Maug and Naik 1995 Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management The Impact of Relative Performance

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读书报告麦田里的守望者英语PPT

In the novel, the catcher in the rye field represents Holden's desire to protect the innocence and purity of children from the evils of the adult world.
Slang and Colloquialisms
The language is full of 1950s teen slang and colloquialisms, adding to the authenticity and immersion in the story.
Mixed Register
He feels lonely, misunderstood, and disconnected from society, and he is constantly on the lookout for something meaningful in life.
Holden's mood is characterized by cynicism, melancholy, and a strong sense of alienation.
The Catcher in the Rye的出版对后来的青春文学产生了深远影响，它开创了青少年成长小说的新篇章，为后来的作家提供了新的创作灵感和方向。
对文学的反叛精神的影响
这部小说所体现的反叛精神影响了许多后来的文学作品，激发了作家们对社会和文化的批判，推动了文学的发展。
The influence on later literature
Dreamlike Quality
Salinger adeptly explores Holden's mental state, including his loneliness, alienation, and confusion about the adult world.

初稿股市中的羊群效应简析

浅析我国股票市场中的羊群效应概述羊群效应（herd instinct；herd behaviour），亦称从众效应，指追从大众的想法与行为，缺乏自我个性和主见的投资状态，也称作“群居本能”---投资者随波逐流、追涨杀跌的心态特征。

本文中主要是指证券投资者在证券交易过程中存在盲目模仿现象，“人云亦云”，一味效仿别人，从而致使投资者在某段时期内买进、卖出相同的股票。

羊群心理（群居本能）原因是缺乏自我主见从而导致的思维或行为方式。

特别是在经济过热、市场充满泡沫时表现的更为突出。

一、什么是羊群效应(一)、羊群效应的具体定义及具体事例１.具体定义:羊群行为亦可称为群体心理,社会压力,传染等，最初是股票投资中的一个术语，主要是证券指投资者在证券交易过程中存在学习与模仿行为，“有样学样”，一味盲目效仿别人，因而导致他们在某段时期内同向交易相同的股票在一个羊群前面横放一只木棍，第一只羊跳了过去，第二只、第三只也会跟着跳过去；这时，如果把那根棍子撤走，后面的羊走到这里，仍然会像前面的羊一样，向上跳一下，尽管拦路的棍子已经没有了，这就是我们所说的的“羊群效应”，也就是“从众心理”。

在羊群效应作用下，证券投资者往往会追随大众的观点，自己并不去独立思考事件的意义。

“羊群效应”是诉诸群众谬误的基础。

在经济学里经常用到“羊群效应”来描述经济个体的从众跟风心理及行为。

羊群是一种很散乱无序的组织，平时在一起时也是盲目地左冲右撞，但只要有一只头羊动起来了，其余的羊也会不假思索地立即一哄而上，全然不会顾忌前面可能有狼或还是不远处有更好的草。

因此，“羊群效应”就是用来形容人都有一种从众心理，从众心理很导致容易盲从，而盲从往往让参与者陷入骗局或遭到失败。

羊群效应一般会出现在一个竞争非常激烈的行业上，并且这个行1业往往有一个领先者（领头羊）占据了强势地位，后果是整个羊群就会不断效仿它的一举一动，领头羊到哪里去“吃草”，其效仿者也去哪里“淘金”。

奈奎斯特定理的英文

奈奎斯特定理的英文The Nyquist Theorem, also known as the Nyquist Sampling Theorem, is a fundamental principle in the field of signal processing and telecommunications. It was first formulated by Harry Nyquist in 1928 and later expanded upon by Claude Shannon in his groundbreaking work on information theory.The theorem states that in order to perfectly reconstruct a continuous-time signal from its samples, the sampling rate must be at least twice the highest frequency present in the signal. This minimum rate is referred to as the Nyquist rate. If the sampling rate falls below this threshold, a phenomenon known as aliasing occurs, where the sampled signal becomes a distorted version of the original signal.The importance of the Nyquist Theorem lies in its application to digital signal processing, where analog signals must be converted into digital form for processing and storage. By adhering to the theorem's guidelines, engineers can ensure that the digital representation of an analog signal is accurate and free from aliasing.In practice, the Nyquist Theorem has implications for a wide range of technologies, from audio recording and broadcasting to medical imaging and seismology. It is a cornerstone concept that underpins the design of sampling systems and the development of anti-aliasing filters, which are used to prevent aliasing before the sampling process.The theorem also has a direct impact on the capacity of communication channels. In digital communication systems, understanding the relationship between the sampling rate and the frequency content of signals is crucial for maximizing the amount of information that can be transmitted without error.In summary, the Nyquist Theorem is a foundational principle that guides the process of sampling and reconstructing signals in digital systems. It ensures that high-quality digital representations of analog signals can be achieved, provided that the sampling rate is sufficiently high. This theorem has far-reaching applications and continues to be a key concept in the advancement of digital technology.。

羊群效应模型

羊群效应模型羊群效应模型（Herd behavior model）[编辑]羊群效应模型概述羊群效应模型认为投资者羊群行为是符合最大效用准则的，是“群体压力”等情绪下贯彻的非理性行为，分为序列型和非序列型两种模型。

序列型羊群效应模型序列型羊群效应模型由Banerjee(1992) 提出，在该模型中，投资者通过典型的贝叶斯过程从市场噪声以及其它个体的决策中依次获取决策信息，这类决策的最大特征是其决策的序列性。

但是现实中要区分投资者顺序是不现实的。

因而这一假设在实际金融市场中缺乏支持。

非序列型则论证无论仿效倾向强或弱，都不会得到现代金融理论中关于股票的零点对称、单一模态的厚尾特征。

行为金融理论中的一个重要的模型是羊群效应模型。

实际上，羊群行为同样也是由模仿造成的。

Scharfstein and Stein (1990)指出，在一些情况中，经营者简单地模仿其他经营者的投资决策，忽略独立的私人信息，虽然从社会角度看这种行为是无效的，但对于关心其在劳动市场声誉的经营者而言却是合理的。

Banerjee (1992)提出序列决策模型分析羊群行为，在这个模型中，每个决策者在进行决策时都观察其前面的决策者做出的决策，对他而言，这种行为是理性的，因为其前面的决策者可能拥有一些重要的信息，因而他可能模仿别人的决策而不使用其自己的信息，由此产生的均衡是无效的。

Banerjee序列决策模型假定投资者的决策次序，投资主体通过典型的贝叶斯过程从市场噪声以及其他个体的决策中获取自己决策的信息，这种依次决策的过程导致市场中的“信息流”。

非序列型羊群效应模型与Banerjee序列决策模型相对的是非序列羊群行为模型。

该模型也是由贝叶斯法则下得出的。

模型假设任意两个投资主体之间的模仿倾向是固定相同的，当模仿倾向较弱时，市场主体的表现是收益服从高斯分布，而当模仿倾向较强时，市场主体的表现是市场崩溃。

此外，Rajan(1994)、Maug & Naik(1996)、Devenow & Welch(1996)分别从投资者的信息不对称、机构运作中的委托——代理关系、经济主体的有限理性等角度探讨羊群行为的内在产生机制。

模仿的社会心理学解释与模仿经济学

模仿的社会心理学解释与模仿经济学Company Document number：WTUT-WT88Y-W8BBGB-BWYTT-19998模仿的社会心理学解释与模仿经济学任寿根南京大学商学院理论经济学博士后流动站内容提要：现代西方主流经济学越来越重视用“模仿”、“羊群行为”等来分析经济问题，如Scharfstein模型和Banerjee模型。

本文在引入社会心理学模仿理论的基础上，对西方行为经济学进行了发展，研究了“模仿经济学”的假设前提、基本理论模式和分析框架，弥补了新凯恩斯主义缺陷，为微观分析转向宏观分析提供了一种过渡，大大增强了经济学的解释力。

关键词：模仿经济学羊群行为模仿一、引言近年来，在西方主流经济学界有一种新的倾向，即用“模仿”、“羊群行为”、“从众行为”等分析经济问题。

这是经济学发展的必然。

1在整个经济学的演进过程中，对模仿的忽视，或未将模仿作为经济学的重要概念来对待，大大减弱了经济假说的解释力。

直到20世纪90年代，人们才将模仿(羊群行为、从众行为等等)作为内生变量引入经济学分析框架。

这是经济学发展的一个巨大进步。

实质上，经济学是一门研究个人经济行为互动过程及其均衡的科学。

而要研究人的互动就离不开研究模仿，因为模仿是人互动的基本属性之一。

因此，以模仿作为核心概念构建一门新的经济学是可行的，也是必然的。

本文首次创造性地提出创建“模仿经济学”的构想。

社会心理学关于模仿的研究有一套成熟的理论，至少可以追溯到20世纪初期(Tarde,1903; McDougall,1928)。

McDougall(1928)认为，从更严格的意义上讲，“模仿”一词仅用于一个体模仿或再现另一个体的行为和身体动作；从狭义上讲模仿和模仿性(imitativeness)通常被认为属于一种本能。

作为一种行为，模仿不能简单归结为“S-R”(刺激—反应)的纯物理过程，它属于一种心理过程，反映心理和物理的一种双重变化。

现代社会心理学把模仿(imitation)解释为有意或无意地对某种刺激作为类似反应的行为方式(周晓虹，1997)。

金融市场中“羊群效应”的主要文献回顾

金融市场中“羊群效应”的主要文献回顾作者：汪敏娟王潇苑来源：《商情》2016年第15期【摘要】人类存在着从众心理，很多时候会产生盲从行为。

金融市场中的羊群行为（Herd Behavior）是一种特殊的非理性行为，它是指投资者在信息环境不确定的情况下，行为受到其他投资者的影响，模仿他人决策，或者过度依赖于舆论，而不考虑自己的信息的行为。

行为金融学的研究逐渐兴起，得到越来越多的关注。

本文是对金融市场中羊群效应的研究做了一些文献梳理的工作。

【关键词】信息不确定羊群效应理论模型实证研究文献梳理一、理论文献回顾有关羊群行为的理论模型，主要可分为信息流模型（information-based herding and cascade）、声誉模型（reputation-based herding）、激励模型（compensation-based herding）三大类。

Bannerjee（1992）、Bikhchandani，Hirshleifer and Welch（1992）、Welch（1992）提出了基于信息瀑布（information cascades）的羊群理论。

信息瀑布的形成实际上因为信息不对称。

在信息不完全和不确定的市场环境下，假设每个投资者都拥有某个股票的私人信息，这些信息可能是投资者自己研究的结果，也可能是通过私下渠道所获取的。

虽然与该股票有关的公开信息已经完全披露，但投资者不能确定这些信息的质量。

在这种市场环境下，投资者无法直接获得别人的私人信息，但可以通过观察别人的买卖行为来推测其私有信息，此时就容易产生羊群行为。

Scharfrein和Stein（1990）、Trueman（1994）、Zweibel（1995）、Prendergast and Stole （1996）、Graham（1999）等提出了基于基金经理或分析师声誉考虑的羊群理论。

毫无疑问，对某个基金经理人能力的怀疑将会影响到他的声誉甚至是职业发展。

美国公司法证券法历年经典论文列表

美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。

自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至2008年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。

以下是每年入选的论文列表：2008年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：1.Anabtawi, Iman and Lynn Stout. Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders. 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255-1308 (2008).2.Brummer, Chris. Corporate law preemption in an age of global capital markets. 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067-1114 (2008).3.Choi, Stephen and Marcel Kahan. The market penalty for mutual fund scandals. 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1021-1057 (2007).4.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. On beyond CalPERS: Survey evidence on the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance. 61 V and. L. Rev. 315-354 (2008).5.Cox, James D., Randall S. Thoma s and Lynn Bai. There are plaintiffs and…there are plaintiffs: An empirical analysis of securities class action settlements. 61 V and. L. Rev. 355-386 (2008).6.Henderson, M. Todd. Paying CEOs in bankruptcy: Executive compensation when agency costs are low. 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543-1618 (2007).7.Hu, Henry T.C. and Bernard Black. Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: Importance and extensions. 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625-739 (2008).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. The hanging chads of corporate voting. 96 Geo. L.J. 1227-1281 (2008).9.Strine, Leo E., Jr. Toward common sense and common ground? Reflections on the shared interests of managers and labor in a more rational system of corporate governance. 33 J. Corp. L. 1-20 (2007).10.Subramanian, Guhan. Go-shops vs. no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications.63 Bus. Law. 729-760 (2008).2007年：1.Baker, Tom and Sean J. Griffith. The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer. 95 Geo. L.J. 1795-1842 (2007).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise. 93 V a. L. Rev. 675-732 (2007).3.Choi, Stephen J. and Robert B. Thompson. Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489-1533 (2006).4.Coffee, John C., Jr. Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534-1586 (2006).5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587-1640 (2006).6.Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller. Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements. 59 V and. L. Rev. 1975-2013 (2006).7.Gordon, Jeffrey N. The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder V alue and Stock Market Prices. 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465-1568 (2007).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control. 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021-1093 (2007).ngevoort, Donald C. The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley. 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817-1855 (2007).10.Roe, Mark J. Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets. 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460-527 (2006).11.Subramanian, Guhan. Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence. 36 J. Legal Stud. 1-26 (2007). (NOTE: This is an earlier working draft. The published article is not freely available, and at SLW we generally respect the intellectual property rights of others.)2006年：1.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735-1758 (2006).2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. Letting Shareholders Set the Rules. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1784-1813 (2006).3.Black, Bernard, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner. Outside Director Liability. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055-1159 (2006).4.Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch and A.C. Pritchard. Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 835.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Letting Billions Slip Through Y our Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411-454 (2005).6.Gilson, Ronald J. Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641-1679 (2006).7.Goshen , Zohar and Gideon Parchomovsky. The Essential Role of Securities Regulation. 55 Duke L.J. 711-782 (2006).8.Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire. Law and the Rise of the Firm. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333-1403 (2006).9.Hu, Henry T. C. and Bernard Black. Empty V oting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms. 61 Bus. Law. 1011-1070 (2006).10.Kahan, Marcel. The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 22 J. L. Econ. & Org. 340-365 (2006).11.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law.58 V and. L. Rev. 1573-1622 (2005).12.Smith, D. Gordon. The Exit Structure of V enture Capital. 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315-356 (2005).2005年：1.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. The case for increasing shareholder power. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833-914 (2005).2.Bratton, William W. The new dividend puzzle. 93 Geo. L.J. 845-895 (2005).3.Elhauge, Einer. Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest. 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733-869 (2005).4.Johnson, . Corporate officers and the business judgment rule. 60 Bus. Law. 439-469 (2005).haupt, Curtis J. In the shadow of Delaware? The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan. 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171-2216 (2005).6.Ribstein, Larry E. Are partners fiduciaries? 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209-251.7.Roe, Mark J. Delaware?s politics. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491-2543 (2005).8.Romano, Roberta. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. 114 Y ale L.J. 1521-1611 (2005).9.Subramanian, Guhan. Fixing freezeouts. 115 Y ale L.J. 2-70 (2005).10.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits. 57 V and. L. Rev. 1747-1793 (2004).11.Weiss, Elliott J. and J. White. File early, then free ride: How Delaware law (mis)shapes shareholder class actions. 57 V and. L. Rev. 1797-1881 (2004).2004年：1Arlen, Jennifer and Eric Talley. Unregulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577-666 (2003).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. The business judgment rule as abstention doctrine. 57 V and. L. Rev. 83-130 (2004).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Alma Cohen. Firms' decisions where to incorporate. 46 J.L. & Econ. 383-425 (2003).4.Blair, Margaret M. Locking in capital: what corporate law achieved for business organizers in the nineteenth century. 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387-455 (2003).5.Gilson, Ronald J. and Jeffrey N. Gordon. Controlling shareholders. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785-843 (2003).6.Roe, Mark J. Delaware 's competition. 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588-646 (2003).7.Sale, Hillary A. Delaware 's good faith. 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456-495 (2004).8.Stout, Lynn A. The mechanisms of market inefficiency: an introduction to the new finance. 28 J. Corp. L. 635-669 (2003).9.Subramanian, Guhan. Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses. 113 Y ale L.J. 621-686 (2003).10.Subramanian, Guhan. The disappearing Delaware effect. 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32-59 (2004)11.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The new look of shareholder litigation: acquisition-oriented class actions. 57 V and. L. Rev. 133-209 (2004).2003年：1.A yres, Ian and Stephen Choi. Internalizing outsider trading. 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313-408 (2002).2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547-606 (2003).3.Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell. Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law? 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775-1821 (2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885-917 (2002).5.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. How to fix Wall Street: A voucher financing proposal for securities intermediaries. 113 Y ale L.J. 269-346 (2003).6.Daines, Robert. The incorporation choices of IPO firms. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1559-1611 (2002).7.Gilson, Ronald J. and David M. Schizer. Understanding venture capital structure: A taxexplanation for convertible preferred stock. 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874-916 (2003).8.Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. The myth of state competition in corporate law. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679-749 (2002).ngevoort, Donald C. Taming the animal spirits of the stock markets: A behavioral approach to securities regulation. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135-188 (2002).10.Pritchard, A.C. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the counterrevolution in the federal securities laws. 52 Duke L.J. 841-949 (2003).11.Thompson, Robert B. and Hillary A. Sale. Securities fraud as corporate governance: Reflections upon federalism. 56 V and. L. Rev. 859-910 (2003).2002年：1.Allen, William T., Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr. Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law. 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859-895 (2001) and 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001).2.A yres, Ian and Joe Bankman. Substitutes for Insider Trading. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235-254 (2001).3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751-846 (2002).4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887-951 (2002).5.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman. Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden V alue. 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521-566 (2002).6.Bratton, William M. Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder V alue. 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361 (2002).7.Coates, John C. IV. Explaining V ariation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers. 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301-1421 (2001).8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871-915 (2002).9.Kahan, Marcel. Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1040-1089 (2002).10.Roe, Mark J. Corporate Law’s Limits. 31 J. Legal Stud. 233-271 (2002).11.Thompson, Robert B. and D. Gordon Smith. Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers. 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261-326 (2001).2001年：1.Black, Bernard S. The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781-855 (2001).2.Coates, John C. IV. Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: a critique of the scientific evidence. 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271-382 (2000).3.Coates, John C. IV and Guhan Subramanian. A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307-396 (2000).4.Coffee, John C., Jr. The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. 111 Y ale L.J. 1-82 (2001).5.Choi, Stephen J. The unfounded fear of Regulation S: empirical evidence on offshore securities offerings. 50 Duke L.J. 663-751 (2000).6.Daines, Robert and Michael Klausner. Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83-120 (2001).7.Hansmann, Henry and Reinier Kraakman. The essential role of organizational law. 110 Y ale L.J. 387-440 (2000).ngevoort, Donald C. The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and accountability. 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (2001).9.Mahoney, Paul G. The political economy of the Securities Act of 1933. 30 J. Legal Stud. 1-31 (2001).10.Roe, Mark J. Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539-606 (2000).11.Romano, Roberta. Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance. 18 Y ale J. on Reg. 174-251 (2001).2000年：1.Bratton, William W. and Joseph A. McCahery. Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference. 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 213-297 (1999).2.Coates, John C. IV. Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783-797 (2000).3.Coffee, John C., Jr. Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure. 25 J. Corp. L. 1-39 (1999).4.Fisch, Jill E. The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters. 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061-1100 (2000).5.Fox, Merritt B. Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment. 85 V a. L. Rev. 1335-1419 (1999).6.Fried, Jesse M. Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers. 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421-477 (2000).7.Gulati, G. Mitu, William A. Klein and Eric M. Zolt. Connected Contracts. 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887-948 (2000).8.Hu, Henry T.C. Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality. 78 Tex. L. Rev. 777-884 (2000).9.Moll, Douglas K. Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective. 53 V and. L. Rev. 749-827 (2000).10.Schizer, David M. Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility. 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440-504 (2000).11.Smith, Thomas A. The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty. 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214-268 (1999).12.Thomas, Randall S. and Kenneth J. Martin. The Determinants of Shareholder V oting on Stock Option Plans. 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31-81 (2000).13.Thompson, Robert B. Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to V ote, Sell, and Sue. 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215-242 (1999).1999年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：1.Bankman, Joseph and Ronald J. Gilson. Why Start-ups? 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289-308 (1999).2.Bhagat, Sanjai and Bernard Black. The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance. 54 Bus. Law. 921-963 (1999).3.Blair, Margaret M. and Lynn A. Stout. A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. 85 V a. L. Rev. 247-328 (1999).4.Coates, John C., IV. “Fair V alue” As an A voidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions. 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251-1359 (1999).5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707 (1999).6.Eisenberg, Melvin A. Corporate Law and Social Norms. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253-1292 (1999).7.Hamermesh, Lawrence A. Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409-495 (1998).8.Krawiec, Kimberly D. Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Y ears Later. 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1039-1104.ngevoort, Donald C. Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319-1343 (1999).ngevoort, Donald C. Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others.52 Stan. L. Rev. 87-125 (1999).11.Talley, Eric. Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine. 108 Y ale L.J. 277-375 (1998).12.Williams, Cynthia A. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency. 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311 (1999).1998年：1.Carney, William J., The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715-780 (1998).2.Choi, Stephen, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916-966 (1998).3.Coffee, John C., Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation. 52 Bus. Law. 1195-1233 (1997).ngevoort, Donald C., Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms). 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101-172 (1997).ngevoort, Donald C., The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior. 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629-676 (1997).6.Mann, Ronald J. The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending. 86 Geo. L.J. 1-44 (1997).haupt, Curtis J., Property Rights in Firms. 84 V a. L. Rev. 1145-1194 (1998).8.Rock, Edward B., Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009-1107 (1997).9.Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation. 107 Y ale L.J. 2359-2430 (1998).10.Schwab, Stewart J. and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions. 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018-1094 (1998).11.Skeel, David A., Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy. 51 V and. L. Rev. 1325-1398 (1998).12.Thomas, Randall S. and Martin, Kenneth J., Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals? 73 Wash. L. Rev. 41-80 (1998).1997年：1.Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487-1537 (1996).2.Arlen, Jennifer and Kraakman, Reinier, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687-779 (1997).3.Brudney, Victor, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595-665 (1997).4.Carney, William J., The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal Stud. 303-329 (1997).5.Choi, Stephen J., Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567-651 (1997).6.Fox, Merritt B., Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom. 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498-2632 (1997).7.Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539-1571 (1996).8.Mahoney, Paul G., The Exchange as Regulator, 83 V a. L. Rev. 1453-1500 (1997).haupt, Curtis J., The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: V enture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865-898 (1997).10.Skeel, David A., Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 V a. L. Rev. 127-175 (1997).1996年：1.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996)2.Gilson, Ronald J. Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996)3. Hu, Henry T.C. Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J. Corp. L. 3 (1995)4.Kahan, Marcel & Michael Klausner Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)5.Kitch, Edmund W. The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 763 (1995)ngevoort, Donald C. Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996)7.Lin, Laura The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 898 (1996)lstein, Ira M. The Professional Board, 50 Bus. Law 1427 (1995)9.Thompson, Robert B. Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1 (1995)10.Triantis, George G. and Daniels, Ronald J. The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance. 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073 (1995)1995年：公司法：1.Arlen, Jennifer and Deborah M. Weiss A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,. 105 Y ale L.J. 325-391 (1995).2.Elson, Charles M. The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995).3.Hu, Henry T.C. Heeding Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985-1040 (1995).4.Kahan, Marcel The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 565-622 (1995).5.Klausner, Michael Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 V a. L. Rev. 757-852 (1995).6.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477-537 (1995).7.Siegel, Mary Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 79-143 (1995).证券法：1.Grundfest, Joseph A. Why Disimply? 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727-747 (1995).2.Lev, Baruch and Meiring de V illiers Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7-37 (1994).3.Mahoney, Paul G. Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047-1112 (1995).4.Seligman, Joel The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994).5.Seligman, Joel The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 649-702 (1995).6.Stout, Lynn A. Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 V a. L. Rev. 611 (1995).7.Weiss, Elliott J. and John S. Beckerman Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Y ale L.J. 2053-2127 (1995).1994年：公司法：1.Fraidin, Stephen and Hanson, Jon D. Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Y ale L.J. 1739-1834 (1994)2.Gordon, Jeffrey N. Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative V oting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124-192 (1994)3.Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Lott, John R., Jr. The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757-802 (1993)4.Kraakman, Reiner, Park, Hyun, and Shavell, Steven When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733-1775 (1994)5.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425- 491 (1993)6.Oesterle, Dale A. and Palmiter, Alan R. Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder V oting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485-583 (1994)7. Pound, John The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003-1071 (1993)8.Skeel, David A., Jr. Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471-557 (1994)9.Thompson, Robert B. Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and V icarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 V and. L. Rev. 1-41 (1994)证券法：1.Alexander, Janet Cooper The V alue of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 1421-1469 (1994)2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1-40 (1993)3.Black, Bernard S. and Coffee, John C. Jr. Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997-2087 (1994)4.Booth, Richard A. The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187-1212 (1993)5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 837-907 (1994)6.Fox, Merritt B. Insider Trading Deterrence V ersus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088-2203 (1994)7.Grundfest, Joseph A. Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961-1024 (1994)8.Macey, Jonathan R. Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909-949 (1994)9.Rock, Edward B. Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987-1031 (1994)。

propagandatechniquesintodaysadvertising原文翻译

propagandatechniquesintodaysadvertising原文翻译广告人想从你那里得到生意，他们会用各种各样的聪明的广告标语去得到它。

如果你曾经回应过广告，你就已经对有效的宣传摇摆不定。

你可能把宣传和政府使用的强有力的策略联系起来。

但Ann McClintock提供了证据表示我们每天都是宣传的目标，并且它塑造了我们很多的观点和决定。

似乎无论是孩子还是成年人的美国人都在被怂恿。

他们正在被洗脑。

而且几乎没有人反抗。

为什么？因为怂恿者和洗脑者是我们乐意地邀请他们到我们家里的，我们是受害者，我们满足地，甚至迫切地渴望被害。

我们在报纸和杂志上阅读广告人的宣传文章，我们观看他们极具诱惑力的电视影像。

我们将他们的信息和图像吸收进我们的潜意识里。

我们所有人都在这样做——即便是那些自我感觉看穿了广告人的把戏并且对其魅力有抵抗力的人们。

广告人极其依赖于宣传来销售，无论这产品是牙膏品牌，一个候选人，或者是一个特别的政治观点宣传是为了赢得人们确定的意见和支持而用来影响人们观点的一种系统的努力。

宣传不必要在意对错，好坏。

宣传者只是想让人们相信他们发出的信息。

通常，宣传者将会完全使用谎言或详细的描述去动摇人们的观点，在宣传战中，任何的策略都是公平的。

当我们听见“宣传”这个词，我们常常想到一种异常的恐吓：极权主义政权播放反美广播节目或者对人质实行洗脑策略。

虽然宣传可能看似仅仅与政治领域有关系，但是，这种理念可以广泛的被采用到产品和理念销售中去。

事实上，绝大多数人都是广告宣传战中的目标。

每天，我们都被标语，宣传报和弹窗广告，商广告，包装报道，广告牌，商标，标志和设计品牌——宣传的所有形式炮轰。

一份调查显示，我们每一个人，平均每天被五百条不同类型的广告所侵染。

这种浸透可能在未来还会增长，因为当前的倾向是电影荧幕，商品车，音频磁带甚至公用电视都充斥着广告。

广告宣传技术有哪些类型？这儿有七种基本的类型。

对骂：对骂是一种宣传策略中带用消极的名字打击对方一侧或竞争对手。

国外知名财务学家（中文）-2-斯蒂芬罗斯

斯蒂芬·罗斯（Stephen A. Ross）教授斯蒂芬·罗斯(Stephen A. Ross)，因其创立了套利定价理论(Arbitrage Pricing Theory，简称APT)而举世闻名,是当今世界上最具影响力的金融学家之一。

斯蒂芬·罗斯生于1944年，1965年获加州理工学院物理学学士学位，1970年获哈佛大学经济学博士学位。

罗斯担任过许多投资银行的顾问，其中包括摩根保证信托银行、所罗门兄弟公司和高盛公司，并曾在许多大公司担任高级顾问，诸如AT＆T和通用汽车公司等；罗斯还曾被聘为案件的专业顾问，诸如AT＆T公司拆分案、邦克-赫伯特公司(Bunker and Herbert)陷入白银市场的诉讼案等；另外，罗斯担任过一些政府部门的顾问，其中包括美国财政部、商业部、国家税务局和进出口银行等；罗斯还曾任美国金融学会主席(1988年)、计量经济学会会员、宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院经济与金融学教授、耶鲁大学经济与金融学Sterling讲座教授。

由于对金融理论的杰出贡献，罗斯获得了许多学术荣誉，包括国际金融工程学会(IAFE)最佳金融工程师奖、金融分析师联合会葛拉汉与杜德奖(Graham and Dodd Award)、芝加哥大学商学院给最优秀学者颁发的利奥·梅内姆奖(Leo Melamed Award)、期权研究领域的Pomerance奖；投资管理与研究学会(AIMR)授予罗斯的尼古拉斯-摩罗德乌斯基奖(Nicholas Molodvsky Awar d)，是一个奖励“改变了某专业的方向并使之达到更高领域所作出的杰出贡献”的奖项；1999年，罗斯在《金融与数量分析杂志》(JFQA)第三期发表的论文“额外风险：再论萨缪尔森的大数谬论”获得JFQA1999年度威廉·夏普奖(William Sharpe Award)(该奖项用于奖励那些在《金融与数量分析杂志》上发表文章、为金融理论作出杰出贡献的研究者)。

跨国10章-并购

价值10亿美元以上并购案例： 1995年迪斯尼公司以190亿美元的成功收购使其成为全球
最大的娱乐业公司; 1996年洛克希德公司以91亿美元收购洛拉尔公司的大部分
股份; 1997年美国最大的两家飞机制造公司波音与麦道公司合并,
涉及金额140亿美元; 美国业名列第四的世界通信公司以370亿美元的巨额价格
2.按照出资方式划分，并购可以划分为现金购买资产、现金购买股票、股票换取资产和股票互换（1）现金购买资产：指并购企业使用现金购买目标企业的资产从而实现并购的方式。
优点是：交易清楚，不容易产生纠纷。
当目标企业产权清晰、债权债务明确时，适用这种方式。
（2）现金购买股票：指并购企业使用现金在股票市场上收购目标企业的股票从而实现并购的方式。
2.收购（Acquisitions）：含义：
①收购的主体可以是自然人,也可以是法人，收购的根本目的是获得目标企业的控制权，获得超额收益。
②收购是为了获得目标企业经营控制权的一种企业经营行为，但是，只有当收购的股权达到一定比例时，才能获得目标企业的控制权。
分类：资产收购（资产所有权）、股权收购（股东
权益）
3.兼并和收购的比较：
共同点：
①对象是共同的,两者都是企业产权交易的形式，其交易都是以企业这一商品为对象。
②都是企业产权的有偿转让。就其活动而言，都是企业的买卖，所不同的只是买卖的方式而已。
③都是企业在谋求自身发展中所采取的外部扩张战略，通过这种外部扩张战略，能加强企业的竞争能力，扩充经济实力，有利于企业不断改善经营管理，提高经济效益。
的生产规模范围内，厂商的规模越大，产品的单位成本就越低，企业经营管理的成本也会降低，规模效应会越明显。 2.竞争优势理论并购的动机是为了获得未来的竞争优势（先进的产品、更大的市场份额、业务范围的整合等），以除竞争压力。

当代国外广告学学术著作(1940年至2004年)(中英文)

当代国外广告学学术著作（1940 年至 2004 年）（中英文）书名（中英文）作者出版社（中英文）出版时间
《一个广告人的日记：战争年代 1942 詹姆斯·韦伯·杨（James 广告出版公司, 芝加哥年 6 月 1 日-1943 年 12 月 31 日》（The Diary of an Ad Man: The War Years June 1, 1942 - December 31, 1943）《广告烟雾》（The Advertising Smoke Screen）布莱克·克拉克 (Blake Clark) 哈珀-兄弟出版社, 纽约（Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York） 1944 （Advertising Publications, Inc, Chicago）（The Diary of an Ad Man: The War Years June 1, 1942 - December 31, 1943）《广告烟雾》（The Advertising Smoke Screen）《经济中的广告》（Advertising in Our Economy）《前所未闻：一个广告人的史册》（And Hearing Not: Annals of an Adman）《奸商》（The Hucksters）《广告的经济效果》（Economic Effects of Advertising）《广告奇谈》（Adventures in Advertising）《广告文案》（Advertising Copy）尼尔·博登（Neil H. Borden）约翰·奥尔·杨（John Orr Young）乔治·霍奇基斯（George B. Hotchkiss）哈珀-兄弟出版公司, 纽约（Harper & Brothers, New York）哈珀出版公司, 纽约 Harper, 1949 New York 1948 （Ernest Elmo Calkins）弗雷德里克·魏克曼（Frederick Wakeman）莱因哈特公司, 纽约（Rinehart and Company, New York）欧文出版社, 芝加哥 Irwin, Chicago 1947 1946 布莱克·克拉克 (Blake Clark) 尼尔·博登 (Neil H. Borden) 欧内斯特·埃尔摩·卡尔金斯哈珀-兄弟出版社, 纽约（Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York）理查德德德欧文公司, 芝加 1945 哥（Richard D. Irwin, Inc, Chicago）查尔斯布纳之子, 纽约（Charles Scribner's Sons, New York） 1946 1944 《一个广告人的日记：战争年代 1942 詹姆斯·韦伯·杨（James 广告出版公司, 芝加哥年 6 月 1 日-1943 年 12 月 31 日》 Webb Young） 1944 Webb Young）（Advertising Publications, Inc, Chicago） 1944

金融市场中羊群行为的模拟研究及启示

金融市场中羊群行为的模拟研究及启示崔巍(北京大学经济学院,北京 100871)摘要:本文在Bikhchandani,Hirshlei fer 和Welch 的羊群行为模型(B HW)的基础上,从实验经济学的角度对金融市场中的羊群行为和信息瀑布进行实验模拟研究,并提出相关的政策建议。

本文主要进行了三组实验,并对投资者决策的有效性和实验过程中的计数偏差、现状偏差和代表性偏差进行了考察。

实验结果显示,在信息不对称的情况下,很可能会发生信息瀑布和羊群行为。

信息因素对羊群行为的产生有重要的影响。

在信息模糊和信息不完全的情况下,投资者决策的有效性会大幅度地降低,并伴随着更多的非理性的决策行为。

关键词:信息不对称;信息瀑布;羊群行为中图分类号:F224 1 文献标识码:A 文章编号:1000 5919(2009)06 0068 07收稿日期:2009 08 10作者简介:崔巍,女,辽宁省沈阳市人,北京大学经济学院讲师,经济学博士。

Banerjee,Abhijit V ,A Si mple Model of Herd Behavior,The Qua rte rly Journal of Economics ,Vol.107,1992,797 817.! Bikhchandani,Sushil;Hirshleifer,David and Welch,Ivo,A Theory of Fads,Fashi on,Cus tom,and Cultural Change asInformational Cascades,The Journa l of Political Economy ,Vol.100,1992,992 1026.∀ Scharfstein,David and Jeremy Stein,Herd Behavior and Investment,American Economic Review ,80,1990,465 479.# Maug,Ernst and Narayan Naik,Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management,Mimeo ,1996,London Business School.一、引言金融市场中的羊群行为逐渐成为投资者和金融监管部门广泛关注的问题。

The Long and Short of Quality Ladders

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIESTHE LONG AND SHORT (OF) QUALITY LADDERSAmit KhandelwalWorking Paper 15178/papers/w15178NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138July 2009I am especially grateful to my dissertation committee, Irene Brambilla, Penny Goldberg and Peter Schott, for guidance and support. I have benefited from conversations with Steve Berry, Ray Fisman, Juan Carlos Hallak, David Hummels, Kala Krishna, Chris Ksoll, Frank Limbrock, Alex Mcquoid, Nina Pavcnik, Siddharth Sharma, Gustavo Soares, Robert Staiger, Catherine Thomas, Daniel Trefler, Chris Udry, Eric Verhoogen, David Weinstein, Jeffrey Weinstein, and various seminar participants. Special thanks also to Amalavoyal Chari. All errors are my own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.© 2009 by Amit Khandelwal. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.The Long and Short (of) Quality LaddersAmit KhandelwalNBER Working Paper No. 15178July 2009JEL No. F1,F15,F16ABSTRACTPrices are typically used as proxies for countries' export quality. I relax this strong assumption by exploiting both price and quantity information to estimate the quality of products exported to the U.S. Higher quality is assigned to products with higher market shares conditional on price. The estimated qualities reveal substantial heterogeneity in product markets' scope for quality differentiation, or their "quality ladders.'' I use this variation to explain the heterogeneous impact of low-wage competition on U.S. manufacturing employment and output. Markets characterized by relatively shorter quality ladders are associated with larger employment and output declines resulting from low-wage competition. Amit KhandelwalGraduate School of BusinessColumbia UniversityUris Hall 606, 3022 BroadwayNew York, NY 10027and NBERak2796@The Long and Short(of)Quality Ladders∗Amit Khandelwal†Columbia Business School&NBERFirst Draft:November2006This Version:July2009AbstractPrices are typically used as proxies for countries’export quality.I relax this strong assumption by exploiting both price and quantity information to estimate the quality of products exported to the U.S.Higher quality is assigned to products with higher market shares conditional on price.The estimatedqualities reveal substantial heterogeneity in product markets’scope for quality diﬀerentiation,or their“quality ladders.”I use this variation to explain the heterogeneous impact of low-wage competition onU.S.manufacturing employment and output.Markets characterized by relatively shorter quality laddersare associated with larger employment and output declines resulting from low-wage competition. Keywords:Quality Ladders;Low Wage Competition;Quality Specialization;Product DiﬀerentiationJEL Classiﬁcation:F1,F15,F161IntroductionThe quality of products manufactured by countries aﬀects many economic outcomes in international and development economics.Past studies have consistently found that product quality inﬂuences cross-border trade;richer countries consume and export higher quality products than developing countries.1The ability ∗I am especially grateful to my dissertation committee,Irene Brambilla,Penny Goldberg and Peter Schott,for guidance and support.I have beneﬁted from conversations with Steve Berry,Ray Fisman,Juan Carlos Hallak,David Hummels,Kala Krishna, Chris Ksoll,Frank Limbrock,Alex Mcquoid,Nina Pavcnik,Siddharth Sharma,Gustavo Soares,Robert Staiger,Catherine Thomas,Daniel Treﬂer,Chris Udry,Eric Verhoogen,David Weinstein,Jeﬀrey Weinstein,and various seminar participants. Special thanks also to Amalavoyal Chari.All errors are my own.†Uris Hall,Room606,3022Broadway,New York,NY10027,email:ak2796@,website: /faculty/akhandelwal/.1Support for the demand-side explanation,initially posited by Linder(1961),has been shown by Hallak(2006)and Verhoogen (2008).Studies by Hummels and Klenow(2005)and Schott(2004)provide systematic evidence that richer countries exportof developing countries to transition from low-quality to high-quality products is therefore seen by some as a necessary(but certainly not a suﬃcient)condition for export success and,ultimately,economic development.2 In addition,quality upgrading features prominently in current debates about the role of international trade in driving wage inequality.But while this research suggests a positive association between quality upgrading and income per capita,Verhoogen(2008)and Goldberg and Pavcnik(2007)argue that quality upgrading also aﬀects the variance of the income distribution through changes in the relative demand for skilled labor. Quality specialization may therefore partly explain why inequality has risen in developing countries following trade liberalizations,in contrast to Stolper-Samuelson predictions.Diﬀerences in the quality space may also aﬀect how closely countries’products compete with one another and therefore have implications for the impact of trade on industry employment and output Leamer(2006).These studies stress the importance of understanding why product quality varies across countries and over time,and how it is inﬂuenced by policy.The challenge faced by this literature is that product quality is unobserved.Research in the international trade literature has attempted to deal with this problem by using prices(or unit values)to proxy for quality.This approach,while convenient,requires strong assumptions since prices could reﬂect not just quality,but also variations in manufacturing costs.For example,in1999, the U.S.imported Malaysian and Portuguese women’s trousers(HS6204624020)at unit values(inclusive of transportation and tariﬀduties)of$146and$371,respectively.If prices are assumed to proxy perfectly for quality,Malaysian trousers would possess about half the quality of Portuguese trousers.However,the annual wage in the apparel sector for Malaysia and Portugal was$3,100and$5,700,respectively(UNIDO, 2005).So the diﬀerence in unit values may instead be a reﬂection of these diﬀerent factor prices.Why would a consumer ever purchase expensive Portuguese trousers if they,in fact,possess lower quality?One explanation is that a fraction of consumers have a preference for the horizontal attributes of Portuguese trousers(for instance,the cut or color patterns).Indeed,U.S.consumers imported more than82,000dozens of Malaysian trousers compared to only865dozens from Portugal.Idiosyncratic preferences for products’horizontal attributes can therefore break the direct mapping from prices to quality that has been traditionally assumed.This paper estimates the quality of U.S.imports using a procedure that relaxes the strong quality-equals-price assumption.The quality measures are derived from a nested logit demand system,based on Berry(1994),that embeds preferences for both horizontal and vertical attributes.3Quality is the vertical higher quality products.Baldwin and Harrigan(2007),Hallak and Sivadasan(2009),Kugler and Verhoogen(2008)and Johnson (2009)also document the role of product quality in inﬂuencing production and trade patterns.2Kremer(1993)provides microeconomic foundations for the quality production function and its implications for economic development(see also Verhoogen(2008)and Kugler and Verhoogen(2008)).Endogenous growth models that highlight the importance of product quality include Grossman and Helpman(1991).Hausmann and Rodrik(2003),Rodrik(2006)and Hidalgo et al.(2007)highlight the importance of export quality for economic performance.3Other studies within international trade that use a nested logit structure include Goldberg(1995)and Irwin and Pavcnikcomponent of the estimated model and captures the mean valuation that U.S.consumers attach to an im-ported product.The procedure utilizes both unit value and quantity information to infer quality and has a straightforward intuition:conditional on price,imports with higher market shares are assigned higher quality.Importantly,the procedure requires no special data beyond what is readily available in standard disaggregate trade data.It is also easy to implement;here,I estimate separate demand curves for approxi-mately hundreds of manufacturing industries.Moreover,the procedure recovers quality at theﬁnest level of product aggregation available(for the U.S.data,this is the ten-digit HS level).4The inferred qualities indicate that developed countries export higher quality products relative to developing countries.Thisﬁnding is consistent with Schott(2004)who uses unit values to proxy for quality.However,the estimates also reveal substantial heterogeneity in product markets’scope for quality diﬀerentiation,or quality ladders,which I measure as the range of qualities within the product market.In markets with a larger scope for quality diﬀerentiation,or a“long”quality ladder,unit values are relatively more correlated with the estimated qualities.In these markets,prices appear to be appropriate proxies for quality.In contrast,prices appear to be less appropriate proxies for quality in markets with a narrow range of estimated qualities(“short”ladder markets).This provides suggestive evidence that expensive imports in short-ladder markets coexist with cheaper rivals due to horizontal product diﬀerentiation.That is,although the average U.S.consumer attaches a low valuation to the expensive import,there is a fraction of consumers who still value the product.This heterogeneity underscores the drawback in invoking the quality-equals-price assumption,particularly for products characterized by short quality ladders.I use this heterogeneity in ladder lengths to demonstrate that quality specialization has important implications for the bor market.The public’s fear of globalization is often rooted in the vulnerability or, to use Edward Leamer’s terminology,the contestability of jobs.According to Leamer,the contestable jobs are those where“wages in Los Angeles are set in Shanghai”(Leamer(2006),p.5).A recent study by Bernard, Jensen,and Schott(2006)provides evidence that the probability of U.S.plant survival and employment growth are negatively associated with an industry’s exposure to import penetration,particularly from low-wage countries.5However,while low-wage competition negatively aﬀects output and employment growth, the impact is heterogenous across industries.For instance,between1980and the mid-1990s,electronics (SIC36)experienced greater low-wage import penetration than fabricated metals(SIC34)but experienced (2004)although these papers do not focus on the quality of imported products.4An alternative procedure developed by Hallak and Schott(2007)relies on the similar intuition to infer countries’export quality to the U.S.,but their methodology prevents estimating quality at theﬁnest level of disaggregation due to data limitations.5Other studies studying the negative relationships between trade and employment include Sachs and Shatz(1994),Free-man and Katz(1991)and Revenga(1992).Bernard,Jensen,and Schott(2006)explicitly connect the relationship between employment and trade with low-wage countries,deﬁned as nations with less than5percent of U.S.per capita GDP.I use their deﬁnition of low-wage countries in this paper(see Table1).a smaller employment decline.6Using a simple model developed in Section2,I demonstrate that the impact of low-wage competition on U.S.industries will vary with its quality ladder.My argument is related to a body of research that reject standard model predictions of factor price equalization(FPE).7These studies show that if countries inhabit diﬀerent cones of(quality)diversiﬁcation,with developing countries exporting low-quality products,then developed countries will be insulated from movements of wages in developing countries.However,if markets vary in their scope for quality diﬀerentiation,developed countries will experience heterogeneity in their exposure to developing countries.In long-ladder markets,developed countries can insulate themselves from the South by using comparative advantage factors(e.g.,skill,capital and/or technology)to specialize atop the quality ladder.In short-ladder markets,however,developed countries will be directly exposed to Southern competition because quality upgrading is infeasible.Thus,a market’s scope for vertical diﬀerentiation is important for understanding Leamer’s notion of contestable jobs.Iﬁnd robust support for this hypothesis by matching U.S.industry data and import competition to quality ladders constructed from the estimated qualities.Consistent with Bernard et al.(2006),Iﬁnd that industry employment is negatively associated with import penetration,particularly from low-wage countries. However,the empirical results conﬁrm that import penetration has a weaker impact on employment in industries with long quality ladders:a ten percentage point increase in low-wage penetration is associated with a6percent employment decline in an industry characterized by an average quality ladder length.A similar increase in competition in a long-ladder industry(one standard deviation above the mean)results in only a1.4percent employment decline.Diﬀerential impacts on industry output are similar.Importantly,the impact of import competition on short and long-ladder industries is similar in magnitude to the diﬀerential impact on low and high capital-intensive industries.In other words,even after controlling for the diﬀerential impact through traditional channels,such as capital and skill intensities(see Sachs and Shatz(1994)and Bernard et al.(2006)),the quality ladder remains an important determinant of an industry’s vulnerability to low-wage competition.Moreover,the heterogenous eﬀect is not precisely captured if one simply uses variations in unit values.These results complement the literature studying the relationship between quality specialization and labor markets.But while existing studies focus predominantly on developing countries(see Goldberg and Pavcnik(2007),Verhoogen(2008),Kaplan and Verhoogen(2005)),the evidence here suggests that quality specialization is also important for developed countries.Quality ladders may therefore help identify those markets that are likely to be contested by competition from low-wage countries.6One potential explanation is diﬀerences in capital intensity,but in1980,electronics was less capital intensive than fabricated metals.Indeed,this paper oﬀers evidence that capital intensity only partly explains the heterogeneity in U.S.employment outcomes due to import competition.7For instance,see Leamer(1987)and Schott(2003).The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.Section2oﬀers a simple model to illustrate that exposure to low-wage competition is greater in markets with short quality ladders.In Section3,I discuss the approach used to infer quality from trade data.The data and quality estimation results are presented in Section4.Section5applies the quality estimates to test the implications of quality specialization for U.S. employment.I conclude in Section6.2A Model of Contestable JobsThis section develops a simple model that delivers two comparative static results.First,the impact of foreign competition on domestic market shares is larger from low-wage countries.Second,the impact will depend on the market’s quality ladder length.I then use the empirical quality measures derived in Section3to assess the predictions of the model.The model is partial equilibrium and analyzesﬁrms in two regions,North(N)and South(S),where the Southernﬁrms freely export to the North.The wages in each country are determined by an outside sector and are therefore treated as exogenous:w N>w S.Each region has J homogenousﬁrms that compete by manufacturing horizontally and vertically distinct varieties.Following Krugman(1980)and Melitz(2003), horizontal diﬀerentiation is costless so in equilibrium,allﬁrms produce horizontally distinct varieties.But as in Flam and Helpman(1987),vertical(e.g.,quality)diﬀerentiation depends on a Ricardian-type comparative advantage given by region c’s technology,Z c.I assume that Northernﬁrms have access to better technology than the South:Z N>Z S.Firm j uses this technology to manufacture a variety subject to a marginal cost function that is increasing with quality(λj):w c+λ2j,for c∈{N,S}.82Z cThe consumers who live in the North have discrete choice preferences.Consumer n observes the domestic and Southern varieties and chooses the variety j that provides her with the highest indirect utility,V nj=θλj−αp j+ nj.(1) Quality is deﬁned as an attribute whose valuation is agreed upon by all consumers:holding pricesﬁxed, all consumers would prefer higher quality objects.The vertical component can be interpreted as the clarity or sharpness of a television screen or it can reﬂect the perceived quality that results from advertising.In either case,quality represents any attribute that enhances consumers’willingness-to-pay for a variety.An alternative interpretation is thatλrepresents a shift parameter in the variety’s demand schedule:holding price p jﬁxed,demand shifts out when the quality improves(Sutton,1991).The empirical identiﬁcation of quality relies on this latter intuition.The parameterθreﬂects the consumers’valuation for quality and,as shown below,represents a proxy for the market’s quality ladder in the model.8One can think of this marginal cost function as arising from aﬁxed-proportions technology that combines labor and capital (with the rental rate on capital being implicitly treated as one).in the proportion1toλ22ZHorizontal product diﬀerentiation is introduced in(1)through the consumer-variety-speciﬁc term, nj.Following standard practice in the discrete choice literature, nj is assumed to be distributed i.i.d. type-I extreme value.Unlike the vertical attribute,the horizontal attribute has the property that some people prefer it while others do not and on average,it provides zero utility.9Denote the mean valuation for variety j asδj≡θλj−αp j.Under the distributional assumption,the market share of variety j is given by the familiar logit formulam j=eδjkeδk.(2)Aﬁrm from region c maximizes proﬁts in the Northern market by choosing price and quality bysolving the following problemmaxp j,λjp j−w c−λ2j2Z ceδjkeδk(3)The market is characterized by monopolistic competition with a suﬃciently large number ofﬁrms that no oneﬁrm can inﬂuence the market equilibrium prices and qualities.The optimal price charged by variety j is therefore10p∗j=1α+w c+λ∗2j2Z c,∀j∈c(4)Under this pricing rule,ﬁrms charge a markup(1α)over their marginal cost.The optimal quality choice equates the marginal beneﬁt of choosing quality to its marginal cost:λ∗j=θZ cα,∀j∈c(5)Equations(4)and(5)indicate that allﬁrms within a region choose the same price and quality(but recall that allﬁrms diﬀerentiate their varieties in the(costless)horizontal dimension).I therefore drop the subscript j and index the representativeﬁrm’s choice in each region by N or S.Note also that the market share in(2) simpliﬁes to m c=eδcJ(eδN+eδS),c∈{N,S}and the aggregate market share in each region is M c=Jm c.The optimal price and quality choice imply that the mean valuation consumers attach to the representativeﬁrm in region c isδ∗c≡θλ∗c−αp∗c=θ2Z c2α−αw c−1,c∈{N,S}.(6)The Northernﬁrms manufacture the higher quality varieties since Z N>Z S.11Below,I verify that more advanced countries indeed export higher quality products using the newly proposed quality measures 9For example,comfort is a quality attribute since,ceteris paribus,all consumers prefer more comfort to less.An article of clothing’s fashion or style is a horizontal attribute since at equal prices,not all consumers would purchase the same style(e.g., stripes versus solids).10If aﬁrm takes into account the impact of its decision on the denominator in(2),the optimal price is given by p∗j=1α(1−m j)+w c+λ∗2j2Z c.As discussed in Anderson et al.(1992),monopolistic competition assumes there are a suﬃciently largenumber of varieties so that the market share of any one variety is negligible.The optimal price is therefore given by(4).11Since quality is a monotonic function of technology,prices are suﬃcient statistics for quality in this model.However,if Z N=Z S,all qualities would be identical,but the North would charge higher prices because of higher manufacturing costs. Thus,empirically,prices alone may confound diﬀerences in quality and quality-adjusted manufacturing costs.which provides a justiﬁcation for this assumption.These higher quality Northernﬁrms will also have larger market shares ifθ2(Z N−Z S)>α(w N−w S),(7)since this implies thatδ∗N >δ∗S.This condition in(7)holds if consumers’valuation for quality is suﬃcientlyhigh or the North’s technological prowess is suﬃcient to overcome its disadvantage in manufacturing costs. This assumption is consistent with substantial theoretical and empirical work arguing that higher quality, or more productive,ﬁrms have higher output(and market shares).12I deﬁne the market’s quality ladder as the diﬀerence between the highest and lowest quality(Gross-man and Helpman,1991).As discussed below,the empirical measures cannot separately identifyλfrom the consumers’valuation for quality(θ).I therefore deﬁne the market’s quality ladder asLadder(θ)≡θλ∗N−θλ∗S=θ2α(Z N−Z S).(8)The market’s quality ladder can be indexed byθand so as the valuation for quality increases,the quality ladder increases,or lengthens.The scope for quality diﬀerentiation will therefore vary according the con-sumers’valuations for quality in each market.13Moreover,as the quality ladder increases,the market sharegains are disproportionately distributed to the manufacturers of the higher quality(∂δ∗N∂θ>∂δ∗S∂θ).This simple model abstracts away from the endogenous“lengthening”of the ladder that may occur in a long-run equilibrium with technological progress or shifts in consumer preferences.Instead,I assume that the quality ladder isﬁxed which may be appropriate in the short to medium run and mitigate endogeneity concerns in the empirical analysis by assigning a market’s quality ladder its initial length.This assumption is consistent with the data which reports a persistence between a market’s initial ladder length and itsﬁnal period length.That is,on average,markets with initially“short”ladders are not“long”by the end of the sample,implying that the quality ladder length is an intrinsic attribute of a market characterizing its scope for quality diﬀerentiation.14I can now analyze how the aggregate Northern market share changes with Southern wages,and how this impact varies according to a market’s quality ladder length.Theﬁrst result shows that the North loses market share as Southern manufacturing wages decline:∂M NS =−M N M S∂δ∗SS>0(9)since∂δ∗SS=−α.(10)12For instance,see Melitz(2003)and Bernard et al.(2007).13The ladder length could also vary by changing Z N and the predictions of the model do not change.Hence,the contestable jobs hypothesis does not hinge on the source of the market’s scope for quality diﬀerentiation.14A market’s intrinsic scope for quality diﬀerentiation is closely related to escalation principle developed in Sutton(1998).Thus,Southernﬁrms become more competitive as its manufacturing costs falls and this gain comes at the expense of lower market shares for the Northernﬁrms.This comparative static is quite intuitive and is supported by existing empirical evidence.For instance,Bernard et al.(2006)show that output and employment for U.S.plants are negatively associated with import competition,but the impact is much larger when import competition originates from countries with less than5%of U.S.per capita GDP.Importantly,this model adds quality diﬀerentiation to show that the intensity of competition within a market depends on the quality ladder length.In particular,while(9)indicates that the North’s market share falls as Southern wages decline,it suﬀers a smaller loss in markets characterized by longer quality ladders(highθmarkets).This is seen by diﬀerentiating(9)with respect toθ:∂2M N ∂w S∂θ=−∂2δ∗S∂w S∂θM N M S+∂δ∗S∂w SM N∂M S∂θ+M S∂M N∂θ=−∂δ∗S∂w SM N M2S−M2N M S∂δ∗N∂θ−∂δ∗S∂θ=∂δ∗S∂w SM N M S(M N−M S)∂δ∗N∂θ−∂δ∗S∂θ=−θM N M S(M N−M S)(Z N−Z S)<0,(11)since M N>M S.This derivative shows that in long-ladder markets(highθ),the sensitivity of Northern market shares to Southern competitiveness is reduced.As a result,a decrease in the South’s wage results in a smaller decline of the North’s market share in long ladders.The model shows that trading with the South can generate a diﬀerential impact on two markets that are otherwise identical but vary according in their quality ladders.This result is related to more general models of international trade that predict a breakdown of FPE when countries are fully specialized in production.In contrast to a single-cone equilibrium,where endowments are such that all countries produce all goods,the conditions required for factor price equalization are not met in multi-cone equilibrium because countries specialize in varieties tailored to their endowments.15Schott(2004)has extended this analysis to within product specialization where endowment diﬀerences cause countries to specialize in diﬀerent segments of a product’s quality ladder.The model here sharpens this analysis by arguing that the scope for quality specialization varies across markets.3Empirical ImplementationThis section describes the procedure that infers quality using price and quantity information from standard disaggregate trade data.The estimated qualities are then used to verify predictions from the model.15For evidence in favor of the hypothesis that countries inhabit multiple cones of diversiﬁcation,see Leamer(1987),Davis and Weinstein(2001)and Schott(2003).The methodology is based on the nested logit framework by Berry(1994).The nested logit has the advantage over the logit in(1)because it partially relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives(IIA) property by allowing for more plausible correlation structures among consumer preferences.To understand why this is important,suppose a consumer is choosing between a Japanese wool shirt and an Italian cotton shirt.If a Chinese cotton shirt enters the market,a logit or CES framework would predict that the market shares for both imports would fall by the same percent.However,we might expect the Italian cotton shirt’s market share to adjust more than the Japanese shirt because the Chinese shirt is also cotton.The nested logit allows for more appropriate substitution patterns by placing varieties into appropriate nests.In order to delineate the nests,I rely on the structure of the U.S.trade data.Feenstra et al.(2002) have compiled U.S.import data which containﬁve-digit SITC industries that have been mapped to ten-digit HS products denoted by h.The products serve as the nests.An import from country c within a product is called a variety.I model consumer preferences for a single industry and therefore suppress industry subscripts.Fol-lowing Berry(1994),consumer n has preferences for country c’s import into HS product h(e.g.,variety ch) at time t.The consumer purchases the one variety that provides her with the highest indirect utility,given byV ncht=λ1,ch+λ2,t+λ3,cht−αp cht+Hh=1µnht d ch+(1−σ) ncht.(12)Quality is deﬁned asλ1,ch+λ2,t+λ3,cht since it reﬂects the valuation for variety ch that is common across consumers(notice that these terms are not subscripted by n).This quality term is decomposed into three components.Theﬁrst term,λ1,ch,is the time-invariant valuation that the consumer attaches to variety ch. The second term,λ2,t,captures for secular time trends common across all varieties.Theλ3,cht term is a variety-time deviation from theﬁxed eﬀect that is observed by the consumer but not the econometrician.This last term is potentially correlated with the variety’s c.i.f.unit value,p cht.The horizontal component of the model is captured by the random component, Hh=1µnht d ch+(1−σ) ncht.The logit error ncht is assumed to be distributed Type-I extreme value and explains why a variety that is expensive and has low quality is ever purchased.The former term interacts the common valuation that consumer n places on all varieties within product h,µnht,with a dummy variable d ch that takes a value of1if country c’s export lies in product h.This term generates the nest structure because if allows consumer n’s preferences to be more correlated for varieties within product h than for varieties across products.16 An“outside”variety completes the demand system.The purpose of the outside variety is to allow16As discussed in Berry(1994),Cardell(1997)has shown that the distribution of Hh=1µnht d ch is the unique distributionsuch that if is distributed extreme value,then the sum is also distributed type-I extreme value.The degree of within nest correlation is controlled byσ∈(0,1].Asσapproaches one,the correlation in consumer tastes for varieties within a nest approaches one and asσtends to zero,the nested logit converges to the standard logit model.。

不可不看的世界著名电影推荐

不可不看的世界著名电影推荐1. 2001 Kubrick, Stanley 1968(《漫游太空2001，库布利克》)2. Accattone Pasolini, Pier Paolo 1961(《乞丐》，帕索里尼)3. Babette's Feast Axel, Gabriel 1987（《芭贝特的盛宴》）4. Battleship Potemkin, The Eisenstein, Sergei 1925（《战舰波将金号》，爱森斯坦）5. Bicycle Thieves, The De Sica, Vittorio 1949（《偷自行车的人》，德-西卡）6. Blade Runner: The Director's Cut Scott, Ridley 1991（《银翼杀手》，雷德利-斯科特）7. Blue Velvet Lynch, David 1986（《蓝丝绒》，大卫-林奇）8. Chronicle of a Summer Rouch, Jean 1960（《夏日纪事》，让-鲁什）9. Clockwork Orange Kubrick, Stanley 1971（《发条橙子》，库布利克）10. Cook, The Thief, His Wife and Her Lover, the Greenaway, Peter 1989 （《情欲色香味》，格林纳威）11. Crash Cronenberg, David 1996（《撞车》，柯南博格）12. Demon Seed Cammell, Donald 1977（《魔种》）13. Desk Set Lang, Walter 195714. Draughtsman's Contract, The Greenaway, Peter 1982（《画师的合约》，格林纳威）15. Dreamlife of Angels, The Zonca, Erick 1998（《两极天使》，宗卡）16. Early Works Richter, Hans 192717. Eraserhead Lynch, David 1977（《橡皮头》，大卫-林奇）18. Fifth Element, The Besson, Luc 1997（《第五元素》，吕克-贝松）19. Film before Film Nekes, Werner 198620. Gattaca Niccol, Andrew 1997（《变种异煞/千钧一发》安德鲁-尼科尔）21. Big Day, The Tati, Jacques 1947（《节日》，雅克-塔蒂）22. Jules et Jim Truffaut, Francois 1962（《朱尔与吉姆》，特吕弗）23. Beauty and the Beast Cocteau, Jean 1946（《美女与野兽》，让-考科多）24. Hate Kassoritz, Mathieu 1995（《仇恨/怒火青春》，卡索维茨）25. Pier, The Marker, Chris 1962（《堤》，克里斯-马克尔）26. New Enchantment, The l'Herbier, Marcel 192427. La Magic Melies Meny, Jacques 199728. Films of Man Ray, The Man Ray 199829. 400 Blows, The Truffaut, Francois 1957（《四百击》，特吕弗）30. Level Five Marker, Chris 199731. Man Bites Dog Belvaux, Remy 1992（《人咬狗》）32. Man Ray Fargier, Jean Paul 199833. Man with a Movie Camera Vertov, Dziga 1929（《持摄影机的人》，维尔托夫）34. Metropolis Lang, Fritz 1929（《大都会》，佛列兹-朗）35. Mr Hulot's Holiday Tati, Jacques 1952（《于洛先生的假期》，雅克-塔蒂）36. My Uncle Tati, Jacques 1958（《我的舅舅》，雅克-塔蒂）37. Naked Leigh, Mike 1993（《赤裸》，迈克-雷）38. Nosferatu Murnau, F.W. 1922（《吸血鬼》，茂瑙）39. Cabinet of Dr Caligari, The Wiene, Robert 1919（《卡里加利博士的小屋》，维内）40. Notorious Hitchcock, Alfred 1946（《美人计》，希区柯克）41. Nuts in May Leigh, Mike 1976（《五月的坚果》，迈克-雷）42. October Eisenstein, Sergei 1927（《十月》，爱森斯坦）43. Paris, Texas Wenders, Wim 1984（《德州，巴黎》，文德斯）44. Pillow Book, The Greenaway, Peter 1995（《枕边书》，格林纳威）45. Playtime Tati, Jacques 1967（《游戏时间》，雅克-塔蒂）46. Solaris Tarkovsky, Andrey 1972（《索拉里斯/飞向太空》，塔尔柯夫斯基）47. Stalker T arkovsky, Andrey 1979（《潜行者》，塔尔柯夫斯基）48. Tampopo Itami, Juzo 1986（《蒲公英》，伊丹十三）49. Tati Shorts Tati, Jacques 1930-67（雅克-塔蒂的短片）50. Things to Come Menzies, William Cameron 1936（《科幻双故事》）51. Tokyo Story Ozu, Yasuijiro 1953（《东京物语》，小津安二郎）52. Man and a Woman, A Lelouch, Claude 1966（《一个男人与一个女人》克劳德?勒鲁什）53. Wings of Desire Wenders, Wim 1987（《柏林苍穹下》，文德斯）54. Birth of a Nation, The Griffith, D.W. 1915（《一个国家的诞生》，格里菲斯）55. Theorem Pasolini, Pier Paolo 1968（《定理》，帕索里尼）56. Week-End Godard, Jean-Luc 1967（《周末》，戈达尔）57. Brothers Quay, The Brothers Quay 1980s58. Andalusian Dog, An Bunuel, Luis/Dali, Salvador 1928（《一条叫安德鲁的狗》，达利，布努埃尔）59. Rome, Open City Rossellini, Roberto 1945（《罗马，不设防的城市》，罗西里尼）60. Intruder, The Corman, Roger 1961（《入侵者》，罗杰科尔曼）61. Visions of Light Glassman, Arnold 1992（《光影的美丽》，阿诺德格拉斯曼）62. Svankmajer : vol 1 Svankmajer, Jan 1960s63. Svankmajer : vol 2 Svankmajer, Jan 1960s64. Contempt Godard, Jean-Luc 1963（《轻蔑》，戈达尔）65. One plus One Godard, Jean-Luc 1968（《一加一》，戈达尔）66. Night in Casablanca, A Mayo, Archie 1946（《卡萨布兰卡之夜》，阿尔其?梅奥）67. Rashomon Kurosawa, Akiro 1950（《罗生门》，黑泽明）68. Yojimbo Kurosawa, Akiro 1961（《用心棒》，黑泽明）69. Early Cinema : vol 1 BFI70. Early Cinema : vol 2 BFI71. Red Desert Antonioni, Michaelangelo 1964（《红色沙漠》，安东尼奥尼）72. Annie Hall Allen, Woody 1977（《安妮?荷尔》，伍迪?艾伦）73. Brazil Gilliam, Terry 1985（《巴西》，特里?吉列姆）74. After Hours Scorsese, Martin 1985（《下班之后》，斯科西斯）75. Wizard of Oz, The Fleming, Victor 1939（《绿野仙踪》，弗莱明）76. Promise, The Von Trotter, Margarethe 1995（《许诺》，玛格丽特?冯?特洛塔）77. Hudsucker Proxy, The Coen, Joel 1994（《金钱帝国》，科恩兄弟）78. Matter of Life and Death, A Powell, Michael 1946（《平步青云》，迈克尔?鲍威尔）79. Thelma and Louise Scott, Ridley 1991（《末路狂花》，雷德利?斯科特）80. Antonia's Line Gorris, Marleen 1995（《不靠男人的女人》，玛琳?格里斯）81. Man Who Fell to Earth, The Roeg, Nic 197382. Wings of the Dove Softley, Iain 1997（《三颗翼动的心》，伊恩?索夫特雷）83. Portrait of a Lady Campion, Jane 1996（《淑女本色》，简?康萍）84. Sense and Sensibility Lee, Ang 1995（《理智与情感》，李安）85. Fanny and Alexander Bergman, Ingmar 1982（《芬尼与亚历山大》，伯格曼）86. Don't Look Now Roeg, Nic 197387. Blow Up Antonioni, Michaelangelo 1966（《放大》，安东尼奥尼）88. Mrs Dalloway Gorris, Marleen 1997（《达洛威夫人》）89. Orlando Potter, Sally 1992（《奥兰多》，萨利?波特）90. Colour of Pomegranates, The/Legend of the Suram Fortress, The Paradjanov, Sergo 1969（《石榴的颜色/苏拉姆城堡的传说》，帕拉杰诺夫）91. Sunset Boulevard Wilder, Billy 1950（《日落大道》，比利?怀尔德）92. Citizen Kane Welles, Orson 1941（《公民凯恩》，威尔斯）93. Blood of a Poet, The Cocteau, Jean 1930（《诗人之血》，让?考科多）94. Crimes and Misdemeanors Allen, Woody 1989（《罪与罚》，伍迪?艾伦）95. His Girl Friday Hawks, Howard 1940（《女友礼拜五》霍华德?霍克斯）96. Batman Burton, Tim 1989（《蝙蝠侠》，提姆?波顿）97. Strange Days Bigelow, Kathryn 1995（《世纪末暴潮》，凯瑟琳?碧罗格）98. Age of Innocence, The Scorsese, Martin 1993（《纯真的年代》，斯科西斯）99. French Lieutenant's Woman, The Reisz, Karel 1981（《法国中尉的女人》，卡尔?雷兹）100. Little Dorrit : Part 1 Edzard, Christine 1988（《小杜瑞特》）101. Little Dorrit : Part 2 Edzard, Christine 1988 102. Clueless Heckerling, Amy 1995（《独领风骚》，艾米·海克林）103. Third Man, The Reed, Carol 1949（《第三个人》，卡洛尔·里德）104. Fellini's Roma Fellini, Frederico 1972（《罗马》，费里尼）105. It's A Wonderful Life Capra, Frank 1946（《美好人生》，卡普拉）106. Edward Scissorhands Burton, Tim 1993（《剪刀手爱德华》，提姆·波顿）107. Dracula - 1992 Coppola, Francis Ford 1992（《吸血惊情四百年》，科波拉）108. Elephant Man, The Lynch, David 1980（《象人》，大卫·里恩）109. Jane Eyre Stevenson, Robert 1943（《简爱》，罗伯特·斯蒂文森）110. Performance Roeg, Nic and Cammell, Donald 1970 111. Flash, The Iscove, Robert 1990（《闪电侠》，罗伯特·伊斯科夫）112. Apartment, The Wilder, Billy 1960（《公寓》，比利·怀尔德）113. My Girlfriend's Boyfriend Rohmer. Eric 1987（《我女朋友的男朋友》，侯麦）114. Silences of the Palaces, The Tlatli, Moufida 1996（《沉默的宫殿》）115. Oliver! Reed, Carol 1968（《奥利弗》，卡洛尔·里德）116. Rope Hitchcock, Alfred 1948（《绳索》，希区柯克）117. Apocalypse Now Coppola, Francis Ford 1979（《现代启示录》，科波拉）118. I've Heard The Mermaids Singing Rozema, Patricia 1996（《我听到美人鱼在唱歌》）119. Intimate Lighting Passer, Ivan 1965（《逝水年华》，伊万·帕瑟）120. Close Encounters of the Third Kind Speilberg, Steven 1977（《第三类接触》，斯皮尔博格）121. Haunting, The Wise, Robert 1963（《猛鬼屋》，罗伯特·怀斯）122. Short Cuts Altman, Robert 1993（《短片集》，罗伯特·阿尔特曼）123. Yellow Submarine Dunning, George 1968（《黄色潜水艇》，乔治·唐宁）124. 8 1/2 Fellini, Federico 1968（《八又二分之一》，费里尼）125. Mirror Tarkovsky, Andrei 1974（《镜子》，塔尔柯夫斯基）126. Dick Tracy Beatty, Warren 1990（《至尊神探》，沃伦·比蒂）127. Lola Demy, Jacques 1960（《劳拉》，雅克·德米）128. Fathers of Pop Arts Council ?129. Conan the Barbarian Milius, John 1981（《霸王神剑》）130. Piano, The Campion, Jane 1993（《钢琴课》，简·康萍）131. Blade Runner: The Director's Cut Scott, Ridley 1991（《银翼杀手导演版》，雷德利·斯科特）132. Red Shoes, The Powell, Michael 1948（《红菱艳》，迈克尔·鲍威尔）133. Gormanghast: Episode 1 Wilson, Andy 2000 134. M Lang, Fritz 1931（《M》佛列兹·朗）135. Gormanghast: Episode 2 Wilson, Andy 2000 136. Enigma of Kasper Hauser, The Herzog, Werner 1974（《加斯·荷伯之迷》，赫尔佐格）137. Dark City Proyas, Alex 1998（《黑暗之城》）138. Gormanghast: Episode 3 Wilson, Andy 2000 139. Fistful of Dollars, A Leone, Sergio 1964（《为了几块钱/荒原大镖客》，莱昂内）140. For a Few Dollars More Leone, Sergio 1965（《为了更多几块钱/黄昏双镖客》，莱昂内）141. Good, The Bad and The Ugly, The Leone, Sergio 1966（《好的坏的和丑的/黄金三镖客》，莱昂内）142. L'Atalante Vigo, Jean 1934（《亚特兰大号》，让·维果）143. Conformist, The Bertolucci, Bernardo 1970（《同流》，贝尔托鲁奇）144. Rear Window Hitchcock, Alfred 1954（《后窗》，希区柯克）145. Kino-Eye Vertov, Dziga 1924（《电影眼》，维尔托夫）146. A Nous La Liberte Clair, Rene 1931（《自由属于我们》，雷内·克莱尔）147. Alphaville Godard, Jean-Luc 1965（《阿尔法城》，戈达尔）148. Touch of Evil Welles, Orson 1958（《历劫佳人/邪恶的接触》，奥逊·威尔斯）149. Fat City Huston, John 1971（《富城》，约翰·休斯顿）150. Under the Roofs of Paris Clair, Rene 1930（《巴黎屋檐下》，雷内·克莱尔）。

公共管理经典书目

公共管理经典书目（一）基础理论经典原著1、威尔逊：《行政学之研究》，《国外政治学》1987年第6期、1988年第1期。

2、古德诺：《政治与行政》，华夏出版社1987年版。

3、泰罗：《科学管理原理》，中国社会科学出版社1990年版。

4、法约尔：《工业管理与一般管理》，中国社会科学出版社1998年版。

5、马克斯·韦伯：《经济与社会》，商务印书馆1997年版。

6、怀特：《行政学概论》，上海商务印书馆1947年版。

7、西蒙：《管理行为》，北京经济学院出版社1988年版。

8、西蒙：《管理决策新科学》，中国社会科学出版社1982年版。

9、沃尔多：《行政国家：美国公共行政的政治理论研究》，纽约：罗纳德出版社1948年版。

10、林德布洛姆：《决策过程》，上海译文出版社1988年版。

11、德罗尔：《逆境中的政策制定》，上海远东出版社1996年版。

12、雷格斯：《行政生态学》，台湾商务印书馆1985年版。

13、弗雷德里克森：《新公共行政学》，美国亚拉巴马大学出版社1980版。

14、奥斯特罗姆：《美国公共行政的思想危机》上海三联书店1999年版。

15、尼斯坎南：《官僚制与公共经济学》，中国青年出版社2004年版。

16、詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊：《官僚机构：政府机构的作为及其原因》，三联书店2006年版。

17、奥斯特罗姆：《公共服务的制度建构》上海三联书店2000年版。

18、布坎南、塔洛克：《同意的计算：立宪民主的逻辑基础》，中国社会科学出版社2000年版。

19、缪勒：《公共选择理论》，中国社会科学出版社1999年版。

20、罗森布鲁姆：《公共行政学：管理、政治和法律的途径》，中国人民大学出版社2002年版。

21、R·J·斯蒂尔曼：《公共行政学：概念与案例》，中国人民大学出版社2004年版。

22、罗伯特•登哈特：《公共组织理论》，中国人民大学出版社2003年版。

23、沙夫里茨、海德：《公共行政学经典》，中国人民大学出版社2004年英文版。

吉姆克劳法英文讲义

吉姆克劳法英文讲义The Jim Crow Laws: A Comprehensive ExaminationThe Jim Crow laws were a series of state and local statutes that legalized racial segregation in the United States, particularly in the Southern states, following the end of Reconstruction in 1877 and the subsequent passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which abolished slavery and granted civil and political rights to African Americans. These laws mandated separate but ostensibly equal public facilities for black and white Americans, such as schools, transportation, restrooms, and restaurants.The origin of the term "Jim Crow" is unclear, but it is believed to have derived from a popular 19th-century minstrel song and dance routine that caricatured African Americans. The laws enforcing racial segregation were enacted at the state and local levels, and they remained in place for nearly a century, from the late 1870s to the 1960s, when the civil rights movement and the passage of federal legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to their eventual dismantling.The Jim Crow system was characterized by the creation of a racialcaste system that relegated African Americans to a subordinate status, denying them the full rights and privileges of citizenship. This system was reinforced through a variety of means, including the disenfranchisement of black voters, the enforcement of discriminatory hiring practices, and the perpetuation of social and economic inequalities.One of the most significant aspects of the Jim Crow laws was their impact on education. Segregated schools were the norm throughout the South, with black students being provided with far fewer resources and poorer facilities compared to their white counterparts. This educational inequality had long-lasting consequences, as it limited the opportunities available to African Americans and perpetuated the cycle of poverty and disadvantage.Transportation was another area heavily affected by the Jim Crow laws. Buses, trains, and other public transportation were required to have separate seating or even separate cars for black and white passengers. This practice was often enforced through violence and intimidation, with African Americans facing the threat of physical harm if they attempted to challenge the segregation policies.The impact of the Jim Crow laws extended beyond the realm of public facilities and services. They also permeated the social and cultural fabric of the South, shaping the daily lives and experiencesof African Americans. The laws reinforced a system of racial hierarchy and discrimination that was deeply ingrained in the region's social and political institutions.The resistance to the Jim Crow system was a central aspect of the civil rights movement that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. Activists such as Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jr., and many others challenged the legality and morality of segregation through a variety of tactics, including boycotts, sit-ins, and nonviolent protests. Their efforts, combined with the growing national attention to the issue of racial injustice, ultimately led to the dismantling of the Jim Crow system and the passage of landmark civil rights legislation.The legacy of the Jim Crow laws continues to shape our understanding of the history of racial discrimination in the United States. These laws not only institutionalized a system of segregation and inequality, but they also had far-reaching consequences that continue to be felt today. The struggle for racial justice and equality remains an ongoing challenge, and the lessons of the Jim Crow era serve as a powerful reminder of the importance of vigilance and collective action in the fight against systemic oppression.。

loving and hating new york 课文和翻译

Loving and Hating New YorkThomas Griffith1 Those ad campaigns celebrating the Big Apple, those T-shirts with a heart design proclaiming “I love New York,” are signs, pathetic in their desperation, of how the mighty has fallen. New York City used to leave the bragging to others, for bragging was “bush” Being unique, the biggest and the best, New York didn’t have to assert how special it was.2 It isn’t the top anymore, at least if the top is measured by who begets the styles and sets the trends. Nowadays New York is out of phase with American taste as often as it is out of step with American politics. Once it was the nation’s undisputed fashion authority, but it too long resisted the incoming casual style and lost its monopoly. No longer so looked up to or copied, New York even prides itself on being a holdout from prevailing American trends, a place to escape Common Denominator Land.3 Its deficiencies as a pacesetter are more and more evident. A dozen other cities have buildings more inspired architecturally than any built in New York City in the past twenty years. The giant Manhattan television studios where Toscanini’s NBC Symphony once played now sit empty most of the time, while sitcoms cloned and canned in Hollywood, and the Johnny Carson show live, preempt the airways from California. Tin Pan Alley has moved to Nashville and Hollywood. Vegas casinos routinely pay heavy sums to singers and entertainers whom no nightspot in Manhattan can afford to hire. In sports, the bigger superdomes, the more exciting teams, the most enthusiastic fans, are often found elsewhere.4 New York was never a good convention city – being regarded as unfriendly, unsafe, overcrowded, and expensive – but it is making something of a comeback as a tourist attraction. Even so, most Americans would probably rate New Orleans, San Francisco, Washington, or Disneyland higher. A dozen other cities, including my hometown of Seattle, are widely considered better cities to live in.5 Why, then, do many Europeans call New York their favorite city? They take more readily than do most Americans to its cosmopolitan complexities, its surviving, aloof, European standards, its alien mixtures. Perhaps some of these Europeans are reassured by the sight, on the twin fashion avenues of Madison and Fifth, of all those familiar international names – the jewelers, shoe stores, and designer shops that exist to flatter and bilk the frivolous rich. But no; what most excites Europeans is the city’s charged , nervous atmosphere, its vulgar dynamism .6 New York is about energy, contention, and striving. And since it contains its share of articulate losers, it is also about mockery, the put-down , the loser’s shrug (“whaddya gonna do?”). It is about constant battles for subway seats, for a cabdriver’s or a clerk’s or a waiter’s attention, for a foothold , a chance, a better address, a larger billing. To win in New York is to be uneasy; to lose is to live in jostling proximity to the frustrated majority.7 New York was never Mecca to me. And though I have lived there more than half my life, you won’t find me wearing an “I Love New York” T-shirt. But all in all, I can’, t think of many places in the world I’d rather li, ve. It’, s not easy to define why.8 Nature’s pleasures are much qualified in N, ew York, . You nev er see a star-filled sky; the city’s bright glow arrogantly obscures the heavens. Sunsets can be spectacular: oranges and reds tinting the sky over the Jersey meadows and gaudily reflected in a thousand windows on Manhattan’s jagged skyline. Nature constantly yields to man in New York: witness those fragile sidewalk trees gamely struggling against encroaching cement and petrol fumes. Central Park, which Frederick Law Olmsted designed as lungs for the city’s poor, is in places grassless and filled with trash, no longer pristine yet lively with the noise and vivacity of people, largely youths, blacks, and Puerto Ricans, enjoying themselves. On park benches sit older people, mostly white, looking displaced. It has become less a tranquil park than an untidy carnival.9 Not the glamour of the city, which never beckoned to me from a distance, but its opportunity –to practice the kind of journalism I wanted –drew me to New York. I wasn’t even sure how I’d measure up against others who had been more soundly educated at Ivy League schools, or whether I could compete against that tough local breed, those intellectual sons of immigrants, so highly motivated and single-minded, such as Alfred Kazin, who for diversion (for heaven’t sake!) played Bach’s Unaccompanied Parti tas on the violin.10 A testing of oneself, a fear of giving in to the most banal and marketable of one’s talents, still draws many of the young to New York. That and, as always, the company of others fleeing something constricting where they came from. Together these young share a freedom, a community of inexpensive amusements, a casual living, and some rough times. It can’t be the living conditions that appeal, for only fond memory will forgive the inconvenience, risk, and squalor. Commercial Broadway may be inaccessible to them, but there is off- Broadway, and then off-off-Broadway. If painters disdain Madison Avenue’s plush art galleries, Madison Avenue dealers set up shop in the grubby precincts of Soho. But the purity of a bohemian dedication can be exaggerated. The artistic young inhabit the same Greenwich Village and its fringes in which the experimentalists in the arts lived during the Depression, united by a world against them. But the present generation is enough of a subculture to be a source of profitable boutiques and coffeehouses. And it is not all that estranged.11 Manhattan is an island cut off in most respects from mainland America, but in two areas it remains dominant. It is the banking and the communications headquarters for America. In both these roles it ratifies more than it creates. Wall Street will advance the millions to make a Hollywood movie only if convinced that a bestselling title or a star name will ensure its success. The networks’ news centers are here, and the largest book pu blishers, and the biggest magazines –and therefore the largest body of critics to appraise the films, the plays, the music, the books that others have created. New York is a judging town, and often invokes standards that the rest of the country deplores o r ignores. A market for knowingness exists in New York that doesn’t exist for knowledge.12 The ad agencies are all here too, testing the markets and devising the catchy jingles that will move millions from McDonald’s to Burger king, so that the ad agency’s “creative director” can lunch instead in Manhattan’s expense-account French restaurants. The bankers and the admen. The marketing specialists and a thousand well-paid ancillary service people, really set the city’s brittle tone— catering to a wide American public whose numbers must be respected but whose tastes do not have to shared. The condescending view from the fiftieth floor of the city’s crowds below cuts these people off from humanity. So does an attitude which sees the public only in terms of large, malleable numbers— as impersonally as does the clattering subway turnstile beneath the office towers.13 I am surprised by the lack of cynicism, particularly among the younger ones, of those who work in such fields. The television generation grew up in the insistent presence of hype, delightsin much of it, and has no scruples about practicing it. Men and woman do their jobs professionally, and, like the pilots who from great heights bombed Hanoi, seem unmarked by it. They lead their real lives elsewhere, in the Village bars they are indistinguishable in dress or behavior from would-be artists, actors, and writers. The boundaries of “art for art’s sake” aren’t so rigid anymore; art itself is less sharply defined, and those whose paintings don’t sell do il lustrations; those who can’ get acting jobs do commercials; those who are writing ambitious novels sustain themselves on the magazines. Besides, serious art often feeds in the popular these days, changing it with fond irony.14 In time the newcomers find or from their won worlds; Manhatten is many such words, huddled together but rarely interaction. I think this is what gives the city its sense of freedom. There are enough like you, whatever you are. And it isn’t as necessary to know anything about an apart ment neighbor- or to worry about his judgment of you- as it is about someone with an adjoining yard. In New York, like seeks like, and by economy of effort excludes the rest as stranger. This distancing, this uncaring in ordinary encounters, has another side: in no other American city can the lonely be as lonely.15 So much more needs to be said. New Your is a wounded city, declining in its amenities . Overloaded by its tax burdens. But it is not dying city; the streets are safer than they were five years age; Broadway, which seemed to be succumbing to the tawdriness of its environment, is astir again.16 The trash-strewn streets, the unruly schools, the uneasy feeling or menace, the noise, the brusqueness- all confirm outsiders in their conviction that they wouldn’t live here if you gave them the place. Yet show a New Yorker a splendid home in Dallas, or a swimming pool and cabana in Beverly Hills, and he will be admiring but not envious. So much of well-to-do America now lives antiseptically in enclaves, tranquil and luxurious, that shut out the world. Too static, the New Yorker would say. Tell him about the vigor of your outdoor pleasures; he prefers the unhealthy hassle and the vitality of urban life. He is hopelessly provincial. To him New York- despite i ts faults, which her will impatiently concede (“so what else is new?”) — is the spoiler of all other American cities.17 It is possible in twenty other American cities to visit first-rate art museums, to hear good music and see lively experimental theater, to meet intelligent and sophisticated people who know how to live, dine, and talk well; and to enjoy all this in congenial and spacious surroundings. The New Yorkers still wouldn’t want to live there.18 What he would find missing is what many outsiders find oppressive and distasteful about New York – its rawness, tension, urgency; its bracing competitiveness; the rigor of its judgments; and the congested, democratic presence of so many other New Yorkers, encased in their own worlds, the defeated are not hidden away somewhere else on the wrong side of town. In the subways, in the buses, in the streets, it is impossible to avoid people whose lives are harder than yours. With the desperate, the ill, the fatigued, the overwhelmed, one learns not to strike up conversation (which isn’t wanted ) but to make brief, sympathetic eye contact, to include them in the human race. It isn’t much, but it is the fleeting hospitality of New Yorkers, each jealous of his privacy in the crowd. Ever helpfulness is often delivered as a taunt: a man, rushing the traffic light, shouts the man behind him. “ You want to be wearing a Buick with Jersey plates?” — great scorn in the word Jersey, home of drivers who don’t belong here.19 By Adolf Hitler’s definition, New York is mongrel ci ty. It is in fact the first truly international metropolis. No other great city- not London, Paris, Rome or Tokyo- plays host (or hostage) to so many nationalities. The mix is much wider- Asians, Africans, Latins - that when that tumultuous variety of European crowded ashore at Ellis Island. The newcomers are never fully absorbed, but are added precariously to the undigested many.20 New York is too big to be dominated by any group, by Wasps or Jews or blacks, or by Catholics of many origins — Irish, Italian, Hispanic. All have their little sovereignties, all are sizable enough to be reckoned with and tough in asserting their claims, but none is powerful enough to subdue the others. Characteristically, the city swallows up the United Nations and refuses to take it seriously, regarding it as an unworkable mixture of the idealistic, the impractical, and the hypocritical. But New Yorkers themselves are in training in how to live together in a diversity of races- the necessary initiation into the future.21 The diversity gives endless color to the city, so that walking in it is constant education in sights and smells. There is wonderful variety of places to eat or shop, and though the most successful of such places are likely to touristy hybrid compromises, they too have genuine roots. Other American cities have ethnic turfs jealously defended, but not, I think, such an admixture of groups, thrown together in such jarring juxtapositions . In the same way, avenues of high-rise luxury in New York are never far from poverty and mean streets. The sadness and fortitude of New York must be celebrated, along with its treasures of art and music. The combination is unstable; it produces friction, or an uneasy forbearance that sometimes becomes a real toleration.22 Loving and hating New York becomes a matter of alternating moods, often in the same day. The place constantly exasperates , at times exhilarates . To me it is the city of unavoidable experience. Living there, one has the reassurance of steadily confronting life.第十四课亦爱亦恨话纽约托马斯格里非斯那些赞美"大苹果"的广告活动，还有那些印着带有"我爱纽约"字样的心形图案的T恤衫，只不过是它们在绝望中发出悲哀的迹象，只不过是纽约这个非凡的城市日趋衰落的象征。

如何衡量流动性

因为股权分散有利于提高流动性，但不利于经营权的集中；Maug（1998）的理论模型表明，高流动性的市场可增强股东监督公司的动力，因为高流动性的市场可让大股东有效地掩饰其通过监督权所获得的信息优势，从而进行内幕交易获取利润。正是在这些意义上，Amihud 和 Mendelson 指出： “流动性是市场的一切。 ” （Amihud and Mendelson, 1988, p.369）从更广泛的意义上看，市场流动性的增加不仅保证了金融市场的正常运转，也促进了资源有效配置和经济增长。（参阅 Levine, 1991；Bencivenga, et al., 1996）证券市场的一个主要功能就是在交易成本尽可能低的情况下，使投资者能够迅速、有效地执行交易。也就是说，市场必须提供足够的流动性。在证券市场上，交易商、限价订单的提供者以及其他一些投机者为市场提供了流动性，经纪商和交易所组织流动性，而无耐心的投资者获得／需要流动性。流动性有多种定义。O'hara（1995）认为，流动性就是“立即完成交易的价格” （the price of immediacy）。Amihud 和 Mendelson（1989）认为，流动性即在一定时间内完成交易所需的成本，或寻找一个理想的价格所需用的时间。Massimb 和 Phelps（1994, p.41）把流动性概括为“为进入市场的订单提供立即执行交易的一种市场能力（通常称为“即时性” ）和执行小额市价订单时不会导致市场价格较大幅度变化的能力（通常称为“市场深度”或“弹性” ）。Glen （1994）把流动性界定为迅速交易且不造成大幅价格变化的能力。Schwartz（1988）认为流动性是以合理价格迅速成交的能力。Lippman 和 McCall（1986）则指出，若某资产能以可预期