultural.All of those advantages, for sure.Someone did a study, of the 146 selective colleges and universities in the United States.And they looked at the students in those colleges and universities to try to find out what their background was, their economic background.What percentage do you think, come from the bottom quarter of the income scale?You know what the figure is?Only three percent of students, at the most selective colleges and universities come from poor backgrounds.Over 70 percent come from affluent families.Let's go one step further then, and try to address Mike's challenge.Rawls actually has two arguments, not one, in favor of his principles of justice.And in particular, of the difference principle.One argument is the official argument, what would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Some people challenge that argument, saying, "Maybe people would want to take their chances.Maybe people would be gamblers behind the veil of ignorance.Hoping that they would wind up on top." That's one challenge that has been put to Rawls.But backing up the argument from the original position is the second argument.And that is the straightforwardly moral argument.And it goes like this, it says, the distribution of income and wealth and opportunities should not be based on factors for which people can claim no credit.It shouldn't be based on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice.He begins with the theory of justice that most everyone these days would reject.A feudal aristocracy.What's wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy?Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is that people's life prospects are determined by the accident of birth.Are you born to a noble family or to a family of peasants and serfs?And that's it.You can't rise.It's not your doing where you wind up or what opportunities you have.But that's arbitrary from a moral point of view.And so that objection to feudal aristocracy leads, and historically has lead, people to say, careers should be open to talents.There should be formal equality of opportunity regardless of the accident of birth.Every person should be free to strive, to work, to apply for any job in the society.And then, if you open up jobs, and you allow people to apply, and to work as hard as they can, then the results are just.So it's more or less the libertarian system that we've discussed in earlier weeks.What does Rawls think about this?He says it's an improvement.It's an improvement because it doesn't take as fixed the accident of birth.But even with formal equality of opportunity the libertarian conception doesn't extend that, doesn't extend its insight far enough.Because if you let everybody run the race, everybody can enter the race, but some people start at different starting points, that race isn't going to be fair.Intuitively, he says, the most obvious injustice of this system is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors arbitrary from a moral point of view.Such as, whether you got a good education or not.Whether you grew up in a family that support you and developed in you a work ethic and gave you the opportunities.So that suggests moving to a system of fair equality of opportunity.And that's really the system that Mike was advocating earlier on.What we might call a merit-based system.A meritocratic system.In a fair meritocracy the society sets up institutions to bring everyone to the same starting point before the race begins.Equal educational opportunities.Head start programs, for example.Support for schools in impoverished neighborhoods.So that everyone, regardless of their family background, has a genuinely fair opportunity.Everyone starts from the same starting line.Well, what does Rawls think about the meritocratic system?Even that, he says, doesn't go far enough in remedying, or addressing, the moral arbitrariness of the natural lottery.Because if you bring everyone to the same starting point and begin the race, who's going to win the race?Who would win?To use the runners example.The fastest runners would win.But is it their doing that they happen to be blessed with athletic prowess to run fast?So Rawls says, "Even the principle of meritocracy, where you bring everyone to the same starting point, may eliminate the influence of social contingencies and upbringing, ...but it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents." And so he thinks that the principle of eliminating morally arbitrary influences in the distribution of income and wealth requires going beyond what Mike favors, the meritocratic system.Now, how do you go beyond?Do you bring everyone to the same starting point and you're still bothered by the fact that some are fast runners and some are not fast runners, what can you do?Well, some critics of a more egalitarian conception say the only thing you can do is handicap the fast runners.Make them wear lead shoes.But who wants to do that?That would defeat the whole point of running the race.But Rawls says, you don't have to have a kind of leveling equality, if you want to go beyond a meritocratic conception.You permit, you even encourage, those who may be gifted, to exercise their talents.But what you do, is you change the terms on which people are entitled to the fruits of the exercise of those talents.And that really is what the difference principle is.You establish a principle that says, people may benefit from their good fortune, from their luck in the genetic lottery, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.And so, for example, Michael Jordan can make 290 only under a system that taxes away a chunk of that to help those who lack the basketball skills that he's blessed with.Likewise, Bill Gates.He can make his billions.But he can't think that he somehow morally deserves those billions."Those who have been favored by nature, may gain from their good fortune but only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out." That's the difference principle.And it's an argument from moral arbitrarianists.Rawls claims, that if you're bothered by basing distributive shares on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view, you don't just reject a feudal aristocracy for a free market.You don't even rest content with a meritocratic system that brings everyone to the same starting point.You set up a system, where everyone, including those at the bottom, benefit from the exercise of the talents held by those who happen to be lucky.What do you think?Is that persuasive?Who finds that argument unpersuasive?The argument for moral arbitrarianists.Yes.I think that in the egalitarian proposition the more talented people, I think it's very optimistic to think that they would still work really hard, even if they knew that part of what they made would be given away.So I think that the only way for the more talented people to exercise their talents to the best of their ability is in the meritocracy.And in a meritocracy, what's your name?Kate.Kate, does it bother you, and Mike, does it bother you, that in a meritocratic system, that even with fair equality of opportunity, people get ahead, people get rewards that they don't deserve simply because they happen to be naturally gifted.What about that?I think that it is arbitrary.Obviously it's arbitrary.But I think that correcting for it would be detrimental.Because it would reduce incentives, is that why?It would reduce incentives, yeah.Mike, what do you say?We're all sitting in this room and we have undeserved, we have undeserved glory of some sort.So you should not be satisfied with the process of your life.Because you have not created any of this.And I think, from a standpoint of, not just this room, us being upset, but from a societal standpoint we should have some kind of a gut reaction to that feeling.The guy who runs the race, he doesn't...He actually harms us as opposed to maybe makes me run that last ten yards faster.And that makes the guy behind me run ten yards faster and the guy behind him ten yards faster.Alright, so Mike, let me ask you.You talked about effort before.Effort.Do you think when people work hard to get ahead, and succeed, that they deserve the rewards that go with effort?Isn't that the idea behind your defense?I mean, of course, bring Michael Jordan here, I'm sure you can get him, and have him come and defend himself about he makes 31 million dollars.And I think what you're going to realize is his life was a very, very tough one to get to the top.And that we are basically being the majority oppressing the minority in a different light.It's very easy to pick on him.Very easy.Alright, effort.You've got...I've got a few. I've got a few.But that's about it.Effort, you know what Rawls's answer to that is?Even the effort that some people expend, conscientious driving, the work ethic, even effort depends a lot on fortunate family circumstances.For which you, we, can claim no credit.Let's do the test.Let's do a test here.Never mind economic class, those differences are very significant.Put those aside.Psychologists say that birth order makes a lot of difference in work ethic, striving, effort.How many here, raise your hand, those of you here, who are first in birth order.I am too by the way.Mike, I noticed you raised your hand.If the case for the meritocratic conception is that effort should be rewarded, doesn't Rawls have a point that even effort striving, work ethic is largely shaped even by birth order?Is it your doing?Mike, is it your doing that you were first in birth order?Then why, Rawls says, of course not.So why should income and wealth and opportunities in life be based on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view?That's the challenge that he puts to market societies, but also to those of us at places like this.A question to think about for next time.A justice of the United States Supreme Court, what do they make?It's just under $200,000.But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.Do you know who it is?- Judge Judy?Judge Judy.How did you know that?Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?$25 million.Now, is that just?Is it fair?We ended last time with that remarkable poll, do you remember?The poll about birth order.What percentage of people in this room raised their hands, was it, to say that they were the first born?403 And what was the significance of that?If you're thinking about these theories of distributive justice.Remember, we were discussing three different theories of distributive justice.Three different ways of answering the question, "How should income and wealth and opportunities and the good things in life, be distributed?" And so far we've looked at the libertarian answer.That says, the just system of distribution is a system of free exchange, a free market economy.Against a background of formal equality.Which simply means, that jobs and careers are open to anyone.Rawls says that this represents an improvement over aristocratic and caste systems, because everyone can compete for every job.Careers open to talents.And beyond that, the just distribution is the one that results from free exchange.Voluntary transactions.No more, no less.Then Rawls argues, if all you have is formal equality, jobs open to everyone, the result is not going to be fair.It will be biased in favor of those who happen to be born to affluent families, who happen to have the benefit of good educational opportunities.And that accident of birth is not a just basis for distributing life chances.And so, many people who notice this unfairness, Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity.That leads to the meritocratic system.Fair equality of opportunity.But Rawls says, even if you bring everyone to the same starting point in the race, what's going to happen?Who's going to win?The fastest runners.So once you're troubled by basing distributive shares on morally arbitrary contingencies, you should, if you reason it through, be carried all the way to what Rawls calls, "the democratic conception".A more egalitarian conception of distributive justice that he defines by the difference principle.Now, he doesn't say that the only way to remedy or to compensate for differences in natural talents and abilities is to have a kind of, leveling equality.A guaranteed equality of outcome.But he does say there's another way to deal with these contingencies.People may gain, may benefit from their good fortune, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.And so, we can test how this theory actually works by thinking about some paid differentials that arise in our society.What does the average school teacher make in the United States, do you suppose?Roughly.-$35,000.It's a little more, 40, $42,000.What about David Letterman?How much do you think David Letterman makes?More than a school teacher?$31 million.David Letterman.Is that fair?That David Letterman makes that much more than a school teacher?Well, Rawls's answer would be, it depends whether the basic structure of society is designed in such a way that Letterman's $31 million is subject to taxation so that some of those earnings are taken to work for the advantage of the least well off.One other example of a paid differential.A justice of the United States Supreme Court.What do they make?It's just under $200,000.Here's Sandra Day O'Connor, for example. There she is.But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.Do you know who it is?- Judge Judy.Judge Judy.How did you know that?You watch?You're right.Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?There she is.$25 million.Now, is that just?Is it fair?Well, the answer is, it depends on whether this is against a background system in line with the difference principle.Where those who come out on top, in terms of income and wealth are taxed in a way that benefits the least well off members of society.Now, we're going to come back to these wage differentials, pay differentials, between a real judge and a TV judge.The one Marcus watches all the time.What I want to do now, is return to these theories and to examine the objections to Rawls's more egalitarian theory.The difference principle.There are at least three objections to Rawls's difference principle.One of them came up last time in the discussion and a number of you raised this worry.What about incentives?Isn't there the risk, if taxes reach 506 that Michael Jordan won't play basketball?That David Letterman won't do late night comedy?Or that CEOs will go into some other line of work?Now, who among those who are defenders of Rawls who has an answer to this objection about the need for incentives?Yes. Go ahead, stand up.Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference that it helps the least well off the most.So if there's too much equality, then the least well off might not be able to watch late night TV, or might not have a job because their CEO doesn't want to work.So you need to find the correct balance where taxation still leaves enough incentive to least well off to benefit from the talents.- Good.And what's your name?- Tim.Tim. Alright, so Tim is saying, in effect, that Rawls is taking count of incentives.And could allow for pay differentials and for some adjustment in the tax rate to take account of incentives.But, Tim points out, the standpoint from which the question of incentives needs to be considered is not the effect on the total size of the economic pie.But instead from the standpoint of the effect of incentives, or disincentives, on the well-being of those on the bottom.Right?Good. Thank you.I think that is what Rawls would say.In fact, if you look in section 17, where he describes the difference principle, he allows for incentives."The naturally advantaged are not gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education andfor using their endowments in ways that help less fortunate as well." So you can have incentives.You can adjust the tax rate.If taking too much from David Letterman or from Michael Jordan, or from Bill Gates, winds up actually hurting those at the bottom.That's the test.So incentives, that's not a decisive objections against Rawls's difference principle.But there are two weightier, more difficult objections.One of them comes from defenders of a meritocratic conception.The argument that says, what about effort?What about people working hard having a right to what they earn because they've deserved it.They've worked hard for it.That's the objection from effort and moral desert.Then there's another objection.That comes from libertarians.And this objection has to do with reasserting the idea of self-ownership.Doesn't the difference principle, by treating our natural talents and endowments as common assets, doesn't that violate the idea that we own ourselves?Now, let me deal first, with the objection that comes from the libertarian direction.Milton Friedman writes, in his book, "Free to Choose," "Life is not fair.And it's tempting to believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned." But his answer is, "The only way to try to rectify that is to have a leveling equality of outcome." Everyone finishing the race at the same point.And that would be a disaster.This is an easy argument to answer.And Rawls addresses it.In one of the most powerful passages, I think, of the theory of justice.It's in Section 17."The natural distribution", and here he's talking about the natural distribution talents and endowments."...is neither just nor unjust."Nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position.These are simply natural facts.What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts." That's his answer to libertarian laissez faire economists like Milton Friedman who say, "Life is unfair but get over it." Get over it and let's see if we can, at least, maximize the benefits that flow from it.But the more powerful libertarian objection to Rawls is not libertarian from the libertarian economists like Milton Friedman.It's from the argument about self-ownership.Developed as we saw, in Nozick.And from that point of view, yes, it might be a good thing, to create head start programs and public schools so that everyone can go to a decent school and start the race at the same starting line.That might be good.But if you tax people to create public schools, if you tax people against their will, you coerce them.It's a form of theft.If you take some of Letterman's $31 million, tax it away to support public schools, against his will, the state is really doing no better than stealing from him.It's coercion.And the reason is, we have to think of ourselves as owning our talents and endowments.Because otherwise we're back to just using people and coercing people.That's the libertarian reply.What's Rawls's answer to that objection?He doesn't address the idea of self-ownership directly.But the effect, the moral weight of his argument for the difference principle is, maybe we don't own ourselves in that thoroughgoing sense after all.Now, he says, this doesn't mean that the state is an owner in me, in the sense that it can simply commandeer my life.Because remember, the first principle we would agree to behind the veil of ignorance, is the principle of equal basic liberties.Freedom of speech, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like.So the only respect in which the idea of self-ownership must give way, comes when we're thinking about whether I own myself in the sense that I have a privileged claim on the benefits that come from the exercise of my talents in a market economy.。
哈佛公开课 公平
Harvard University - Justice Michael Sandel哈佛大学公开课----公平迈克尔·桑代尔教授主讲Y our trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 Mph.你的电车正以每小时60英里行驶。
Now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think is the right thing to do.我们还要研究你这样做的原因.Who is willing to volunteer a reason?谁愿意说说你的想法？Better to save five lives even if it means to sacrifice one.牺牲一个，救活更多人。
What became of the principle that almost everyone endorse in the first case?第一种情况几乎每个人都赞同，原因何在？Is there a way out of this?是否有更好的办法？Let‘s just forget a moment about this case.让我们暂时搁下这个故事。
Don‘t lean over.不要摔下来哦。
Let‘ step back from these stories, these arguments.让我们回过头来看这些故事和争论。
Certain moral principles have already begun to emerge from discussion we had.我们的谈论已经涉及到了一些道德的原则.Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act in the state of the rule that we resolve from the thing you do.结果主义的道德推理取决于道德行为的后果,它取决于我们最后的结果。
哈佛最受欢迎公开课～正义
第十章 從美德到共善/ 重建公民意識
正義-一場思辨之旅 導讀
前言
• 本書的結構: 看一個社會正不正義，就要問它如何分配人民所珍視之事物：所得、 財富、權力、機會、職位、榮譽。正義社會的分配一定合乎正道，人 人皆得到他應該得的。問題的棘手處卻在「應該得到多少」還有「為 什麼」。
• 本書循著以下的順序探討： 一、以邊沁的「功利主義」來探討從「福祉」出發的正義觀。 二、討論多種將正義與自由連接的學說，由於自由主義包含「放任」 與「公平」兩大陣營，因此作者籠統的介紹了海耶克、傅利曼等人的 理論，更以大篇幅介紹康德的自由主義與羅爾斯的自由主義。 三、第三部分探討了正義與美德、良善應該連結的論點，並以亞理士 多德的理論來說明。 四、在介紹各家學說或價值體系後，作者提出「社群主義」、美德與 思辨及他的看法。讓讀者在了解如此多正反兩面的論辯後，再來看看 作者的意見，非常有意思。
John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873
第三章 自由至上主義
• 延續第二章功利主義學者彌爾主張的個人自由是 個人權利的彰顯，本章作者介紹「自由至上主義」 （Libertarianism），主張市場放任，反對政府 管制，但其出發點不是經濟效率，而是人的自由。 他們的核心訴求：自由是一種基本人權，人人對 自有財物皆享有支配權，前提是我們也必須尊重 他人的相同權利（P70）。 • 諾齊克認為：只有功能最小，僅限於合約執行， 保護人民免於暴力、竊盜、詐欺之害的政府，才 符合正義。功能再多一些，就會侵犯到人民免於 做事情不情願的權利，就會淪為不公不義的政府。 • 諾齊克看重的是自由市場個人選擇。對於「分配 正義」 ，只需要考慮初始獲得的正當性，以及 是否從自由市場賺來、從別人自願贈與的移轉正 義即可（p74）。 • 透過「公平交易咖啡」的例子來說明自由市場真 的有正義嗎？