同传汉译英 1-5 (5分钟)

同传汉译英（5分钟）
1.
美国军事转型
在讨论军事发展问题时，人们往往将“军事转型”等同于“军事现代化”。

“军事现代化”非常重要，它是一个随着时间的推移完善装备和训练的自然过程。

但“转型”意味着根据新规律进行决策，这是一个创新性更强、更具革命性的变化，这一变化创造了全新的战争环境。

从历史上看，19世纪初曾有过这样巨大的变化。

那时拿破仑为了战争能够动员和激发整个国家。

这样巨大的变化在20世纪中叶也曾再现，那时德国人发展了闪击战的战术。

拿破仑的全民动员迫使全世界反思战争是如何发起的，而德军创造性地将坦克部队与战术航空兵结合使用制服了盟军，后者直到后来才按照德军模式进行了改编。

不久前，我们也实现了一些引人注目的转型。

全球定位系统就是一个最为著名的转型方面的例子。

1991年“沙漠风暴”行动中，全球定位系统为美国军队提供了巨大的优势。

它的出现改变了军队、国防部和社会。

另一个转型的例子就是美军成功地“拥有黑夜”，将新的夜视技术和创造性的作战概念结合在一起。

在伊拉克和阿富汗战事中，美军显示的适应和转型能力给人印象深刻。

在阿富汗北方联盟发动的攻势中，美国特种作战部队召唤B-1、B-52和其他美国飞机进行支援。

对现有技术的这种创新使用非常有效，极大地影响了作战行动，加速了塔利班的溃败。

在广阔的伊拉克战场上，在主攻线路上，重型装甲和机械化部队向巴格达快速推进。

同时，数量空前的装备轻型武器的特种作战部队、空降部队和空中机动部队在伊拉克的南部、北部和西部实施分散支援行动。

在战斗中，美国和盟军的行动速度非常之快，使丧失斗志的伊拉克军队无法组织任何像样的防御或反击。

虽然未来部队的形式和遂行军事行动的样式还在演变，但是两个特点已然非常突出：一是部队是以网络为中心的联合部队；二是该部队将能在网络中心战的支持下实施基于效果作战。

现代技术和新作战概念的结合已经使网络化部队和单个平台能够以数年前还被认为不可能的方式作战。

按照国防部的构想，联合网络中心部队能够依据正在出现的战争样式原则遂行军事行动。

实现这一构想有赖于各级指挥员、参谋人员、部队和个人获取的情报数质量的大幅度提高，以及更加灵活、反应更快的战斗后勤概念。

为此，美军必须加快军事转型。

U.S. Military Transformation
When discussing military development, people often tend to equate “military transformation” with “military modernization.” Of course, the latter is very important. It is the natural process of improving equipment and training as time progresses. Yet what is meant by “transformation” is decision-making according to new rules, a more innovative and revolutionary change that creates a whole new warfare environment.
Historically, such sea changes were demonstrated by the Napoleonic ability to mobilize and inspire the whole nation for war at the beginning of the 19th century or the blitzkrieg tactics developed by the Germans in the mid 20th century. Napoleon’s levee en masse forced the entire world to rethink how it waged war, while the Wehrmacht’s innovative employment of armor and tactical air in combination overwhelmed the Allies until they adapted by following the German model.
In more recent history, we have achieved some notable transformational changes. The Global Positioning System (GPS), one of the best known examples of transformation, gave the U.S. forces a tremendous advantage over Iraqi forces in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. Its advent changed the military, the Department, and civil society. Another example of transformation has been the U.S. Army’s successful efforts to “own the night,” combining new night vision technology with innovative operational concepts.
In the operations both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has demonstrated an impressive ability to adapt and transform. In Afghanistan, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) were able to call in precision air strikes by B-1s, B-52s, and other U.S. aircraft to support the Northern Alliance offensive battle. This innovative use of existing technology proved highly effective, dramatically affecting operations and hastening the defeat of the Taliban.
On a broader field of battle in Iraq, while heavy armor and mechanized units pushed rapidly towards Baghdad in the main effort, lightly armed SOF, airborne, and air mobile forces in unprecedented numbers were used to prosecute supporting but dispersed operations in the south, north, and west of the country. The U.S. and allied forces acted very speedily in the battle and precluded the demoralized Iraqi army from being able to mount a credible defense or counter-attack.
Although the concept of what the future force will look like and how it will conduct military operations is still evolving, two salient characteristics seem to stand out: (1) It will
be a joint, network-centric force; and (2) It will be capable of executing effects-based operations (EBO), enabled by NCW. the combination of modern technology and new operational concepts has already enabled networked units and individual platforms to operate together in ways not considered possible just a few years ago.
The r ealization of the Department’s vision for a joint, network-centric force capable of conducting military operations in accordance with the principles of the emerging way of war will depend on significant improvement in the volume and quality of the intelligence available to commanders, staffs, units, and individuals at all levels and a more flexible, responsive concept of combat logistics. Thus military transformation is inevitable for the US forces.
李光耀论领导艺术
李光耀从1959年出任新加坡自治邦首届政府总理开始，担任新加坡最高领导人长达31年，1990年至今任新加坡内阁资政。

李光耀被称为现代新加坡之父，并享有世界级政治家的声誉。

美国前总统尼克松在《领导者》一书中曾经谈到：李光耀是他会见过的最为能干的国家领导人之一。

尼克松称赞李光耀是“小舞台上的大人物”，“由于历史的偶然”，才只担任了小国的领导人，“像李光耀这样一位高瞻远瞩的领导人不能在更广阔的舞台上施展才干，对世界是一个不可估量的损失”。

尼克松评价说：李光耀首先是一个讲求实际的人，他对政治理论不感兴趣，对那些不能直接有助于实现新加坡繁荣富强目标的事，他都漠然置之。

他从不将言词与实质混为一体，决不允许意识形态压倒基本常识。

邓小平1992年在中国南方视察时也提到：“新加坡的社会秩序好，他们管得严，我们应当借鉴他们的经验，而且比他们管得更好。

”
新加坡自1959年自治和1965年独立以来，经济发展迅速，在20世纪70年代末即已进入新兴工业化国家行列，目前是世界上最富有和最具竞争力的国家之一，同时也是世界上最优秀的商业都市之一。

新加坡的社会发展成就与李光耀和人民行动党政府的杰出领导密不可分。

李光耀与其说是一位政治思想家，不如说是一位政治策略家和实干家。

1980年，在纪念执政的人民行动党建党25周年的庆祝会上，李光耀总结了他和人民行动党多年来的从政经验和领导艺术，归纳为以下“六个基本原则”：1．发出明确的信号，不要迷惑人民。

我们通过私底下的辩论和讨论，解决我们的歧见，在公开的场合里，我们从来不互相反驳。

以避免使我们的支持者感到混乱。

2．前后一致：在基本政策上不要突然转向和改变。

对自己和人民都要守信。

3．保持廉洁，杜绝贪污。

我们当政，素以廉洁、公正和效率为依归。

遇到令人难堪和困难的处境时，我们从不避重就轻敷衍了事。

4．要受人尊敬，不要讨人喜欢。

为了人民的长远利益，即使有一些政策在短期内不受欢迎，政府也毫不犹豫地付诸实施。

5．分摊利益,——不剥夺人民应有的生活条件。

如果从工作和进步中所取得的成就和利益，没有公平地让全体人民分享，我们就不会得到他们全心全意的合作和参与。

6．努力争取成功——决不屈服。

要保持冷静，对问题的大小作一个实际的研究，并冷静评估，找出可能的解决办法。

如果你已尽最大的能力，还不能够解决问题，那历史也会宽恕你。

President Lee Kuan Yew: On the Art of Leadership
Lee Kuan Yew had served as the supreme leader of Singapore for 31 years since he became the first Prime Minister of the self governing state in 1959. From the year of 1990 to present he was the Senior Minister of Singapore. Honored as the father of the modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew enjoys a high reputation as a world-class statesman. The former US president Nixon has once said in his book “Leaders” that Lee Kuan Yew was one of the ablest States leaders he had ever met. Nixon praised that Lee wa s “a big man on a small stage”, who only served as the leader of a small country “due to the historical accident”, and that “it was an immeasurable loss to the world that such a foresighted leader like Lee had not displayed his t alent on a broader arena”.
Nixon made a comment that Lee Kuan Yew was, first of all, a practical man, who was not interested in political theories and indifferent to whatever cannot directly help achieve the goal of making Singapore prosperous and powerful, and that he never identified words with substance, nor did he allow ideology to overtake basic knowledge.
Deng Xiaoping has also mentioned during his inspection tour to south China in 1992, “Thanks to a strict administration, Singapore has good public order. We should learn from its experience and surpass it in this respect.”
Since gaining autonomy in 1959 and then independence in1965, with its rapid development, Singapore had joined the rank of the newly industrializing countries by the end of the 1970s. At present, it is one of the richest and the most competitive countries in the world and, at the same time, one of the best commercial metropolises in the world. Singapore’s achievements in social development are closely related with the outstanding leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and People’s Action Party (PAP) Government. Lee is more a political strategist and a man of action than apolitical thinker.
On the celebration of the 25th Foundation of the incumbent PAP in 1980, Lee Kuan Yew summarized the experience and the art of leadership of himself and PAP over the years as the following “six basic principles”:
1. Give out clear messages rather than confusing the people. We resolve our disagreements in private argument and discussion, while we never refute one another in public, to avoid making our supporters confused.
2. Be consistent; do not swerve or change the basic policies suddenly. Keep faith with both our people and ourselves.
3. Keep ourselves honest and clean; prohibit corruption. Bear in mind honesty, fairness and efficiency when we are in office. In embarrassing and difficult situations, we never avoid the important and dwell on the trivial or perform our duty in a perfunctory manner.
4. Be respectable rather than pleasing people. For the long-term interests of the people, the government would unhesitatingly put into effect some of the policies which are unpopular in the short term.
5. Share the profits -- do not deprive people of proper living conditions. We would not get whole-hearted cooperation and participation of the people, if we have not had them fairly share the fruits and interest gained in the work and progress.
6. Strive to succeed -- never give up. Keep calm; make a practical study of the problem and estimate soberly to find out a possible solution. If you have tried your best but still left the problem unsolved, history would forgive you.
3.
1996年台海危机
1996年中美台海危机是因1995年5月美国同意李登辉访美引发的。

李登辉访美给中美关系以突然而又沉重地一击。

对此，克林顿政府虽然一直持否定态度，但是美国参众议院的表决压力最终使李登辉访美得以成行。

美国政府公然允许李登辉访问美国，中国政府作出了强烈的反应。

中方向美方提出了强烈抗议，决定终止两国间的一系列交流，推迟国防部长迟浩田访美，中止国务委员李贵鲜、空军司令于正武访美，推迟中美关于导弹及其技术控制制度和核能合作的专家磋商，美国官员的一系列访华要求也被推迟。

6月，中方宣布驻美大使李道豫回国述职。

随后美国政府开始希望修复与中国的关系，通过8月东盟地区论坛外长会议、塔尔诺夫访华、两国大使返回等一系列渠道的沟通，两国关系逐渐得到恢复。

10月末，在联合国纪念二战胜利50周年之时，两国首脑实现了会晤，并就今后发展中美关系以及如何处理双方的分歧和问题取得了一些共识。

此后，中美间的高层互访和政治磋商逐步恢复，两国围绕着李登辉访美问题进行的斗争基本告一段落。

但是与此对应的是，台海的军事紧张气氛却有升级趋势。

从1995—1996年春，台湾当局举行了多次军事演习。

为了震慑“台独”势力，中国人民解放军7月和8月在台湾岛以北东海水域进行了两次导弹演习。

1995年12月19日，美国航空母舰尼米兹号驶经台湾海峡，这是1979年中美关系正常化以来美国航母第一次驶经台湾海峡。

1996年3月5日中国新华社授权宣布，中国人民解放军将于3月8—15日向东海南海的确定海域进行导弹发射训练。

“为了向全世界显示保卫祖国领土完整的决心和实力，中国人民解放军数次举行军事演习，其中1996年3月的演习意义尤为重大。

”解放军于3月12—20日，在东海和南海进行海空实弹演习，于3月18—25日在台湾海峡进行海陆空联合演习。

为了表示对台海形势的“严重关注”和作为对中国演习的回应，克林顿总统命令尼米兹号航空母舰特混舰队从海湾地区驶往台湾附近水域，并同独立号航母会合。

这两个航空母舰战斗群由13艘战舰和150架飞机组成，是美国自70年代越战结束以来在东亚地区最大的一次军事集结，也是美军为了牵制中国军事演习而展开的大规模的“炮舰外交”。

Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996
The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis is a result of US permission of Lee Teng-hui’s visit to America in May 1995. Lee’s visit was a sudden and serious strike on the relationship of
Sino-US. In terms of this issue, although Clinton government always kept the negative attitude, the voting press of the Senate and the House made the visit of Lee come to a fact.
Because American government openly allowed the visit of Lee, Chinese government made a strong reaction. China put forward its serious protest, deciding to call off a series of communications between the two countries, such as suspending the visit of Gen. Chi Haotian, Minister of National Defense, breaking off the visits of Li Guixian, member of the State Council and of Air Force Gen. Yu Zhengwu, commander of PLAAF, postponing the consultation of experts on missile and technology control mechanism and the cooperation of nuclear energy between the two countries, and putting off a lot of requirements of visiting China as well. Chinese government declared in June that Li Daoyu, the ambassador to America, was recalled for reporting his work in June.
After these events, the US government hoped to restore the relationship with China. Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs of SEANA Forum in August, the visit of Tarnoff to China and the return of the ambassadors, the relationship between the two countries resumed. At the end of October, in the 50anniversary of the end of World War II, the heads of the two countries met in the UN and achieved some consensus in Sino-US relationship and the disposal of the discrepancies. Afterwards, the visit and political negotiation between the two countries resumed and the conflicts concerning Lee’s visit came to an end. However, the tension in the strait was upgrading. From1995 to the spring of 1996, Taiwan administration held several military maneuvers. In order to deter the “Taiwan independence” advocators, the PLA held a missile maneuvers in East Sea to the North of Taiwan. On December 19, 1995, the US aircraft carrier Nimitz passed the Strait, the first time since the normalization of relationship between China and the US in 1979.
On March 5, 1996, Xinhua news agency was authorized to declare that the PLA was to carry out missile launch drill in the East S ea and South Sea from March 8 to 15. “In order to show the determination and strength of protecting the integrity of the country, the PLA carried out several military maneuvers, the most significant of which is the one in March 1996.” The PLA carried out s ea and air live exercises in the East Sea and South Sea from March 12 to 20, and combined-arms exercises in the Taiwan Strait from March 18 to 25. In
order to show the “serious concern” about the Taiwan Strait situation and respond to Chinese maneuvers, President Clinton ordered Nimitz-class carrier task force to come to the sea close by Taiwan and meet with another carrier, the Independence. The two carrier battle groups consist of 13 battle ships and 150 aircrafts. It is the largest military buildup in East Asia since the end of Vietnam War in the 1970s, and a large scale “gunboat diplomacy” of the US to restrain China’s military maneuver.
4.
中美撞机事件的经验教训
2001年4月，中美发生撞机事件。

这一事件在中美之间引发了一场危机。

严格地讲，这只是一场准危机，性质不像完整危机那样严重，也比较容易解决。

即便如此，它仍给两国关系带来了严重损害；而事件全过程中蕴涵的潜在危险如果都爆发出来，后果还可能更加严重。

这场危机迅速引发了两国及两国民众的严重对立，形势甚至一度有失控的危险。

在中国，出现了要求审判美机组人员、扣留美机，甚至质问政府为何未将美机击落等十分激愤的情绪；在美国则出现了要求召回大使、中止两军交往、取消在华投资美商政府担保、不延长给予中国的正常贸易关系、反对中国主办2008年奥运会和加入WTO,将事件与售台武器挂钩等呼声，美国国会还迅速通过了若干反华议案。

如果不是双方政府从中美关系大局出发，较快地化解了这场危机，两国关系遭受的损害可能会更大。

这场危机在一定程度上加速了布什政府上台后两国关系的磨合过程，但双方却为此付出了高昂的代价。

两国民意的对立情绪上升，这对两国关系有着长远的不利影响。

两军的对立加剧，美国国防部抓住此事，长期阻碍两军关系的发展，以致双方军事关系直到2003年底才基本上得到恢复。

当时美议员纷纷取消或推迟对中国的访问，美国国会反华情绪更加严重。

如果不是“9·11事件”引起国际形势和美国安全政策的重大变化，两国发展建设性合作关系的步伐将会十分缓慢。

中美两国都应从撞机事件及其引发的危机中汲取一定的教训。

在一次中美安全关系研讨会上，一位美国国防部前高级官员在谈到中美之间的危机管理时曾经提出，炸馆事件难以预料，而撞机事件却在预料之中。

这一看法令人深思。

突发事件通常难以预料。

但在撞机事件发生之前，已有种种出事的预兆，双方已就美机侦察和中方监视跟踪问题进行过多次外交交涉，都感到了危险性，双方还在海上军事安全磋商会议上对此专门进行过讨论，但却未能采取及时、有效的措施防止事件的发生。

撞机事件在一个最不应该发生的时候发生了：布什政府刚刚上台，双方关系正处在十分敏感时刻。

如果双方之间有较为完善的安全预警机制，在进行外交交涉时，都能向有关方面及时通报情况，并共同严格遵守双方就海上军事安全达成的共识，这一事件本来是可能避免的。

The Chinese-American Aircraft Collision
In April 2001, a Chinese military aircraft and a US surveillance plane collided in the South China Sea. The collision triggered a crisis between China and the United States. Strictly speaking, it was only a semi crisis that was not as serious as a full-fledged crisis, and it was relatively easy to resolve. Even so, it caused serious damage to bilateral relations. The consequences might have been worse if the potential dangers latent in the development of the crisis had materialized.
The crisis prompted a serious confrontation between the two countries and the peoples of the two countries. The situation for a time threatened to get out of control. In China, some indignant groups called for a trial of the U.S. aircrew and detention of the plane; they even questioned why the Chinese government had not shot down the U.S. plane in the first place. In the United States, voices demanded the recall from China of the U.S. ambassador, suspension of military contacts, withdrawal of government guarantees for U.S. investors in China, refusal to renew normal trade relations with China, and opposition to China’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games and membership in the WTO; and they even linked the incident with arms sales to Taiwan. Congress passed a number of anti-China resolutions. The Sino-American relationship might have suffered more if the two governments had not focused on the overall well-being of their relationship and relatively quickly settled the crisis.
To some extent, this crisis sped the readjustment in the Sino-American relationship after the new administration came into power in the United States. However, the price both countries paid was rather high. Between the two peoples, there was a growing resentment, with profound and long-term negative effects on the bilateral relationship. Antagonism between the military authorities intensified. The U.S. Department of Defense clung to the incident and obstructed progress in the bilateral military relationship for a protracted period of time. As a result, it took until the end of 2003 to resume the basic Sino-U.S.
military-to-military relationship. Anti-China sentiment was running high in Congress, and many members of Congress cancelled or delayed visits to China. Had it not been for the incidents of September 11, 2001, which led to great changes in the international situation and major readjustments in U.S. security policy, the development of constructive cooperation between China and the United States would have progressed very slowly.
The two countries should draw some lessons from the aircraft collision and the crisis it
created.
A former senior official of the U.S. Department of Defense once pointed out during a workshop on Sino-American security relations that, while the bombing of China’s embassy was unexpected, the aircraft collision should have been predictable. This opinion made the Chinese participants ponder deeply.
Accidents are generally hard to predict. However, in this case, there had been many signs of a possible incident before the actual event. The two countries had already had several diplomatic exchanges that centered on U.S. surveillance flights and flight monitoring by China as both had sensed the potential danger. China and the United States had specifically discussed the issue during their consultations on maritime military security. Nevertheless, they took no timely and effective measures to avoid such an occurrence. The aircraft collision was a most untimely incident: the Bush administration had just come into power, the bilateral relationship was at a sensitive juncture.
Had there been a relatively well-developed early-warning mechanism in the security field, had the two sides informed their related authorities of the developments in diplomatic negotiations in a timely manner, and had both sides strictly abided by the common understanding reached on maritime military security, the incident could have been avoided.
5.
孟加拉“大海天使”行动
孟加拉国作为受自然攻击的对象由来已久。

这个国家位于恒河、普拉马普特拉河和梅格纳河的交汇处，拥有世界第二大的三角洲地区，受到龙卷风、飓风和季风袭击的频率惊人。

在这片非常肥沃的土地上生活着1.2亿人口，但是由于地势较低，人口密度太高，基础设施不发达，所以自然灾害所带来的损失常常十分严重。

1991年4月29日傍晚，飓风“玛丽安”从三角洲的西南海岸登陆，风速超过了235公里/小时。

超过10万人丧生，数以百万计的人无家可归。

超过100万头牲畜死亡。

7.4万英亩庄稼全毁，另有30万英亩庄稼受损坏。

田地上积满了盐水，土壤被损坏，饮用水被污染。

基础设施遭到大面积损毁。

孟加拉国的主要港口之一吉大港受到严重损坏，并接连几日无法使用。

被损坏以及沉没的船只堵塞了港口，其中有相当一部分属于孟加拉国海军。

包括通往吉大港的主要桥梁在内的几座关键的大桥被冲垮或者受到其他形式的损坏。

整个灾区内的海堤瘫塌，防波堤消失，土路被淹没，建筑遭到破坏，交通运输中断。

对于孟加拉国政府来说，飓风是在最糟糕的时间发生的。

在多年的军事统治之后，孟加拉国迎来了齐亚总理领导下的第一届民事政府。

但在这届政府上台后不到两个月，飓风就来临了。

因此，这个年轻、缺乏经验的政府对于是否会表现得软弱无能非常敏感，正努力试图保持国内政治连贯性，在应对飓风时面临着严重的问题。

奇怪的是，问题之一并不是救灾物品的可用性。

应急供应充足，要么存在于政府仓库中，名为“下发”，要么被非政府组织所贮存和拥有，例如美国援外合作社和红新月会。

但是，孟加拉国政府由于同非政府组织缺乏合作而受到阻碍；同样，控制“下发”中的谷物的官僚也不愿将控制权移交其他机构。

在种种政治障碍中，最严重的是分配的问题。

落后的基础设施加上飓风所带来的严重破坏使吉大港连续几天与外界隔离。

而且，一旦救灾物资运抵吉大港，孟加拉国政府无力将它们运到沿岸孤立的岛屿上。

而这些岛屿却是最需要援助的。

1991年5月10日，美国总统指示美国军队提供人道主义援助。

一支由亨利•斯塔克波尔中将领导的应急联合特遣部队迅速建立起来。

斯塔克波尔是驻冲绳的第3陆战远征部队司令。

一支从波斯湾返回的美海军两栖特混部队开赴孟加拉国。

一个看到两栖特混部队从海上驶来的孟加拉人宣称它们是“来自大海的天使”。

不管是否确有此事，这个消息不胫而走，“大海天使”行动由此得名。

“Sea Angel” action in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has long been the object of nature attack. This country is located in the junction of the Ganges, Brahmaputra River and Meghna River, with the world's second largest delta region. It is hit by tornadoes, hurricanes and monsoons with alarming frequency. In this very fertile land lived 120 million people; but because of the low-lying topography, high population density, underdeveloped infrastructure, the losses caused by natural disasters are often very serious.
On the evening of April 29, 1991, the hurricane “Marianne” landed from the southwest coast of the Delta. The wind speed exceeded 235 km/hour. More than100,000 people were killed; hundreds of millions of people were homeless. More than 1 million livestock died. 74,000 acres of crops were completely destroyed, and another 300,000 acres of crops were damaged. Fields were flooded with salt water; soil was damaged; drinking water was contaminated.
Infrastructure had been extensively damaged. One of Bangladesh’s main ports, Chittagong, was seriously damaged, and could not be used in the following days. Damaged and sunken ships blocked the port, most of which were a significant component of Bangladesh Navy. Several key bridges, including the main bridge leading to Chittagong, had been washed away, or damaged in other forms. The seawall throughout the disaster area was paralyzed and collapsed; breakwater disappeared, ground roads were flooded, buildings were destroyed, transportation was interrupted.
For the Government of Bangladesh, the hurricane happened at the worst time. After many years of military rule, Bangladesh greeted the first civil government led by Prime Minister Zia. But the hurricane arrived after the government took office within less than two months. Therefore, this young and inexperienced Government was very sensitive to whether they would show weakness and incompetence and were trying to maintain domestic political continuity. The government was facing serious problems dealing with hurricanes.
Strangely enough, one of the problems was not the availability of relief supplies. Emergency supplies were adequate, either in the Government warehouses, known as “issued”, or stored and owned by non-governmental organizations, for example, the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the Red Crescent Society. However, the Government of Bangladesh had been hampered for lack of cooperation with non-governmental organizations; similarly, the bureaucrats who controlled “issue” of the
grain were also reluctant to hand over control to other agencies.
Among the various political obstacles, the most serious was the allocation issue. Poor infrastructure coupled with the serious damage caused by the hurricane isolated the Chittagong with the outside world for several days. Moreover, once relief supplies arrived in Chittagong, Bangladesh government was unable to transport them to the isolated coastal islands, and these islands were most in need of assistance.
On May 10, 1991, U.S. President directed the U.S. Military to provide humanitarian assistance. One contingency joint Task Force led by Lieutenant General Henry Stackpole was quickly established. Stackpole was Commander of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, which was stationed in Okinawa. A U.S. Navy amphibious task force that had just had returned from the Persian Gulf left for Bangladesh. One Bangladeshi who saw the amphibious task force coming from the sea claimed that they were “angels from the sea”. Whether it was true or not, the news spread like wildfire. Hence “Sea Angel” action got its name.。