农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

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金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

金融银行信用风险论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献Managing Credit Risks with Knowledge Management forFinancial BanksAbstract-Nowadays,financial banks are operating in a knowledge society and there are more and more credit risks breaking out in banks.So,this paper first discusses the implications of knowledge and knowledge management, and then analyzes credit risks of financial banks with knowledge management. Finally, the paper studies ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management. With the application of knowledge management in financial banks, customers will acquire better service and banks will acquire more rewards.Index Terms–knowledge management; credit risk; risk management; incentive mechanism; financial banksI.INTRODUCTIONNowadays,banks are operating i n a“knowledge society”.So, what is knowledge? Davenport(1996)[1]thinks knowledge is professional intellect, such as know-what, know-how, know-why, and self-motivated creativity, or experience, concepts, values, beliefs and ways of working that can be shared and communicated. The awareness of the importance of knowledge results in the critical issue of “knowledge management”. So, what is knowledge management? According to Malhothra(2001)[2], knowledge management(KM)caters to the critical issues of organizational adaptation, survival and competence in face of increasingly discontinuous environmental change. Essentially it embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic combination of data and information processing capacity of information technologies and the creative and innovative capacity of human beings. Through the processes of creating,sustaining, applying, sharing and renewing knowledge, we can enhance organizational performance and create value.Many dissertations have studied knowledge managementapplications in some special fields. Aybübe Aurum(2004)[3] analyzes knowledge management in software engineering and D.J.Harvey＆R.Holdsworth(2005)[4]study knowledge management in the aerospace industry. Li Yang(2007)[5] studies knowledge management in information-based education and Jayasundara＆Chaminda Chiran(2008)[6] review the prevailing literature on knowledge management in banking industries. Liang ping and Wu Kebao(2010)[7]study the incentive mechanism of knowledge management inBanking.There are also many papers about risks analysis and risks management. Before the 1980s, the dominant mathematical theory of risks analysis was to describe a pair of random vectors.But,the simplification assumptions and methods used by classical competing risks analysis caused controversy and criticism.Starting around the 1980s, an alternative formulation of risk analysis was developed,with the hope to better resolve the issues of failure dependency and distribution identifiability. The new formulation is univariate risk analysis.According to Crowder(2001)[8], David＆Moeschberger(1978)[9]and Hougaard(2000)[10],univariate survival risk analysis has been dominantly, which is based on the i.i.d assumptions(independent and identically distributed) or, at least, based on the independent failure assumption.Distribution-free regression modeling allows one to investigate the influences of multiple covariates on the failure, and it relaxes the assumption of identical failure distribution and to some extent, it also relaxes the single failure risk restriction. However, the independent failures as well as single failure events are still assumed in the univariate survival analysis. Of course,these deficiencies do not invalidate univariate analysis, and indeed, in many applications, those assumptions are realistically valid.Based on the above mentioned studies, Ma and Krings(2008a, 2008b)[11]discuss the relationship and difference of univariate and multivariate analysis in calculating risks.As for the papers on managing the risks in banks, Lawrence J.White(2008)[12]studies the risks of financial innovations and takes out some countermeasures to regulate financial innovations. Shao Baiquan(2010)[13]studies the ways to manage the risks in banks.From the above papers, we can see that few scholars have studied the way to manage credit risks with knowledge management. So this paper will discuss using knowledgemanagement to manage credit risks for financial banks.This paper is organized as follows: SectionⅠis introduction. SectionⅡanalyzes credit risks in banks with knowledge management. SectionⅢstudies ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management. SectionⅣconcludes.II.ANALYZING CREDIT RISKS IN BANKS WITHKNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENTA.Implication of Credit RiskCredit ris k is the risk of loss due to a debtor’s non-payment of a loan or other line of credit, which may be the principal or interest or both.Because there are many types of loans and counterparties-from individuals to sovereign governments-and many different types of obligations-from auto loans to derivatives transactions-credit risk may take many forms.Credit risk is common in our daily life and we can not cover it completely,for example,the American subprime lending crisis is caused by credit risk,which is that the poor lenders do not pay principal and interest back to the banks and the banks do not pay the investors who buy the securities based on the loans.From the example,we can find that there are still credit risks,though banks have developed many financial innovations to manage risks.B.Sharing KnowledgeKnowledge in banks includes tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge,which is scattered in different fields.For example, the information about the customers’income, asset and credit is controlled by different departments and different staffs and the information can’t be communicated with others. So it is necessary for banks to set up a whole system to communicate and share the information and knowledge to manage the risks.C.Setting up Incentive Mechanism and Encouraging Knowledge InnovationThe warning mechanism of credit risks depends on how bank’s staffs use the knowledge of customers and how the staffs use the knowledge creatively.The abilities of staffs to innovate depend on the incentive mechanism in banks,so, banks should take out incentive mechanism to urge staffs to learn more knowledge and work creatively to manage credit risks.We can show the incentive mechanism as Fig.1:Fig.1 The model of incentive mechanism with knowledge management From Fig.1,we can see there are both stimulative and punitive measures in the incentive model of knowledge management for financial banks.With the incentive mechanism of knowledge management in financial banks,the staffs will work harder to manage risks and to acquire both material returns and spiritual encouragement.III.MANAGING CREDIT RISKS IN BANKS WITH KNOWLEDGEMANAGEMENTThere are four blocks in managing credit risks with knowledge management.We can show them in Fig.2:Fig.2 The blocks of managing credit risksA.Distinguishing Credit RiskDistinguishing credit risks is the basis of risk management.If we can’t recognize the risks,we are unable to find appropriate solutions to manage risks.For example,the United States subprime crisis in 2007 was partly caused by that the financial institutions and regulators didn’t recognize the mortgage securitization risks timely.With knowledge management,we can make out some rules to distinguish credit risks,which are establishing one personal credit rating system for customers and setting up the data warehouse.We can use the system to analyze customers’credit index, customers’credit history and the possible changes which may incur risks.At the same time,we should also watch on the changes of customers’property and income to recognize potential risks.B.Assessing and Calculating Credit RiskAfter distinguishing the credit risks,we should assess the risk exposure,risk factors and potential losses and risks, and we should make out the clear links.The knowledgeable staffs in banking should use statistical methods and historical data to develop specific credit risks evaluation model and the regulators should establish credit assessment system and then set up one national credit assessment system.With the system and the model of risk assessment,the managers can evaluate the existing and emerging risk factors,such as they prepare credit ratings for internal use.Other firms,including Standard ＆Poor’s,Moody’s and Fitch,are in the business of developing credit rating for use by investors or other third parties.Table Ⅰshows the credit ratings of Standard ＆Poor’s.TABLE ISTANDARD ＆POOR’S CREDITT RATINGSAfter assessing credit risks,we can use Standardized Approach and Internal Rating-Based Approach to calculate the risks.And in this article,we will analyze how Internal Rating-Based Approach calculates credit risk of an uncovered loan.To calculate credit risk of an uncovered loan,firstly,we will acquire the borrower’s Probability of Default(PD),Loss Given Default(LGD),Exposure at Default(EAD)and Remaining Maturity(M).Secondly,we calculate the simple risk(SR)of the uncovered loan,using the formula as following:SR=Min{BSR(PD)*[1+b(PD)*(M-3)]*LGD／50,LGD*12.5} (1)Where BSR is the basic risk weight and b(PD)is the adjusting factor for remaining maturity(M).Finally,we can calculate the weighted risk(WR)of the uncovered loan,using the following formula:WR=SR*EAD (2)From(1)and(2),we can acquire the simple and weighted credit risk of an uncovered loan,and then we can take some measures to hedge the credit risk.C.Reducing Credit RiskAfter assessing and calculating credit risks,banks should make out countermeasures to reduce the risks.These measures include：(1)Completing security system of loans. The banks should require customers to use the collateral and guarantees as the security for the repayment,and at the same time,banks should foster collateral market.(2)Combining loanswith insurance.Banks may require customers to buy a specific insurance or insurance portfolio.If the borrower doesn’t repay the loans,banks can get the compensation from the insurance company.(3)Loans Securitization. Banks can change the loans into security portfolio,according to the different interest rate and term of the loans,and then banks can sell the security portfolio to the special organizations or trust companies.D.Managing Credit Risk and Feeding backA customer may have housing loans,car loans and other loans,so the banks can acquire the customer’s credit information,credit history,credit status and economic background from assessing the risks of the customer based on the data the banks get.By assessing and calculating the risks of the customer,banks can expect the future behavior of the customers and provides different service for different customers. Banks can provide more value-added service to the customers who have high credit rates and restrict some business to the customers who have low credit rates.At the same time, banks should refuse to provide service to the customers who are blacklisted. Banks should set up the pre-warning and management mechanism and change the traditional ways,which just rely on remedial after the risks broke out.In order to set up the warning and feeding back mechanism,banks should score credit of the customers comprehensively and then test the effectiveness and suitability of the measures,which banks use to mitigate risks.Finally, banks should update the data of the customers timely and keep the credit risk management system operating smoothly.IV.CONCLUSIONIn this paper,we first discuss the implications of knowledge and knowledge management.Then we analyze the credit risks of financial banks with knowledge management. Finally,we put forward ways for banks to manage credit risks with knowledge management.We think banks should set up data warehouse o f customers’credit to assess and calculate the credit risks,and at the same time,banks should train knowledgeable staffs to construct a whole system to reduce risks and feed back.With knowledge management,banks can take out systemic measures to manage cust omers’credit risks and gain sustainable profits.ACKNOWLEDGMENTIt is financed by the humanities and social sciences project of the Ministry of Educationof China(NO.06JC790032).REFERENCES[1]Davenport,T.H.et al,“Improving knowledge work processes,”Sl oan Management Review,MIT,USA,1996,V ol.38,pp.53-65.[2]Malhothra,“Knowledge management for the new world of business,”New York BRINT Institute,2001,lkm/whatis.htm.[3]Aybübe Aurum,“Knowledge management in software engineering education,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies,2004,pp.370-374.[4]D.J.Harvey＆R.Holdsworth,“Knowledge management in the aerospace industry,”Proceedings of the IEEE International Professional Communication Conference,2005,pp.237-243.[5]Li Yang,“Thinking about knowledge management applications in information-based education,”IEEE International Conference on Advanced Learning Technologies,2007,pp.27-33.[6]Jayasundara＆Chaminda Chiran,“Knowledge management in banking industries:uses and opportunities,”Journal of the University Librarians Association of Sri Lanka,2008,V ol.12,pp.68-84.[7]Liang Ping,Wu Kebao,“Knowledge management in banking,”The Conference on Engineering and Business Management,2010, pp.4719-4722.[8]Crowder,M.J.Classical Competing Risks,British:Chapman&Hall, 2001,pp.200.[9]David,H.A.&M.L.Moeschberger,The Theory of Competing Risks, Scotland,Macmillan Publishing,1978,pp.103.金融银行信用风险管理与知识管理摘要：目前，金融银行经营在一个知识型社会中，而且越来越多的信用风险在在银行中爆发。

小额贷款外文翻译文献

文献信息文献标题：An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities （小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究）文献作者：Jonathan Kimmitt， Mariarosa Scarlata，Dimo Dimov文献出处：《Venture Capital》 ,2016,18(3):257–276字数统计：英文3661单词，21609字符；中文6504汉字外文文献An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities Abstract Understanding under which conditions microcredit is used by new, growing ventures is becoming increasingly pertinent to scholars. This paper investigates the interplay of the use of microcredit with entrepreneurial capabilities and the moderating role of institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings show that higher constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities are associated with higher use of microcredit. In addition, we find that new, growing ventures use microcredit more where either economic or political institutions are less developed. Our findings suggest the importance of the existence of some type of institutional strength that must be in place to form the basis for microcredit activity. This allows for speculation as to whether microcredit works as the literature currently assumes.KEYWORDS: Capabilities; entrepreneurial finance; institutions; microfinance1.IntroductionEntrepreneurial activity is strongly influenced by the context it is embedded in (Baumol 1990, 1993; Autio and Acs 2010; Welter 2011). Particularly in emerging markets, entrepreneurs face a number of challenges, such as the mixed success ofinnovation (Bradley et al. 2012), weak institutions (Acemoglu 2003), and low human capital levels (Acs and Virgill 2010). One particular challenge for these entrepreneurs is access to finance (Honohan 2007) which can lead them into “poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996), ultimately undermining their ability to freely choose among options (Gries and Naudé 2011) and pursue the goals they value (Alkire 2005). A financial sector that is well developed, on the contrary, would give them the instrumental capability to more adequately participate in economic exchange (Sen 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007).To respond to funding challenges that particularly characterize developing economies, the provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs has been regarded as an important part of the strategy through which livelihoods could be improved (Mair and Marti 2006; Peredo and Mclean 2006; Khavul 2010). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) pursue profit-making strategies that facilitate and support the ongoing activity of capital provision to entrepreneurs while also trying to extend their services and drive outreach (Morduch 1999; Fernando 2006). By providing microcredit, savings, insurance, and retirement plans, individuals are able to obtain capital which can be used to finance the creation and the survival of new ventures (Campbell 2010; Khavul 2010). As such, microcredit allows entrepreneurs to build assets and economic resources, while creating employment opportunities and services for local communities (Helms 2006). This can ultimately have an effect on individuals’ capabilities and the contexts entrepreneurs operate in (Mair and Marti 2009).Current debates in the microcredit and microfinance literature have focused on the dynamics through which microcredit is deployed, particularly to women, as well as its effectiveness (cfr. among others Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Milanov, Justo, and Bradley 2015; Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch 2015), how microfinance institutions function (cfr. among others, Morduch 1999; Armendariz and Morduch 2007) as well as their level of sustainability (cfr. among others, Gonzalez-Vega 1994; Morduch 2000), and their ability to shape the context they operate in (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013). Research has also indicated that institutional quality determines theperformance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and Chávez 2015) and that institutions influence how entrepreneurial finance is channeled to entrepreneurs in developing economies (Eid 2005). However, Beck (2007) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) indicate that small and medium-sized businesses, often called “missing middle,” offer high returns on investments in these contexts. Yet, they remain underserved financially and overlooked by researchers. We also know that empirical access to finance is a critical issue for firms in developing economies and microcredit is a particular type of high-risk debt which may not always be sought after (Hulme 2000; George 2005).In addition, if context shapes entrepreneurship and sets the boundaries for entrepreneurial action (Welter 2011), it is not clear (a) whether ventures using microcredit are those whose capabilities are constrained the most by the environment they operate in and (b) under which institutional conditions these ventures actually use microfinance to fund their business needs. The question about when and where entrepreneurs decide to pursue or forgo the option of using microfinance loans still remains unanswered (Khavul 2010). In this paper, we ask the following question: How do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? To answer these questions, our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit by firms in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized as a context with a high level of constrained capabilities. Often viewed as institutionally homogenous (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), we highlight the institutional heterogeneity of this context and the varying capabilities associated with it. We test predictions using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, the Economic Freedom of the World Report index (2011), as well as the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). Our findings indicate that microcredit is indeed used in areas where individuals’ entrepreneurial capabilities are more constrained. At the same time, in these contexts, microcredit tends to be mostly used where there is either a well-developed market or a well-functioning political–judicial system which guarantee a minimal“rule of game”. It is only under those institutional conditions that firms, constrained by their capabilities, are prone to/can use microcredit to financetheir business activities.2.Theoretical backgroundSen’s (1999, 2005) “capabilities approach” introduced the notion that development should be conceptualized as freedoms, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their ability to act. Because individuals have ideas about the type of lives they want to live, they act in accordance with such aims (Sen 1999). Following the capabilities approach, antecedents and consequences of individual circumstances can be highlighted using non-monetary indicators: Capability constraints need to be understood with respect to the individual’s freedom, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their abilities to do or to be (Alkire 2005). In the capabilities approach, a person’s freedom refers to the genuine opportunity to realize whatever it is that they are trying to achieve (Alkire 2005). This, in turn, determines“what they do” (Anand et al. 2009). Building on Sen’s (1999) argument, Nambiar (2013) further reports that capabilities are synonymous with individuals feeling constrained or enabled by their immediate circumstances, whereas Robeyns (2005), Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) indicate that it is an individual’s environment which creates heterogeneities in capabilities. Severely restricted capabilities are therefore associated with an inability to act in accordance with ones’ aims.Prior work shows that context is particularly important in shaping entrepreneurial capabilities: By setting boundaries, it can be the space for the emergence of opportunities while also placing limitations upon them (Welter 2011; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013). Context influences enterprising activities at the intersection of different levels of analysis, situating theories, and empirical patterns within their natural settings (Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014). Evans (2002) and Sen (1999), among others, indicate that the institutional context indeed influences capability development. Both Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) explain that expanding individual freedoms are central to advancing capabilities; this expansion is guided by institutional frameworks. The proposition here is thatinstitutional development impacts freedoms, such as those related to economic opportunities, property, finance, and other basic services (Stiglitz 1998; Nussbaum 2000), and this impacts capability development. On the one hand, as Robeyns (2005) reports, the capabilities of entrepreneurs require appreciating that there are heterogeneities in their abilities to achieve their aims. On the other hand, institutional failure can increase transaction costs which limit the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, reducing the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities and leading to suppression of entrepreneurial activity (Baker, Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin 2005).The development of financial institutions, which provide adequate financial services, is categorized by Sen (1999) as an instrumental capability. Contexts where financial institutions are underdeveloped contribute to the creation of“poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996) as it reduces the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities. This, in turn, hinders the ability of individuals to adequately participate in economic exchange and overall capabilities (Sen 1999). Microcredit developed in contexts characterized by limited access to resources (Peredo and Chrisman 2006) as a solution for individuals who are constrained by the environment, which inhibits the pursuit of lucrative opportunities (Sen 2005). As such, microcredit acts as a means toward the expansion of entrepreneurs’ capabilities (Ansari, Munir, and Gregg 2012) who can incrementally improve their capabilities of achieving small-scale solutions to macro social problems (Moyo 2009). This leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:Hypothesis 1. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where capabilities are constrained.Hypothesis 2. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where economic institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 3. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where political-judicial institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 4. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit in environments characterized by high constrained capabilities where economic institutions are more(less) developed and political-judicial institutions less (more) developed.3.MethodologyTo test our hypotheses, we used data by the World Bank through its annual Enterprise Survey. We focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa since this has been consistently depicted as one of the areas with seriously restricted capabilities. In particular, the World Bank (2012) reports an increase in sub-Saharan urban population by 114% between 1990 and 2009, and an increase in people living with less than $1 a day by 183%; also, the average life expectancy at birth results to be 52.5 years, compared with 71.5 years for North Africa and 69.2 years for the world. Still, the prevalence of HIV for people aged 15–49 is nearly 7 times the world’s average (World Bank 2012).Twenty-seven sub-Saharan countries were included in the survey. The enterprise surveys collect firm level information on the business environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and the various constraints to firm performance and growth (World Bank 2011). Firm-level data are available from 2002; however, since data prior to 2006 were collected by different units within the World Bank and employed different survey questions for different countries, our analysis focuses on data collected from 2006. In addition, the enterprise survey is addressed to operating businesses that employ a minimum of five employees; this eliminates most of the subsistence-driven and self-employment forms of entrepreneurship, something that Karnani (2007) has defined as “misguiding” in that the focus on subsistence entrepreneurship does not help us in understanding and/or explaining economic development. Similarly, Mead and Liedholm (1998) have shown that within an African context, small and medium-sized enterprises generate significantly more jobs than larger scale enterprises yet remain chronically underfunded. By concentrating on ventures with five or more employees, we are able to focus on the“missing middle” of the microfinance sector which have the greatest potential for driving economic growth and is consistently under-researched (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002). To date, this is a group of entrepreneurs who havereceived sparse attention within the microfinance literature, which has heavily focused on microfinance institutions themselves rather than on recipients of their services (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Moss, Neubam, and Meyskens 2015; Silva and Chávez 2015).For what concerns our conceptualization of entrepreneurship as new ventures, consistent with prior research in both developed and developing countries, we limited our analysis to those firms that were not part of larger firms and were less than 10 years old (Benson 2001; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Reuber and Fischer 2002; Barnir, Gallaugher, and Auger 2003; Park and Bae 2004; Bhagavatula et al. 2010). Based on these parameters, our sample size for analysis was 5255 of the 16847 firms in the original Enterprise Survey data set.4.Discussion, limitations, and future researchScholars have consistently linked entrepreneurial activity with economic growth. However, in developing countries, individuals often lack the capabilities to access the market and obtain capital to fund new business opportunities. Acknowledging these challenges, microcredit developed to provide small amount of loans to allow such individuals to efficiently engage in economic exchange and build their ventures, thus making wider economic contributions (Mcmullen 2011). However, entrepreneurship researchers have argued that contextual factors, both at the individual and institutional level, augment entrepreneurial activity (Baumol 1990; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013).This paper highlights the contextual conditions under which new, growing ventures use microcredit. These ventures are classified as the“missing middle” and have been overlooked by mainstream academic research and practitioners’ work, where a focus has been on individuals receiving microcredit for subsistence purposes and/or to develop micro-enterprises (Beck 2007). Yet, we know that microcredit developed as a solution to offer individuals the necessary financial instruments that would enable building entrepreneurial capabilities by developing new businesses. As such, this “missing middle” represents smaller firms within developing economiesthat have limited financial options even though they may offer returns on investments in these contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) and potentially provide much more significant economic externalities in terms of job and wealth creation (Karnani 2007). Although the term “missing middle” has been used for some time, there is very little research on this group of firms even though they are becoming a more prominent part of the microfinance picture and have a more significant economic impact than their micro counterparts (Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013).Because sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized by high constraints to individual capabilities and little attention has been paid to heterogeneity of capabilities across the continent (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit in“missing middle” ventures in such countries. Specifically, we examine the degree to which microcredit is utilized by new ventures as a function of the country’s institutional environment, measured as the development of economic and political institutions, and of the degree of constraints to a firm’s capabilities, measured by the fruitfulness of the commercial environment. We then argue that microcredit is more likely to be used by those ventures that have higher restrictions to their capabilities only when there is some institutional arrangement, either at an economic or political–judicial level that sets “the rules of the game.”Our empirical results suggest that microcredit is indeed used by these new, missing middle ventures in contexts that present challenges both at the firm and institutional level of analysis. The identification of a positive effect between the use of microcredit and the constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities reinforces Sen’s (1999) view and the notion that microcredit facilitates access to capital for those entrepreneurs that operate in regions with the most restricted capabilities. However, our results also show this happens only when there are appropriate supporting institutional mechanisms, further suggesting that contextual features of the institutional environment shape microfinance activity. Particularly, the use of microcredit by the“missing middle” increases in contexts characterized by restricted capabilities and either (a) well (less) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions or (b) less (well) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions. Theunderdevelopment of economic institutions can prevent entrepreneurs from forming contracts, ultimately increasing business uncertainty and compounding their ability to create wealth (Seelos and Mair 2007). This is theoretically consistent with the Mair and Marti (2009) argument who assert that MFIs act as institutional entrepreneurs in contexts of institutional weakness left open by underdeveloped economic institutions. Similarly, contexts where political–judicial institutions are characterized by high levels of corruption raise the fundamental threat of rent and asset expropriation, generating uncertainty in the business environment. This uncertainty undermines entrepreneurial aspirations of individuals and has a stronger effect on new ventures than on established ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In such contexts, institutions in charge of transferring resources to one party to another, and designed to serve on behalf of the government or the people (including, thus, the government itself ), may not be answerable to their principals.However, our results also do show that we should consider the interaction between development of economic and political institutions to fully understand the use of microcredit by new, growing firms and that heterogeneity of capabilities drives such relationship. Particularly, microcredit may help shape institutional contexts characterized by heterogeneous capabilities, but foundational institutional support is needed in order to tackle such capability problems. Whereas prior work (Mair and Marti 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013) has indicated that microcredit is used in contexts where only economic institutions are to be developed, our work shows that there must be some formal institutional political framework in place for entrepreneurs to use microcredit in such contexts. Without it, the developmental role of microcredit may be overstated.At the same time, we also show that microcredit is used in contexts where there is development of economic institutions. Yet, we identify that the use of microcredit is to be found in contexts with stronger economic institutions and weak political ones. It is precisely this interaction between developed economic institutions and underdevelopment of political ones that the literature has not addressed this far. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the distinction between extractive and inclusiveinstitutions, arguing that extractive contexts (e.g., autocratic rule/weak governance) can have strong economic institutions. However, because these are less open politically, they may deter potentially novel businesses that spur economic growth. If microcredit is utilized by capability-constrained firms in potentially extractive contexts, this suggests that the entrepreneurial activity being stimulated, even within the “missing middle”, may be less productive for economic development (Baumol 1990). Our work, therefore, highlights the institutional conditions within which microcredit is used to fund the development of new entrepreneurial opportunities: if less favorable political contexts may lead entrepreneurs to capture opportunities which are less conducive to the overall development of the economy, the impact of microcredit in these nations may be somehow minimalistic. Conversely, in more politically inclusive economies, microcredit may help spur the creation of more competitive and innovative markets which can help diversify markets beyond the basic services (e.g., food goods, provisions) often provided (Banerjee 2007). As such, the relationship between the nature of the institutional environment and the type of business opportunity pursued in the microfinance industry would be an interesting avenue for further study. Indeed, further study needs to dig deeper into the role of informal institutions in this process.Overall, this encourages us to consider whether the relationship between microcredit, entrepreneurship, and capabilities works as the literature currently assumes – microcredit is used by entrepreneurs in the most resource constrained environments where only economic institutions are to be shaped. As such, our findings suggest a more complex picture than extant research currently suggests and contribute to a better understanding of the use of microcredit at the level of the firm receiving it (Silva and Chávez 2015), with a need to consider institutional heterogeneities both within and across developing countries (Roth and Kostova 2003) and the interaction between a complex constellation of factors of institutions and capabilities (Nambiar 2013). It is therefore of key importance for future work to understand the dynamics through which microcredit is developed in contexts characterized by political institutional weakness. From a political perspective, mostresearch has focused on the role of regulation in the microfinance sector (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2011) without considering the other aspects of political institutions we have theorized, and empirically identified, here. This would help scholars and practitioners alike in gaining a better understanding how microcredit works in varying political environments.From a policy perspective, our findings which suggest that new ventures need some level of institutional support to be able to pursue and fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, something that has strong implications given the recent political upheaval in North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In post-conflict contexts, often characterized by the lowest level of capability development, and where political institutions (or economic ones) are still in the process of being redefined and shaped, the intervention of MFIs may be of key importance in stimulating entrepreneurial activity and the economy in some of the most challenging contexts. Emerging evidence suggests that many nations in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond are developing the appropriate institutions through which financial institutions can stimulate the private sector (Naudé 2010). Microcredit could be an appropriate tool for augmenting entrepreneurial activity in those environments where individuals lack the basic individual and institutional infrastructure to fulfill their aspirations. As such, the ability of entrepreneurs to have access to improved instrumental capabilities is likely to be shaped by how varying institutional arrangements support them, determining where investors see scalable operations and therefore the diversity of financial services at the disposal of entrepreneurs.Aside from the contribution and further reflection that our results stimulate, there are limitations to our study that need to be considered in any further extrapolation from our results. First, the study was cross sectional in nature and, as such, cannot make a reliable inference on the direction of the interplay between the effectiveness of the provision of microcredit on capabilities or on the institutional development over time. The nature of our data enabled us to study only the use of microcredit as a function of capability constraints, but a promising and much needed extension of the work concerns the reverse relationship, i.e., how the use of microcredit helps inimproving entrepreneurial capabilities. Second, while large-scale data are difficult to collect on this topic, the availability of the enterprise survey has enabled us to throw a glimpse at the use of microcredit across a large group of African countries. At the same time, as is true for any secondary data set, the data offer limited insight into the conditions and rationale under which microcredit was (or was not) obtained. We hope that our insights can stimulate further research that would seek to elucidate this mechanism through more suitable research designs.中文译文小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究摘要学者们越来越多关注，在哪种条件下，小额信贷才会被新的、成长中的企业所使用。

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)RURAL FINANCE: MAINSTREAMING INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSBy Hans Dieter SeibelAbstractInformal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associations, are of ancient origin. Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgradetheir operations and be integrated into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have spontaneously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to banks; strengthening Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environment, promoting appropriate legal forms, prudential regulation and delegated supervision. Key words: Microfinance, microcredit, microsavings。

金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。

拉丁美洲农村金融机构信贷风险管理【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Managing Credit Risk in Rural Financial Institutions in Latin American Material Source：Rural Financial Learning Centre（RFLC）Authors：Mark Wenner, Sergio Navajas, Carolina Trivelli, Alvaro TarazonaAdequately managing credit risk in financial institutions is critical for their survival and growth. In the case of rural lending in general and agricultural lending in particular, the issue of credit risk is of even of greater concern because of the higher levels of perceived risks resulting from some of the characteristics of rural dwellers and the conditions that they find themselves in. More extremely poor people tend to live in rural than in urban areas. In addition, fewer people are able to access basic infrastructure services and these tend to be of lesser quality or to be less reliable than in urban areas. Rural residents tend to be less educated, more often than not they have insecure land tenure, and they live farther apart than urban populations .Most importantly, agriculture, the mainstay of most rural economies, tends to be subject to price volatility, weather shocks, and trade restrictions. As a result, financial institutions that are active in rural areas are likely to face an elevated level of credit risk and need to manage it well. The lack of good risk mitigation techniques and high transaction costs can discourage formal financial institutions from entering and serving rural areas.Conclusions and RecommendationsCredit risk management in Latin American rural financial institutions is improving and evolving, but much still needs to be done. Many of the institutions surveyed demonstrated success as measured by high overall rates of profitability, low delinquency rates in both general and agricultural portfolios, and sustained growth rates in agricultural portfolios over time. Nonetheless, the paucity of institutions active in rural areas and expressed desires for better risk management systems, the relatively small loan sizes, and restricted terms indicate that the situation is less than optimal.There are four ways to deal with credit risk—reduce it, cope with it, transfer it, or retain it. Based on survey results and the four case studies, the followingtechniques were identified as the most important and widely used:1.Expert-based, information-intensive credit technologies (whereinrepayment incentives for clients and performance incentives for staff play important roles and information acts as a virtual substitute for real guarantees) are being used to reduce risk.2. A number of diversification strategies (geographic, sectoral,commodity) are being used to cope with risk.3.Portfolio exposure limits (wherein agricultural credit is less than 40percent of total lending) are being used to reduce risk.4.Excessive provisioning is being used to absorb and internalize risks.Few, however, are transferring the credit risk to third parties and this represents the next challenge. Massive credit expansion in developed countries has been due in large part to the introduction and wide diffusion of risk transfer techniques (insurance, securitization, derivatives ,etc.) and the wider acceptance of different types of collateral (inventories, accounts receivables ,warehouse receipts, etc.). In Latin America, the most common risk transfer instruments available are publicly-financed loan guarantee funds; however, they are used only modestly (25 percent).Historically, guarantee funds have been plagued with problems of high costs, limited additional-ity, and moral hazard (A distinction should be made between individual loan guarantee funds to which this statement applies and intermediary guarantees to which it does not). Recent work has shown that the most successful guarantee funds in Latin America (in terms of additional-ity) are those in Chile, and that much of the positive impact is due to adequate regulation (Llisterri et al., 2006). In order to introduce some of the other risk transfer instruments more commonly found in developed financial markets, investments will be needed to reform and strengthen the insurance industry, capital markets, credit bureaus, commercial codes, secured transaction frameworks, and information disclosure rules. The implications of using the aforementioned credit risk management techniques commonly found in Latin America are manifold.First, the credit evaluation technologies commonly used are very expensive and tend to increase operating costs and interest rates charged because they are time and labor intensive. Steps need to be taken to dramatically reduce the cost of gathering and analyzing data; of securing, perfecting, and executing guarantees; of classifying and modeling risks; and of monitoring clients. With cost reductions, innovations in delivery mechanisms, and greater competition, interest rate spreads should declineover time, making financial systems more inclusive.Second, some minimal economies of scale and scope are necessary. The larger rural finance institutions in the sample showed that they could more easily diversify risks, offer a wider range of products, obtain better efficiency ratios, and charge lower lending interest rates. Agricultural lending probably cannot be the primary type of lending unless more robust risk transfer techniques become more commonplace. If more sophisticated risk transfer instruments can be introduced, smaller and more agriculturally or i-ented institutions can be more readily helped and supported. Otherwise, the challenge for donors/governments and owners of financial institutions is how to rapidly grow and diversify financial institutions that started out small with a rural vocation and how to attract to rural are as larger institutions that hitherto were primarily urban. The majority of rural financial institutions tend to be very small, exhibit many institutional needs (access to more low-cost source of funds, inadequate credit technology, better internal controls) and are possibly overexposed to agriculture .The larger financial institutions that social planners would like to see more active in rural areas are not interested because they perceive high risks and can exploit other more profitable market segments such as consumer lending to salaried workers.Third, the agricultural microfinance credit technology reviewed here is essentially an adaptation of urban microcredit technology, but it has limits. The better-performing institutions seem to adhere to a common set of principles, but there are slight differences from institution to institution as they adapt the principles to suit local conditions. For example, the general rule is to give preference to highly diversified households, but if price and yield risk can be controlled, institutions will lend to highly specialized farm households. The noteworthy differences of the rural adaptation of the urban micro-credit technology are the use of specialized staff with a knowledge of agronomy, fewer repayments, larger loan sizes, charging of relatively lower interest rates compared to micro-enterprise rates to avoid adverse selection, and projection of a strong corporate responsibility image. All of the four case study institutions, for example, finance works of charity and have a visible presence in the communities where they operate .The emerging model of agricultural microfinance, however, will have to evolve and possibly coexist with other credit technologies more suited for small business and fixed investment lending. The leading institutions are constantly tweaking and improving their technologies. However, the tweaking is being done by trial and error and not in asystematic way. To fully understand what works and does not work, cost accounting (activity-based accounting), randomize devaluations, and frequent client satisfaction surveys would have to be institutionalized .These changes can be costly and would require anew mindset and way of doing business.Based on the survey and case study findings, we have formulated six recommendations for donors, governments, and managers of financial institutions interested in designing interventions to improve how rural financial institutions manage credit risk.First, donors and governments should identify and support rural institutions with a minimum scale that would permit easy diversification of credit risk and help them to expand and innovate as the preferred or first best option. The second best option would be assist those with a clear strategic commitment to the rural sector and competent management to do the following: (i)upgrade credit technologies; (ii) help them develop diversification strategies within their reach(i.e. introduce new credit products, finance a wider number of sectors, finance only highly diversified households); and (iii) use agricultural portfolio limits by agency and total portfolio as an early warning system to take corrective actions .As the third best option, and in the absence of minimal scale institutions, donors and governments should strive to assist smaller institutions to merge or associate. An effective association of smaller institutions can derive benefits from collective action such as fundraising, common training, purchase and installation of modern information management systems, and lobbying for regulatory changes. A movement to merge smaller institutions would permit the emerging entity to have scale and scope. A fourth option would be to promote value chain financing wherein credit risk is managed and transferred among various actors in a supply chain. A fifth possible option, that donors and governments may pursue, would be link ages between regulated financial institutions (such as commercial banks) with NGOs active in rural areas. NGOs, for example, could serve as delegates of banks in remote areas.Second, donors, governments, and managers/owners of rural financial institutions need to collaborate in the introduction and improvement of a variety of risk transfer instruments. The risk transfer instruments in rank order of easiest to most difficult to introduce are (i) recognition and valuing of inventories and accounts receivables as forms of assets that can be pledged as colla t-eralor sold to third parties for cash; (ii) guarantee funds; (iii) credit insurance (death, disability, portfolio); (iv) parametric crop insurance; (v) portfolio securitization; and (vi)derivatives and swaps. Each of the above has preconditions and country-by-country assessments would have to be made. In general, recognition of inventories and accounts receivables require reforms in banking supervision and regulatory frameworks ,commercial codes, and taxes affecting financial transactions. To improve guarantee fund operations, political interference needs to be minimized or eliminated and adequate regulation introduced. To introduce credit insurance, credit bureaus have to be strengthened, and massive databases and probabilistic risk models built. To introduce crop insurance, large investments in information, training, and modeling are needed .To introduce portfolio securitization, long data series on loan type performance, standard underwriting procedures, a sufficient number of homogenous loans for bundling, and rating companies are needed. For derivatives and swaps, well-developed legal/regulatory frameworks and capital markets need to be developed.Third, donors and governments should promote and support regulated nonbank financial institutions .Nonbanks are forced to be more disciplined (adhere to loan documentation, risk classification, and provisioning rules) and have better chances of diversifying liabilities (access to government lines of credit, issuing bonds, capture savings (where permitted) besides obtaining commercial loans), but allowances have to be made for flexibility and innovation.Fourth, the role of the state is fundamental in helping to develop rural financial markets, but direct political interference at the retail level can retard progress. The preferred role would be for state-owned second-tier institutions to extend lines of credit and to train staff of rural finance institutions. Many of the institutions expressed a need for more liquidity and access to low-cost funds. It was also clear that term finance is very scarce. Most institutions do not offer term finance with the stated reason being fear of mismatches .Second-tier institutions and international donors can assist in extending terms through a combination of lines of credit and promotion of savings mobilization.Fifth, donors and governments should focus on improving the legal and regulatory framework, especially with regards to improving contract enforcement, an expressed concern of many surveyed.Sixth, donors and governments can assist in the capture and dissemination of relevant information that would serve to reduce asymmetries that contribute to market failures. High quality and functioning databases would help to facilitate better agricultural marketing, better risk measurement, better risk modeling, and thedesign of credit, savings, and insurance.译文拉丁美洲农村金融机构信贷风险管理资料来源:农村金融学习中心（RFLC）作者：马克·温纳,塞尔吉奥·纳瓦加斯,卡罗莱纳·泰维利,阿拉瓦罗·塔拉泽那金融机构恰当的信贷风险管理对于其生存和发展是非常关键的。

农企融资问题研究外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处：Edelman S. The Research on the Finance Service of Small and Medium-sized Agricultural Corporate [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2016，15(9): 12-22.原文The Research on the Finance Service of Small and Medium-sized AgriculturalCorporateEdelman SAbstractWhen agricultural financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises, on the one hand, because of a shortage of enterprise to the pledged collateral, credit information asymmetry, weak ability to resist risks, life-size characteristics, on the other hand is due to the imperfection of the financial system, inadequate financial innovation. Financing difficulties became a limit and the bottleneck of restricting agricultural development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Although the government is constantly to support policy, Banks are also continuously improve products and services, but the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult problem is always difficult to crack. At present, the study of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises financing difficult problem is mainly concentrated in the development of the financial support system, accelerate the construction of credit guarantee system, set up financial institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises, etc., considering the current development situation of financial markets, through these ways to solve the problem of financing problems of small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises also need to be realized a long period of time. So at present, the commercial bank developing agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing business through innovation, in view of the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing needs improvement, financial product innovation and financing mode of correction, to alleviate the practice of agricultural financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises are more feasible.Keywords: Finance Service; Agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises;Agribusiness finance1 IntroductionAgricultural small and medium-sized enterprise credit level is low, the lack of mortgage assets, financing cost higher specificity, agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises often because of lack of money and become helpless. On the other hand because of the investment system is not sound, lack of complete legal protection system and policy support system, agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises through equity financing; At the same time, the bank for reasons of risk and profit, agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise is difficult to get bank credit funds to support. So the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprises get financial resources and its reality demand unbecoming. The serious restriction and slow the pace of the farmers to get rich, influence the development of the industrialization of agriculture, agriculture has always been the core of the enterprise in the aspect of improving their finances often use "extend payment days", and "to give discount" to the dealer to pay in advance. Given the way with the interests of the whole industry chain on the best strategic arrangement in conflict, many core enterprises are actively seeking new financing options.2 The present situation of agribusiness financingSmall and medium-sized agricultural enterprise's vitality and growth although there for all to see, but it still does not decrease the market-oriented financing difficulty. In agricultural enterprises, on the one hand, most small and medium-sized enterprise is located in the township, mainly agricultural products processing enterprises, these enterprises "small, scattered, low and weak" fundamental change, development present situation is not survival situation is not optimistic. Some Banks, on the other hand, the agricultural enterprise credit support far lower than its contribution to the national economy, insufficient funds for many enterprises to develop the most adverse problems. Credit demand of the enterprise cannot be satisfied, greatly restrain its development.In three major industries, as the first industry of agriculture from the financial institutions of the total amount of credit funds are still in a passive subordinate status.From the three major industries of external financial support, on agriculture disadvantage of small and medium-sized enterprises as the main body of the agricultural industry didn't fundamentally change.According to the corporate finance theory suggests that enterprises should want to get better development, need to constantly broaden the financing policy, implementation of multi-level, three-dimensional financing. With the deepening of financial reform, the development of capital market to the deep time, diversified financing channels has been established, broke the indirect financing mode in the past. Still in terms of the present stage, the agricultural small and medium-sized enterprise financing scale is still small, capital source with given priority to with their own money, development rely on the profit mode of survival. Mainly labor-intensive small and medium enterprises of agriculture, the profit level is generally low, still profit model of a single, only rely on their own capital and profits retained as the main source of funds of enterprises, are unable to meet the enterprise long-term expanded reproduction and the needs of the development of investment.3 The reason of the agribusiness financing predicamentFarmers' property rights is not clear, less collateral, resist risk ability is poor, which means that the agribusiness naturally not the darling of the capital. Some growth companies need financial support, and investment funds and struggling to find suitable investment. There are many reasons for this, now in addition to some small companies, a large number of agricultural enterprises are in a small size or scale of decentralized management mode. Hence lead to investment fund, want to find out of the project is really difficult, it is found that, after the agricultural enterprise to achieve its investment condition, and even fewer. Now many enterprises in their management is not very formal, and add their own size is too small, also cause they are difficult to value investment funds, this should be a problem in many aspects. For this problem, the most main or agricultural enterprise own reason, of course, there are some policy implications.In addition to their own reasons, there are some other factors also influence financing of agribusiness. First of all, in the agricultural materials enterprise financingways, main approaches on the one hand, rely on bank loans, on the one hand is the capital of the industry, for the moment, more should come from industry external capital is the industry's external investors. But because the people often said that the agricultural enterprises need more money, get less money, account problem of agricultural enterprises. First, because agricultural enterprises of low profit margins. Professional development economic organization, but not let the enterprise into a large scale, because now the main body of agriculture or to give priority to with farmers, the reason for restricting large-scale agricultural enterprises to, is out of fear of a lot of land-losing farmers appeared this situation into account. Agricultural enterprises want to develop only tried to pay attention to production, but who is the trend of the development of the agricultural enterprises in the aspect of raw material supply more secure who is all the more development of the initiative, so don't let the large-scale agricultural enterprises to enter, for agricultural enterprises of raw material guarantee is a problem. This should be a threshold limit.Second, now of the various tax policies for small and medium-sized enterprises is higher, the industry many enterprises can't bear, there are some industries and don't let external capital and foreign capital to enter, but from the perspective of market development, in fact is not the problem of how to regulate, but the question of funds, is due to all kinds of threshold for agribusiness is too much, outside money even if want to get into but suitable project and really hard to find, so radically restrict the development of agricultural enterprises. According to understand, agricultural enterprises are not affected by the favor of capital, and relationship with the enterprise, head of the personal credit is very large. Now the agricultural enterprises in the majority of small and medium-sized enterprises, enterprise as legal person is the good and bad are intermingled, credit level is not consistent. Some personal credit degree is low, enterprise as a legal person is defaulted, lay debt, debt phenomenon such as rejection, causing Banks to agribusiness can't trust too much, even if the loan, the credentials must be very heavy and complicated. Lose patience, make agricultural enterprises financing and financing difficult problem is further amplified.Also some people pointed out that the bank would also restricted the financingneeds of agribusiness. As Banks commercialization, the shareholding system reform and market-oriented operation, the pursuit of self-interest maximization as a bank management goal, policy credit funds. Banks more is to pursue investment is large, the returns of large projects, and to "high risk, less number, batch number, recycling" of agricultural projects focus on less, don't want to. Bank itself is not perfect, credit products less, the flexibility and diversity of credit products, some even less than the original credit products, such as farmers microcredit, a credit product shrinkage phenomenon, can't meet the demand of enterprises, especially small agricultural enterprises credit.4 How to decipher the financing difficult of agribusiness enterprisesAt present, agricultural development has been actively towards the transition from traditional simple, extensive agriculture integration of modern industry and modern service industry, the industry chain, agriculture is also in the application of brand strategy, improve the added value of agricultural products, the formation of scale, intensive and industrialized production of the road. And at the same time, the agricultural enterprises only timely change, positive change, to development, the capital support can be achieved.Agribusiness itself now mostly insufficient standard, there are many obstacles in communication with financing institutions. In agricultural enterprise financing is the most realistic difficulty is that many at the time of loan and come up with a decent business plan and the problem of business books, if you have such a file, the bank will save a lot of trouble, will be very reluctant to invest, but now many of the entrepreneurs have is just a preliminary idea, only I want to build a project, the project the idea of what the future holds. Without a detailed description and analysis of market detailed business plan. This should be the cause of loans to a very real problem, it should be said that the two sides on the communication problems.In addition, companies themselves are not financially specification, many enterprises are zhang under two books, a lot of financial is not clear, the financing to hire an accountant, when I was working again, and many books themselves are not clear, make accountant and myself are confused about. So it will be harder to makeothers believe that, financing is a lot of work needs to be done. Because Banks need to first understand the industry is a potential, then we will understand enterprise, thus formed the difference, if the enterprise has a good financial business plans and specifications, it can also go to find money, so could be better for the financing effect. Now, of course, is not looking for investment, but they are now because there is no good business plan, so it is difficult to find. So I think that is really their own many of the problems need to be solved. They must standardize the oneself, make oneself communication barrier-free and financing mechanism, can solve the problem of financing difficulties finally. Agricultural enterprises loan interest rates should be reduced. Because enterprise's pressure is bigger, the preference for high-end products is relatively small, mostly in low - and to carry on the fight. So they should be differentiated. In fact, agricultural enterprises financing difficulties this dilemma has been quietly changed.译文中小型农业企业融资研究Edelman S摘要农业中小企业融资难，一方面时候由于企业抵质押担保不足、信用信息不对称、抗风险能力弱等身特点决定的，另一方面是由于金融体系不够完善，金融创新力不足造成的。

美国农村金融管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

美国农村金融管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Rural Finance: The American ExperienceConstruction of the rural financial system the U.S. The basic principle is to provide financial support for agricultural development. After years of development, rural America as a whole formed a multi-level, full range of financial institutions, through government subsidies, the development of rural financial system, increase agricultural production, agricultural loans and various channels such as social, agricultural financing funds to meet the agricultural the development of a variety of financial needs, to provide the financial security of agricultural modernization. Building a new socialist countryside, we must adhere to the development of the rural economy as the center, and developing the rural economy can not do without the support of rural finance.Rural econenomic development of rural finance as the most important elements of the capital allocation system,and its role more and more obvious,rural financial Xingxing is agriculture,rural finance activities,the agricultural activities.Agricultural development from the experience of other countries, both developed and developing countries have attached great importance to rural financial institution building. In some countries the rural financial development better, establish a general policy, including financial, co-finance and rural insurance, including comprehensive, multi-level financial system, establish a fund to support rural development cycle of long-term mechanism, more better support the rural and agricultural development, safeguarding the interests of the majority of farmers. We are on the rural financial system in these countries a comparative analysis of proposed rural financial system and improve the path selection.The rural financial system construction rationaleRural financial theory to the formation and development, has received the modern financial development theories and policies of influence. From developing countries of rural financial theory perspective, the three major genres: agricultural financing theory, rural financial markettheory and recent incomplete competition theory.In the early 1980s, before agriculture finance theories have been rural financial theory of mainstream. This theory is based on that of rural residents, especially poor strata not saving ability, rural is facing fund shortage problem. And because the agricultural output characteristics (income uncertainty, investment long-term and low yield, etc.), agriculture and cannot be a commercial bank's investment object, this makes the rural financial mess up, a large amount of fund outflow. Therefore, it is necessary to rural peripheral infuse policy fund, and establish non-profit professional financial institutions to capital allocation. However, this over-reliance on external funding of rural financial policy has sparked funds, the low efficiency of the low return a series of contradictions, in addition to the rural financial market mechanism of neglect, cause rural financial cycle development the long-term mechanism of difficult to build.In the 1980s, the rural financial market theory gradually replaced agricultural credit subsidies theory. Its main theories, the lack of rural financial capital, not because farmers not saving ability, but due to the rural financial system unreasonable financial arrangements (such as government regulation, interest rate control, etc.), curb its development. Its policies are: to play a role in financial markets, and reduce government intervention, realize interest rate marketization, achieving rural savings and capital supply and demand the balance, Cancel special specific target loan system, the appropriate development of non-formal finance market, etc.Since the 1990s, again appeared imperfect competition market theory. This theory is mainly, and the market mechanism is not everything, for stable financial market for reasonable government intervention is necessary. Imperfect competition market is the representative figure of SiDiGeLiCi that because of the existence of market failure factors, the government in rural financial market a very important role, but the government also cannot replace market, but should become the beneficial supplement of the market. The government of financial market supervision should adopt indirect control mechanism, and according to certain principle establish regulatory scope and standards. Rural financial market is not a completely competitive market, especially the loan party (financial institutions) to the borrower's situation can't fully grasp the, plus rural special cases, financial institutions to control rural system risk, if fully in accordance with market mechanism might not be able to cultivate a rural social needed financial market, therefore, it is necessary to adopt appropriate financial markets, such as government intervention and theborrower's organization etc non-market measures.The imperfect market competition theory the main policy suggestion: one is the precondition of the development of financial markets is low inflation macroeconomic stability; etc. Second, in the financial market development to a certain degree, compared with interest rate liberalization, before more attention shall be paid to the actual deposit interest rate remained at will, within the scope of positive while suppressing deposit rate of growth, if the resulting credit allocation and excessive credit demand problem, can not damage by governments in financial institutions savings from external motivation and mobilization providing funds, Third, it is in the interests of the most basic does not damage the bank, within the scope of the policy finance (facing the specific sectors cheap financing) is effective. The fourth is the government should encourage and use the borrower LianBao group and organizational borrower mutual cooperation forms, in order to avoid the rural financial market existing incomplete information loan recovery caused by the problem of low, The use of security, access and mutual financing guarantee ChuJinHui wait for method, can improve the asymmetric information, Six is financing and real business (such as fertilizer, crop, etc.) of combining the method is effective and can ensure loan recovery, Seven is to promote the development of financial institutions, should give its certain special policies, such as limits on new participants, etc.We think, due to the particularity of agricultural production, agricultural income uncertainty, agricultural investment long-term and low yield and production of dispersion characteristics, leading to the rural financial transaction costs and funds use cost is higher, regular commercial financial institutions generally don't want to find the rural financial market, produced the market leading of failure. Therefore, in the process of building the rural financial system, the government suitable intervention is necessary and effective. From all the evolution of rural financial system view, government intervention in rural financial constructing early indeed plays a very significant positive effects. But the government intervention is not the ultimate goal of financial development, financial system, with the establishment and perfection of government intervention can only more and hinder the development of rural financial market. Especially in some developing countries due to the macroeconomic environment instability, departmental policy trend and widespread laws and regulations sex obstacle government intervention become the bottleneck of rural financialdevelopment. So, in many countries, the rural financial system to really play a role, first needs to grasp "government intervention degree" this problem.American of rural financial systemThe United States is the world agriculture of the most developed countries, this with a complete the rural financial system are inseparable. American building the rural financial system are fundamental principles for agricultural development fund supports. After years of development, the rural America from whole formed a multi-level and comprehensive financial systems, through government subsidy, the development of rural financial system, increase agricultural loans and agricultural production socialization and other channels for agriculture, agricultural development, meet the financing of various funds for agricultural modernization needs, provides funding. American rural financial system belongs to a kind of composite credit model, this model has the following characteristics: one is to provide agricultural credit funds of organizations, both professional rural financial institutions, there are other types of financial institutions. 2 it is in financial organization system, general is cooperative financial institution, policy financial institutions and commercial financial institutions co-existing. The United States has now formed the government leading rural policy finance, rural cooperative financial system and a rural commercial finance system.(a) American policy of rural financial systemAccording to the American agricultural credit law to establish a rational division of labor and cooperation of policy-related finance system that by farmers' living bureau, rural electrification bureau, commodity credit company and small business administration composition. American policy rural financial institutions is by the U.S. federal government leading created, especially for its agriculture development and rural development to provide financing institution. Its main function is for agricultural production and activities related to the agricultural production provide credit funds and service, and through the adjustment of agricultural credit activity production scale and the direction of development, implementation of rural financial policy, the control ofagricultural development scale, etc. These financial institutions funds mainly comes from the government provides capital, budget, loan turnover funds and part, borrowing funds utilization is mainly provides some commercial Banks and other lenders is not willing to provide loans, in loan object on different records.1. To improve farmers' living, improvement of agricultural production for the purpose of peasants living innings. Farmers' living innings of the predecessor is agricultural revitalize administration, the agency not profit-minded purpose, aims to help the poor areas and low-income farmers solve fund shortage problem, its borrower is mainly who cannot from commercial Banks and other agricultural credit institutions of agricultural loans to employees. In recent years, farmers living bureau also become American government to implement the agricultural policy, the main tool. If the U.S. government to rational utilization of agricultural production resources and family to farmers by farmers extend bureau of water conservancy and land improvement loans, time limit can be 40 years. In 1990s, farmers living in state, county bureau set up offices has reached more than 1700, strongly support the development of agriculture. Farmers' living bureau of capital operation is mainly provides loans and guarantee. Farmers' living bureau of loans into direct loan scheme and emergency loan program two kinds, including farm ownership loans, operating expenditure loans, crackage construction loan, water conservancy development and soil conservation loans, etc; Farmers' living bureau is mainly to the commercial Banks and other financial institutions according to the farmers living bureau loan scheme to farmers the borrower loan assure.2. To improve rural public facilities and conditions and the establishment of the rural electrification bureau. Rural community development, the construction of water conservancy, electric power facilities and other relevant rural basic construction issue that needs to be unified planning to address common, countries should give financial support and provide the necessary credit help. Founded in 1935 of rural electrification bureau, is also the usda subsidiary institutions, Its main functions are on rural thermal-power cooperatives and farms the borrower loan to improve rural electrification level. The agency's fund use is also known for loans and guarantee primarily.3. Commodity credit company. In 1933, the U.S. government established commodity credit company mainly in order to respond to natural disasters and agricultural crisis. Commodity creditsto farm because company natural disasters caused the reduction of give subsidies, and agricultural production insurance are similar. Its main function is implementing the administration of price and income support program that price support, control of agricultural production, avoid agriculture production waves to the agricultural producers impact, safeguard the interests of consumers. The fund application forms mainly for providing loans and payment subsidies, mainly including agricultural mortgages, warehousing, drying and other treatment equipment loans, disaster subsidies and price subsidies.In addition, the United States has a kind of policy-based financial institutions - small business administration, is specialized for not from other normal channel gaining sufficient funds of small businesses to provide financing to help. The fund mainly comes from parliament appropriated turnover funds and withdraw the loan principal and interest, etc, the fund is mainly used for issuing direct loans, participate in joint loan and guarantee and other special credit. Small business administration on small farms lending is with peasants living bureau division of collaboration, if small farm borrower economic conditions and bad loans small, then by farmer family bureau fund supports, when small farm borrower economic status improved, the more loan demand by the small business administration provided.(b) American rural cooperative finance systemBenefited from the United States highly developed economic and financial system, American rural constructed comparatively perfect cooperation financial system. In the early 20th century, American agricultural credit financing is mostly by private institutions and individuals with, such credit funds of the quantity is limited, and period is shorter, as the us economy development, the financial system has clearly can not adapt to the needs of the development of modern agriculture. The U.S. government began in 1916 NongDai formulated a series of law, set up by the U.S. government leading NongDai grass-roots organization specialized Banks and credit system. Its main purpose is passed on the agricultural organizations, agricultural development project lending, expand agricultural funds available sources, improving farmers' working conditions and welfare, increases the farmers' income, accelerate the development of agriculture. Initial rural financial cooperation organization are in government leaders and contributed by support built, along withthe national capital gradually introduced, now of the rural cooperative finance has become by farmers have cooperation financial institutions.Now, the rural cooperative finance by federal medium-term credit bank, cooperative Banks, federal land bank and land bank cooperatives three system composition, the three rural cooperative financial institutions are in government leaders and capital support, using a top-down way up. Among them the federal medium-term credit bank is America's most important agricultural credit cooperative system, this system is 1923 by the U.S. government in 12 credit area established 12 families federal medium-term credit bank composition, its main resolving peasants' short-term loans difficult question. Every credit bank credit cooperatives, subordinate many production cooperatives implement shareholding ownership, the borrower must have equivalent to loan sum of 5% to 10% cooperatives stocks or participate in the card. Loan time limit is 1 year commonly, the longest do not exceed seven years. With the corresponding is federal land banking system, this system comprises 12 agricultural credit the federal land bank and its subordinate co-operatives of composition, this system has become the main provider of farmer long-term loans, Federal land ownership, each bank implements shares to federal bank must pay a total of ubcta member borrowing capital of 5%, bank shares shall belong to all the cooperatives all, also indirectly shall belong to all the borrower all, Federal land bank only deal with long-term real estate loans, loan object basically is the individual farmer, loan time limit for legal 5-40 years. Cooperative bank system is designed to give us a acquire equipment, supplementary operating funds, buying goods such as providing loans and the establishment of, it by thirteen cooperative Banks composition, 12 credit district each set up a, still include in 1988 was created in Washington's central bank partner.(c) American agricultural insurance systemAmerican agricultural insurance system is after fumble ceaselessly, development and form. Early American agricultural insurance is by private insurance companies, but due to agricultural insurance risk huge, its management of the crop insurance are ended in failure. In order to help farmers deal with agricultural production risks, the American government has been very active in crop insurance plan. Since 1938 the federal crop insurance law enacted, the American agricultureinsurance after 60 years of development, the formation of a relatively complete crop insurance business, safeguard level and farmer participation rate rise ceaselessly, for stable agricultural production, improving national welfare level played an important role. Existing U.S. agricultural insurance completely by the commercial insurance company management and agent, of course, commercial insurance company will get government in business management fee and insurance premium, support of subsidies, etc. American crop insurance operation of the main points three levels, the first layer for federal crop insurance company (risk), mainly be responsible for the nationwide administration planted terms the formulation, the risk control to private insurance companies, reinsurance support; etc. The 2nd is have management of agricultural risks qualification priate insurers, they signed an agreement with risk administration execution risk administration, and promised to the provisions of article layer is a crop insurance agent and survey nuclear deliberately, American crop insurance agent sales, mainly through specific business, they are responsible for the implementation.Reference Documentation:1:Steven Husted, Michael Melvin, International Economics [M], (the fifth edition), Higher Education Press, 20022:Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (2005). Financial and legal constraints to growth: Does firm size matter? The Journal of Finance, 60, 137–177.3:Peng, Y. (2004). Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China's transitional economy. American Journal of Sociology, 109,1045–10744:Qian, Y. (2000). The process of China’s market transition (1978–1998):The evolutionary, historical, and comparative perspectives. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156, 151–171.5:Shane, S., & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Management Science, 48, 364–381.6:Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy.International Political Science Review, 22, 201–214.7:Liu, Z. (2003). The economic impact and determinants of investment in human and political capital in China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51, 823–850.8:Birner, R., & Witter, H. (2003). Using social capital to create politicalcapital. In The commons in the New Millennium: Challenges andadaptation (pp. 291–334). Cambridge and London: MIT Press.译文：美国农村金融管理模式美国是世界上农业最发达的国家，这与其有完备的农村金融体制密不可分。

农村小额贷款公司的风险防范可持续发展外文文献翻译

文献出处：Dworkin S L. Rural microfinance companies risk prevention [J]. AIDS and Behavior, 2015, 12(3): 62-71.原文Rural microfinance companies risk preventionDworkin S L.AbstractThe emergence of rural microfinance company is the result of the development of rural financial innovation, on the one hand, not enough because of the reform of the rural financial reform, small scope and the effect is not obvious, lead to the rural financial supply is difficult to meet the financial needs of rural areas is exuberant, makes the difficulty of increasing farmers' income, narrowing the widening gap between urban and rural areas; Small and medium-sized enterprises, on the other hand, due to small size, high operating risk and uncertain problems, such as product market demand, under the impact of the financial crisis, the development of small and medium-sized enterprises more difficult, shortage of funds, the decline in export trade, labor costs rise, material costs are the four major challenges facing the small and medium-sized enterprises, the financing difficult problem is one of the biggest problems. Rural microfinance companies, is advantageous to the release of the rural financial demand, activate the rural financial market, to break the bank financial institutions in the rural credit market monopoly, thus sets out for a different size, different financial demand groups provide differentiated products and services of good situation.Key words: Microfinance; Risk prevention; The sustainable development1 IntroductionSmall loans originated in the 1970 s famous economist Muhammad Bangladesh. Professor test, then the people's bank of Indonesia (BRI) "sunshine" bank of rural credit, Bolivia, Thailand's agricultural and rural cooperative bank, the international community assistance fund (FINCA), credit unions and many non-governmental organizations (Ngoc), etc.Microfinance is essentially -?Order to low-income and disadvantaged groups to provide sustainable financing way of innovative financialservices and strategic targets for poverty alleviation. Microfinance in small practices play a role in driving the people pay attention to the sustainable development of microfinance Sights (1990) argues that this model is mainly on the risk, the risk of regulators on the borrowers. Basely and coater (1995), the group of group of way can through to the default as goods punishment measures to stimulate the members of the reimbursement, thus improve the repayment rates.Microfinance institutions "refers to a specifically for low-income groups in microfinance services business agencies or private organizations. International is usually based on the operation characteristics of microfinance institutions, it can be divided into commercial and welfare, also can say institutionalism and welfarism.And China's microfinance institutions will be divided into two categories: the first kind of foot depend on international aid in the form of non-governmental microfinance institutions or the domestic public welfare organization in the microfinance 0;The second category is the formal financial institutions run by microfinance operations; The second category is the pilot of commercial microfinance company.2 Risk factors for rural microfinance companyAs to improve rural finance, rural microfinance company absorb folk capital, standardize the folk credit, compression of the underground financial a new type of financial institutions, to promote rural financial market competition plays an important role, but at the same time we also cannot ignore, rural microfinance company as a new thing, in the process of operation and development has met some problems from external and internal, these problems restrict the sustainable development of the rural microfinance company, influence the exertion of its effect on rural economic development.2.1 Internal governance structure is imperfectRural Microfinance Company’s equity structure too scattered. Under the condition of the dispersed equity, most of the number of shares of shareholders, leading to a single shareholder's role is limited, although this is beneficial to avoid "a dominant" the negative effect on the corporate governance, is conducive to the democratic decision-making, but is not convenient to the company for centralizeddecision-making. Some small loans company rules, in loans over a certain amount of outward, needs under the condition of all shareholders agree to issue. In addition, has yet to establish scientific and reasonable incentive constraint mechanism, but individual rural microfinance company has established the responsibility, right, the combination of the performance appraisal mechanism, microfinance company will assess to quantify the indicators of achievement effect, the wages of credit shell from its loans are tied to the quantity and quality. But overall, rural microfinance has not yet established a scientific and reasonable mechanism of incentive and constraint. First of all, although some companies formulate measures of performance appraisal, but generally is relatively simple.2.2 Lacking of professionalsIn the long run, rural microfinance company’s market core competitiveness is the loan principle of "small, scattered, compared with the bank loan officers, rural microfinance companies facing the loan officer to customers more and more complicated, credit management personnel must possess high professional level and professional quality. However, good at management talent lack, scattered small loans restricted the small loan business of the company. Because rural microfinance company has just set up soon, is still in the initial stage of development, the company scale is small, ability to resist risk is low, a single business, and generally is located in the township, these reasons have led to a small loan company is difficult to attract good people so rural microfinance companies generally exist the phenomenon of lack of talent area.2.3 The lack of effective risk control mechanismRural Microfinance Company mainly is financial enterprises to form, not understanding the financial sector, basically do not have to establish a risk prevention and control measures. Thus, rural microfinance companies for the control of financial risk consciousness are weak. And rural microfinance company operational risk is relatively large, the reason is that the rural microfinance loan object has its own particularity: on the one hand, the rural small and medium-sized enterprises, compared with large enterprises, small scale, management risk is high, the credit levelis relatively low; At the same time, small and medium-sized enterprise loan amount is small, be nasty, high frequency, fast turnover, so in order to meet the special needs of small and medium-sized enterprises, compared with the bank, micro credit loans business generally have "small amount, short period and high efficiency" features, increased the probability of risk.2.4 "credit not only to save" lead to rural microfinance company funds shortageDifferent from other rural microfinance company engaged in loan business of financial structure is characterized by "goods not only to save”. In practice, due to the rural microfinance company does not belong to financial institutions, its financing from the bank only in accordance with the general business loans to the bank and cannot enjoy interbrain lending rates and only in accordance with the enterprise loan interest rates, coupled with high demand for bank loans to mortgage, guarantee, the petty loan company to the high cost of bank financing. Rural microfinance companies to bank financing difficulties, the more impossible to accept donated money. This leads to the rural microfinance companies operating capital mainly comes from the shareholders to pay capital, unable to absorb deposits, and the financing difficult, to the world makes rural microfinance company in after issuing the capital, is difficult to keep up with the subsequent lending funds, lead to rural microfinance companies facea serious of the problem of insufficient funds.3 The risk prevention measures of rural microfinance companies3.1 Clear market positioning itselfRural Microfinance Company is set up to solve the problem of rural financial service of the new type of organization, is the beneficial supplement of the rural financial system in our country. Small Loan Company shall, in accordance with the requirements of policy design and market environment, with clear market positioning. Rural microfinance company to clear their own market position, you must correct their own management idea, to help farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises to improve economic conditions as the mission, based on agriculture, the development of rural economy, the strategy of increasing farmers' income, firmly establish a depending on "two farmers" strives for the development of business ideas; To focuson the analysis and research of the rural microfinance market, expanding the rural credit cooperatives, agricultural bank, postal savings bank and other financial institutions are difficult to or don't want to involved in microfinance market, strengthening the support to farmers and rural small and medium-sized enterprises, promote the development of rural economy. Second is to avoid positive competition with Banks. Competition with the financial markets, small loan companies should avoid confrontation with the bank, starting from their own familiar with local market conditions, clear its own customer base Hugh foot wide farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises. To hold the characteristic of its flexible, play to the advantage of "ship small good turn", shorten the credit apricot, careful work, small batch process, improve the efficiency of credit approval, the innovation credit product, with Banks left alienation of market competition, promote the development of itself. 3.2 Improve the risk control mechanismLoan guarantees form innovation, reduce borrowers default risk. Rural microfinance company loan object is mainly some low-income farmers and small businesses, small and growing the customer in this case, the rural microfinance companies a foot than commercial Banks can adopt more flexible form of guarantee, the mortgaged property, and the pledge, for example, the farmer's house and usufruct right to the contracted management of land, agriculture and other kinds of rural property can be as loan collateral; In addition, strengthen the loan examination and approval, supervision and administration. Rural microfinance company shall strengthen the examination and approval of loans, improve the loan approval process, strictly implement the former credit investigation, credit tracking tube now occupied a towel and post-loan back not a link, before the loan on the condition of the customer review according to the facts, avoid feelings) LI and personal loans; Loan should carefully review, standardize loan process, establish strict internal control mechanism.3.3 To perfect the corporate governance structureIn general, the corporate internal governance structure refers to the owners (mainly shareholders) for the operator of a supervision and checks and balances. Through a system arrangement, to reasonably configure the rights and responsibilitiesbetween the owner and operator. To perfect internal governance structure of rural microfinance companies, can from the following several aspects: optimization of shareholder structure. One is to improve access for shareholders. Rural microfinance companies claim to the shareholders should not be limited to the financial strength of shareholders (for example, if it has investment ability, capital supplement ability and management ability, etc.), should also ask shareholders itself has a good social credit and social evaluation, moral level and word of mouth. Reasonable design of corporate governance structure. From regulators on rural microfinance company's equity structure design, dispersed ownership structure is beneficial to avoid the "a dominant" the negative effect on the corporate governance, but the decentralized equity design may be inefficient decision-making, shareholders cannot effectively supervise the company's operations, caused a lazy and interests to managers seize opportunities, etc. Under decentralized equity structure, therefore, should be according to the actual situation of microfinance company locates the region and corporate ownership structure, reasonable design of the shareholders meeting, board of directors, management structure, forming an effective corporate governance principal-agent relationship, for the long-term and healthy development of the rural microfinance company is particularly important.3.4 Improve rural micro credit system design of the companyAllow small loans company foreign deposits and appropriately raise the ratio of bank financing. On the one hand, due to the incomplete rural financial system, rural financial development lags behind, rural areas have a large capital requirements; On the other hand, the existing policy, rural microfinance company capital source mainly shareholders' money, donated money and financing, to no more than two Banks shall not exceed 50% of the net capital and financing, this leads to small loans company financing channels of a single, can't meet the demand of rural area larger funds. In order to effectively solve the above problems, rural microfinance company to the public should be allowed to take deposits, namely savings business, successful foreign loan department of the people's bank of Indonesia and Bolivia sunshine bank savings business, financial management, not only help low-income also billion wins the ruralmicrofinance firm's financing channels, to make loans to more customers for its support. Also should be small loan companies into the capital from Banks and other financial institutions to obtain, by now should not exceed 50% of the net capital increase to 100%.Should at the same time, the petty loan company funds to Banks and other financial institutions into the defined as interbrain lending, enjoy the inter bank lending rates, thus reducing microfinance company financing costs, expand the scale of rural microfinance firms.译文农村小额贷款公司的风险防范Dworkin S L.摘要农村小额贷款公司的出现是农村金融不断发展创新的结果,一方面,农村金融改革由于改革力度不够、范围小且效果不明显,导致农村金融供给难以满足农村地区旺盛的金融需要,使农民增收困难,城乡差距不断拉大；另一方面,中小企业由于存在规模小、经营风险高、产品市场需求不确定等问题,在金融危机的冲击下,中小企业的发展更加艰难,资金短缺、出口贸易下滑、人工成本上升原、材料成本上涨是中小企业面临的四大难题,而融资难问题是其中最大的难题。

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。

小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献

小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献1. 简介创业活动受到其所处环境的强烈影响（Baumol，1990，1993；Autio 和Acs，20XX年；Welter，20XX年）。

特别是在新兴市场，企业家面临着诸多挑战，例如创新成败参半（Bradley 等，20XX 年）、制度薄弱（Acemoglu，20XX年）和人力资本水平低下（Acs 和Virgill，20XX年）。

这些企业家面临的一个特别挑战是获得资金的机会(Honohan，20XX年)，这可能导致他们陷入“贫困陷阱”(Berthelmy 和Varoudakis，1996)，最终削弱了他们自由选择的能力(Gries 和Naudé，20XX年)和追求价值目标的能力(Alkire，20XX年)。

相反，一个发展良好的金融部门将使他们有能力更充分地参与到经济交流中（Sen，1999；Beck、Demirgüç-Kunt 和Levine，20XX年）。

为了应对发展中经济体特有的融资挑战，向企业家提供小额信贷已被视为可以改善生计战略的一个重要组成部分（Mair 和Marti，20XX年；Peredo 和Mclean，20XX年；Khavul，20XX年）。

小额信贷机构（MFIs）追求盈利战略，促进和1/ 7支持向企业家提供资本的持续活动，同时努力扩大服务范围，并推动外联（Morduch，1999；Fernando，20XX年）。

通过提供小额信贷、储蓄、保险和退休计划，个人能够获得资金，用于资助新企业的创建和生存（Campbell，20XX年；Khavul，20XX 年）。

因此，因此，小额信贷使企业家能够建立资产和经济资源，同时为当地社区创造就业机会和服务（Helms 20XX年）。

这最终可能会对个人能力和企业家的经营环境产生影响（Mair 和Marti，20XX年）。

目前关于小额信贷和小额融资的文献中的辩论侧重于小额信贷的部署动态，特别是对女性的小额信贷及其有效性（参见Mair、Marti 和Ventresca，20XX年；Milanov、Justo 和Bradley，20XX年；Chliova、Brinckmann 和Rosenbusch，20XX年），小额信贷机构如何运作（参见Morduch，1999；Armendariz 和Morduch，20XX年）小额信贷的可持续发展水平（参见Gonzalez-Vega，1994；Morduch，20XX年），以及小额信贷塑造其运作环境的能力（参见Mair 和Marti，20XX年；Khavul、Chavez 和Bruton，20XX年）。

农村金融外文翻译文献综述

农村金融外文翻译文献综述(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)农村金融发展不会促进经济发展吗？来自尼日利亚的实证摘要：强劲的经济发展是不可能没有金融深化的，尤其是在欠发达国家（最不发达国家）大多数民众居住的农村社区。

本文分析了农村金融发展对尼日利亚经济增长的影响。

本文选用了1980-2011年的时间序列数据，运用Johansen和Juselius的协整检验，以得出变量之间的长期关系。

因此，用动态普通最小二乘法（ DOLS ）方法揭示尼日利亚农村金融发展与经济增长之间的关系。

协整检验结果表明农村金融发展与尼日利亚经济增长之间存在长期关系。

此外， DOLS 结果发现农村金融发展与尼日利亚经济增长之间存在显著的正相关关系。

它在这项研究中得到证实，农村金融作为全国经济增长的引擎。

因此，可以得出结论，提高农村生产力的信贷可以减免弱势创业者的负担，从而使他们能够对尼日利亚经济的发展做出最大的贡献。

此外，本研究建议除其他事项外，对于农村生产的信贷分配的障碍应减少到最低限度。

关键词：农村发展；信贷分配；金融发展1 引言包容性增长的理念，促使第三世界的经济体发起，实现变化的政策和规划旨在将瘫痪的经济代理人转变成积极的人员来提高他们的经济增长。

尼日利亚政府也不例外，政府促进包容性增长通过尼日利亚中央银行（CBN）运用双广义目标金融包容策略。

首先，要将无银行帐户的民众绝大多数在农村社区成为金融体系的活跃成员。

其次，它也强调在农民负担得起的成本上，提高农村居民的信贷可得性。

不幸的是，在使用金融包容性策略如村镇银行和农业信贷保证计划等等，没有达到目标受益者。

一方面，一些确定为负责非洲农村金融市场的发展表现不佳的问题包括过度管制，监管不力和人才缺乏（Aliero，2009）。

另一方面，该方案在那时间会受政治因素影响（Ibrahim和Aliero，2012）。

尼日利亚历届政府都提出了结构调整计划的几个扶贫方案（SAP）通过国家的经济增长和发展战略（需求）转换到议程。

小微企业金融租赁研究中英文对照外文翻译文献

小微企业金融租赁研究中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The Research on Financial Leasing and China’s Small MicroEnterprisesAbstract：The financing difficulties is China’s small micro enterprises existence a universal problem, it has become the main small micro enterprises development of a bottleneck. The financial leasing in the service of small micro enterprises has marked effect. First, to broaden the financing channels of small micro enterprises, second, reduce the fund pressure of small micro enterprises, and the third, promote the technology innovation of small micro enterprises, fourth, promote the market development of small micro enterprises. Due to lack of necessary knowledge on financial leasing, corresponding policies imperfect, lack of the necessary capital supply, affecting the development of financial leasing. To promote the development of financial leasing, China should establish uniform management system, improve the relevant policies, expand the funding sources of financial leasing.Key words: Small micro enterprises; Financial leasing; Role; Problems; SuggestionsINTRODUCTION：Small micro enterprises in the process of economic development of China plays a more and more prominent role, however, China’s small micro enterprises generally faced the difficulty of shortage of funds. How to solve the financing problems of small micro enterprises is a hot issue in China’s economic development. Studies have shown that financial leasing is an effective way to solve the financing difficulties of small micro enterprises in China. Positive development of financial leasing, can effectively resolve the financing problems of small micro enterprises, thereby promoting economic development.Financial Leasing as a new way to trade, it put the traditional rental, trade and financial way all organic combination up, be understood as a financing bank loans and capital markets after the third road. Financial leasing has the dual function of financing and financial objects, has its unique advantages in the service of the real economy, especially in services to small micro enterprises. In 2010 June, Chinese financial authorities issued further completes the small micro enterprise financial service work certain opinions, requirement to the development of the financial leasing business. The full display financial leasing’s function, may promote the small micro enterprise’s development effectively.1. FINANCIAL LEASING IS THE IDEAL FINANCING OPTIONS FOR SMES IN CHINABecause China’s small micro enterprises financing channel is narrow, the financial leasing in service for small companies can give full play to the advantages provided a condition.The enterprise financing way has stockholder’s rights financing and the creditor’s rights financing two types. Stockholder’s rights financing can be divided into two forms: public offering and private collect. The public to raise financing is IPO financing. From the present situation of the development of China’s capital market see, through the IPO of the financing of enterprise are only a small part, thousands of companies listed on the inside and outside is only a very small part of the tens of millions of enterprises. Do not need to undergo a rigorous listing of the audit through a private placement financing, relatively speaking, easier to achieve financing, however, due to the operation of the private equity funds to achieve legalization, even though the public has a lot of private equity funds exist, but really be able to supply the amount of money is relatively limited. On the creditor’s rights financing, at present China’s form of creditor’s rights financing is sing le,mainly bank credit channel. Bank considering security problems, often to provide money for a credit ratings, the strength of large enterprises, in addition, due to the bank credit market degree is relatively low, not established truly mature enterprise credit rating system, especially the rating system of the small micro enterprises, so that the bank credit activity impossible cover a much wider range of debt financing needs, only to meet a range of financing demand. So, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially small micro enterprises financing constraints become enterprise development of a bottleneck. Financial leasing way was invented in the 1950s, as a kind of long-term debt financing, is by the lesser according to the lessee’s need, in advanc e in accordance with the contract, the lessee to designated betray a person to buy the lessee designate d fixed assets, in the lessor has the fixed assets under the premise of ownership, to the lessee pays the rent for conditions, will be a period of time fixed assets and earnings of the right to transfer to the lessee. Financial lease financing way has several obvious features: First, the lessee may have a full financing. Second, can save the lessee's capital investment, reduce business cash flow pressure. Third, the leased equipment is selec ted according to their needs to determine by the lessee. Fourth, lease activities involve at least three parties, can form the mutual restrict. Fifth, after the expiry of the lease, the lessee of the equipment used dispose of the three options remain to purchase, renew or surrender of tenancy rights. At the same time, the financial leasing has the function of financing and product promotion function. Financial leading’s characteristic and the function speaking of the financing channel narrow small micro enterprise, is one relatively ideal financing solution way. Therefore, financial leasing has superiority serves for the small micro enterprises, it easier to become one kind of substitution choice of small micro enterprises long-term creditor's rights debt financing.2. THE ROLE PLAYED BY FINANCIAL LEASING SERVICES TO SMESFinancial leasing advantage decided it has a unique role in service for small micro enterprises. Financial leasing has the following advantages: First, provides professional services for small micro enterprises. Leasing companies often choose some specific industry to carry out leasing business, can provide enterprises with professional services. In the process of cooperation with the enterprise, the leasing company in addition to providing financing service outside, with the development of it industry, enterprise to the understanding of the profit model, and master the management of the enterprise, which objectively can play on small micro enterprises guidance.Second, procedure is simple, flexible service. Usually, the small micro enterprises has short, anxious, the quick characteristic to the fund demand. Compared with the bank credit, financial leasing to the lessee of assets and liabilities of the requirements is not high, do not need to strict examination and approval, only need to the lessee of the future cash flow of an investigation. The small micro enterprises with rents the company to work out the different contract, satisfies the tenant to the cash flow request, the rent payment pattern may also process nimbly. Therefore, financial leasing way more accord with small micro enterprises capital demand characteristic. Third, helps small micro enterprises to reduce operation risk. Not afford to buy production equipment, the lessee obtained through financial leasing equipment, the project put into operation as early as the early benefit from improved operating efficiency. The financial leasing reduces the outflow of funds for the enterprise equipping. Financial leasing scheme is designed with a certain degree of flexibility, leasing companies can be tailored according to the enterprise’s cash flow rent repayment plan, avoid enterprise repayment pressure too concentrated, thereby reducing the financial risk. Entered into a lease contract, the equipment prices, rentals and other important issues are to determine the one-time, the lease term remains fixed, thus reducing the uncertainty due to price fluctuations in the process of renting. Because financial leasing has the advantage, therefore, it plays a unique role in service for small micro enterprises.2.1 Expand the Small Micro Enterprise’sFinancing Channel Bank considers to the safety of the credit funds to set up corresponding assets loan mortgage conditions, the small micro enterprises are restricted by many factors, it is difficult to obtain loan from the bank. Compared with the cumbersome procedure of the bank loans, financial leasing often do not require the lessee to provide credit guarantee finance simplicity, therefore, the financial leasing for those in the early days, there’s no mortgage assets, the lack of complete credit history, asset-liability ratio higher small micro enterprises, especially small micro enterprises in the start-up stage to provide a realistic financing channels.2.2 Reduce the Small Micro Enterprise’s Fund Pressure Compared with corporate self-purchase of equipment, through financial leasing, the lessee pays the rent way to obtain the right to use of machinery and equipment, a combination of financing and investment, to create the operating profit. Although the equipment not getting the ownership of the equipment, but, the enterprise to pay the rent for the far less than the amount needed for the lump sum investmentfinancing volume. With the aid of financial leasing, the lessee is by equipment, return the money, namely to rent way to pay for the equipment. The rent installment payment amount by the lessee and the lessor is both in their cash flow condition considered after certain, beneficial to the lessee cash flow, managing enterprise capital expenditure, reduce the financial pressure. In addition, because of the financial leasing is not included in the company’s balance sheet, through financial leasing enterprises can reduce the rate of assets and liabilities, for the enterprise development laid the foundation for other financing activities2.3 Promote the Small Micro Enterprise’s Technological Innovation Financial leasing can make both supply and demand meet directly, reduce the intermediate link, so as to facilitate the equipment into the fields, and drive enterprise production development, financial leasing to become the link of enterprises cohesion production and sales. Due to the strength of strong small micro enterprises reduce the full risk of equipment investment, so that enterprises have more energy to track changes in the market, accelerate technical innovation pace, produces more competitive products. Small micro enterprises through financial leasing to reduce the burden of equipment investment, quickly get the needed technology and equipment. This way can shorten the technological transformation of the enterprise and equipment renewal cycle, through the continuous rent advanced equipment to shorten the time machine equipment use, thus speeding up production equipment renewal, maintain production technology lead, and seizes the market opportunities.2.4 Promote the Small Micro Enterprise to Develop the Market Financing and the sale are two difficult problems which the small micro enterprises faces. Financial leasing has not only solved enterprise's financing problem, moreover the help enterprise has developed the market. May reduce the selling expenses through financial leasing, reduces purchases the threshold, enhancement customer purchase ability, to reduce sells link's account receivable and the time sale risk. At the same time, because financial leasing is one kind manages the behavior, between the lessor and the tenant maintains continually the good communication condition, the tenant can act according to the customer feedback the information, carries on the renewal and the consummation to the product, maintains the product the lead. Through financial leasing, may communicate the finance, the trade, to produce three markets, the guidance capital reasonable order is mobile, promotion financial capital, industrial capital and trade capital fusion.3. THE PROBLEMS OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL LEASING AND WHY2011 China financial leasing industry development report shows, to the end of 2011, 286 Chinese operations in the book all types of financial leasing companies, financial leasing contract balance of approximately 930 billion yuan. Should say, financial leasing industry development scale and the development of the Chine se economy condition is don’t match3.1 Problems of Financial LeasingAlthough China financial leasing business started in 1981, but look on the whole, it is still a new business in China, is still in the initial stage of development, the external market environment, the legal environment is still not perfect and mature. As the main body of market rental company professional skills, management level, risk control ability has yet to be further improved. 2011 China financial leasing industry development repo rt listed the problems of China’s financial leasing industry: First, to financial leasing profession understanding existence erroneous zone. The Department concerned thought that financial leasing will boost the inflation, thus, the financial leasing compa ny has adopted the scale control policy, rented enterprise’s sources of fund to come under the influence. Second, financial leasing business in areas around the development is not balanced. As 90% of all types of financial leasing companies are concentrated in 30 cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, while the rest of the country more than 200 Earth-level above the city, including some capital cities, has not a financial leasing company. Third, relevant laws and regulations are not perfect. The development of financial leasing industry still lacks a unified and effective judicial safeguard. Fourth, financial leasing company’s risk awareness is still relatively weak. The country related supervisory department’s supervision system is not perfect. Many lease enterprises did not set up effective risk control mechanism. Some lease enterprise on a smaller scale, but business promoting soon, capital adequacy ratio even less than 1%. Some comprehensive lease in the business enterprise develop, after-sales back to the proportion of the rent is too big. In addition, China’s financial leasing industry regulation is not uniform. China’s financial leasing industry, according to the different nature of the investor, by the People’s Bank of China, the CBRC, the CSRC, the Ministry of Commerce of China, both funded by commercial banks or the four asset management companies, non-bank financial institutions supervision by the CBRC, also includes by each kind of non-financial enterprise investment, the Ministry of Commerce of China is responsible to supervise, not to include the financial organ to rent thecompany。

民间借贷风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

民间借贷风险中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)THE STUDY OF PRIV ATE LENDING RISKS1 The typical reflection of folk lending risk typing methodRisk duality, uncertainty and exposure, suggests that the risk is the contradiction between objective reality and subjective expected deviating relationship, which induced by the uncertainty of objective existence is contrary to expectation of opportunities and possibilities. In view of the subjective understanding on the incompleteness of bounded rationality and objective information, risk regulation (risk regulation will require the "subject" should be to seek the breakthrough of methodology to make up for congenital deficiency of subjective and objective, typed research method is the optimal choice. The reason has this function, because "' typed method introduced broke the" abstract "and" specific "on the methodology of law of binary opposition, and quickly became a mediation" that connects the two. To be specific, typed has the function of abstract concrete, concrete abstraction can get through the subjective and objective " and the second pulse", to reduce the objective and subjective, thus effectively regulation risk. Again, folk lending the type is various, characterization, its hidden risks also reveals the uniqueness, therefore, the legal regulating of the private lending risk need to risk types into a cornerstone, to ensure that the risk system, completeness and effectiveness of regulation.From the point of the present study, many scholars have used the typed methods was carried out on the private lending risks., for example, many scholars believe that the formal finance is the deepening development of folk lending and the result of regulation, investigate its root, in monetary financing ways, there were little difference. Therefore, typed on the private lending risks in the process of division, can draw lessons from the regulation of Basel 2, divide the risks of private lending for credit risk, operational risk, market risk and strategic risk types; Also have some scholars based on legal issues existing in the private lending, private lending risks can be divided into risk of interest rate risk, identity and USES risk; And scholars from theprivate law and public law level typed divides, its risk is divided into public law and private law risk; From the financial system, financial regulation and financial regulation to study the three aspects and so on. In a larger extent, the above all kinds of risk classification method is more based on the characteristics of the financial industry. It is important to note, however, different sectors, disciplines have different ways of thinking, focus and value choice, to a certain extent, the risk of the financial industry classification standard, management standard is not completely accord with the requirement of risk been regulated in law. Typical folk lending typed partition method, most of them from the Angle of finance or the financial sector risk, more focused on the specific risks, although have typed in the name of, but no reality of the typing, which is difficult to realize effective regulation of private lending risks.In view of the financial sector risk types of classification method, this article only in Basel on the division of risk types, for example, to prove the risk classification from the viewpoint of illegal learning bring risk regulation of the troubles and problems. From the perspective of risk regulation, the Basel agreement "will be divided into credit risk, market risk, operational risk, legal risk, reputation risk and liquidity risk six types. By many scholars, however, this kind of classification has a larger question, they think that operational risks include legal risks, and to some extent, liquidity risk, market risk, including further, many people think of sensitivity of reputation risk. Therefore, we should put risk is divided into credit risk, market risk and operation risk three types. First of all, from the point of view of law, the law emphasizes more on non-market risk regulation. Therefore, the market risk can be ruled out in this paper. Followed by questions about operation risk definition. In the new Basel capital accord, the original definition of operational risk is the risk other than some of the market risk and credit risk, this definition method is fuzzy, lack of pertinence. Since the operation risk is the risk of market risk and credit risk, the inevitable requirement of market risk and credit risk definition must be clear. Different institutions to credit risk and market risk, however, there are large difference between the range of designated, it will further increase the uncertainty of operating risk. Take a step back, even if the definition of operational risk within the financialinstitutions is certain, however "the bank's own definition of operational risk may be different in the regulatory definition of operating risks (regulatory definition might be more widely)".In a sense, in real life for breach of promise is the symbolization of credit risk characterization, at the same time, the operation risk is also a manifestation of the person's behavior, both can be reflected in the behavior, and both can be called behavioral risk. So, can will be the realization risk, operation risk and credit risk --, under the general of behavioral risk types, thus realize the effective regulation of risk. It is obvious that the Basel agreement typed yes will be divided into the risk regulation institutions for risk regulation and the introduction of the legislative branch of risk regulation. Of course, I do not deny that the Basel agreement typed on the risk classification of finance, perhaps for the internal control the risks of financial institutions, meaning is very profound. However, from the perspective of law, finance or the financial sector to typed the risks of private lending division standard or method for risk regulation is slightly inferior. Because of this, the author will use legal thinking methods of private lending risks are typed, and regulation, the first use of law on the theory of subjective and objective relationship to private lending risk is divided into main risk and risk behavior of two types, and then build the folk lending subject classification difference registration and classification guidance regulation coupling double nested risk regulation mechanism, to effectively regulate the folk lending subject risk and the risk.2 The standard of law under the view of folk lending risk typed and type analysisAs mentioned above, since the legal regulating of the private lending risk from level typed analysis of law, then it is necessary to study how to make typing? Should be typed as the standard with what? Typical of the law "the relationship between subject and object" analysis method is the best choice. From the law of "the relationship between subject and object" thinking method to obtain the private lending risk deconstruction as the main body and object risk, then combined the subject andobject risk considerations, its specific performance as follows: first, the law is clear right and obligation is the most fundamental, most the core elements of the law and the rights and obligations are to be subject to or not to take to implement the action, and based on "the adjustment object of law is behavior" as well as the main body is equal to its statements and expressions of a series of behavior, and behavior is indispensable to the risk analysis blindly elements, furthermore, is the inner meaning of external expression and implementation, lose the behavior of the subject must be pale, or even non-existent, reality subject cannot little.Second, the legal relationship including the subject, object, content, behavior and intellectual property, etc.) and three aspects of content, has been holding the legal thinking of the "relationship between subject and object" method, and the subject and object, which is the core of the legal research, stressed without there is no such thing as the subject and object of legal norms; Will the relationship between the legal relationship as the plural subject and behavior. Based on the two points, the author divided the private lending risk as the main body of risk and risk behavior of two types, and within the framework of private lending risk type deliberative contents and the causes of private lending risks, and then realizes the private lending risk typed legal regulation.Folk lending risks.” Identity is vital for the judgment of the risk, the risk of identity different may lead to the nature of the risk, the risk liability is different, even decided to risk existence" in private lending activities, behavior subjects include natural persons, legal persons and other organizations, and in the different lending activities, different main body plays a different role, can be either borrowers and lenders, yes key is an intermediary, and risk Bear will also vary. In terms of our country folk lending, folk lending subject risk mainly refers to the folk lending legal relationship, because the people borrowing between main body and lead to the risk of inadequate, the folk lending subject because of the lack of legal business licenses is engaged in the business of lending and deposit-taking business, with a legal qualification but beyond the scope of business, etc., and the possibility of adverse legal consequence. Its main performance for private lending intermediary wind risks and lending between non-financial companies subject two types of risk.Private lending intermediary main risk Firstly, the natural type body discomfort, the risk of private lending the middlemen. Does not involve the third person of the civil lending between natural person is allowed by law, but now most folk lending by the familiar people borrowing, lending evolved into between strangers who type natural folk lending agent generates, and informal lending natural intermediary toward specialization. Among them, a lot of natural person no intermediaries to limit its business on the general introduction of lending or borrowing for range, but in the absence of fixed in accordance with the procedures to apply for legal license, illegal engaged in absorb deposits and issue loans and other financial business, easy to cause the inadequate subject risk problems. Second, the type of legal person private lending intermediary body risk. In real practice, folk lending middleman present institutions, the trend of, however, the current laws and regulations have not been to effectively confirm the legal status of private lending agencies, the rights and obligations is also a lack of proper regulations, irregularities is very serious, lead to private lending risks occur.Risk of non-financial corporate lending between the main body first, general borrowing main body between the industry and commerce enterprise risk. National ban on borrowing between enterprises and enterprises, if each other to borrow money and contract interest, the court visual situation to confiscation of interest in accordance with the law, to the other party should be fined equivalent of bank interest, therefore, easy lending between enterprises due to a lack of lending in the enterprise qualification and folk lending risk. Second, folk lending institutions, the trend of "the folk lending subject including underground Banks, pawn shops, auction houses, small and medium-sized enterprise financing companies, small and medium-sized enterprise loan companies, asset appraisal, some basic bank will also become one of the main body of folk lending".Therefore, the folk lending subject has limited qualifications, not all of the civil subject can become main body of the rights and duties of the private lending. So, in the folk lending legal relationship, the principal may bear the corresponding risks due to its own inadequate.Folk lending risk regardless of the facts or legal actions are likely to cause,change and eliminate the legal relationship, and have certain legal consequences. Are dissimilar, inner concepts, ideas, without legal consequences, "because I just due to express themselves, just step into reality, I did not enter the range swayed by lawm akers? For the law, in addition to my behavior, I am not saving in”. Hegel said, shall bear legal consequences can be to people's behavior. Any behavior inevitably lead to consequences, but not any behavior leads to legal consequences. Private lending risk is to point to in the implementation of private lending, risk caused by act of misconduct or biased. It is important to note that because of the folk lending practices of misconduct or biased and the risk, not referring to the folk lending risk all the behavior main body, but to produce potential risks caused by borrowing risk, bear the unfavorable legal consequences that may lead to risk subject behavior caused by the risk. Private lending typical behavior risk is divided into private lending interest rate agreed over the provisions of the state standard of risk, risk posed by illegal engaged in financial business and malicious borrowing the risk, etc.Contract beyond the standards of the state interest rates caused by risk according to the views of Marxism, "usury in essence it is a kind of economic phenomenon, its own has its inherent law of development”. Illegal engaged in financial business risk caused by illegal engaged in financial business risk is to point to by the offender is not in accordance with the statutory procedures approved by the relevant departments, to the society is not in the name of any particular object of illegal fund-raising, illegal absorbing public deposits or absorb public deposits in disguised forms, illegal loans and other illegal behavior and should bear the risk of financial business.民间借贷风险研究1 典型民间借贷风险类型化划分方法的反思风险二象性———不确定性与暴露，表明风险是客观实在与主观预期相背离的矛盾性关系，亦即因客观存在的不确定性而诱致实在与预期相悖的机会和可能性。

农村金融监管的思考中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融监管的思考中英文对照外文翻译文献农村金融监管的思考中英文对照外文翻译文献Improve the concept of financial supervision in rural areas1Xun QianFarmers in China's vast population, has some large-scale production of the farmers, but also survival-oriented farmers, huge differences between the financial needs of rural finance intermediation makes complex, together with agriculture itself is the profit low, natural and market risks high risk decision to weak agricultural industry characteristics, resulting in the cost of rural financial transactions is far higher than the city, also decided to organize the rural financial system in terms of operation or in the market has its own special characteristics. 20 years of financial reform, financial development while the Chinese city made impressive achievements, but the rural finance is the entire financial system is still the weakest link. Insufficient supply of rural finance, competition is not sufficient, farmers and agricultural enterprises in getting loans and other issues is also very prominent, backward rural financial system can no longer effectively support the development of modern agriculture or the transformation of traditional agriculture and the building of new socialist countryside, which to improve the rural financial supervision new topic.China's rural financial regulatory problems(A) the formation of China's financial regulatory system had "a line three commission " (People's Bank, the Securities Regulatory Commission, Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Banking Regulatory Commission) financial regulatory structure. BankThese stringent requirements, different management and diversification of monitoring has its positive role, but it also had some negative effects. First, inefficient supervision, supervision of internal consumption of high costs, limited financial industry business development and innovation space. Second, the regulatory agencies, regulatory bodies and the information asymmetry between central banks, banking, securities, and insurance mechanisms of coordination between regulatory bodies are1American Journal of Agricultural Economics，2009.not perfect. Information between central banks and regulatory agencies is difficult to share, is difficult to create effective monitoring force. Basically between the various regulators in their respective state regulators, regulatory policies and measures to overlapping or conflicting phenomena have occurred, unable to cope with China's current rural financial market complexity and diversity and so on. Third, financial institutions have liquidity risk or out of the market and so on, may be excessive because the central bank assistance, financial institutions and financial institutions led to the person in charge "capacity risk" and "moral hazard", or for financial institutions regulatory arbitrage possibilities; addition, since the lack of recourse, may adversely affect the financial stability.(B) rural financial ecological environment is not in-depthThe current financial environment in rural county building still remains in the letter the user, village, township, community development credit level, "government-led, human-propelled, departmental interaction" and create a mechanism for financial ecological environment in rural areas lack. Local governments and authorities the importance of financial knowledge of the ecological environment is not deep, implementation and functions of individual local protectionism and heavy, there is interference with the financial sector credit and other daily business situation. Rural credit system lag, lack of bad credit punishment mechanism, rural businesses and residents in the overall credit awareness is not high, rural finance development and expansion of social services and social protection of the environment has not yet formed.(C) China's existing legal system of financial supervision and a number of shortcomings, can not guarantee that financial regulation is reasonable, effective, standardized implementationFirst, regulatory lag, supporting regulations are incomplete, the content is too rough, too simple, the banking, securities and insurance supervision laws and regulations more old, a general lack of quantitative science. Supervisory regulations and standards, regulatory methods and technical means not meet regulatory requirements in the market. Staff in the actual implementation, not easy to grasp the scale, may of operation. Second, the Chinese regulators and the regulated objects exist some interest, and the existing regulations, lack of supervision and regulatoryenforcement are to ensure that financial regulation can not be just and reasonable. Finally, China's financial supervision is still difficult to shake off the inertia of the executive-style regulatory impact.(D) of the Rural Financing drifting outside the existing financial regulatoryAccording to IFAD study, Chinese farmers from the informal financial institutions, loans from official credit institutions about 4 times. For farmers, the importance of informal financial markets over the formal financial market. China's mainly rural folk form of finance rural credit cooperatives, Cooperation, private lending, private banks, private funds, microfinance, etc., of which only rural credit cooperatives and microfinance in China's financial supervision under the rest of the financial forms the lack of appropriate supervision. The general lack of rural financial organizations of civil norms, there is a big risk, China's existing laws and regulations on private financial institutions in rural areas is one of "isolation" policy, making a lot of money from the dark into the rural financial market and greater regulation of financial difficulty, on rural financial security is a potential threat.learn from the developed countries(A) improve coordination of rural finance mechanisms for external supervision1. The United States "multiple composite" of the coordination mechanism. U.S. financial cooperation system in rural areas by the federal mid-term credit banks, cooperative banks, federal land banks and federal land bank system composed of three Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Administration (NCUA) leadership, and with the Council under the leadership of the private banks in rural commercial credit, National Rural Credit Bank policy of the United States shared the task of rural financial intermediation. The organizational model is a typical multi-mode hybrid system, three systems have an independent management system, with clear terms of reference. To ensure the healthy development of rural financial institutions, commercial banks in the United States adopted a different regulatory models, specifically setting up a relatively sound financial regulatory system in rural areas, including regulators, industry self-regulation associations, financial intermediation and mutual insurance group clearing center, the four kind of independent agencies and their subsidiary bodies, the functions of different, but share the same objectives as a common rural cooperative financial institutions to serve the regulatory system.2. Germany's "comprehensive regulatory model" of coordination mechanisms. Low concentration of the German banking system, in the very important parts of the bank, the representative of the financial mixed operation. Commonwealth Bank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority the power to regulate the two main regulators of the banking sector there is a clear division of labor, but also close cooperation. Commonwealth Bank in Germany, nine states have branch offices, using their own network advantages to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for daily transmission of data banks focus for the Federal Financial Authority to provide a better basis for the exercise of regulatory functions, but it is not directly involved in the regulation work, nor has the administrative punishment. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority did not have branches in the states, it is difficult to carry out regular supervision, need to cooperate with the Commonwealth Bank to perform its regulatory functions. Germany's main central banks and industry rely on the federal audit of the regulatory system and risk prevention and protection system to ensure rural finance in the specification on the basis of continuous development.3. Japan's "complement each other-type" coordination mechanism. In Japan, the dual supervision of the implementation of rural finance: first, the Office of Government financial regulation, supervision on the implementation of various financial institutions, to achieve the overall risk control; Second, national and local Forestry and Fisheries Department with the Office of Financial Regulation on the implementation of rural financial institutions supervision, including the Ministry of Agriculture consists of the branch on Norinchukin supervision, Forestry and Fisheries set up in six major areas of agricultural area in County Council on joint supervision of the letter, and all, Road House, County Farmer of the Ministry of Agriculture within its jurisdiction Association for Cooperative Finance Supervision Department(B) the establishment of deposit insurance and emergency rescue system to form a three-tier safety netDeveloped financial system generally established strict internal management system, deposit insurance system and the system of three emergency safety net. As a second-class safety net of deposit insurance system has been very satisfactory. The federal government on rural finance unified compulsory deposit insurance, the specific business operation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Savings。

农村金融监管中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融监管中英文对照外文翻译文献农村金融监管中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Improve the concept of financial supervision in rural areas1Xun QianFarmers in China's vast population, has some large-scale production of the farmers, but also survival-oriented farmers, huge differences between the financial needs of rural finance intermediation makes complex, together with agriculture itself is the profit low, natural and market risks high risk decision to weak agricultural industry characteristics, resulting in the cost of rural financial transactions is far higher than the city, also decided to organize the rural financial system in terms of operation or in the market has its own special characteristics. 20 years of financial reform, financial development while the Chinese city made impressive achievements, but the rural finance is the entire financial system is still the weakest link. Insufficient supply of rural finance, competition is not sufficient, farmers and agricultural enterprises in getting loans and other issues is also very prominent, backward rural financial system can no longer effectively support the development of modern agriculture or the transformation of traditional agriculture and the building of new socialist countryside, which to improve the rural financial supervision new topic.China's rural financial regulatory problems(A) the formation of China's financial regulatory system had "a line three commission " (People's Bank, the Securities Regulatory Commission, Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Banking Regulatory Commission) financial regulatory structure. BankThese stringent requirements, different management and diversification of monitoring has its positive role, but it also had some negative effects. First, inefficient supervision, supervision of internal consumption of high costs, limited financial industry business development and innovation space. Second, the regulatory agencies, regulatory bodies and the information asymmetry between central banks, banking, securities, and insurance mechanisms of coordination between regulatory bodies are1American Journal of Agricultural Economics，2009.not perfect. Information between central banks and regulatory agencies is difficult to share, is difficult to create effective monitoring force. Basically between the various regulators in their respective state regulators, regulatory policies and measures to overlapping or conflicting phenomena have occurred, unable to cope with China's current rural financial market complexity and diversity and so on. Third, financial institutions have liquidity risk or out of the market and so on, may be excessive because the central bank assistance, financial institutions and financial institutions led to the person in charge "capacity risk" and "moral hazard", or for financial institutions regulatory arbitrage possibilities; addition, since the lack of recourse, may adversely affect the financial stability.(B) rural financial ecological environment is not in-depthThe current financial environment in rural county building still remains in the letter the user, village, township, community development credit level, "government-led, human-propelled, departmental interaction" and create a mechanism for financial ecological environment in rural areas lack. Local governments and authorities the importance of financial knowledge of the ecological environment is not deep, implementation and functions of individual local protectionism and heavy, there is interference with the financial sector credit and other daily business situation. Rural credit system lag, lack of bad credit punishment mechanism, rural businesses and residents in the overall credit awareness is not high, rural finance development and expansion of social services and social protection of the environment has not yet formed.(C) China's existing legal system of financial supervision and a number of shortcomings, can not guarantee that financial regulation is reasonable, effective, standardized implementationFirst, regulatory lag, supporting regulations are incomplete, the content is too rough, too simple, the banking, securities and insurance supervision laws and regulations more old, a general lack of quantitative science. Supervisory regulations and standards, regulatory methods and technical means not meet regulatory requirements in the market. Staff in the actual implementation, not easy to grasp the scale, may of operation. Second, the Chinese regulators and the regulated objects exist some interest, and the existing regulations, lack of supervision and regulatoryenforcement are to ensure that financial regulation can not be just and reasonable. Finally, China's financial supervision is still difficult to shake off the inertia of the executive-style regulatory impact.(D) of the Rural Financing drifting outside the existing financial regulatoryAccording to IFAD study, Chinese farmers from the informal financial institutions, loans from official credit institutions about 4 times. For farmers, the importance of informal financial markets over the formal financial market. China's mainly rural folk form of finance rural credit cooperatives, Cooperation, private lending, private banks, private funds, microfinance, etc., of which only rural credit cooperatives and microfinance in China's financial supervision under the rest of the financial forms the lack of appropriate supervision. The general lack of rural financial organizations of civil norms, there is a big risk, China's existing laws and regulations on private financial institutions in rural areas is one of "isolation" policy, making a lot of money from the dark into the rural financial market and greater regulation of financial difficulty, on rural financial security is a potential threat.learn from the developed countries(A) improve coordination of rural finance mechanisms for external supervision1. The United States "multiple composite" of the coordination mechanism. U.S. financial cooperation system in rural areas by the federal mid-term credit banks, cooperative banks, federal land banks and federal land bank system composed of three Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Administration (NCUA) leadership, and with the Council under the leadership of the private banks in rural commercial credit, National Rural Credit Bank policy of the United States shared the task of rural financial intermediation. The organizational model is a typical multi-mode hybrid system, three systems have an independent management system, with clear terms of reference. To ensure the healthy development of rural financial institutions, commercial banks in the United States adopted a different regulatory models, specifically setting up a relatively sound financial regulatory system in rural areas, including regulators, industry self-regulation associations, financial intermediation and mutual insurance group clearing center, the four kind of independent agencies and their subsidiary bodies, the functions of different, but share the same objectives as a common rural cooperative financial institutions to serve the regulatory system.2. Germany's "comprehensive regulatory model" of coordination mechanisms. Low concentration of the German banking system, in the very important parts of the bank, the representative of the financial mixed operation. Commonwealth Bank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority the power to regulate the two main regulators of the banking sector there is a clear division of labor, but also close cooperation. Commonwealth Bank in Germany, nine states have branch offices, using their own network advantages to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for daily transmission of data banks focus for the Federal Financial Authority to provide a better basis for the exercise of regulatory functions, but it is not directly involved in the regulation work, nor has the administrative punishment. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority did not have branches in the states, it is difficult to carry out regular supervision, need to cooperate with the Commonwealth Bank to perform its regulatory functions. Germany's main central banks and industry rely on the federal audit of the regulatory system and risk prevention and protection system to ensure rural finance in the specification on the basis of continuous development.3. Japan's "complement each other-type" coordination mechanism. In Japan, the dual supervision of the implementation of rural finance: first, the Office of Government financial regulation, supervision on the implementation of various financial institutions, to achieve the overall risk control; Second, national and local Forestry and Fisheries Department with the Office of Financial Regulation on the implementation of rural financial institutions supervision, including the Ministry of Agriculture consists of the branch on Norinchukin supervision, Forestry and Fisheries set up in six major areas of agricultural area in County Council on joint supervision of the letter, and all, Road House, County Farmer of the Ministry of Agriculture within its jurisdiction Association for Cooperative Finance Supervision Department(B) the establishment of deposit insurance and emergency rescue system to form a three-tier safety netDeveloped financial system generally established strict internal management system, deposit insurance system and the system of three emergency safety net. As a second-class safety net of deposit insurance system has been very satisfactory. The federal government on rural finance unified compulsory deposit insurance, the specific business operation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's SavingsAssociation Insurance Fund, and to assume supervision of the insured financial institutions; the German government on the implementation of the voluntary deposit of credit co-insurance, not mandatory insurance, its insurance sector is the industry organization; Japan's credit co-national compulsory deposit insurance, the insurance agency is a joint venture between Government and the people, by the Government, Norinchukin Bank, Japan Bank, Credit Union and a coalition of agricultural water fishery credit cooperatives Industry Insurance Agency. As a third-class safety net for emergency rescue system, specific measures for implementation in different countries, bank deposits for the brink of bankruptcy, in some countries directly by the central bank to offer special low-interest loans (such as the U.S. and Italy), in some countries by the bank regulatory authorities and other Commercial Bank for the establishment of special institutions to finance the rescue (such as France and Belgium), a number of countries came forward by the deposit insurance agency to provide funds (such as Japan), more by one or a few large banks in support of official support.(C) rural finance within the industry associations to play a regulatory role1. U.S. Rural Cooperative Finance Association of self-management. In the United States, various credit associations or co-finance up to several dozen, including a long history, nationally renowned for the National Association of Credit (CUNA), a specialized credit services for the Federal Register Association (NAFCU), there are also special school credit for community service credit unions and associations (CCUC), etc.. While the states also have their own Credit Union Association. The trade association is one of the major work to develop a code of conduct, self-regulation management.2. German credit cooperation and other cooperative system of industry self-regulation of mutual integration. German cooperation in the National Credit Union (BVR) is a cooperative bank industry self-regulatory organizations, grass-roots local cooperative banks, cooperative banks and district central cooperative banks, as well as professional co-finance companies, cooperative credit union is a member. Germany 11 contributions from the various types of cooperatives set up jointly organized a regional cooperative audit association, responsible for annual audit of the specialized agencies of the various types of cooperatives, which are also common types of cooperatives at the district level, the industry watchdog, plays an important industry supervisory role.3. Set supervision and service in one of the Japanese Agricultural Association. Japanese government in 1947 promulgated the "Agricultural Cooperative Law," agricultural association provides services for members of cooperative organizations, its not for profit, adhere to the rural communities and members for the service centers, institutional system based on grass-roots level according to facilitate farmers , established the principle manageable. The main source of funding is to absorb the rural deposits, in principle, limited to serving as a member of the farmers and agricultural groups. To ensure financial security cooperation, and healthy run, set up a rural credit insurance, temporary transfers of funds mutual aid system and credit cooperative organizations, and government co-funded deposit insurance system, agricultural disaster compensation system and the agricultural credit guarantee system for the insurance system measures.improve the financial supervision of the concept of rural China(A) improve and perfect the legal system of rural financial regulation, supervision according to lawFinance as the core of the economy, the continued growth of rural finance is more in need of legal regulation and a sound legal environment, accelerate the development of rural finance laws, no legal basis to change the situation, has become the strong demand of rural financial development. Since the reform and opening up, no one for rural finance, rural financial regulation can serve as a basis for law. To achieve effective supervision, the need for additional professional laws, regulations, and specific regulatory measures, regulations and implementation details, so as to achieve from the general administrative supervision to improve the legal system, efforts to establish changed the credit system, and ultimately control law .While in strengthening the legal system, adopt effective measures to strengthen the integrity of the whole community education and step up publicity to raise awareness of the general financial and legal residents, to actively support the work of the national collective finance; education of the population according to lending, and actively with the illegal lending practices fight, really create a sound legal basis, that the law according to the credit environment and legal environment.(B) give full play to grassroots government, professional regulatory functionActively cooperate with local governments at all levels and support the financialregulatory authorities in rural credit markets make an important guarantee for supervision. To actively coordinate local government and non-basic level target consistency, to avoid the expense of national interests and local interests of the occurrence.The Chinese government should establish a tax system is different from commercial banks, a low tax or tax-free policy, by policy banks to provide low-interest or interest-free loans of rural finance, rural finance to increase subsidies and assistance. Those relatively large amount of private credit, shall be approved by local authorities just to strengthen the audit checks to the legitimate rights and interests protected.China's rural economy, small and dispersed operations, has not been large-scale establishment of agricultural insurance, in case of force majeure, the rural financial system will face great risk. Chinese financial institutions in the internal governance structure and risk management system has been initially established, the basic external financial regulation in place of the case, should refer to the experience of developed countries, commercial banks in the country to establish a mandatory deposit insurance system and the emergency rescue system, the formation of three protection network.(C) strictly rural financial institutions, "access and" to improve the professional standards of financial supervisionFinancial regulators should be a good loan companies, postal savings banks, rural credit union funds, village banks and other new-type rural financial institutions, market access, ensure that the new-type rural financial institutions in corporate governance, capital adequacy ratio to meet the requirements. Kind in the country selected the new rural financial institutions, better internal control system, modified to add a representative of management to form the template to help set up rural financial institutions, covering credit, billing, savings, cash, security and other risk point of internal control system . Establish small rural banks and other financial institutions, guidance system, the financial regulators to conduct the transition of its guidance, to promote rural financial institutions to a sound system of internal control as soon as possible, improve management, risk control and management mechanisms work well.(D) to play the role of industry self-regulatory associations, to promote the vitality and force the formation of the banking sectorChina was set up in late 2005, China Banking Association of Rural FinancialWorking Committee, the current to China Banking Regulatory Commission and the provincial government regulatory framework based on an industry self-regulatory organization more. Promoting the Development, promoting and developing self-regulatory functions of trade associations, for building a healthy banking system in China is significant. Association to play a functional role to guide the establishment of liaison mechanisms and management of daily work, and improving the industry conventions and regulations, regulators should not control those, which were needed in the work of regulatory bodies, as far as possible by the association responsible for promoting the formation of the energy and banking efforts to achieve self-management and trade association national regulatory authorities to monitor the combination system of regulation.(E) to safeguard the security and financial safety regulation to changes in both the core competitivenessThe nature of financial regulation is intended to innovation and development of the financial industry to create a favorable internal and external environment, rather than constrained the development and expansion of rural finance. For the monitoring and supervision, do not speak the efficiency of regulation, which implies the greatest risk, will affect the long-term development of the rural financial sector.ConclusionIn short, improving financial supervision in terms of its breadth, should be an include government regulation, industry self-regulation, financial institutions, internal control, four levels of social supervision system; its depth, it should be involved in risk prevention, effective access, legal norms, the operation simple and efficient aspects of a systems engineering. Only by striving to improve the new concept of financial supervision, the introduction of new methods of financial supervision in order to receive financial regulation expected results. Only in this way can be established consistent with China's national conditions, but also to adapt to modern requirements of international financial regulatory system in rural China.发展中国农村金融监管的思考Xun Qian农民在中国人口众多,有一些大型生产的农民,但也自给自足的农民,巨大的金融需求之间的差异使农村金融需求很是复杂,连同农业本身是利润低、自然和市场风险高的风险决策农业产业特性,软弱的农村金融交易的成本远高于城市,也决定组织农村金融体系的运行或市场有其自身的特点。

小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译

文献出处:Dietrich A. The Research of Small loan Company Credit Risk [J]. Small Business Economics, 2015, 8(4): 481-494.原文The Research of Small loan Company Credit RiskDietrich A.AbstractMicrofinance is pointing to the tiny enterprises or individual enterprises provide credit service, small loans basic characteristics for the process simple, amount of small, unsecured, etc.The emergence of small loan companies before fill in the blank of traditional financial institutions, to ensure the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and individual enterprises need. However, due to the particularity of micro-credit Company itself exists, there are many deep level problems to be solved. Such as capital source, interest rate limits, etc., especially the credit risk control problem. Credit risk is the main risk facing microfinance institutions. Quality was monopolized by the original financial institutions, loan to customers rely mainly on credit personnel subjective judgments, the weakness of the service object group, partly due to the scarcity of high-quality professionals, in the specific operation and operation on the face of the numerous credit risk. Microfinance is a small loan company's core business, loan assets are an integral part of its assets, loan income is the main income, and credit risk will lead to microfinance institutions to produce a large amount of bad debts will not be repaid, will seriously affect the quality of credit assets. Previous management, risk management is equivalent to afterwards that the understanding for the loan risks management of collection, the processing of bad loans, etc.Practice has proved that this approach will only increase operating costs, and late is no guarantee of the company's asset quality. Risk control is the key to identify risk, credit risk is the main source of customers, choose good customer credit conditions at the time the loan is helpful to reduce the probability of credit risk. Therefore, we should from the source to control risk, when choosing loan customers, carefully screening customers, for customers to make the right evaluation. Key words: small loans; Credit risk; Prevention mechanism;1 IntroductionThe rise of small loan companies, making the private capital to enter the small loan companies, great convenience is provided for the small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households.Microcredit in absorbing private capital at the same time, broaden the financing channels. As a legitimate financial intermediation, enriched the organization form of the financial system. It also makes a lot of in the "underground" sunlight to folk financing mechanism; standardize the order of the financial market financing. Small Loan Company’s gradual development, make it’s become important force in the future diversified financial market.Small Loan Company since its establishment, has been for many small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households offers a wide range of financial support, guarantee the good operation of the economy. However, small loans company also has a lot of problems. First of all, according to the small loan companies operating conditions, the management mode for the "credit not only to save”. Can’t absorb deposits, which are also the biggest different microfinance companies and Banks. So its sources of funding are mostly shareholder investment and bank lending. This leads to the size of its capital is limited by great, when it comes to an amount loan amount, small loan company's business is difficult to maintain. Second, the small loan company's clients are difficult to loan from the bank's clients, in this high quality customer was monopolized by the traditional financial institutions, small loans company greatly increase the credit risk. Because we can not from the credit status of customer credit systems, company surveys every loan applicants need to spend a lot of time and energy. Finally, small loan company's products are mostly unsecured, completely by customer credit loans, which accelerate the speed and efficiency of the loan, but at the same time, the company's capital safety not guaranteed, when customer default, can calculate the loss of the company. These weaknesses can require small loan companies from the source to control risk, makes every effort to do it by reducing the credit risk to the minimum.In the process of field research, small loan companies do better on the credit riskcontrol, but also the above problems. Therefore, combined with the characteristics of small loan companies, a set of accord with the actual situation of the simple and easy to use credit evaluation system, through analyzing the characteristics of the default customer, for new loan customer default probability for effective judgment, control and reduce the risk of credit business is the main problems of small loan companies are facing at present stage.2 The necessity of research on theBased on the principle of small loans and related theory, under the guidance of conduct empirical study of Microfinance Company, through analysis of the situation, credit risk has the following practical significance:2.1 Promote microfinance company better risk controlExisting micro credit company risk control relies mainly on the subjective judgment of executives and the loan officer, lack of professional assessment of risk and risk management system, the risk is the intrinsic attributes of financial activities. For microfinance companies the special financial institutions, can effectively control and manage risk, related to the sustainable development of small loan companies can. Small Loan Company’s ultimate goal is profit, improve risk management, and help to reduce non-performing loans, to ensure the safety of the assets of the company, so as to realize the sustainable development of small loan companies.2.2 To perfect the existing financial system of risk controlTraditional financial institutions attach great importance to risk control, the state-owned commercial bank's risk management and internal control are better, on the basis of legal, effective and prudent, set up a specialist team of risk assessment methods. Such as 0, the agricultural bank of China credit rating for business customers, eventually will be divided into enterprise credit grade AAA, AA, A, B, C five grades, China construction bank efficacy coefficient method is used to determine the score, to measure the customer credit risk size, as according to the judgment of borrowers credit risk condition, and issuing different credit lines to different customers.3 Small loans company credit riskMicrofinance company time is not long, data is not complete, so dedicated to small loans of credit risk assessment model is less, because small loans business and loan business of commercial Banks and other financial institutions to traditional similar, so we can draw on the experience of credit risk assessment model of commercial Banks. In the context of index selection, developing countries believe that the most predictive power of microfinance credit risk assessment indicators are: customer own characteristics: age, gender, number of family members, etc;Family or corporate financial data; Loan characteristics and the status of the default in the past. Schreiner (2004) also think that risk is associated with the characteristics of lending institutions, such as the loan officer's experience and branch loan situation. n addition, policy changes, seasonal factors will have an effect to the default. In terms of developed countries, the evaluation index and the developing countries, James Copes take said (2007) through the questionnaire results showed that age, gender, household assets and labor quantity is the determinant of small loans to repay. Italian commercial Banks selected the explanatory power of higher indicators are: personal characteristics: the borrower characteristics and borrowing record; Business features: inventory, number of employees, revenue expenditure, etc; Other features: real estate properties, the current address live time, etc.3.1 Small loans company credit risk definitionCredit Risk (Credit Risk), also known as default Risk, refers to the borrower fails to carry out obligations in the contract within the prescribed time, the possibility of economic loss caused by small loans company. Specifically, the borrower may change because of its environment and cause credit conditions are poor and cannot afford the rest of the loan repayment, or false application materials when apply for a loan, get loans from microfinance company after not getting paid on time. The above conditions will lead to small loans company actual earnings deviating from the expected return, serious when still can cause company losses, credit risk has always been a traditional financial institutions risk, is also the main risk. According to the study, carries on the comparison to all kinds of risks, credit risk has the highest proportion, is considered to be all the factors which lead to debt repayment, thebiggest. This makes the credit risk control important. Small Loan Company profits from customers, but the company the biggest risk comes from the customer. From the causes of credit risk, mainly including: to understand the borrower's information is not complete, no accurate judgment to the borrower's credit status, colluding with collusion between the loan officer and the borrower, the loan examination and approval is not strict, a lack of understanding of customer credit situation, accredit risk arises from the whole process of lending, any mistakes will cause credit risk.3.2 Small loans company forms of credit riskMicro-credit companies are facing the credit risk is the main form of borrower default, delinquent loans, resulting in the delinquent loans, bad debt loss and etching order to prevent and reduce the possibility of loss, make. To minimize the loss, it is necessary for us to study on specialized default. Default refers to the borrowers did not follow the stipulations of the contract, within the prescribed time limit; pay off the loan, thus making the loan payments or delinquent loans. Different microfinance firm definition of default is not the same, if some agency interpret default loans for any overdue payment loans (American education to promote small business network, SEEP), also some think a loan is a loan default or delay paying behavior refers to the returned overdue loans. Specific how long overdue is recorded as the default; in practice of microfinance company is diverse.4 Prevention mechanism to reduce the credit riskThrough analysis, we believe that the individual situation, operation stability, loan borrowers credit records and other factors associated with small loans company customer credit risk, through the empirical study of small loan companies, we also found that good credit score model can help the loan officer found good potential defaulters, in view of the above situation, we put forward the following countermeasures.4.1 Starting from the customer, the establishment of customer resource filesFrom the article analysis shows that any risk assessment model is the basis of data collection, the role of the model is to extract important information from a large number of customer information, and according to the customer's payment tocustomer classification, and data collection is in accordance with the information provided by the customer. Make full use of by the customer, the information provided by the customer bank running water, such as accounts receivable bills for the record, and is an important factor analysis customers repay ability. Establish the borrower repayment ability analysis system, through to the borrower can bear the liabilities of the biggest limit the ability of analysis, control the loan amount and duration of the borrowers, in helping borrowers through financing difficulty, development business at the same time, reduce the loan funds transferred or misappropriate possibility, greatly reduce the occurrence of bad loans.4. 2 Establish and constantly improve microfinance credit reporting databaseBased on field research shows, small loan companies, now of small loan companies can only rely on the loan officer to spend a lot of time and energy to investigate the credit status of customers. As a result of the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection, there is a big risk of small loans to the company's business, if small loan companies can enter the credit reporting system for customer's credit standing, you can quickly understand the customer's information, speed up the lending, at the same time, saving manpower and financial resources, reduce the cost of operation.4. 3 Choose reasonable and scientific credit evaluation modelField survey found in small loan companies, petty loan company's risk management department is research and development of "score CARDS", the so-called "score card", is to report according to the customer manager of customer's basic situation, through certain technical means, the overall customer risk scores. The customer the higher the score, the more performance rate, the lower the score, the more possible risk of default. At present this technology for unsecured customers only, because this part of the customer is the biggest customer base, and because there is no collateral, so the risk is bigger. Unsecured customer loan program is relatively simple, the use of "score CARDS", can quickly determine the client's credit standing, making lending more convenient.译文小额贷款公司信用风险研究Dietrich A.摘要小额信贷是指向微型企业或个体经营户提供额度较小的贷款服务，基本特征为流程简易，额度较小，无抵押等。

银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献1银行金融数据分析中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Banks analysis of financial dataAbstractA stochastic analysis of financial data is presented. In particular we investigate how the statistics of log returns change with different time delays t. The scale-dependent behaviour of financial data can be divided into two regions. The first time range, the small-timescale region (in the range of seconds) seems to be characterised by universal features. The second time range, the medium-timescale range from several minutes upwards can be characterised by a cascade process, which is given by a stochastic Markov process in the scale ττ. A corresponding Fokker–Planck equation can be process in the scaleextracted from given data and provides a non-equilibrium thermodynamical description of the complexity of financial data.Keywords: Banks; Financial markets; Stochastic processes;Fokker––Planck equationFokker1.IntroductionFinancial statements for banks present a different analytical problem than manufacturing and service companies. As a result, analysis of a bank’s financial statements requires a distinct approach that recognizes a bank’’s financial statements requires a distinct approach that recognizes a bank somewhat unique risks.Banks take deposits from savers, paying interest on some of these accounts. They pass these funds on to borrowers, receiving interest on the loans. Their profits are derived from the spread between the rate they pay forfunds and the rate they receive from borrowers. This ability to pool deposits from many sources that can be lent to many different borrowers creates the flow of funds inherent in the banking system. By managing this flow of funds,banks generate profits, acting as the intermediary of interest paid and interest received and taking on the risks of offering credit.2. Small-scale analysisBanking is a highly leveraged business requiring regulators to dictate minimal capital levels to help ensure the solvency of each bank and the banking system. In the US, a bank’’s primary regulator could be the Federal banking system. In the US, a bankReserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision or any one of 50 state regulatory bodies, depending on the charter of the bank. Within the Federal Reserve Board, there are 12 districts with 12 different regulatory staffing groups. These regulators focus on compliance with certain requirements, restrictions and guidelines, aiming to uphold the soundness and integrity of the banking system.As one of the most highly regulated banking industries in the world, investors have some level of assurance in the soundness of the banking system. As a result, investors can focus most of their efforts on how a bank will perform in different economic environments.Below is a sample income statement and balance sheet for a large bank. The first thing to notice is that the line items in the statements are not the same as your typical manufacturing or service firm. Instead, there are entries that represent interest earned or expensed as well as deposits and loans.As financial intermediaries, banks assume two primary types of risk asthey manage the flow of money through their business. Interest rate risk is the management of the spread between interest paid on deposits and received on loans over time. Credit risk is the likelihood that a borrower will default onits loan or lease, causing the bank to lose any potential interest earned as wellas the principal that was loaned to the borrower. As investors, these are theprimary elements that need to be understood when analyzing a bank’’s primary elements that need to be understood when analyzing a bankfinancial statement.3. Medium scale analysisThe primary business of a bank is managing the spread between deposits. Basically when the interest that a bank earns from loans is greater than the interest it must pay on deposits, it generates a positive interest spread or net interest income. The size of this spread is a major determinant of the profit generated by a bank. This interest rate risk is primarily determined by the shape of the yield curve.As a result, net interest income will vary, due to differences in the timing of accrual changes and changing rate and yield curve relationships. Changes in the general level of market interest rates also may cause changes in the volume and mix of a bank’’s balance sheet products. For example, when volume and mix of a bankeconomic activity continues to expand while interest rates are rising,commercial loan demand may increase while residential mortgage loangrowth and prepayments slow.Banks, in the normal course of business, assume financial risk by making loans at interest rates that differ from rates paid on deposits. Deposits often have shorter maturities than loans. The result is a balance sheet mismatch between assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits). An upward sloping yield curve is favorable to a bank as the bulk of its deposits are short term and their loans are longer term. This mismatch of maturities generates the net interest revenue banks enjoy. When the yield curve flattens, this mismatch causes net interest revenue to diminish.4.Even in a business using Six Sigma® methodology. an “optimal” level of working capital management needs to beidentified.The table below ties together the bank’s balance sheet with the income statement and displays the yield generated from earning assets and interestbearing deposits. Most banks provide this type of table in their annual reports. The following table represents the same bank as in the previous examples: First of all, the balance sheet is an average balance for the line item, rather than the balance at the end of the period. Average balances provide a better analytical frame analytical framework to help understand the bank’s financial performance. work to help understand the bank’s financial performance. Notice that for each average balance item there is a correspondinginterest-related income, or expense item, and the average yield for the time period. It also demonstrates the impact a flattening yield curve can have on a bank’s net interest income.The best place to start is with the net interest income line item. The bank experienced lower net interest income even though it had grown averagebalances. To help understand how this occurred, look at the yield achieved on total earning assets. For the current period ,it is actually higher than the prior period. Then examine the yield on the interest-bearing assets. It issubstantially higher in the current period, causing higher interest-generating expenses. This discrepancy in the performance of the bank is due to the flattening of the yield curve.As the yield curve flattens, the interest rate the bank pays on shorter term deposits tends to increase faster than the rates it can earn from its loans. This causes the net interest income line to narrow, as shown above. One way banks try o overcome the impact of the flattening of the yield curve is to increase the fees they charge for services. As these fees become a larger portion of the bank’s inco portion of the bank’s income, it becomes less dependent on net interest me, it becomes less dependent on net interest income to drive earnings.Changes in the general level of interest rates may affect the volume ofcertain types of banking activities that generate fee-related income. For example, the volume of residential mortgage loan originations typically declines as interest rates rise, resulting in lower originating fees. In contrast,mortgage servicing pools often face slower prepayments when rates are rising, since borrowers are less likely to refinance. Ad a result, fee income and associated economic value arising from mortgage servicing-related businesses may increase or remain stable in periods of moderately rising interest rates.When analyzing a bank you should also consider how interest rate risk may act jointly with other risks facing the bank. For example, in a rising rate environment, loan customers may not be able to meet interest payments because of the increase in the size of the payment or reduction in earnings. The result will be a higher level of problem loans. An increase in interest rate is exposes a bank with a significant concentration in adjustable rate loans to credit risk. For a bank that is predominately funded with short-term liabilities, a rise in rates may decrease net interest income at the same time credit quality problems are on the increase.5.Related LiteratureThe importance of working capital management is not new to the finance literature. Over twenty years ago. Largay and Stickney (1980) reported that the then-recent bankruptcy of W.T. Grant. a nationwide chain of department stores. should have been anticipated because the corporation had been running a deficit cash flow from operations for eight of the last ten years of its corporate life. As part of a study of the Fortune 500’s financ ial management practices. Gilbert and Reichert (1995) find that accounts receivable management models are used in 59 percent of these firms to improve working capital projects. while inventory management models were used in 60 percent of the companies. More recently. Farragher. Kleiman andSahu (1999) find that 55 percent of firms in the S&P Industrial indexcomplete some form of a cash flow assessment. but did not present insights regarding accounts receivable and inventory management. or the variations of any current asset accounts or liability accounts across industries. Thus. mixed evidence exists concerning the use of working capital managementtechniques.Theoretical determination of optimal trade credit limits are the subject of many articles over the years (e.g.. Schwartz 1974; Scherr 1996). with scant attention paid to actual accounts receivable management. Across a limited sample. Weinraub and Visscher (1998) observe a tendency of firms with low levels of current ratios to also have low levels of current liabilities.Simultaneously investigating accounts receivable and payable issues. Hill. Sartoris. and Ferguson (1984) find differences in the way payment dates are defined. Payees define the date of payment as the date payment is received. while payors view payment as the postmark date. Additional WCM insight across firms. industries. and time can add to this body of research.Maness and Zietlow (2002. 51. 496) presents two models of valuecreation that incorporate effective short-term financial management activities. However. these models are generic models and do not consider unique firm or industry influences. Maness and Zietlow discuss industry influences in a short paragraph that includes the observation that. “An industry a company is located i located in may have more influence on that company’s fortunes than overall n may have more influence on that company’s fortunes than overall GNP” (2002. 507). In fact. a careful review of this 627GNP” (2002. 507). In fact. a careful review of this 627-page textbook finds -page textbook finds only sporadic information on actual firm levels of WCM dimensions.virtually nothing on industry factors except for some boxed items with titles such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In such as. “Should a Retailer Offer an In--House Credit Card” (128) andnothing on WCM stability over time. This research will attempt to fill thisvoid by investigating patterns related to working capital measures within industries and illustrate differences between industries across time.An extensive survey of library and Internet resources provided very few recent reports about working capital management. The most relevant set of articles was Weisel and Bradley’s (2003) arti cle on cash flow management and one of inventory control as a result of effective supply chain management by Hadley (2004).6.Research MethodThe CFO RankingsThe first annual CFO Working Capital Survey. a joint project with REL Consultancy Group. was published in the June 1997 issue of CFO (Mintz and Lezere 1997). REL is a London. England-based management consulting firm specializing in working capital issues for its global list of clients. The original survey reports several working capital benchmarks for public companies using data for 1996. Each company is ranked against its peers and also against the entire field of 1.000 companies. REL continues to update the original information on an annual basis.REL uses the “cash flow from operations” value loc ated on firm cash flow statements to estimate cash conversion efficiency (CCE). This value indicates how well a company transforms revenues into cash flow. A “daysof working capital” (DWC) value is based on the dollar amount in each of the aggregate. equally-weighted receivables. inventory. and payables accounts. The “days of working capital” (DNC) represents the time period between purchase of inventory on acccount from vendor until the sale to the customer. the collection of the receivables. and payment receipt. Thus. it reflects the company’s ability to finance its core operations with vendor credit. A detailed investigation of WCM is possible because CFO also provides firmand industry values for days sales outstanding (A/R). inventory turnover. and days payables outstanding (A/P).7.Research FindingsAverage and Annual Working Capital Management Performance Working capital management component definitions and average values for the entire 1996 –– 2000 period . Across the nearly 1.000 firms in thefor the entire 1996survey. cash flow from operations. defined as cash flow from operations divided by sales and referred to as “cash conversion efficiency” (CCE). averages 9.0 percent. Incorporating a 95 percent confidence interval. CCE ranges from 5.6 percent to 12.4 percent. The days working capital (DWC). defined as the sum of receivables and inventories less payables divided by daily sales. averages 51.8 days and is very similar to the days that sales are outstanding (50.6). because the inventory turnover rate (once every 32.0 days) is similar to the number of days that payables are outstanding (32.4 days). In all instances. the standard deviation is relatively small. suggesting that these working capital management variables are consistent across CFO reports.8.Industry Rankings on Overall Working Capital Management PerformanceCFO magazine provides an overall working capital ranking for firms in its survey. using the following equation:Industry-based differences in overall working capital management are presented for the twenty-six industries that had at least eight companies included in the rankings each year. In the typical year. CFO magazine ranks 970 companies during this period. Industries are listed in order of the mean overall CFO ranking of working capital performance. Since the best average ranking possible for an eight-company industry is 4.5 (this assumes that the eight companies are ranked one through eight for the entire survey). it is quite obvious that all firms in the petroleumindustry must have been receiving very high overall working capital management rankings. In fact. the petroleum industry is ranked first in CCE and third in DWC (as illustrated in Table 5 and discussed later in this paper).Furthermore. the petroleum industry had the lowest standard deviation of working capital rankings and range of working capital rankings. The only other industry with a mean overall ranking less than 100 was the Electric & Gas Utility industry. which ranked second in CCE and fourth in DWC. The two industries with the worst working capital rankings were Textiles and Apparel. Textiles rank twenty-second in CCE and twenty-sixth in DWC. The apparel industry ranks twenty-third and twenty-fourth in the two working capital measures9. Results for Bayer dataThe Kramers––Moyal coefficients were calculated according to Eqs. (5) and The Kramers(6). The timescale was divided into half-open intervalsassuming that the Kramers––Moyal coefficients are constant with respect to assuming that the Kramersthe timescaleττin each of these subintervals of the timescale. The smallestthe timescaletimescale considered was 240 s and all larger scales were chosen such that ττi timescale considered was 240 s and all larger scales were chosen such that . The Kramers––Moyal coefficients themselves were parameterised ＝0.9*τi+1. The Kramersin the following form:This result shows that the rich and complex structure of financial data, expressed by multi-scale statistics, can be pinned down to coefficients with a relatively simple functional form.10. DiscussionCredit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counter-party will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. When this happens, the bank will experience a loss of some or all of the credit it provide to its customer. To absorb these losses, banks maintain anallowance for loan and lease losses. In essence, this allowance can be viewed as a pool of capital specifically set aside to absorb estimated loan losses. This allowance should be maintained at a level that is adequate to absorb theestimated amount of probable losses in the institution’’s loan portfolio. estimated amount of probable losses in the institutionA careful review of a bank’’s financial statements can highlight the keyA careful review of a bankfactors that should be considered becomes before making a trading or investing decision. Investors need to have a good understanding of the business cycle and the yield curve-both have a major impact on the economic performance of banks. Interest rate risk and credit risk are the primary factors to consider as a bank’’s financial performance follows the yield curve. When to consider as a bankit flattens or becomes inverted a bank’’s net interest revenue is put underit flattens or becomes inverted a bankgreater pressure. When the yield curve returns to a more traditional shape, a bank’’s net interest revenue usually improves. Credit risk can be the largest bankcontributor to the negative performance of a bank, even causing it to lose money. In addition, management of credit risk is a subjective process that can be manipulated in the short term. Investors in banks need to be aware of these factors before they commit their capital.银行的金融数据分析摘要财务数据随机分析已经被提出，特别是我们探讨如何统计在不同时间τ记录返回的变化。

小额贷款公司经营风险外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处：M Swan. The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan Companies [J]. Decision Support Systems, 2015，12(4): 828-838.原文The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan CompaniesM SwanAbstractSmall Loan Company is still in its infancy. Just in the process of its establishment and continuously explore, suffered a lot from themselves and the environment problems. As the regulators in the financial markets and relevant scholars, on how to locate small loan companies, how to make small loan companies play a real role in the national economy is full of concern. Small loan company capital source channel is narrow. Mechanisms involved in microfinance planning period is not long, after internal personnel practice survey, random diffusion time or disturbing both inside and outside conditions. Whether internal standard units or departments, professional analysis for such enterprises in the financial markets of rapid infiltration and perpetuate problems have been attached great importance to. As folk further liberalization of the capital market, therefore, small loan companies the management risk and financial risk is increasingly highlighted.Keywords: Small loan companies; Risk management; Control to prevent1 IntroductionIn the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, to summarize these appear in running the root cause of the risk management, it is more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective methods for these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention. Most scholars, according to the theory of small loan companies run the risk and prevention countermeasures of research, mainly concentrated in all kinds of risk and risk analysis is put forward, put small loan companies this new industrycompared with other financial industry environment, in the concrete for small loan companies on risk management in the operation of the fundamental problems, and how to guard against these problems has not conducted detailed discussed and countermeasures, and only in small loans risk aspects of problems in the operation of the company in theory emphasizes the overall risk of small loan companies and prevention. In the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, summed up in these. The root cause of the risk management in the operation of, is all the more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective means to these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention.2 Risk and risk managementSo-called hidden risks in small loan companies operating activities, mainly in the specific planning period internal profit performance on derivatives with the default index of conflicting phenomenon, especially given risk loss of effect. Combining normative power relatively broad regulatory body Angle of observation, the symptoms mainly joint mechanism disorders, loss events and the concrete performance of the amount of loss data. Under the background of this kind of developing system management, strategic planning can be established targets more completely, which along with all the fluctuations of will appropriate to eliminate, or make the disturbing factors have condition remains inside the company can accept the reasonable space structure, so as to strengthen the organization interest charge ability. Set of small loan companies, this article mainly emphasized by supervision, legal person or organization in the society structure transition to reverse the operation, one for the public deposits were rejected, hope to be able to operate in microfinance project implement profit motive for a long time under the control indicators. Need special attention is, the need to accept the country specific regulatory legal department, under the premise that the arrangement of all business, profit and loss or risk ofconflict will be borne by the company leadership comprehensive, and any shareholder will direct retain significant asset management personnel selection and accurate maintenance right content such as earnings results. After all these there is essential difference between companies and Banks, not synchronous open deposit business, will therefore shall be regarded as more formal financial management unit.The so-called risk management problem, that is, any enterprise during the period of Foreign Service accordingly to keep conflict prediction results and the prevention and control means, excluding the above factors still excessive crisis situation. Now comprehensive perfect the internal financial market regulation system in our country, but such risks does not2.1 Market riskIn its depth of stress is that when a specific enterprise marketing mode hidden conflicts hidden premise for market competition, the core area and actual occupy the share of late will produce certain gap preset indexes and as a result, under this background, a specific commodity technology innovation preparation procedure will breed a disorder or scale effect, which is difficult to cause the public recognition. Question on this part of the risk detailed analysis the following contents: first, the demand for consumer self satisfaction biased forecast results. Actually in such trouble enterprise product styles are different, but the late consumer activity development would be struggling, as for when to break free from the shackles of established the shackles of thinking is much more difficult to provide accurate answers. Second, the distortion of market core competitive power. In this kind of technology challenges of the corporate sector are often consumers and market regulators to double review, including the internal capital adequacy, executive’s comprehensive technical ability and moral quality level and finally improve the quality of our products means. At a particular stage based on enterprise competitive potential certification is trouble until trouble troubles you. Finally, the market demand curve from time to time. Market and product structure change activities must maintain synchronization effect, through heterogeneous mechanism connotation lap joint debugging, technical personnel will be left arbitrary cope with habits problem because of the weak.2.2 Technical riskRelative technical risk problems during the implementation of product shape transition depth, if you don't on any technical content cohesion, can make innovation activities. Such technical achievement to run from the initial transmission process through three levels, including scientific research experiments, quality testing and industrial structure promotion and so on, but the legacy of the potential risks will be more severe. During scientific research projects, the unit can content to cater to the preset standards are often difficult to conclude that negligence often because the operation subject facing failure situation. Mid-term test link, even the innovation product has production, but the public response to the information collection is not comprehensive, including side effects or ecosystem destruction in the planning process, etc. On this basis, to realize commercialization of research results will not be so easy. And large-scale production and sales stage, because the high-tech content in succession process has rough surface, make the products within the market to gain a foothold, especially under the condition of life is not long by the rest of the technology to replace the possibility is very high. So any a product no matter from the initial development stage for internal promotion is to the market and involving internal process is filled with all kinds of risk. In particular, technical risk mainly covers the detailed aspects: first, technology research and development activities extend range is not accurate verification; Second, the late in response to population fluctuations from time to time. Third, the market competition activity is participating in the lack of persistence.2.3 The financial riskIs mainly refers to project funding cannot achieve reasonable dredge out and make the result of the failure mechanism of innovation activities. Information funds for the financial position at risk enterprise how important, but in reality such enterprise expansion fund tends to have the following characteristics. First of all, the capital demand range is larger; Second, the concrete financing way too narrow. Late for venture enterprises economic benefits inherent fluctuation, makes any unit in to invest in its early after a long period of psychological war, so, its implementingoverall financing is still not enough reality. Financial control activities related to performance of the risk elements as follows: first, the financing sources and the number are difficult to textual research. Fortunately when such companies to adapt to the development stage, especially along with the expansion of business scope, make internal capital demand quantity full boom, if still can not get money as it should be within the prescribed period of time the number of support, will lose industry competitive advantage, eventually be eliminated by times. Second, money supply timeliness position shakes. Risk enterprises need to rely on money supply mechanism transition reform task, especially in well-funded, aging characteristics influence premise, despite the results spectacular gains phase, but may also be because cash shortage and make both industrial chain break, enabling enterprises to edge back intoa rout.2.4 Manage riskSpecific enterprise due to the default response mechanism in the process of implementation of the project planning result error and influence department reputation foundation, makes the development prospect of the late of blank, this kind of phenomenon also is late investment risk control activities need to focus on the core of the comprehensive technical problems. Combined with the morphology of risk enterprises, mismanagement signs are spreading, for enterprise management in the future bring depth limit crisis. Specific breeds reasons are: first, the enterprise established imbalance effect management organization structure design, especially with the field of technology transition entrepreneurial subject, often because under the background of knowledge management lack of license enterprises effect diffusion mechanism shortcomings; Secondly, the enterprise cohesion cooperation organizations cannot complete and enterprises in a task, even if is the size of the business situation is good, but neglected will derive more prominent contradiction, further into the root cause of risk management. About this part of the risk situation presents the following rules: (1) specific management thinking innovation main body is not strong enough, most of the internal rectification technology innovation risk firms simply focus on details, for the daily work of team quality form and technicalapplication ability almost unnoticed, makes the process structure, management content is difficult to meet the demand of era, it is bound to make enterprise strategy presents simplification feature in the future.(2) management experience is inadequate. In Chinese with the innovation of technology to realize the development of the corporate sector, will be because manager’s lack of personal ability makes it hard for business activities smoothly. (3) The personnel position structure arrangement conflict. Retain risk disadvantages enterprise position and corresponding matching, always involuntarily handover odds and enterprise development, has repeatedly let will only make the internal structure of high quality talents to pieces, make the business activities in the future as well as usual.3 Management risk control and prevention3.1 Strengthen the internal controlMost of the small loan companies will face professional’s scarce status, because small loans company belongs to the emerging of financial industry, industry system is not perfect. Therefore, the company's employees determine the small loan company can survive in the fierce market, and can be continuous development. Small loan company first to employ the persons with specialized knowledge and rich experience as executives, make financial institutions work and rich management experience of personnel to conduct regular training, less experienced practitioners organization personnel system to study the laws and regulations, familiar with financial knowledge of business and finance case, improve the staff's work ability and business level, strengthen the awareness of risk prevention.3.2 Open up the financing channels, the realization of diversified sources of fundingFirst of all, for subsequent insufficient funds become the greatest threat to the large-scale promotion in the future. At present, the company can only by the shareholders of a company constantly additional investment or developing new east and solve the problem of loan able funds, this makes the how to develop and maintain business steadily to become the biggest challenge. Second, countries to promote small loan credit, be in namely to promote the development of "agriculture, rural areas and farmers", small enterprises. Let go of small loan companies financing channels, togive financial institutions such as identity, fiscal and tax reduction policy support to process, small companies have the funds to solve legal channels, which naturally will not desperate to go "deposits" and off-balance-sheet financing illegally, this is the fundamental problem of small loan company funds source, as well as the development of basic problem, but as a small loan companies this is not the short-term investors, operators may change the status.3.3 Optimize the company's internal and external environment, strengthen the management of loansFirst of all, on the premise of guarantee its own environmental benign circulation, with the deepening of the company's business do more big, can slowly to such as Banks and other financial industry such as type of organization, benchmarking learning successful case of financial institutions, to further clear the requirement of the mortgaged property and improve the mortgaged property to accept mortgage threshold, so that we can effectively control the mortgaged property depreciation causes losses to the company. Secondly, establish and perfect the restraint mechanism with capital management as the core, and the traditional mainly denotation expansion of extensive growth mode to give priority to with connotation improve gradually intensive growth mode transformation. At the same time, small loans companies should adhere to market-oriented, commercial orientation, by high interest rates to reduce transaction risk and transaction costs, ensure that the company's earnings and normal operation. In risk control department and business department can through the establishment of "firewall system", strengthen the monitoring of loan risk, to timely feedback of loan quality deterioration, the loan provision for risk provisions for bad enough value. Give full play to the functions of small loan company's industry association, improve the industry self-discipline consciousness, and strengthen the financial accounting system, management personnel, registered capital of supervision and management, promoting its healthy development. Positive use of internal ratings and small credit has more mature technology, and through the way of market research, analysis of the demand for loans, and thus to develop a business strategy, so can make small loan co., LTD for the issuance of loans more tend to be more reasonable, and ismore practical and effective to control the loan risk.译文小额贷款公司经营风险防范M Swan摘要小额贷款公司目前仍处于起步阶段。

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1. informal finance, self-help groupsIn March 1967, on one of my first field trips in Liberia, I had the opportunity to observe a group of a dozen Mano peasants cutting trees in a field belonging to one of them. Before they started their work, they placed hoe-shaped masks in a small circle, chanted words and turned into animals. One turned into a lion, another one into a bush hog, and so on, and they continued to imitate those animals throughout the whole day, as they worked hard on their land. I realized I was onto something serious, and at the end of the day, when they had put the masks into a bag and changed back into humans, I started asking questions. I learned that they worked as a group, tackling the fields of each one in turn, carrying out all the tasks performed by men. For the activities attributed to the female sex, the women organized their own group (Seibel, 1967). During subsequent visits to each of the 17 ethnic groups in Liberia over extensive periods in the two years that followed, I continued to ask questions. The study started with group work; it ended with informal finance.All over Liberia, I found people forming self-help groups in which each person regularly contributed equal amounts of something valuable: labor, rice, money or other items. Among the Gbandi, Loma and Kissi in the northeast, you could still find masses of twisted iron rods, with one flat and one round end, the so-called Kissi pennies. This was once the local currency before the Americo-Liberians introduced the US dollar. In all of these groups, one participant at a time received the accumulated total which he could use for his own individual benefit: to fell trees with the help of a rotating work group, to feed a wedding party with the rice accumulated by a rice savings group, or as microenterprise working capital provided by a rotating savings group. A cycle was considered to be complete when each member had received the total once over. A new cycle could then start with the same or a different membership.Accumulating and reallocating labor, rice and money are three seemingly different forms of economic cooperation. Yet in the eyes of a peasant whom I met in the Ivory Coast in 1985, they are all about financial intermediation: "Le travail, c'est notre argent!" In Ghana, in 1979, I saw groups of women jointly producing palm-oil whichthey sold on the market, allocating the proceeds to one member of the group at a time. Most of these groups also provided social insurance by allocating scarce resources, out of turn, to members in emergency situations. In the early days this consisted mainly of food items, whereas nowadays it is usually money.With the expansion of the money economy, these informal financial institutions (IFIs) have not lost their vigor. Quite to the contrary, they have multiplied, both in number and diversity. Banks, with their inappropriate products and practices, have not prevented the IFIs from spreading. In many instances, even the staff of commercial and central banks (as in the case of Bank Indonesia) have been found to participate. Some banks have even adopted the financial technologies used, such as daily deposit collection adopted by Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia and by the Northern Mindanao Development Bank in the Philippines.2.From Traditional Organizations to MicrofinanceMy first studies in the 1960s were devoted to traditional organizations (Seibel & Massing, 1974), a term which, at best, evoked the interest of anthropologists. During the 1970s, technical assistance agencies rediscovered these organizations under an old name used by Raiffeisen a hundred years earlier: self-help groups (Seibel & Damachi, 1982). In the mid-1980s, they changed into informal financial institutions (Seibel & Marx, 1987). Finally, in 1990, inspired by the 1989 World Bank Conference on Microenterprises, I proposed to the Economics Institute in Boulder, Colorado, that it offer part of its program in World Banking and Finance under the heading of Microfinance, comprising both microsavings and microcredit (Seibel, 1996). This new term reflects the fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to clearly distinguish between formal and nonformal origins and practices.3.Dhikuti, the Small Businessman's Self-help Finance CompanyThere are numerous other forms of institutional upgrading to be found worldwide. In Nepal, institutional upgrading has taken a different route. Until the 1950s, the dikur or dhikuti was a simple rotating savings association among Thakali traders. Since then, it has spread throughout all towns and most ethnicities in Nepal and become the small businessman's self-help bank (Seibel & Shrestha, 1988). As business opportunities grew and money became scarce, secret bidding (widespread also in the Chinese hui and the Vietnamese ho) replaced allocation by lottery. For example, at the first turn, the lowest bidder may accept a pot of $1000 for $600, reducing individual contributions by 40% or putting the balance of $400 into an emerging loan fund.In response to a new law permitting the establishment of finance companies, the first dhikuti have now started to register as finance companies and this has substantially altered the traditional pattern of rotating savings and credit. The most prominent of these is the Himalaya Finance and Savings Company, which offers various savings and credit products to the poor and near-poor throughout Nepal, including contractual savings and term finance. At one point, up to 600 daily savings collectors collected deposits of US$ 0.15 per day, before new central bank regulations led to a reduction in the number of collectors and an increase in deposit amounts.(Seibel & Schrader, 1999)4.Financial Service Associations (FSAs): an Option Pioneered by IFADThe concept and development of Financial Service Associations (FSAs) is an IFAD innovation built on the principles of indigenous non-rotating savings and credit associations: proximity, local financial intermediation, ownership and self-management by the poor, self-reliance, and sustainability. With a view to promoting cost-effective delivery of financial services at the village level in areas devoid of banking facilities, IFAD first introduced this model in the Republic of South Africa in 1994, followed by the Republic of Congo in 1996, and in the Republics of Guinea and Benin in 1997. Introduction of the model in Ghana, particularly in the northern regions with sparse rural banking facilities, is being planned. The FSA model avoids use of external funds by mobilizing local savings in the form of equity and transforming them into small loans to shareholders for quick turnaround activities. The salient features of the FSA model are as follows:(a) Proximity. An FSA is a joint stock company with a variable capital that is owned and operated by shareholders, who are local residents.(b) Savings. Mobilization of local savings as equity or stock, rather than demand deposits. Local resource accumulation and security of savings are major incentives for buying shares.(c) Accounting. Record keeping, including the annual closing of accounts, is done locally by the FSA itself.Accounting and administrative procedures are simplified, transparent and based on local practices and experience.(d) Management Autonomy. All decisions are taken and carried out by shareholders themselves including creditworthiness examinations. There is no ceiling on the number of shares held by a member; but no shareholder can have more than 10 votes in the General Assembly where all major management decisions are made.(e) Controls. The mechanisms for internal and external controls constitute a coherent whole that facilitates the rapid attainment of autonomy and self-regulation.(f) Profitability. The shareholders themselves define the FSA's strategy for profit generation; concern fo profitability is an integral part of all decision-making.(g) Lending Operations. FSA mobilizes financial resources in the form of equity, from within its area of operations, for investment back into the area. The main financial product of the FSA is represented by small very short-term loans that can foster the socio-economic promotion of at least 80% of the membership. Its offer of financial services may be expanded but only after participatory analysis both of the costs of credit and of ways to attain an acceptable trade-off between the financial health of the FSA and the profitability to borrowers.(h) Sustainability. The members define their own strategies for risk management, for constituting reserves, for remunerating capital and for making allocations for operating costs, bad debt provisioning and the preservation of the value of capital against inflation.(i) Networking. The creation of FSAs is able to stimulate the emergence of local institutions and networks providing central services to the FSAs. As intermediaries, FSAs are able to facilitate access by formal financial institutions to the rural markets.Thus, the FSA concept is a flexible microfinance model for delivery of low-cost financial services to rural areas by establishing village-level financial structures that are initiated, owned, and operated by villagers themselves. It represents yet another solution to the lack of interaction between formal and informal financial entities. (The World Bank & IFAD and Tounessi, 2000)5.Linkage BankingAt their own initiative (and sometimes aided by consultancy proposals), informal financial institutions have entered into numerous linkages, mostly depositing sayings in cooperatives and banks. But being informal, these institutions had great difficulty in accessing credit from those banks or cooperatives. This is where Asia Pacific Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (APRACA), a Bangkok-based association of central and rural-agricultural banks in Asia and the Pacific, intervened. An increasing number of member institutions, such as Bank Indonesia, Landbank in the Philippines, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) in India and Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand, have encouraged banks and NGOs to cooperate, on the commercial terms, with existing financial self-help groups (Ghate, 1992; Kropp, et al., 1989; Seibel & Parhusip, 1992; Seibel, 1996), thereby reducing the transaction costs of lenders and borrowers as well as deposit takers and depositors.This has worked well in Asian countries where policy frameworks have favored financial innovations, cost-covering interest rates and institutional viability. In Africa, where policy environments are unfavorable, or less stable, as in Nigeria, APRACA's sister organization, African Rural and Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA) found it more difficult to promote linkage banking. However, some of its member institutions, such as Caisse Nationale du Credit Agricole (CNCA) in Burkina Faso, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) in Zimbabwe, and the Central Bank of Nigeria, have undertaken promising initiatives. In Ghana, the World Bank, IFAD and the African Development Bank are preparing a new initiative of linking indigenous savings and credit associations, the so-called susu clubs, and daily deposit collectors to banks.6.NGOs as Promoters of Good PracticesNGOs can play a special role in the promotion of sound microfinancial institutions (MFI). They can disseminate information and organize exposure training programs, such as the one provided by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Through training, they can assist small institutions in improving their viability and upgrade their legal status, as required. They can also initiate financial operations which, in many countries, preclude deposit collection. But if they are seriously interested in financial operations, they should register as a rural or commercial bank, finance company or savings and credit cooperative. Among those that have successfullyembarked on this road are, to name a few: BancoSol in Bolivia, Bank Purba Danarta and numerous other NGO banks in Indonesia, and Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) Rural Bank in the Philippines (Seibel & Torres 1999).NGOs may propagate good microfinance practices (but not best practices, which evoke notions of universally valid optimal solutions). Good practices are crucial to the sustainability of microfinance services. They may comprise:* the mobilization of internal resources for institutional self-reliance through savings collection, higher interest rates on loans, share capital, profits and insurance premiums* the promotion of microsavings as a source of microenterprise or farm household self-financing, including voluntary withdrawable savings, time deposits,mandatory regular savings, lottery savings, and daily savings collection on doorsteps* appropriate microcredit products with small loan sizes growing according to repayment performance and absorptive capacity, mostly short maturities and installments according to customer capacity, insistence on timely repayment, and market rates of interest covering the costs of each product* microinsurance products contributing to loan security,such as life, health, cattle insurance* product reciprocity, tying credit to savings and insurance, to enhance financial discipline and bankability* collection reciprocity as a means of arrears prevention,combining savings and loan installment collection or financial and commodity transactions* customer-oriented microfinance procedures and services set by financial institutions rather than government, including sound financial management, convenient collection and deposit facilities, appropriate loan processing, adequate risk management, timely repayment collection, monitoring and effective information gathering* terms and conditions which benefit from the experience of formal and nonformal institutions and serve the interests of both the institution and its customers 7.Promoting Prudential Regulation and Supervision7.1Indigenous Self-regulationThe evolution from rotating savings groups to non-rotating credit groups has been accompanied by a shift from oral rules and regulations to written by-laws. In their simplest form, they may read like the rules of a so-called money company found in a small Mono village in the Liberian hinterland in 1967:All members should agree upon one sum of money to be paid every Sunday. And one late to pay that Sunday five cents interest will be added to the sum he suppose to pay. Members should always put in the income; no matter how hard money business might be; you will have to put in the income. The five officers should agree before the money should be loaned to someone. Any money missing from the bank the Treasurer is responsible to pay for what is missing. Time for the income:EverySunday. (Literal transcription) (Seibel & Massing,1974)7.2Prudential Regulation and SupervisionUnder conditions of a repressive policy environment, IFIs and other unregulated MFIs, compared to regulated institutions, have a competitive advantage as they are free to set their own interest rates and other contract terms. Many IFIs remain informal simply because there is no suitable legal form available, or at least no legal form with sufficiently low minimum equity capital requirements, or with capital adequacy ratios instead. However, once the policy environment is deregulated and entrance barriers are removed, much may be gained from prudential regulation and supervision. Three reform measures are of crucial importance for the upgrading of IFIs into regulated MFIs:1. The deregulation of interest rates on deposits and loans: permitting each institution to adjust its interest rates to its effective costs, including costs of serving marginal areas and of collecting microsavings and microinstalments at doorsteps.2. A revision of the banking law: permitting local people to establish their own small financial institutions with moderate minimum capital requirements, or else capital adequacy ratios (higher than those for commercial banks). In addition, the legal system should provide for alienable land-use or ownership rights as a basis for collateral and for the efficient processing of claims arising from bad debts.3. The provision of effective bank supervision: providing guidance and supervision to institutions with microfinancial services in the interest of both the MFIs and their clients. In the case of a multitude of small local microfinance institutions, such supervision may be provided by separate, second-tier regulatory authorities within a delegated system of regulation and supervision, i.e., through self-organized networks of MFIs which in turn are supervised by the financial authorities.8.Status of MFIsDo MFIs benefit from banking status? Alternatively, should they remain hidden within a nonformal financial sector? The answer is an unequivocal yes, they should stay informal if the policy environment is repressive, enforcing interest rate regulation, submitting institutions to inappropriate supervisory agencies, or simply barring institutions from sound practices. In many countries, equity capital requirements are such that banking status is beyond the reach of local MFIs; and the only way for IFIs to register and thereby turn into semiformal MFIs is under the Societies Act, as non-stock, non-profit corporations, private or public trusts, or cooperatives. Upgrading to some legal status may enable the institutions to substantially increase their assets and continue building them up instead of redistributing them periodically among the members, as is done by most IFIs.One example are the Lumbung Pitih Nagari (LPN) among the Minangkabau in West Sumatra, Indonesia. They have evolved from two informal institutional sources: the communal rice store, lumbung pitih, and the rotating savings group, julo-julo. As money was substituted for rice, about 500 LPN turned into semiformal financial institutions owned by their members and registered with the provincial government.With the creation of a new provincial law during the 1970s, which does not come under the national banking law, legal upgrading followed institutional evolution. The provincial government gave the LPN an equity injection, which approximately half of them used for the purpose of growing in financial strength and outreach. In 1988, with the passing of a village banking law, LPN entered into yet another phase of legal evolution, meaning that they could now register as formal village banks, such as Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (Seibel, 1989). An increasing number of LPN have taken advantage of this option in recent years, with substantial upscaling effects on their operations.9.Objective: Informal Financial Institutions (IFIs) are Upgraded and Mainstreamed1. Networking among IFIs is facilitated1.1 Institutional patterns of forming financial grassroots organizations are analyzed(e.g., rotating and nonrotating savings & credit associations, self-help groups with financial services such as water-user associations or women's groups, deposit collectors, moneylenders)1.2 Existing IFIs of the poor are identified1.3 The poor are assisted in joining local IFIs owned and managed by the poor1.4 Networking among IFIs is facilitated1.5 Central network services are promoted as incentives to join the network (such as: training, consultancy, bookkeeping tools, legal assistance, exchange of experience, interest representation, dialogues with local and national authorities, auditing and supervision, liquidity exchange,and commercial bank linkages)1.6 Voluntary registration of IFIs is facilitated1.7 NGOs are supported as facilitators of IFI networks and trainers of IFIs1.8 Prudential norms are agreed upon2. Mainstreaming is initiated by incentives to IFIs2.1 Basic accounting training is provided as an incentive for registration with a network2.2 Financial management training is provided as an incentivefor financial reporting to the network2.3 Consultancy services in good practices are provided as an incentive to acquire a legal status2.4 Liquidity exchange and refinancing services are provided as an in-centive to follow prudential norms2.5 Accreditation with a seal of quality is provided as an incentive to submit to external supervision3. Upgrading of IFIs is facilitated3.1 Legal upgrading to attain a suitable legal status is facilitated3.2 Human upgrading through staff and financial management training is facilitated3.3 Organizational upgrading, converting rotating groups(RoSCAs, tontines), funeral societies, deposit collectors and other IFIs into perm-anent institutions with a loan fund built from equity, deposits and fees or premiums3.4 Operational upgrading, including proper bookkeeping,effective financial products, reporting to the network, is facilitated3.5 Financial upgrading in terms of self-reliance(mobilizing internal resources), viability (covering costs from operating income) and sustainability andoutreach(increasing earnings for expansion) is facilitated4. Access to banks (Linkage Banking) on commercial terms is facilita-ted4.1 Refinancing services are provided4.2 Deposit services are provided4.3 Payment services are provided4.4 Financial consultancy services are providedCopyright of Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship is the property of World Scientific Publishing Company and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.农村金融:主流的非正规金融机构作者：汉斯迪.特尔.赛贝尔摘要在他们之中到处存在的替换储蓄和信用协会——非正式的金融机构(IFIs) ，是远古的起源。