农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

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金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

金融银行信用风险论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献Managing Credit Risks with Knowledge Management forFinancial BanksAbstract-Nowadays,financial banks are operating in a knowledge society and there are more and more credit risks breaking out in banks.So,this paper first discusses the implications of knowledge and knowledge management, and then analyzes credit risks of financial banks with knowledge management. Finally, the paper studies ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management. With the application of knowledge management in financial banks, customers will acquire better service and banks will acquire more rewards.Index Terms–knowledge management; credit risk; risk management; incentive mechanism; financial banksI.INTRODUCTIONNowadays,banks are operating i n a“knowledge society”.So, what is knowledge? Davenport(1996)[1]thinks knowledge is professional intellect, such as know-what, know-how, know-why, and self-motivated creativity, or experience, concepts, values, beliefs and ways of working that can be shared and communicated. The awareness of the importance of knowledge results in the critical issue of “knowledge management”. So, what is knowledge management? According to Malhothra(2001)[2], knowledge management(KM)caters to the critical issues of organizational adaptation, survival and competence in face of increasingly discontinuous environmental change. Essentially it embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic combination of data and information processing capacity of information technologies and the creative and innovative capacity of human beings. Through the processes of creating,sustaining, applying, sharing and renewing knowledge, we can enhance organizational performance and create value.Many dissertations have studied knowledge managementapplications in some special fields. Aybübe Aurum(2004)[3] analyzes knowledge management in software engineering and D.J.Harvey＆R.Holdsworth(2005)[4]study knowledge management in the aerospace industry. Li Yang(2007)[5] studies knowledge management in information-based education and Jayasundara＆Chaminda Chiran(2008)[6] review the prevailing literature on knowledge management in banking industries. Liang ping and Wu Kebao(2010)[7]study the incentive mechanism of knowledge management inBanking.There are also many papers about risks analysis and risks management. Before the 1980s, the dominant mathematical theory of risks analysis was to describe a pair of random vectors.But,the simplification assumptions and methods used by classical competing risks analysis caused controversy and criticism.Starting around the 1980s, an alternative formulation of risk analysis was developed,with the hope to better resolve the issues of failure dependency and distribution identifiability. The new formulation is univariate risk analysis.According to Crowder(2001)[8], David＆Moeschberger(1978)[9]and Hougaard(2000)[10],univariate survival risk analysis has been dominantly, which is based on the i.i.d assumptions(independent and identically distributed) or, at least, based on the independent failure assumption.Distribution-free regression modeling allows one to investigate the influences of multiple covariates on the failure, and it relaxes the assumption of identical failure distribution and to some extent, it also relaxes the single failure risk restriction. However, the independent failures as well as single failure events are still assumed in the univariate survival analysis. Of course,these deficiencies do not invalidate univariate analysis, and indeed, in many applications, those assumptions are realistically valid.Based on the above mentioned studies, Ma and Krings(2008a, 2008b)[11]discuss the relationship and difference of univariate and multivariate analysis in calculating risks.As for the papers on managing the risks in banks, Lawrence J.White(2008)[12]studies the risks of financial innovations and takes out some countermeasures to regulate financial innovations. Shao Baiquan(2010)[13]studies the ways to manage the risks in banks.From the above papers, we can see that few scholars have studied the way to manage credit risks with knowledge management. So this paper will discuss using knowledgemanagement to manage credit risks for financial banks.This paper is organized as follows: SectionⅠis introduction. SectionⅡanalyzes credit risks in banks with knowledge management. SectionⅢstudies ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management. SectionⅣconcludes.II.ANALYZING CREDIT RISKS IN BANKS WITHKNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENTA.Implication of Credit RiskCredit ris k is the risk of loss due to a debtor’s non-payment of a loan or other line of credit, which may be the principal or interest or both.Because there are many types of loans and counterparties-from individuals to sovereign governments-and many different types of obligations-from auto loans to derivatives transactions-credit risk may take many forms.Credit risk is common in our daily life and we can not cover it completely,for example,the American subprime lending crisis is caused by credit risk,which is that the poor lenders do not pay principal and interest back to the banks and the banks do not pay the investors who buy the securities based on the loans.From the example,we can find that there are still credit risks,though banks have developed many financial innovations to manage risks.B.Sharing KnowledgeKnowledge in banks includes tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge,which is scattered in different fields.For example, the information about the customers’income, asset and credit is controlled by different departments and different staffs and the information can’t be communicated with others. So it is necessary for banks to set up a whole system to communicate and share the information and knowledge to manage the risks.C.Setting up Incentive Mechanism and Encouraging Knowledge InnovationThe warning mechanism of credit risks depends on how bank’s staffs use the knowledge of customers and how the staffs use the knowledge creatively.The abilities of staffs to innovate depend on the incentive mechanism in banks,so, banks should take out incentive mechanism to urge staffs to learn more knowledge and work creatively to manage credit risks.We can show the incentive mechanism as Fig.1:Fig.1 The model of incentive mechanism with knowledge management From Fig.1,we can see there are both stimulative and punitive measures in the incentive model of knowledge management for financial banks.With the incentive mechanism of knowledge management in financial banks,the staffs will work harder to manage risks and to acquire both material returns and spiritual encouragement.III.MANAGING CREDIT RISKS IN BANKS WITH KNOWLEDGEMANAGEMENTThere are four blocks in managing credit risks with knowledge management.We can show them in Fig.2:Fig.2 The blocks of managing credit risksA.Distinguishing Credit RiskDistinguishing credit risks is the basis of risk management.If we can’t recognize the risks,we are unable to find appropriate solutions to manage risks.For example,the United States subprime crisis in 2007 was partly caused by that the financial institutions and regulators didn’t recognize the mortgage securitization risks timely.With knowledge management,we can make out some rules to distinguish credit risks,which are establishing one personal credit rating system for customers and setting up the data warehouse.We can use the system to analyze customers’credit index, customers’credit history and the possible changes which may incur risks.At the same time,we should also watch on the changes of customers’property and income to recognize potential risks.B.Assessing and Calculating Credit RiskAfter distinguishing the credit risks,we should assess the risk exposure,risk factors and potential losses and risks, and we should make out the clear links.The knowledgeable staffs in banking should use statistical methods and historical data to develop specific credit risks evaluation model and the regulators should establish credit assessment system and then set up one national credit assessment system.With the system and the model of risk assessment,the managers can evaluate the existing and emerging risk factors,such as they prepare credit ratings for internal use.Other firms,including Standard ＆Poor’s,Moody’s and Fitch,are in the business of developing credit rating for use by investors or other third parties.Table Ⅰshows the credit ratings of Standard ＆Poor’s.TABLE ISTANDARD ＆POOR’S CREDITT RATINGSAfter assessing credit risks,we can use Standardized Approach and Internal Rating-Based Approach to calculate the risks.And in this article,we will analyze how Internal Rating-Based Approach calculates credit risk of an uncovered loan.To calculate credit risk of an uncovered loan,firstly,we will acquire the borrower’s Probability of Default(PD),Loss Given Default(LGD),Exposure at Default(EAD)and Remaining Maturity(M).Secondly,we calculate the simple risk(SR)of the uncovered loan,using the formula as following:SR=Min{BSR(PD)*[1+b(PD)*(M-3)]*LGD／50,LGD*12.5} (1)Where BSR is the basic risk weight and b(PD)is the adjusting factor for remaining maturity(M).Finally,we can calculate the weighted risk(WR)of the uncovered loan,using the following formula:WR=SR*EAD (2)From(1)and(2),we can acquire the simple and weighted credit risk of an uncovered loan,and then we can take some measures to hedge the credit risk.C.Reducing Credit RiskAfter assessing and calculating credit risks,banks should make out countermeasures to reduce the risks.These measures include：(1)Completing security system of loans. The banks should require customers to use the collateral and guarantees as the security for the repayment,and at the same time,banks should foster collateral market.(2)Combining loanswith insurance.Banks may require customers to buy a specific insurance or insurance portfolio.If the borrower doesn’t repay the loans,banks can get the compensation from the insurance company.(3)Loans Securitization. Banks can change the loans into security portfolio,according to the different interest rate and term of the loans,and then banks can sell the security portfolio to the special organizations or trust companies.D.Managing Credit Risk and Feeding backA customer may have housing loans,car loans and other loans,so the banks can acquire the customer’s credit information,credit history,credit status and economic background from assessing the risks of the customer based on the data the banks get.By assessing and calculating the risks of the customer,banks can expect the future behavior of the customers and provides different service for different customers. Banks can provide more value-added service to the customers who have high credit rates and restrict some business to the customers who have low credit rates.At the same time, banks should refuse to provide service to the customers who are blacklisted. Banks should set up the pre-warning and management mechanism and change the traditional ways,which just rely on remedial after the risks broke out.In order to set up the warning and feeding back mechanism,banks should score credit of the customers comprehensively and then test the effectiveness and suitability of the measures,which banks use to mitigate risks.Finally, banks should update the data of the customers timely and keep the credit risk management system operating smoothly.IV.CONCLUSIONIn this paper,we first discuss the implications of knowledge and knowledge management.Then we analyze the credit risks of financial banks with knowledge management. Finally,we put forward ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management.We think banks should set up data warehouse o f customers’credit to assess and calculate the credit risks,and at the same time,banks should train knowledgeable staffs to construct a whole system to reduce risks and feed back.With knowledge management,banks can take out systemic measures to manage cust omers’credit risks and gain sustainable profits.ACKNOWLEDGMENTIt is financed by the humanities and social sciences project of the Ministry of Educationof China(NO.06JC790032).REFERENCES[1]Davenport,T.H.et al,“Improving knowledge work processes,”Sl oan Management Review,MIT,USA,1996,V ol.38,pp.53-65.[2]Malhothra,“Knowledge management for the new world of business,”New York BRINT Institute,2001,lkm/whatis.htm.[3]Aybübe Aurum,“Knowledge management in software engineering education,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies,2004,pp.370-374.[4]D.J.Harvey＆R.Holdsworth,“Knowledge management in the aerospace industry,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Professional Communication Conference,2005,pp.237-243.[5]Li Yang,“Thinking about knowledge management applications in information-based education,”IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies,2007,pp.27-33.[6]Jayasundara＆Chaminda Chiran,“Knowledge management in banking industries:uses and opportunities,”Journal of the University Librarians Association of Sri Lanka,2008,V ol.12,pp.68-84.[7]Liang Ping,Wu Kebao,“Knowledge management in banking,”The Conference on Engineering and Business Management,2010, pp.4719-4722.[8]Crowder,M.J.Classical Competing Risks,British:Chapman&Hall, 2001,pp.200.[9]David,H.A.&M.L.Moeschberger,The Theory of Competing Risks, Scotland,Macmillan Publishing,1978,pp.103.金融银行信用风险管理与知识管理摘要：目前，金融银行经营在一个知识型社会中，而且越来越多的信用风险在在银行中爆发。

小额贷款外文翻译文献

文献信息文献标题：An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities （小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究）文献作者：Jonathan Kimmitt， Mariarosa Scarlata，Dimo Dimov文献出处：《Venture Capital》 ,2016,18(3):257–276字数统计：英文3661单词，21609字符；中文6504汉字外文文献An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities Abstract Understanding under which conditions microcredit is used by new, growing ventures is becoming increasingly pertinent to scholars. This paper investigates the interplay of the use of microcredit with entrepreneurial capabilities and the moderating role of institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings show that higher constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities are associated with higher use of microcredit. In addition, we find that new, growing ventures use microcredit more where either economic or political institutions are less developed. Our findings suggest the importance of the existence of some type of institutional strength that must be in place to form the basis for microcredit activity. This allows for speculation as to whether microcredit works as the literature currently assumes.KEYWORDS: Capabilities; entrepreneurial finance; institutions; microfinance1.IntroductionEntrepreneurial activity is strongly influenced by the context it is embedded in (Baumol 1990, 1993; Autio and Acs 2010; Welter 2011). Particularly in emerging markets, entrepreneurs face a number of challenges, such as the mixed success ofinnovation (Bradley et al. 2012), weak institutions (Acemoglu 2003), and low human capital levels (Acs and Virgill 2010). One particular challenge for these entrepreneurs is access to finance (Honohan 2007) which can lead them into “poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996), ultimately undermining their ability to freely choose among options (Gries and Naudé 2011) and pursue the goals they value (Alkire 2005). A financial sector that is well developed, on the contrary, would give them the instrumental capability to more adequately participate in economic exchange (Sen 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007).To respond to funding challenges that particularly characterize developing economies, the provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs has been regarded as an important part of the strategy through which livelihoods could be improved (Mair and Marti 2006; Peredo and Mclean 2006; Khavul 2010). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) pursue profit-making strategies that facilitate and support the ongoing activity of capital provision to entrepreneurs while also trying to extend their services and drive outreach (Morduch 1999; Fernando 2006). By providing microcredit, savings, insurance, and retirement plans, individuals are able to obtain capital which can be used to finance the creation and the survival of new ventures (Campbell 2010; Khavul 2010). As such, microcredit allows entrepreneurs to build assets and economic resources, while creating employment opportunities and services for local communities (Helms 2006). This can ultimately have an effect on individuals’ capabilities and the contexts entrepreneurs operate in (Mair and Marti 2009).Current debates in the microcredit and microfinance literature have focused on the dynamics through which microcredit is deployed, particularly to women, as well as its effectiveness (cfr. among others Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Milanov, Justo, and Bradley 2015; Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch 2015), how microfinance institutions function (cfr. among others, Morduch 1999; Armendariz and Morduch 2007) as well as their level of sustainability (cfr. among others, Gonzalez-Vega 1994; Morduch 2000), and their ability to shape the context they operate in (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013). Research has also indicated that institutional quality determines theperformance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and Chávez 2015) and that institutions influence how entrepreneurial finance is channeled to entrepreneurs in developing economies (Eid 2005). However, Beck (2007) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) indicate that small and medium-sized businesses, often called “missing middle,” offer high returns on investments in these contexts. Yet, they remain underserved financially and overlooked by researchers. We also know that empirical access to finance is a critical issue for firms in developing economies and microcredit is a particular type of high-risk debt which may not always be sought after (Hulme 2000; George 2005).In addition, if context shapes entrepreneurship and sets the boundaries for entrepreneurial action (Welter 2011), it is not clear (a) whether ventures using microcredit are those whose capabilities are constrained the most by the environment they operate in and (b) under which institutional conditions these ventures actually use microfinance to fund their business needs. The question about when and where entrepreneurs decide to pursue or forgo the option of using microfinance loans still remains unanswered (Khavul 2010). In this paper, we ask the following question: How do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? To answer these questions, our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit by firms in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized as a context with a high level of constrained capabilities. Often viewed as institutionally homogenous (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), we highlight the institutional heterogeneity of this context and the varying capabilities associated with it. We test predictions using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, the Economic Freedom of the World Report index (2011), as well as the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). Our findings indicate that microcredit is indeed used in areas where individuals’ entrepreneurial capabilities are more constrained. At the same time, in these contexts, microcredit tends to be mostly used where there is either a well-developed market or a well-functioning political–judicial system which guarantee a minimal“rule of game”. It is only under those institutional conditions that firms, constrained by their capabilities, are prone to/can use microcredit to financetheir business activities.2.Theoretical backgroundSen’s (1999, 2005) “capabilities approach” introduced the notion that development should be conceptualized as freedoms, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their ability to act. Because individuals have ideas about the type of lives they want to live, they act in accordance with such aims (Sen 1999). Following the capabilities approach, antecedents and consequences of individual circumstances can be highlighted using non-monetary indicators: Capability constraints need to be understood with respect to the individual’s freedom, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their abilities to do or to be (Alkire 2005). In the capabilities approach, a person’s freedom refers to the genuine opportunity to realize whatever it is that they are trying to achieve (Alkire 2005). This, in turn, determines“what they do” (Anand et al. 2009). Building on Sen’s (1999) argument, Nambiar (2013) further reports that capabilities are synonymous with individuals feeling constrained or enabled by their immediate circumstances, whereas Robeyns (2005), Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) indicate that it is an individual’s environment which creates heterogeneities in capabilities. Severely restricted capabilities are therefore associated with an inability to act in accordance with ones’ aims.Prior work shows that context is particularly important in shaping entrepreneurial capabilities: By setting boundaries, it can be the space for the emergence of opportunities while also placing limitations upon them (Welter 2011; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013). Context influences enterprising activities at the intersection of different levels of analysis, situating theories, and empirical patterns within their natural settings (Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014). Evans (2002) and Sen (1999), among others, indicate that the institutional context indeed influences capability development. Both Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) explain that expanding individual freedoms are central to advancing capabilities; this expansion is guided by institutional frameworks. The proposition here is thatinstitutional development impacts freedoms, such as those related to economic opportunities, property, finance, and other basic services (Stiglitz 1998; Nussbaum 2000), and this impacts capability development. On the one hand, as Robeyns (2005) reports, the capabilities of entrepreneurs require appreciating that there are heterogeneities in their abilities to achieve their aims. On the other hand, institutional failure can increase transaction costs which limit the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, reducing the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities and leading to suppression of entrepreneurial activity (Baker, Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin 2005).The development of financial institutions, which provide adequate financial services, is categorized by Sen (1999) as an instrumental capability. Contexts where financial institutions are underdeveloped contribute to the creation of“poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996) as it reduces the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities. This, in turn, hinders the ability of individuals to adequately participate in economic exchange and overall capabilities (Sen 1999). Microcredit developed in contexts characterized by limited access to resources (Peredo and Chrisman 2006) as a solution for individuals who are constrained by the environment, which inhibits the pursuit of lucrative opportunities (Sen 2005). As such, microcredit acts as a means toward the expansion of entrepreneurs’ capabilities (Ansari, Munir, and Gregg 2012) who can incrementally improve their capabilities of achieving small-scale solutions to macro social problems (Moyo 2009). This leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:Hypothesis 1. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where capabilities are constrained.Hypothesis 2. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where economic institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 3. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where political-judicial institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 4. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit in environments characterized by high constrained capabilities where economic institutions are more(less) developed and political-judicial institutions less (more) developed.3.MethodologyTo test our hypotheses, we used data by the World Bank through its annual Enterprise Survey. We focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa since this has been consistently depicted as one of the areas with seriously restricted capabilities. In particular, the World Bank (2012) reports an increase in sub-Saharan urban population by 114% between 1990 and 2009, and an increase in people living with less than $1 a day by 183%; also, the average life expectancy at birth results to be 52.5 years, compared with 71.5 years for North Africa and 69.2 years for the world. Still, the prevalence of HIV for people aged 15–49 is nearly 7 times the world’s average (World Bank 2012).Twenty-seven sub-Saharan countries were included in the survey. The enterprise surveys collect firm level information on the business environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and the various constraints to firm performance and growth (World Bank 2011). Firm-level data are available from 2002; however, since data prior to 2006 were collected by different units within the World Bank and employed different survey questions for different countries, our analysis focuses on data collected from 2006. In addition, the enterprise survey is addressed to operating businesses that employ a minimum of five employees; this eliminates most of the subsistence-driven and self-employment forms of entrepreneurship, something that Karnani (2007) has defined as “misguiding” in that the focus on subsistence entrepreneurship does not help us in understanding and/or explaining economic development. Similarly, Mead and Liedholm (1998) have shown that within an African context, small and medium-sized enterprises generate significantly more jobs than larger scale enterprises yet remain chronically underfunded. By concentrating on ventures with five or more employees, we are able to focus on the“missing middle” of the microfinance sector which have the greatest potential for driving economic growth and is consistently under-researched (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002). To date, this is a group of entrepreneurs who havereceived sparse attention within the microfinance literature, which has heavily focused on microfinance institutions themselves rather than on recipients of their services (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Moss, Neubam, and Meyskens 2015; Silva and Chávez 2015).For what concerns our conceptualization of entrepreneurship as new ventures, consistent with prior research in both developed and developing countries, we limited our analysis to those firms that were not part of larger firms and were less than 10 years old (Benson 2001; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Reuber and Fischer 2002; Barnir, Gallaugher, and Auger 2003; Park and Bae 2004; Bhagavatula et al. 2010). Based on these parameters, our sample size for analysis was 5255 of the 16847 firms in the original Enterprise Survey data set.4.Discussion, limitations, and future researchScholars have consistently linked entrepreneurial activity with economic growth. However, in developing countries, individuals often lack the capabilities to access the market and obtain capital to fund new business opportunities. Acknowledging these challenges, microcredit developed to provide small amount of loans to allow such individuals to efficiently engage in economic exchange and build their ventures, thus making wider economic contributions (Mcmullen 2011). However, entrepreneurship researchers have argued that contextual factors, both at the individual and institutional level, augment entrepreneurial activity (Baumol 1990; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013).This paper highlights the contextual conditions under which new, growing ventures use microcredit. These ventures are classified as the“missing middle” and have been overlooked by mainstream academic research and practitioners’ work, where a focus has been on individuals receiving microcredit for subsistence purposes and/or to develop micro-enterprises (Beck 2007). Yet, we know that microcredit developed as a solution to offer individuals the necessary financial instruments that would enable building entrepreneurial capabilities by developing new businesses. As such, this “missing middle” represents smaller firms within developing economiesthat have limited financial options even though they may offer returns on investments in these contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) and potentially provide much more significant economic externalities in terms of job and wealth creation (Karnani 2007). Although the term “missing middle” has been used for some time, there is very little research on this group of firms even though they are becoming a more prominent part of the microfinance picture and have a more significant economic impact than their micro counterparts (Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013).Because sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized by high constraints to individual capabilities and little attention has been paid to heterogeneity of capabilities across the continent (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit in“missing middle” ventures in such countries. Specifically, we examine the degree to which microcredit is utilized by new ventures as a function of the country’s institutional environment, measured as the development of economic and political institutions, and of the degree of constraints to a firm’s capabilities, measured by the fruitfulness of the commercial environment. We then argue that microcredit is more likely to be used by those ventures that have higher restrictions to their capabilities only when there is some institutional arrangement, either at an economic or political–judicial level that sets “the rules of the game.”Our empirical results suggest that microcredit is indeed used by these new, missing middle ventures in contexts that present challenges both at the firm and institutional level of analysis. The identification of a positive effect between the use of microcredit and the constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities reinforces Sen’s (1999) view and the notion that microcredit facilitates access to capital for those entrepreneurs that operate in regions with the most restricted capabilities. However, our results also show this happens only when there are appropriate supporting institutional mechanisms, further suggesting that contextual features of the institutional environment shape microfinance activity. Particularly, the use of microcredit by the“missing middle” increases in contexts characterized by restricted capabilities and either (a) well (less) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions or (b) less (well) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions. Theunderdevelopment of economic institutions can prevent entrepreneurs from forming contracts, ultimately increasing business uncertainty and compounding their ability to create wealth (Seelos and Mair 2007). This is theoretically consistent with the Mair and Marti (2009) argument who assert that MFIs act as institutional entrepreneurs in contexts of institutional weakness left open by underdeveloped economic institutions. Similarly, contexts where political–judicial institutions are characterized by high levels of corruption raise the fundamental threat of rent and asset expropriation, generating uncertainty in the business environment. This uncertainty undermines entrepreneurial aspirations of individuals and has a stronger effect on new ventures than on established ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In such contexts, institutions in charge of transferring resources to one party to another, and designed to serve on behalf of the government or the people (including, thus, the government itself ), may not be answerable to their principals.However, our results also do show that we should consider the interaction between development of economic and political institutions to fully understand the use of microcredit by new, growing firms and that heterogeneity of capabilities drives such relationship. Particularly, microcredit may help shape institutional contexts characterized by heterogeneous capabilities, but foundational institutional support is needed in order to tackle such capability problems. Whereas prior work (Mair and Marti 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013) has indicated that microcredit is used in contexts where only economic institutions are to be developed, our work shows that there must be some formal institutional political framework in place for entrepreneurs to use microcredit in such contexts. Without it, the developmental role of microcredit may be overstated.At the same time, we also show that microcredit is used in contexts where there is development of economic institutions. Yet, we identify that the use of microcredit is to be found in contexts with stronger economic institutions and weak political ones. It is precisely this interaction between developed economic institutions and underdevelopment of political ones that the literature has not addressed this far. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the distinction between extractive and inclusiveinstitutions, arguing that extractive contexts (e.g., autocratic rule/weak governance) can have strong economic institutions. However, because these are less open politically, they may deter potentially novel businesses that spur economic growth. If microcredit is utilized by capability-constrained firms in potentially extractive contexts, this suggests that the entrepreneurial activity being stimulated, even within the “missing middle”, may be less productive for economic development (Baumol 1990). Our work, therefore, highlights the institutional conditions within which microcredit is used to fund the development of new entrepreneurial opportunities: if less favorable political contexts may lead entrepreneurs to capture opportunities which are less conducive to the overall development of the economy, the impact of microcredit in these nations may be somehow minimalistic. Conversely, in more politically inclusive economies, microcredit may help spur the creation of more competitive and innovative markets which can help diversify markets beyond the basic services (e.g., food goods, provisions) often provided (Banerjee 2007). As such, the relationship between the nature of the institutional environment and the type of business opportunity pursued in the microfinance industry would be an interesting avenue for further study. Indeed, further study needs to dig deeper into the role of informal institutions in this process.Overall, this encourages us to consider whether the relationship between microcredit, entrepreneurship, and capabilities works as the literature currently assumes – microcredit is used by entrepreneurs in the most resource constrained environments where only economic institutions are to be shaped. As such, our findings suggest a more complex picture than extant research currently suggests and contribute to a better understanding of the use of microcredit at the level of the firm receiving it (Silva and Chávez 2015), with a need to consider institutional heterogeneities both within and across developing countries (Roth and Kostova 2003) and the interaction between a complex constellation of factors of institutions and capabilities (Nambiar 2013). It is therefore of key importance for future work to understand the dynamics through which microcredit is developed in contexts characterized by political institutional weakness. From a political perspective, mostresearch has focused on the role of regulation in the microfinance sector (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2011) without considering the other aspects of political institutions we have theorized, and empirically identified, here. This would help scholars and practitioners alike in gaining a better understanding how microcredit works in varying political environments.From a policy perspective, our findings which suggest that new ventures need some level of institutional support to be able to pursue and fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, something that has strong implications given the recent political upheaval in North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In post-conflict contexts, often characterized by the lowest level of capability development, and where political institutions (or economic ones) are still in the process of being redefined and shaped, the intervention of MFIs may be of key importance in stimulating entrepreneurial activity and the economy in some of the most challenging contexts. Emerging evidence suggests that many nations in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond are developing the appropriate institutions through which financial institutions can stimulate the private sector (Naudé 2010). Microcredit could be an appropriate tool for augmenting entrepreneurial activity in those environments where individuals lack the basic individual and institutional infrastructure to fulfill their aspirations. As such, the ability of entrepreneurs to have access to improved instrumental capabilities is likely to be shaped by how varying institutional arrangements support them, determining where investors see scalable operations and therefore the diversity of financial services at the disposal of entrepreneurs.Aside from the contribution and further reflection that our results stimulate, there are limitations to our study that need to be considered in any further extrapolation from our results. First, the study was cross sectional in nature and, as such, cannot make a reliable inference on the direction of the interplay between the effectiveness of the provision of microcredit on capabilities or on the institutional development over time. The nature of our data enabled us to study only the use of microcredit as a function of capability constraints, but a promising and much needed extension of the work concerns the reverse relationship, i.e., how the use of microcredit helps inimproving entrepreneurial capabilities. Second, while large-scale data are difficult to collect on this topic, the availability of the enterprise survey has enabled us to throw a glimpse at the use of microcredit across a large group of African countries. At the same time, as is true for any secondary data set, the data offer limited insight into the conditions and rationale under which microcredit was (or was not) obtained. We hope that our insights can stimulate further research that would seek to elucidate this mechanism through more suitable research designs.中文译文小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究摘要学者们越来越多关注，在哪种条件下，小额信贷才会被新的、成长中的企业所使用。

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)RURAL FINANCE: MAINSTREAMING INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSBy Hans Dieter SeibelAbstractInformal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associations, are of ancient origin. Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgradetheir operations and be integrated into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have spontaneously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to banks; strengthening Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environment, promoting appropriate legal forms, prudential regulation and delegated supervision. Key words: Microfinance, microcredit, microsavings。

金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。

拉丁美洲农村金融机构信贷风险管理【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Managing Credit Risk in Rural Financial Institutions in Latin American Material Source：Rural Financial Learning Centre（RFLC）Authors：Mark Wenner, Sergio Navajas, Carolina Trivelli, Alvaro TarazonaAdequately managing credit risk in financial institutions is critical for their survival and growth. In the case of rural lending in general and agricultural lending in particular, the issue of credit risk is of even of greater concern because of the higher levels of perceived risks resulting from some of the characteristics of rural dwellers and the conditions that they find themselves in. More extremely poor people tend to live in rural than in urban areas. In addition, fewer people are able to access basic infrastructure services and these tend to be of lesser quality or to be less reliable than in urban areas. Rural residents tend to be less educated, more often than not they have insecure land tenure, and they live farther apart than urban populations .Most importantly, agriculture, the mainstay of most rural economies, tends to be subject to price volatility, weather shocks, and trade restrictions. As a result, financial institutions that are active in rural areas are likely to face an elevated level of credit risk and need to manage it well. The lack of good risk mitigation techniques and high transaction costs can discourage formal financial institutions from entering and serving rural areas.Conclusions and RecommendationsCredit risk management in Latin American rural financial institutions is improving and evolving, but much still needs to be done. Many of the institutions surveyed demonstrated success as measured by high overall rates of profitability, low delinquency rates in both general and agricultural portfolios, and sustained growth rates in agricultural portfolios over time. Nonetheless, the paucity of institutions active in rural areas and expressed desires for better risk management systems, the relatively small loan sizes, and restricted terms indicate that the situation is less than optimal.There are four ways to deal with credit risk—reduce it, cope with it, transfer it, or retain it. Based on survey results and the four case studies, the followingtechniques were identified as the most important and widely used:1.Expert-based, information-intensive credit technologies (whereinrepayment incentives for clients and performance incentives for staff play important roles and information acts as a virtual substitute for real guarantees) are being used to reduce risk.2. A number of diversification strategies (geographic, sectoral,commodity) are being used to cope with risk.3.Portfolio exposure limits (wherein agricultural credit is less than 40percent of total lending) are being used to reduce risk.4.Excessive provisioning is being used to absorb and internalize risks.Few, however, are transferring the credit risk to third parties and this represents the next challenge. Massive credit expansion in developed countries has been due in large part to the introduction and wide diffusion of risk transfer techniques (insurance, securitization, derivatives ,etc.) and the wider acceptance of different types of collateral (inventories, accounts receivables ,warehouse receipts, etc.). In Latin America, the most common risk transfer instruments available are publicly-financed loan guarantee funds; however, they are used only modestly (25 percent).Historically, guarantee funds have been plagued with problems of high costs, limited additional-ity, and moral hazard (A distinction should be made between individual loan guarantee funds to which this statement applies and intermediary guarantees to which it does not). Recent work has shown that the most successful guarantee funds in Latin America (in terms of additional-ity) are those in Chile, and that much of the positive impact is due to adequate regulation (Llisterri et al., 2006). In order to introduce some of the other risk transfer instruments more commonly found in developed financial markets, investments will be needed to reform and strengthen the insurance industry, capital markets, credit bureaus, commercial codes, secured transaction frameworks, and information disclosure rules. The implications of using the aforementioned credit risk management techniques commonly found in Latin America are manifold.First, the credit evaluation technologies commonly used are very expensive and tend to increase operating costs and interest rates charged because they are time and labor intensive. Steps need to be taken to dramatically reduce the cost of gathering and analyzing data; of securing, perfecting, and executing guarantees; of classifying and modeling risks; and of monitoring clients. With cost reductions, innovations in delivery mechanisms, and greater competition, interest rate spreads should declineover time, making financial systems more inclusive.Second, some minimal economies of scale and scope are necessary. The larger rural finance institutions in the sample showed that they could more easily diversify risks, offer a wider range of products, obtain better efficiency ratios, and charge lower lending interest rates. Agricultural lending probably cannot be the primary type of lending unless more robust risk transfer techniques become more commonplace. If more sophisticated risk transfer instruments can be introduced, smaller and more agriculturally or i-ented institutions can be more readily helped and supported. Otherwise, the challenge for donors/governments and owners of financial institutions is how to rapidly grow and diversify financial institutions that started out small with a rural vocation and how to attract to rural are as larger institutions that hitherto were primarily urban. The majority of rural financial institutions tend to be very small, exhibit many institutional needs (access to more low-cost source of funds, inadequate credit technology, better internal controls) and are possibly overexposed to agriculture .The larger financial institutions that social planners would like to see more active in rural areas are not interested because they perceive high risks and can exploit other more profitable market segments such as consumer lending to salaried workers.Third, the agricultural microfinance credit technology reviewed here is essentially an adaptation of urban microcredit technology, but it has limits. The better-performing institutions seem to adhere to a common set of principles, but there are slight differences from institution to institution as they adapt the principles to suit local conditions. For example, the general rule is to give preference to highly diversified households, but if price and yield risk can be controlled, institutions will lend to highly specialized farm households. The noteworthy differences of the rural adaptation of the urban micro-credit technology are the use of specialized staff with a knowledge of agronomy, fewer repayments, larger loan sizes, charging of relatively lower interest rates compared to micro-enterprise rates to avoid adverse selection, and projection of a strong corporate responsibility image. All of the four case study institutions, for example, finance works of charity and have a visible presence in the communities where they operate .The emerging model of agricultural microfinance, however, will have to evolve and possibly coexist with other credit technologies more suited for small business and fixed investment lending. The leading institutions are constantly tweaking and improving their technologies. However, the tweaking is being done by trial and error and not in asystematic way. To fully understand what works and does not work, cost accounting (activity-based accounting), randomize devaluations, and frequent client satisfaction surveys would have to be institutionalized .These changes can be costly and would require anew mindset and way of doing business.Based on the survey and case study findings, we have formulated six recommendations for donors, governments, and managers of financial institutions interested in designing interventions to improve how rural financial institutions manage credit risk.First, donors and governments should identify and support rural institutions with a minimum scale that would permit easy diversification of credit risk and help them to expand and innovate as the preferred or first best option. The second best option would be assist those with a clear strategic commitment to the rural sector and competent management to do the following: (i)upgrade credit technologies; (ii) help them develop diversification strategies within their reach(i.e. introduce new credit products, finance a wider number of sectors, finance only highly diversified households); and (iii) use agricultural portfolio limits by agency and total portfolio as an early warning system to take corrective actions .As the third best option, and in the absence of minimal scale institutions, donors and governments should strive to assist smaller institutions to merge or associate. An effective association of smaller institutions can derive benefits from collective action such as fundraising, common training, purchase and installation of modern information management systems, and lobbying for regulatory changes. A movement to merge smaller institutions would permit the emerging entity to have scale and scope. A fourth option would be to promote value chain financing wherein credit risk is managed and transferred among various actors in a supply chain. A fifth possible option, that donors and governments may pursue, would be link ages between regulated financial institutions (such as commercial banks) with NGOs active in rural areas. NGOs, for example, could serve as delegates of banks in remote areas.Second, donors, governments, and managers/owners of rural financial institutions need to collaborate in the introduction and improvement of a variety of risk transfer instruments. The risk transfer instruments in rank order of easiest to most difficult to introduce are (i) recognition and valuing of inventories and accounts receivables as forms of assets that can be pledged as colla t-eralor sold to third parties for cash; (ii) guarantee funds; (iii) credit insurance (death, disability, portfolio); (iv) parametric crop insurance; (v) portfolio securitization; and (vi)derivatives and swaps. Each of the above has preconditions and country-by-country assessments would have to be made. In general, recognition of inventories and accounts receivables require reforms in banking supervision and regulatory frameworks ,commercial codes, and taxes affecting financial transactions. To improve guarantee fund operations, political interference needs to be minimized or eliminated and adequate regulation introduced. To introduce credit insurance, credit bureaus have to be strengthened, and massive databases and probabilistic risk models built. To introduce crop insurance, large investments in information, training, and modeling are needed .To introduce portfolio securitization, long data series on loan type performance, standard underwriting procedures, a sufficient number of homogenous loans for bundling, and rating companies are needed. For derivatives and swaps, well-developed legal/regulatory frameworks and capital markets need to be developed.Third, donors and governments should promote and support regulated nonbank financial institutions .Nonbanks are forced to be more disciplined (adhere to loan documentation, risk classification, and provisioning rules) and have better chances of diversifying liabilities (access to government lines of credit, issuing bonds, capture savings (where permitted) besides obtaining commercial loans), but allowances have to be made for flexibility and innovation.Fourth, the role of the state is fundamental in helping to develop rural financial markets, but direct political interference at the retail level can retard progress. The preferred role would be for state-owned second-tier institutions to extend lines of credit and to train staff of rural finance institutions. Many of the institutions expressed a need for more liquidity and access to low-cost funds. It was also clear that term finance is very scarce. Most institutions do not offer term finance with the stated reason being fear of mismatches .Second-tier institutions and international donors can assist in extending terms through a combination of lines of credit and promotion of savings mobilization.Fifth, donors and governments should focus on improving the legal and regulatory framework, especially with regards to improving contract enforcement, an expressed concern of many surveyed.Sixth, donors and governments can assist in the capture and dissemination of relevant information that would serve to reduce asymmetries that contribute to market failures. High quality and functioning databases would help to facilitate better agricultural marketing, better risk measurement, better risk modeling, and thedesign of credit, savings, and insurance.译文拉丁美洲农村金融机构信贷风险管理资料来源:农村金融学习中心（RFLC）作者：马克·温纳,塞尔吉奥·纳瓦加斯,卡罗莱纳·泰维利,阿拉瓦罗·塔拉泽那金融机构恰当的信贷风险管理对于其生存和发展是非常关键的。

农企融资问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处：Edelman S. The Research on the Finance Service of Small and Medium-sized Agricultural Corporate [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2016，15(9): 12-22.原文The Research on the Finance Service of Small and Medium-sized AgriculturalCorporateEdelman SAbstractWhen agricultural financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises, on the one hand, because of a shortage of enterprise to the pledged collateral, credit information asymmetry, weak ability to resist risks, life-size characteristics, on the other hand is due to the imperfection of the financial system, inadequate financial innovation. Financing difficulties became a limit and the bottleneck of restricting agricultural development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Although the government is constantly to support policy, Banks are also continuously improve products and services, but the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult problem is always difficult to crack. At present, the study of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises financing difficult problem is mainly concentrated in the development of the financial support system, accelerate the construction of credit guarantee system, set up financial institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises, etc., considering the current development situation of financial markets, through these ways to solve the problem of financing problems of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises also need to be realized a long period of time. So at present, the commercial bank developing agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing business through innovation, in view of the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing needs improvement, financial product innovation and financing mode of correction, to alleviate the practice of agricultural financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises are more feasible.Keywords: Finance Service; Agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises;Agribusiness finance1 IntroductionAgricultural small and medium-sized enterprise credit level is low, the lack of mortgage assets, financing cost higher specificity, agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises often because of lack of money and become helpless. On the other hand because of the investment system is not sound, lack of complete legal protection system and policy support system, agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises through equity financing; At the same time, the bank for reasons of risk and profit, agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise is difficult to get bank credit funds to support. So the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises get financial resources and its reality demand unbecoming. The serious restriction and slow the pace of the farmers to get rich, influence the development of the industrialization of agriculture, agriculture has always been the core of the enterprise in the aspect of improving their finances often use "extend payment days", and "to give discount" to the dealer to pay in advance. Given the way with the interests of the whole industry chain on the best strategic arrangement in conflict, many core enterprises are actively seeking new financing options.2 The present situation of agribusiness financingSmall and medium-sized agricultural enterprise's vitality and growth although there for all to see, but it still does not decrease the market-oriented financing difficulty. In agricultural enterprises, on the one hand, most small and medium-sized enterprise is located in the township, mainly agricultural products processing enterprises, these enterprises "small, scattered, low and weak" fundamental change, development present situation is not survival situation is not optimistic. Some Banks, on the other hand, the agricultural enterprise credit support far lower than its contribution to the national economy, insufficient funds for many enterprises to develop the most adverse problems. Credit demand of the enterprise cannot be satisfied, greatly restrain its development.In three major industries, as the first industry of agriculture from the financial institutions of the total amount of credit funds are still in a passive subordinate status.From the three major industries of external financial support, on agriculture disadvantage of small and medium-sized enterprises as the main body of the agricultural industry didn't fundamentally change.According to the corporate finance theory suggests that enterprises should want to get better development, need to constantly broaden the financing policy, implementation of multi-level, three-dimensional financing. With the deepening of financial reform, the development of capital market to the deep time, diversified financing channels has been established, broke the indirect financing mode in the past. Still in terms of the present stage, the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing scale is still small, capital source with given priority to with their own money, development rely on the profit mode of survival. Mainly labor-intensive small and medium enterprises of agriculture, the profit level is generally low, still profit model of a single, only rely on their own capital and profits retained as the main source of funds of enterprises, are unable to meet the enterprise long-term expanded reproduction and the needs of the development of investment.3 The reason of the agribusiness financing predicamentFarmers' property rights is not clear, less collateral, resist risk ability is poor, which means that the agribusiness naturally not the darling of the capital. Some growth companies need financial support, and investment funds and struggling to find suitable investment. There are many reasons for this, now in addition to some small companies, a large number of agricultural enterprises are in a small size or scale of decentralized management mode. Hence lead to investment fund, want to find out of the project is really difficult, it is found that, after the agricultural enterprise to achieve its investment condition, and even fewer. Now many enterprises in their management is not very formal, and add their own size is too small, also cause they are difficult to value investment funds, this should be a problem in many aspects. For this problem, the most main or agricultural enterprise own reason, of course, there are some policy implications.In addition to their own reasons, there are some other factors also influence financing of agribusiness. First of all, in the agricultural materials enterprise financingways, main approaches on the one hand, rely on bank loans, on the one hand is the capital of the industry, for the moment, more should come from industry external capital is the industry's external investors. But because the people often said that the agricultural enterprises need more money, get less money, account problem of agricultural enterprises. First, because agricultural enterprises of low profit margins. Professional development economic organization, but not let the enterprise into a large scale, because now the main body of agriculture or to give priority to with farmers, the reason for restricting large-scale agricultural enterprises to, is out of fear of a lot of land-losing farmers appeared this situation into account. Agricultural enterprises want to develop only tried to pay attention to production, but who is the trend of the development of the agricultural enterprises in the aspect of raw material supply more secure who is all the more development of the initiative, so don't let the large-scale agricultural enterprises to enter, for agricultural enterprises of raw material guarantee is a problem. This should be a threshold limit.Second, now of the various tax policies for small and medium-sized enterprises is higher, the industry many enterprises can't bear, there are some industries and don't let external capital and foreign capital to enter, but from the perspective of market development, in fact is not the problem of how to regulate, but the question of funds, is due to all kinds of threshold for agribusiness is too much, outside money even if want to get into but suitable project and really hard to find, so radically restrict the development of agricultural enterprises. According to understand, agricultural enterprises are not affected by the favor of capital, and relationship with the enterprise, head of the personal credit is very large. Now the agricultural enterprises in the majority of small and medium-sized enterprises, enterprise as legal person is the good and bad are intermingled, credit level is not consistent. Some personal credit degree is low, enterprise as a legal person is defaulted, lay debt, debt phenomenon such as rejection, causing Banks to agribusiness can't trust too much, even if the loan, the credentials must be very heavy and complicated. Lose patience, make agricultural enterprises financing and financing difficult problem is further amplified.Also some people pointed out that the bank would also restricted the financingneeds of agribusiness. As Banks commercialization, the shareholding system reform and market-oriented operation, the pursuit of self-interest maximization as a bank management goal, policy credit funds. Banks more is to pursue investment is large, the returns of large projects, and to "high risk, less number, batch number, recycling" of agricultural projects focus on less, don't want to. Bank itself is not perfect, credit products less, the flexibility and diversity of credit products, some even less than the original credit products, such as farmers microcredit, a credit product shrinkage phenomenon, can't meet the demand of enterprises, especially small agricultural enterprises credit.4 How to decipher the financing difficult of agribusiness enterprisesAt present, agricultural development has been actively towards the transition from traditional simple, extensive agriculture integration of modern industry and modern service industry, the industry chain, agriculture is also in the application of brand strategy, improve the added value of agricultural products, the formation of scale, intensive and industrialized production of the road. And at the same time, the agricultural enterprises only timely change, positive change, to development, the capital support can be achieved.Agribusiness itself now mostly insufficient standard, there are many obstacles in communication with financing institutions. In agricultural enterprise financing is the most realistic difficulty is that many at the time of loan and come up with a decent business plan and the problem of business books, if you have such a file, the bank will save a lot of trouble, will be very reluctant to invest, but now many of the entrepreneurs have is just a preliminary idea, only I want to build a project, the project the idea of what the future holds. Without a detailed description and analysis of market detailed business plan. This should be the cause of loans to a very real problem, it should be said that the two sides on the communication problems.In addition, companies themselves are not financially specification, many enterprises are zhang under two books, a lot of financial is not clear, the financing to hire an accountant, when I was working again, and many books themselves are not clear, make accountant and myself are confused about. So it will be harder to makeothers believe that, financing is a lot of work needs to be done. Because Banks need to first understand the industry is a potential, then we will understand enterprise, thus formed the difference, if the enterprise has a good financial business plans and specifications, it can also go to find money, so could be better for the financing effect. Now, of course, is not looking for investment, but they are now because there is no good business plan, so it is difficult to find. So I think that is really their own many of the problems need to be solved. They must standardize the oneself, make oneself communication barrier-free and financing mechanism, can solve the problem of financing difficulties finally. Agricultural enterprises loan interest rates should be reduced. Because enterprise's pressure is bigger, the preference for high-end products is relatively small, mostly in low - and to carry on the fight. So they should be differentiated. In fact, agricultural enterprises financing difficulties this dilemma has been quietly changed.译文中小型农业企业融资研究Edelman S摘要农业中小企业融资难，一方面时候由于企业抵质押担保不足、信用信息不对称、抗风险能力弱等身特点决定的，另一方面是由于金融体系不够完善，金融创新力不足造成的。

美国农村金融管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

美国农村金融管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Rural Finance: The American ExperienceConstruction of the rural financial system the U.S. The basic principle is to provide financial support for agricultural development. After years of development, rural America as a whole formed a multi-level, full range of financial institutions, through government subsidies, the development of rural financial system, increase agricultural production, agricultural loans and various channels such as social, agricultural financing funds to meet the agricultural the development of a variety of financial needs, to provide the financial security of agricultural modernization. Building a new socialist countryside, we must adhere to the development of the rural economy as the center, and developing the rural economy can not do without the support of rural finance.Rural econenomic development of rural finance as the most important elements of the capital allocation system,and its role more and more obvious,rural financial Xingxing is agriculture,rural finance activities,the agricultural activities.Agricultural development from the experience of other countries, both developed and developing countries have attached great importance to rural financial institution building. In some countries the rural financial development better, establish a general policy, including financial, co-finance and rural insurance, including comprehensive, multi-level financial system, establish a fund to support rural development cycle of long-term mechanism, more better support the rural and agricultural development, safeguarding the interests of the majority of farmers. We are on the rural financial system in these countries a comparative analysis of proposed rural financial system and improve the path selection.The rural financial system construction rationaleRural financial theory to the formation and development, has received the modern financial development theories and policies of influence. From developing countries of rural financial theory perspective, the three major genres: agricultural financing theory, rural financial markettheory and recent incomplete competition theory.In the early 1980s, before agriculture finance theories have been rural financial theory of mainstream. This theory is based on that of rural residents, especially poor strata not saving ability, rural is facing fund shortage problem. And because the agricultural output characteristics (income uncertainty, investment long-term and low yield, etc.), agriculture and cannot be a commercial bank's investment object, this makes the rural financial mess up, a large amount of fund outflow. Therefore, it is necessary to rural peripheral infuse policy fund, and establish non-profit professional financial institutions to capital allocation. However, this over-reliance on external funding of rural financial policy has sparked funds, the low efficiency of the low return a series of contradictions, in addition to the rural financial market mechanism of neglect, cause rural financial cycle development the long-term mechanism of difficult to build.In the 1980s, the rural financial market theory gradually replaced agricultural credit subsidies theory. Its main theories, the lack of rural financial capital, not because farmers not saving ability, but due to the rural financial system unreasonable financial arrangements (such as government regulation, interest rate control, etc.), curb its development. Its policies are: to play a role in financial markets, and reduce government intervention, realize interest rate marketization, achieving rural savings and capital supply and demand the balance, Cancel special specific target loan system, the appropriate development of non-formal finance market, etc.Since the 1990s, again appeared imperfect competition market theory. This theory is mainly, and the market mechanism is not everything, for stable financial market for reasonable government intervention is necessary. Imperfect competition market is the representative figure of SiDiGeLiCi that because of the existence of market failure factors, the government in rural financial market a very important role, but the government also cannot replace market, but should become the beneficial supplement of the market. The government of financial market supervision should adopt indirect control mechanism, and according to certain principle establish regulatory scope and standards. Rural financial market is not a completely competitive market, especially the loan party (financial institutions) to the borrower's situation can't fully grasp the, plus rural special cases, financial institutions to control rural system risk, if fully in accordance with market mechanism might not be able to cultivate a rural social needed financial market, therefore, it is necessary to adopt appropriate financial markets, such as government intervention and theborrower's organization etc non-market measures.The imperfect market competition theory the main policy suggestion: one is the precondition of the development of financial markets is low inflation macroeconomic stability; etc. Second, in the financial market development to a certain degree, compared with interest rate liberalization, before more attention shall be paid to the actual deposit interest rate remained at will, within the scope of positive while suppressing deposit rate of growth, if the resulting credit allocation and excessive credit demand problem, can not damage by governments in financial institutions savings from external motivation and mobilization providing funds, Third, it is in the interests of the most basic does not damage the bank, within the scope of the policy finance (facing the specific sectors cheap financing) is effective. The fourth is the government should encourage and use the borrower LianBao group and organizational borrower mutual cooperation forms, in order to avoid the rural financial market existing incomplete information loan recovery caused by the problem of low, The use of security, access and mutual financing guarantee ChuJinHui wait for method, can improve the asymmetric information, Six is financing and real business (such as fertilizer, crop, etc.) of combining the method is effective and can ensure loan recovery, Seven is to promote the development of financial institutions, should give its certain special policies, such as limits on new participants, etc.We think, due to the particularity of agricultural production, agricultural income uncertainty, agricultural investment long-term and low yield and production of dispersion characteristics, leading to the rural financial transaction costs and funds use cost is higher, regular commercial financial institutions generally don't want to find the rural financial market, produced the market leading of failure. Therefore, in the process of building the rural financial system, the government suitable intervention is necessary and effective. From all the evolution of rural financial system view, government intervention in rural financial constructing early indeed plays a very significant positive effects. But the government intervention is not the ultimate goal of financial development, financial system, with the establishment and perfection of government intervention can only more and hinder the development of rural financial market. Especially in some developing countries due to the macroeconomic environment instability, departmental policy trend and widespread laws and regulations sex obstacle government intervention become the bottleneck of rural financialdevelopment. So, in many countries, the rural financial system to really play a role, first needs to grasp "government intervention degree" this problem.American of rural financial systemThe United States is the world agriculture of the most developed countries, this with a complete the rural financial system are inseparable. American building the rural financial system are fundamental principles for agricultural development fund supports. After years of development, the rural America from whole formed a multi-level and comprehensive financial systems, through government subsidy, the development of rural financial system, increase agricultural loans and agricultural production socialization and other channels for agriculture, agricultural development, meet the financing of various funds for agricultural modernization needs, provides funding. American rural financial system belongs to a kind of composite credit model, this model has the following characteristics: one is to provide agricultural credit funds of organizations, both professional rural financial institutions, there are other types of financial institutions. 2 it is in financial organization system, general is cooperative financial institution, policy financial institutions and commercial financial institutions co-existing. The United States has now formed the government leading rural policy finance, rural cooperative financial system and a rural commercial finance system.(a) American policy of rural financial systemAccording to the American agricultural credit law to establish a rational division of labor and cooperation of policy-related finance system that by farmers' living bureau, rural electrification bureau, commodity credit company and small business administration composition. American policy rural financial institutions is by the U.S. federal government leading created, especially for its agriculture development and rural development to provide financing institution. Its main function is for agricultural production and activities related to the agricultural production provide credit funds and service, and through the adjustment of agricultural credit activity production scale and the direction of development, implementation of rural financial policy, the control ofagricultural development scale, etc. These financial institutions funds mainly comes from the government provides capital, budget, loan turnover funds and part, borrowing funds utilization is mainly provides some commercial Banks and other lenders is not willing to provide loans, in loan object on different records.1. To improve farmers' living, improvement of agricultural production for the purpose of peasants living innings. Farmers' living innings of the predecessor is agricultural revitalize administration, the agency not profit-minded purpose, aims to help the poor areas and low-income farmers solve fund shortage problem, its borrower is mainly who cannot from commercial Banks and other agricultural credit institutions of agricultural loans to employees. In recent years, farmers living bureau also become American government to implement the agricultural policy, the main tool. If the U.S. government to rational utilization of agricultural production resources and family to farmers by farmers extend bureau of water conservancy and land improvement loans, time limit can be 40 years. In 1990s, farmers living in state, county bureau set up offices has reached more than 1700, strongly support the development of agriculture. Farmers' living bureau of capital operation is mainly provides loans and guarantee. Farmers' living bureau of loans into direct loan scheme and emergency loan program two kinds, including farm ownership loans, operating expenditure loans, crackage construction loan, water conservancy development and soil conservation loans, etc; Farmers' living bureau is mainly to the commercial Banks and other financial institutions according to the farmers living bureau loan scheme to farmers the borrower loan assure.2. To improve rural public facilities and conditions and the establishment of the rural electrification bureau. Rural community development, the construction of water conservancy, electric power facilities and other relevant rural basic construction issue that needs to be unified planning to address common, countries should give financial support and provide the necessary credit help. Founded in 1935 of rural electrification bureau, is also the usda subsidiary institutions, Its main functions are on rural thermal-power cooperatives and farms the borrower loan to improve rural electrification level. The agency's fund use is also known for loans and guarantee primarily.3. Commodity credit company. In 1933, the U.S. government established commodity credit company mainly in order to respond to natural disasters and agricultural crisis. Commodity creditsto farm because company natural disasters caused the reduction of give subsidies, and agricultural production insurance are similar. Its main function is implementing the administration of price and income support program that price support, control of agricultural production, avoid agriculture production waves to the agricultural producers impact, safeguard the interests of consumers. The fund application forms mainly for providing loans and payment subsidies, mainly including agricultural mortgages, warehousing, drying and other treatment equipment loans, disaster subsidies and price subsidies.In addition, the United States has a kind of policy-based financial institutions - small business administration, is specialized for not from other normal channel gaining sufficient funds of small businesses to provide financing to help. The fund mainly comes from parliament appropriated turnover funds and withdraw the loan principal and interest, etc, the fund is mainly used for issuing direct loans, participate in joint loan and guarantee and other special credit. Small business administration on small farms lending is with peasants living bureau division of collaboration, if small farm borrower economic conditions and bad loans small, then by farmer family bureau fund supports, when small farm borrower economic status improved, the more loan demand by the small business administration provided.(b) American rural cooperative finance systemBenefited from the United States highly developed economic and financial system, American rural constructed comparatively perfect cooperation financial system. In the early 20th century, American agricultural credit financing is mostly by private institutions and individuals with, such credit funds of the quantity is limited, and period is shorter, as the us economy development, the financial system has clearly can not adapt to the needs of the development of modern agriculture. The U.S. government began in 1916 NongDai formulated a series of law, set up by the U.S. government leading NongDai grass-roots organization specialized Banks and credit system. Its main purpose is passed on the agricultural organizations, agricultural development project lending, expand agricultural funds available sources, improving farmers' working conditions and welfare, increases the farmers' income, accelerate the development of agriculture. Initial rural financial cooperation organization are in government leaders and contributed by support built, along withthe national capital gradually introduced, now of the rural cooperative finance has become by farmers have cooperation financial institutions.Now, the rural cooperative finance by federal medium-term credit bank, cooperative Banks, federal land bank and land bank cooperatives three system composition, the three rural cooperative financial institutions are in government leaders and capital support, using a top-down way up. Among them the federal medium-term credit bank is America's most important agricultural credit cooperative system, this system is 1923 by the U.S. government in 12 credit area established 12 families federal medium-term credit bank composition, its main resolving peasants' short-term loans difficult question. Every credit bank credit cooperatives, subordinate many production cooperatives implement shareholding ownership, the borrower must have equivalent to loan sum of 5% to 10% cooperatives stocks or participate in the card. Loan time limit is 1 year commonly, the longest do not exceed seven years. With the corresponding is federal land banking system, this system comprises 12 agricultural credit the federal land bank and its subordinate co-operatives of composition, this system has become the main provider of farmer long-term loans, Federal land ownership, each bank implements shares to federal bank must pay a total of ubcta member borrowing capital of 5%, bank shares shall belong to all the cooperatives all, also indirectly shall belong to all the borrower all, Federal land bank only deal with long-term real estate loans, loan object basically is the individual farmer, loan time limit for legal 5-40 years. Cooperative bank system is designed to give us a acquire equipment, supplementary operating funds, buying goods such as providing loans and the establishment of, it by thirteen cooperative Banks composition, 12 credit district each set up a, still include in 1988 was created in Washington's central bank partner.(c) American agricultural insurance systemAmerican agricultural insurance system is after fumble ceaselessly, development and form. Early American agricultural insurance is by private insurance companies, but due to agricultural insurance risk huge, its management of the crop insurance are ended in failure. In order to help farmers deal with agricultural production risks, the American government has been very active in crop insurance plan. Since 1938 the federal crop insurance law enacted, the American agricultureinsurance after 60 years of development, the formation of a relatively complete crop insurance business, safeguard level and farmer participation rate rise ceaselessly, for stable agricultural production, improving national welfare level played an important role. Existing U.S. agricultural insurance completely by the commercial insurance company management and agent, of course, commercial insurance company will get government in business management fee and insurance premium, support of subsidies, etc. American crop insurance operation of the main points three levels, the first layer for federal crop insurance company (risk), mainly be responsible for the nationwide administration planted terms the formulation, the risk control to private insurance companies, reinsurance support; etc. The 2nd is have management of agricultural risks qualification priate insurers, they signed an agreement with risk administration execution risk administration, and promised to the provisions of article layer is a crop insurance agent and survey nuclear deliberately, American crop insurance agent sales, mainly through specific business, they are responsible for the implementation.Reference Documentation:1:Steven Husted, Michael Melvin, International Economics [M], (the fifth edition), Higher Education Press, 20022:Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal constraints to growth: Does firm size matter? The Journal of Finance, 60, 137–177.3:Peng, Y. (2004). Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China's transitional economy. American Journal of Sociology, 109,1045–10744:Qian, Y. (2000). The process of China’s market transition (1978–1998):The evolutionary, historical, and comparative perspectives. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156, 151–171.5:Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Management Science, 48, 364–381.6:Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy.International Political Science Review, 22, 201–214.7:Liu, Z. (2003). The economic impact and determinants of investment in human and political capital in China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51, 823–850.8:Birner, R., & Witter, H. (2003). Using social capital to create politicalcapital. In The commons in the New Millennium: Challenges andadaptation (pp. 291–334). Cambridge and London: MIT Press.译文：美国农村金融管理模式美国是世界上农业最发达的国家，这与其有完备的农村金融体制密不可分。

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1. informal finance, self-help groupsIn March 1967, on one of my first field trips in Liberia, I had the opportunity to observe a group of a dozen Mano peasants cutting trees in a field belonging to one of them. Before they started their work, they placed hoe-shaped masks in a small circle, chanted words and turned into animals. One turned into a lion, another one into a bush hog, and so on, and they continued to imitate those animals throughout the whole day, as they worked hard on their land. I realized I was onto something serious, and at the end of the day, when they had put the masks into a bag and changed back into humans, I started asking questions. I learned that they worked as a group, tackling the fields of each one in turn, carrying out all the tasks performed by men. For the activities attributed to the female sex, the women organized their own group (Seibel, 1967). During subsequent visits to each of the 17 ethnic groups in Liberia over extensive periods in the two years that followed, I continued to ask questions. The study started with group work; it ended with informal finance.All over Liberia, I found people forming self-help groups in which each person regularly contributed equal amounts of something valuable: labor, rice, money or other items. Among the Gbandi, Loma and Kissi in the northeast, you could still find masses of twisted iron rods, with one flat and one round end, the so-called Kissi pennies. This was once the local currency before the Americo-Liberians introduced the US dollar. In all of these groups, one participant at a time received the accumulated total which he could use for his own individual benefit: to fell trees with the help of a rotating work group, to feed a wedding party with the rice accumulated by a rice savings group, or as microenterprise working capital provided by a rotating savings group. A cycle was considered to be complete when each member had received the total once over. A new cycle could then start with the same or a different membership.Accumulating and reallocating labor, rice and money are three seemingly different forms of economic cooperation. Yet in the eyes of a peasant whom I met in the Ivory Coast in 1985, they are all about financial intermediation: "Le travail, c'est notre argent!" In Ghana, in 1979, I saw groups of women jointly producing palm-oil whichthey sold on the market, allocating the proceeds to one member of the group at a time. Most of these groups also provided social insurance by allocating scarce resources, out of turn, to members in emergency situations. In the early days this consisted mainly of food items, whereas nowadays it is usually money.With the expansion of the money economy, these informal financial institutions (IFIs) have not lost their vigor. Quite to the contrary, they have multiplied, both in number and diversity. Banks, with their inappropriate products and practices, have not prevented the IFIs from spreading. In many instances, even the staff of commercial and central banks (as in the case of Bank Indonesia) have been found to participate. Some banks have even adopted the financial technologies used, such as daily deposit collection adopted by Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia and by the Northern Mindanao Development Bank in the Philippines.2.From Traditional Organizations to MicrofinanceMy first studies in the 1960s were devoted to traditional organizations (Seibel & Massing, 1974), a term which, at best, evoked the interest of anthropologists. During the 1970s, technical assistance agencies rediscovered these organizations under an old name used by Raiffeisen a hundred years earlier: self-help groups (Seibel & Damachi, 1982). In the mid-1980s, they changed into informal financial institutions (Seibel & Marx, 1987). Finally, in 1990, inspired by the 1989 World Bank Conference on Microenterprises, I proposed to the Economics Institute in Boulder, Colorado, that it offer part of its program in World Banking and Finance under the heading of Microfinance, comprising both microsavings and microcredit (Seibel, 1996). This new term reflects the fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to clearly distinguish between formal and nonformal origins and practices.3.Dhikuti, the Small Businessman's Self-help Finance CompanyThere are numerous other forms of institutional upgrading to be found worldwide. In Nepal, institutional upgrading has taken a different route. Until the 1950s, the dikur or dhikuti was a simple rotating savings association among Thakali traders. Since then, it has spread throughout all towns and most ethnicities in Nepal and become the small businessman's self-help bank (Seibel & Shrestha, 1988). As business opportunities grew and money became scarce, secret bidding (widespread also in the Chinese hui and the Vietnamese ho) replaced allocation by lottery. For example, at the first turn, the lowest bidder may accept a pot of $1000 for $600, reducing individual contributions by 40% or putting the balance of $400 into an emerging loan fund.In response to a new law permitting the establishment of finance companies, the first dhikuti have now started to register as finance companies and this has substantially altered the traditional pattern of rotating savings and credit. The most prominent of these is the Himalaya Finance and Savings Company, which offers various savings and credit products to the poor and near-poor throughout Nepal, including contractual savings and term finance. At one point, up to 600 daily savings collectors collected deposits of US$ 0.15 per day, before new central bank regulations led to a reduction in the number of collectors and an increase in deposit amounts.(Seibel & Schrader, 1999)4.Financial Service Associations (FSAs): an Option Pioneered by IFADThe concept and development of Financial Service Associations (FSAs) is an IFAD innovation built on the principles of indigenous non-rotating savings and credit associations: proximity, local financial intermediation, ownership and self-management by the poor, self-reliance, and sustainability. With a view to promoting cost-effective delivery of financial services at the village level in areas devoid of banking facilities, IFAD first introduced this model in the Republic of South Africa in 1994, followed by the Republic of Congo in 1996, and in the Republics of Guinea and Benin in 1997. Introduction of the model in Ghana, particularly in the northern regions with sparse rural banking facilities, is being planned. The FSA model avoids use of external funds by mobilizing local savings in the form of equity and transforming them into small loans to shareholders for quick turnaround activities. The salient features of the FSA model are as follows:(a) Proximity. An FSA is a joint stock company with a variable capital that is owned and operated by shareholders, who are local residents.(b) Savings. Mobilization of local savings as equity or stock, rather than demand deposits. Local resource accumulation and security of savings are major incentives for buying shares.(c) Accounting. Record keeping, including the annual closing of accounts, is done locally by the FSA itself.Accounting and administrative procedures are simplified, transparent and based on local practices and experience.(d) Management Autonomy. All decisions are taken and carried out by shareholders themselves including creditworthiness examinations. There is no ceiling on the number of shares held by a member; but no shareholder can have more than 10 votes in the General Assembly where all major management decisions are made.(e) Controls. The mechanisms for internal and external controls constitute a coherent whole that facilitates the rapid attainment of autonomy and self-regulation.(f) Profitability. The shareholders themselves define the FSA's strategy for profit generation; concern fo profitability is an integral part of all decision-making.(g) Lending Operations. FSA mobilizes financial resources in the form of equity, from within its area of operations, for investment back into the area. The main financial product of the FSA is represented by small very short-term loans that can foster the socio-economic promotion of at least 80% of the membership. Its offer of financial services may be expanded but only after participatory analysis both of the costs of credit and of ways to attain an acceptable trade-off between the financial health of the FSA and the profitability to borrowers.(h) Sustainability. The members define their own strategies for risk management, for constituting reserves, for remunerating capital and for making allocations for operating costs, bad debt provisioning and the preservation of the value of capital against inflation.(i) Networking. The creation of FSAs is able to stimulate the emergence of local institutions and networks providing central services to the FSAs. As intermediaries, FSAs are able to facilitate access by formal financial institutions to the rural markets.Thus, the FSA concept is a flexible microfinance model for delivery of low-cost financial services to rural areas by establishing village-level financial structures that are initiated, owned, and operated by villagers themselves. It represents yet another solution to the lack of interaction between formal and informal financial entities. (The World Bank & IFAD and Tounessi, 2000)5.Linkage BankingAt their own initiative (and sometimes aided by consultancy proposals), informal financial institutions have entered into numerous linkages, mostly depositing sayings in cooperatives and banks. But being informal, these institutions had great difficulty in accessing credit from those banks or cooperatives. This is where Asia Pacific Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (APRACA), a Bangkok-based association of central and rural-agricultural banks in Asia and the Pacific, intervened. An increasing number of member institutions, such as Bank Indonesia, Landbank in the Philippines, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) in India and Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand, have encouraged banks and NGOs to cooperate, on the commercial terms, with existing financial self-help groups (Ghate, 1992; Kropp, et al., 1989; Seibel & Parhusip, 1992; Seibel, 1996), thereby reducing the transaction costs of lenders and borrowers as well as deposit takers and depositors.This has worked well in Asian countries where policy frameworks have favored financial innovations, cost-covering interest rates and institutional viability. In Africa, where policy environments are unfavorable, or less stable, as in Nigeria, APRACA's sister organization, African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA) found it more difficult to promote linkage banking. However, some of its member institutions, such as Caisse Nationale du Credit Agricole (CNCA) in Burkina Faso, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) in Zimbabwe, and the Central Bank of Nigeria, have undertaken promising initiatives. In Ghana, the World Bank, IFAD and the African Development Bank are preparing a new initiative of linking indigenous savings and credit associations, the so-called susu clubs, and daily deposit collectors to banks.6.NGOs as Promoters of Good PracticesNGOs can play a special role in the promotion of sound microfinancial institutions (MFI). They can disseminate information and organize exposure training programs, such as the one provided by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Through training, they can assist small institutions in improving their viability and upgrade their legal status, as required. They can also initiate financial operations which, in many countries, preclude deposit collection. But if they are seriously interested in financial operations, they should register as a rural or commercial bank, finance company or savings and credit cooperative. Among those that have successfullyembarked on this road are, to name a few: BancoSol in Bolivia, Bank Purba Danarta and numerous other NGO banks in Indonesia, and Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) Rural Bank in the Philippines (Seibel & Torres 1999).NGOs may propagate good microfinance practices (but not best practices, which evoke notions of universally valid optimal solutions). Good practices are crucial to the sustainability of microfinance services. They may comprise:* the mobilization of internal resources for institutional self-reliance through savings collection, higher interest rates on loans, share capital, profits and insurance premiums* the promotion of microsavings as a source of microenterprise or farm household self-financing, including voluntary withdrawable savings, time deposits,mandatory regular savings, lottery savings, and daily savings collection on doorsteps* appropriate microcredit products with small loan sizes growing according to repayment performance and absorptive capacity, mostly short maturities and installments according to customer capacity, insistence on timely repayment, and market rates of interest covering the costs of each product* microinsurance products contributing to loan security,such as life, health, cattle insurance* product reciprocity, tying credit to savings and insurance, to enhance financial discipline and bankability* collection reciprocity as a means of arrears prevention,combining savings and loan installment collection or financial and commodity transactions* customer-oriented microfinance procedures and services set by financial institutions rather than government, including sound financial management, convenient collection and deposit facilities, appropriate loan processing, adequate risk management, timely repayment collection, monitoring and effective information gathering* terms and conditions which benefit from the experience of formal and nonformal institutions and serve the interests of both the institution and its customers 7.Promoting Prudential Regulation and Supervision7.1Indigenous Self-regulationThe evolution from rotating savings groups to non-rotating credit groups has been accompanied by a shift from oral rules and regulations to written by-laws. In their simplest form, they may read like the rules of a so-called money company found in a small Mono village in the Liberian hinterland in 1967:All members should agree upon one sum of money to be paid every Sunday. And one late to pay that Sunday five cents interest will be added to the sum he suppose to pay. Members should always put in the income; no matter how hard money business might be; you will have to put in the income. The five officers should agree before the money should be loaned to someone. Any money missing from the bank the Treasurer is responsible to pay for what is missing. Time for the income:EverySunday. (Literal transcription) (Seibel & Massing,1974)7.2Prudential Regulation and SupervisionUnder conditions of a repressive policy environment, IFIs and other unregulated MFIs, compared to regulated institutions, have a competitive advantage as they are free to set their own interest rates and other contract terms. Many IFIs remain informal simply because there is no suitable legal form available, or at least no legal form with sufficiently low minimum equity capital requirements, or with capital adequacy ratios instead. However, once the policy environment is deregulated and entrance barriers are removed, much may be gained from prudential regulation and supervision. Three reform measures are of crucial importance for the upgrading of IFIs into regulated MFIs:1. The deregulation of interest rates on deposits and loans: permitting each institution to adjust its interest rates to its effective costs, including costs of serving marginal areas and of collecting microsavings and microinstalments at doorsteps.2. A revision of the banking law: permitting local people to establish their own small financial institutions with moderate minimum capital requirements, or else capital adequacy ratios (higher than those for commercial banks). In addition, the legal system should provide for alienable land-use or ownership rights as a basis for collateral and for the efficient processing of claims arising from bad debts.3. The provision of effective bank supervision: providing guidance and supervision to institutions with microfinancial services in the interest of both the MFIs and their clients. In the case of a multitude of small local microfinance institutions, such supervision may be provided by separate, second-tier regulatory authorities within a delegated system of regulation and supervision, i.e., through self-organized networks of MFIs which in turn are supervised by the financial authorities.8.Status of MFIsDo MFIs benefit from banking status? Alternatively, should they remain hidden within a nonformal financial sector? The answer is an unequivocal yes, they should stay informal if the policy environment is repressive, enforcing interest rate regulation, submitting institutions to inappropriate supervisory agencies, or simply barring institutions from sound practices. In many countries, equity capital requirements are such that banking status is beyond the reach of local MFIs; and the only way for IFIs to register and thereby turn into semiformal MFIs is under the Societies Act, as non-stock, non-profit corporations, private or public trusts, or cooperatives. Upgrading to some legal status may enable the institutions to substantially increase their assets and continue building them up instead of redistributing them periodically among the members, as is done by most IFIs.One example are the Lumbung Pitih Nagari (LPN) among the Minangkabau in West Sumatra, Indonesia. They have evolved from two informal institutional sources: the communal rice store, lumbung pitih, and the rotating savings group, julo-julo. As money was substituted for rice, about 500 LPN turned into semiformal financial institutions owned by their members and registered with the provincial government.With the creation of a new provincial law during the 1970s, which does not come under the national banking law, legal upgrading followed institutional evolution. The provincial government gave the LPN an equity injection, which approximately half of them used for the purpose of growing in financial strength and outreach. In 1988, with the passing of a village banking law, LPN entered into yet another phase of legal evolution, meaning that they could now register as formal village banks, such as Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Seibel, 1989). An increasing number of LPN have taken advantage of this option in recent years, with substantial upscaling effects on their operations.9.Objective: Informal Financial Institutions (IFIs) are Upgraded and Mainstreamed1. Networking among IFIs is facilitated1.1 Institutional patterns of forming financial grassroots organizations are analyzed(e.g., rotating and nonrotating savings & credit associations, self-help groups with financial services such as water-user associations or women's groups, deposit collectors, moneylenders)1.2 Existing IFIs of the poor are identified1.3 The poor are assisted in joining local IFIs owned and managed by the poor1.4 Networking among IFIs is facilitated1.5 Central network services are promoted as incentives to join the network (such as: training, consultancy, bookkeeping tools, legal assistance, exchange of experience, interest representation, dialogues with local and national authorities, auditing and supervision, liquidity exchange,and commercial bank linkages)1.6 Voluntary registration of IFIs is facilitated1.7 NGOs are supported as facilitators of IFI networks and trainers of IFIs1.8 Prudential norms are agreed upon2. Mainstreaming is initiated by incentives to IFIs2.1 Basic accounting training is provided as an incentive for registration with a network2.2 Financial management training is provided as an incentivefor financial reporting to the network2.3 Consultancy services in good practices are provided as an incentive to acquire a legal status2.4 Liquidity exchange and refinancing services are provided as an in-centive to follow prudential norms2.5 Accreditation with a seal of quality is provided as an incentive to submit to external supervision3. Upgrading of IFIs is facilitated3.1 Legal upgrading to attain a suitable legal status is facilitated3.2 Human upgrading through staff and financial management training is facilitated3.3 Organizational upgrading, converting rotating groups(RoSCAs, tontines), funeral societies, deposit collectors and other IFIs into perm-anent institutions with a loan fund built from equity, deposits and fees or premiums3.4 Operational upgrading, including proper bookkeeping,effective financial products, reporting to the network, is facilitated3.5 Financial upgrading in terms of self-reliance(mobilizing internal resources), viability (covering costs from operating income) and sustainability andoutreach(increasing earnings for expansion) is facilitated4. Access to banks (Linkage Banking) on commercial terms is facilita-ted4.1 Refinancing services are provided4.2 Deposit services are provided4.3 Payment services are provided4.4 Financial consultancy services are providedCopyright of Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship is the property of World Scientific Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.农村金融:主流的非正规金融机构作者：汉斯迪.特尔.赛贝尔摘要在他们之中到处存在的替换储蓄和信用协会——非正式的金融机构(IFIs) ，是远古的起源。