小额贷款外文翻译文献

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中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献Title: Financing Channels for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and English LiteratureIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, they often face challenges in accessing finance due to limited assets, credit history, and information transparency. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing existing literature in both Chinese and English.1. Overview of SME Financing Channels:1.1 Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans are a common financing option for SMEs. They offer advantages such as long-term repayment periods, lower interest rates, and established banking relationships. However, obtaining bank loans may be challenging for SMEs with insufficient collateral or creditworthiness.1.2 Venture Capital and Private Equity:Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) attract external investments in exchange for equity stakes. These financing channels are particularly suitable for high-growth potential SMEs. VC/PE investors often provide not only financial resources but also expertise and networks to support SMEs' growth. However, SMEs may face challenges in meeting the stringent criteria required by VC/PE firms, limiting accessibility.1.3 Angel Investment:Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide early-stage funding to SMEs. They are often interested in innovative and high-potential ventures. Angel investments can bridge the funding gap during a company's initial stages, but SMEs need to actively seek out and convince potential angel investors to secure funding.1.4 Government Grants and Subsidies:Governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs' business development and innovation. These resources play a pivotal role in ensuring SMEs' survival and growth. However, the application process can be cumbersome, and the competition for these funds is usually high.1.5 Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise capital from a large poolof individual investors. This channel provides opportunities for SMEs to showcase their products or services and engage directly with potential customers. However, the success of crowdfunding campaigns depends on effective marketing strategies and compelling narratives.2. Comparative Analysis:2.1 Chinese Literature on SME Financing Channels:In Chinese literature, research on SME financing channels focuses on the unique challenges faced by Chinese SMEs, such as information asymmetry, high collateral requirements, and insufficient financial transparency. Studiesemphasize the importance of government policies, bank loans, and alternative financing channels like venture capital and private equity.2.2 English Literature on SME Financing Channels:English literature encompasses a broader range of financing channels and their implications for SMEs worldwide. It highlights the significance of business angel investment, crowdfunding, trade credit, factoring, and peer-to-peer lending. The literature also emphasizes the role of financial technology (fintech) in expanding SMEs' access to finance.3. Recommendations for SMEs:3.1 Enhancing Financial Literacy:SMEs should invest in improving their financial literacy to understand different financing options and strategies. This knowledge will help them position themselves more effectively when seeking external funding.3.2 Diversifying Funding Sources:To mitigate financing risks, SMEs should explore multiple channels simultaneously. A diversified funding portfolio can help SMEs access different sources of capital while reducing dependence on a single channel.3.3 Building Relationships:Developing relationships with banks, investors, and relevant stakeholders is crucial for SMEs seeking financing. Strong networks and connections can provide valuable support and increase the likelihood of securing funding.Conclusion:Access to appropriate financing channels is crucial for the growth and development of SMEs. This analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing Chinese and English literature, highlights the diverse options available. By understanding the strengths and limitations of each channel, SMEs can make informed decisions and adopt strategies that align with their unique business requirements. Governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders should continue to collaborate in creating an enabling environment that facilitates SMEs' access to finance.。

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)RURAL FINANCE: MAINSTREAMING INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSBy Hans Dieter SeibelAbstractInformal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associations, are of ancient origin. Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgradetheir operations and be integrated into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have spontaneously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to banks; strengthening Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environment, promoting appropriate legal forms, prudential regulation and delegated supervision. Key words: Microfinance, microcredit, microsavings。

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译the XXX credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)。

However。

micro enterprises (MEs) which are smaller than SMEs。

have been XXX。

using a path XXX finance。

such as family and friends。

due to the lack of access to formal finance。

Path dependence is also evident。

XXX finance.翻译:乌干达的小微企业融资:路径依赖和其他融资决策的决定因素XXX:Winifred XXX-XXX博士摘要:发展中国家的融资文献主要关注正规金融机构向中小型企业(SMEs)提供信贷的角色。

然而,小微企业(MEs)比SMEs更小,却被忽视了。

本文使用路径依赖框架,研究了乌干达小微企业的融资决策,识别了影响它们获得融资的因素。

研究发现,由于缺乏正规融资渠道,小微企业严重依赖非正规融资来源,如家人和朋友。

路径依赖也很明显,过去的融资决策和与非正规融资来源的关系影响了当前的融资决策。

本研究建议政策应着重改善小微企业获得正规融资的渠道,并促进金融素养,减少对非正规融资来源的依赖。

Access to credit is crucial for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro enterprises。

as they are considered to be the main drivers of economic growth。

In e countries。

XXX role than SMEs。

XXX-agricultural self-XXX。

XXX due to the way they are XXX。

外文文献翻译——参考格式

外文文献翻译——参考格式

广东工业大学华立学院本科毕业设计(论文)外文参考文献译文及原文系部经济学部专业经济学年级 2007级班级名称 07经济学6班学号 16020706001学生姓名张瑜琴指导教师陈锶2011 年05月目录1挑战:小额贷款中的进入和商业银行的长期承诺 (1)2什么商业银行带给小额贷款和什么把他们留在外 (2)3 商业银行的四个模型进入小额贷款之内 (4)3.1内在的单位 (4)3.2财务子公司 (5)3.3策略的同盟 (5)3.4服务公司模型 (6)4 合法的形式和操作的结构比较 (8)5 服务的个案研究公司模型:厄瓜多尔和Haiti5 (9)1 挑战:小额贷款中的进入和商业银行的长期承诺商业银行已经是逐渐重要的运动员在拉丁美洲中的小额贷款服务的发展2到小额贷款市场是小额贷款的好消息客户因为银行能提供他们一完整类型的财务的服务,包括信用,储蓄和以费用为基础的服务。

整体而言,它也对小额贷款重要,因为与他们广泛的身体、财务的和人类。

如果商业银行变成重的运动员在小额贷款,他们能提供非常强烈的竞争到传统的小额贷款机构。

资源,银行能廉宜地发射而且扩张小额贷款服务rela tively。

如果商业广告银行在小额贷款中成为严重的运动员,他们能提出非常强烈的竞争给传统的小额贷款机构。

然而,小额贷款社区里面有知觉哪一商业银行进入进入小额贷款将会是短命或浅的。

举例来说,有知觉哪一商业银行首先可能不搬进小额贷款因为时候建立小额贷款操作到一个有利润的水平超过银行的标准投资时间地平线。

或,在进入小额贷款,银行之后可能移动在-上面藉由增加贷款数量销售取利润最大值-或者更坏的事,退出如果他们是不满意与小额贷款的收益性的水平。

这些知觉已经被特性加燃料商业银行的情形进入小额贷款和后来的出口之内。

在最极端的,一些开业者已经甚至宣布,”降低尺度死!”而且抛弃了与主意合作的商业银行。

在最 signific 看得到的地方,蚂蚁利益商业银行可能带给小额贷款,国际的ACCION 发展发射而且扩张的和一些商业银行的关系小额贷款操作。

小额贷款公司财务风险防范文献综述及外文文献资料

小额贷款公司财务风险防范文献综述及外文文献资料

小额贷款公司财务风险防范文献综述及外文文献资料本份文档包含:关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题: The Case of Minority Small Business Owners: Empirical Evidence of Problems in Loan Financing作者: Bohdan, Roman; Tipton, Elizabeth; Kiefer, Dean期刊名称: International Journal of Finance and Banking Studies;第3卷;第3期;页码:1-13;年份: 2014The Case of Minority Small Business Owners: Empirical Evidence of Problems inLoan FinancingAbstractThis academic research explores the availability of loan financing to minority-owned businesses and examines a potential relationship between the size of a loan and the characteristics of a business in the USA. It also investigates the possible impact of different characteristics and quantifiable criteria on credit loan denial across different demographic groups. Probity models are used to evaluate the potential existence of racial or ethnic discrimination in the availability and approval of credit. Regression analysis is used to assess the impact that the race of a small business owner has on the relative size of a denied loan, the size of portioned credit, or the size of the company. When other variables suspected of influencing credit approval and rationing are controlled, black-owned and Asian-owned businesses appear to be less likely to be approved for loans and more likely to experience significantly greater credit rationing than their white counterparts.Keywords: Credit; ethnicity; loans; racial discrimination; small businesses1. IntroductionThe Federal Reserve has conducted a Survey of Small Business Finances every five years since 1987 and has provided a series of rich datasets through 2003. These datasets have been used extensively by researchers investigating many aspects of banking practices with regard to small businesses. Many of these studies examined theissue of lending discrimination against women-owned and black-owned businesses and concluded that such discrimination does exist.This study identifies several characteristics that affect the amount, approval and denial of loans and examines differences in these characteristics of minority-owned and white owned businesses and business owners.The results support the conclusion of earlier research that lending discrimination exists for black-owned and minority- owned businesses.2. Literature ReviewSmall businesses are vital drivers of the U.S. economy (Cavalluzzo & Wolken, 2002; Coleman, 2002; Hardee, 2007). According to The Facts about Small Business 1999 small businesses contribute up to 75 percent of new jobs. They are also substantial contributors to the private gross domestic product. However, small businesses have restricted access to the publicly traded capital markets. Thus, they often seek out loans to help meet their needs for capital. This results in their being very dependent on the financing of commercial banks (Hardee, 2007). Thus, financing of small business is an important issue forstrengthening the economy and increasing the country's gross domestic product. Discrimination against minority-owned businesses with respect to credit is thus somewhat problematic for a society that seeks to expand economic opportunities to minorities.Loan financing to minority-owned businesses is typically less available than loan financing to white-owned businesses. Toussaint-Comeau & Rhine (2003) studied racial discrimination and credit rationing by examining small business start-ups in Chicago, Minneapolis and St. Paul Neighborhoods. They found that racial differences exist in the source and amount of start-up financing. According to these authors,white-owned start-ups used more bank loans than minority-owned start-ups. Cole (2009) investigated different variables influencing approval of credit lines utilizing data gathered in 1993, 1998, and 2003. Small privately held firms were classified based on credit need into one of four distinct groups. Significant differences were noted among these groups. "On-going borrowers" look very similar to the "approved borrowers". While some of the characteristics of the "discouragedborrowers" strongly resemble "denied borrowers," they were also significantly different in several aspects. "Discouraged borrowers" are those that choose not to apply because they expect their applications to be denied (Levenson and Willard, 2000). Cole's (2009) most relevant conclusion for this research was that "black-owned firms were denied credit at a far higher rate than firms with owners who were white." Coleman (2002) also concluded that it is less likely for companies with white ownership or management to be turned down for a loan than their black-owned or hispanic-owned counterparts.Prior research has shown that loans were less available and rationed for minority-owned businesses. Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) used the data from the 1993 and 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances for their inquiry. The primary objective of this research was to examine racial discrimination broadly operating in credit markets affecting small businesses. They discovered that black-owned economic entities were significantly more likely to be turned down for a line of credit. The authors also concluded that inconsistencies exist in the credit availability for blacks. Furthermore, black owners of small businesses frequently reported issues related to the availability of credit in the past and that they expected this pattern would continue in the future. One surprising result was that they did not find additional evidence of such credit disparity for other minorities or for women. Finally, these authors conclude that the fear of being turned down due to prejudice or discrimination generally discourages black- owned companies from applying for loans. Coleman (2002, 2005) also discovered that black-owned firms are reluctant to apply for a line of credit due to the strong belief that it will be denied.Restricted access to capital goes beyond the acceptance or rejection of loans as loan sizes can also vary. When restrictions are placed on the sizes of loans offered, they are said to be rationed. Park and Coleman (2009) attempted to determine whether financial institutions are rationing credit to minority-owned firms by using data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances. They found that the credit supply to black-owned firms is "even more severely constrained" than the credit supply to firms owned by other minorities.There are many other covariates besides ethnicity that mayinfluence the loan application process for small businesses: Size of the business, the organizational structure, the total assets, the total liabilities, and the total amount of the loan applied for, and so on. These also present a variety of challenges for owners of these companies. Kjenstady and Su (2012) claim that there is a strong disparity between the lender's and borrower's estimates of a loan's total amount. Unsurprisingly, borrowers prefer to be considered for higher amounts at the stated interest while lenders prefer to offer a lower amount. Ardeni and Messori (1994) found that the strong presence of internal economies of scale or the transaction cost of a long indicated a higher quality for the financed project while the presence of external economies of scale or organizational costs signaled a lower quality. Overall, their model demonstrated that project quality, project return, and the total loan amount ultimately depended upon the organizational complexity of the project being financed. According to Syrneonidis (1996), very small firms do very little research and development and thus produce fewer innovations. He also stated that research and development seems to increase relatively proportionally with size, although there are variations to this pattern across industries, time periods and countries.When the loan is within established parameters, however, then different variables play a role in the approval and the amount of the loan. In this case, the total amount of the borrowed funds could be pegged to the quality and nature of the project or program the monies are to support. At this stage of the process, prior research indicates that the ethnicity of the owners of the borrowing entity does not have a negative impact on approval.This paper explores the availability of loan financing tominority-owned businesses and investigates the possible relationship between loan size and business' characteristics. Of particular interest is the overall size of the economic entity applying for the loan. The first section has provided the reader with a short literature review. The second section describes the analysis methodology: Hypotheses, data acquisition, variables, and models. The third section presents the results of both univariate and multivariate statistical analyses. In the final section, the findings arediscussed and conclusions are drawn.3. Methodology3.1. HypothesesThis study intends to continue along the lines of prior academic research by investigating the possible existence of racial/ethnic discrimination in the availability and approval of credit. As such, "discouraged borrowers" will not be controlled for in our model as the lack of credit availability within this group brought on by the beliefs and actions of the borrower and not the lender. This study will examine firms with specific forms of ownership in specific time periods. Consequently, the first null and alternative hypotheses are:H0.1: The probability of credit approval is the same for small business owners of any race.H1.1: The probability of credit approval differs depending upon the race of small business owners.If sufficient evidence is found to reject H0.1, then there is evidence of the possibility of racial discrimination taking place in the credit approval process.The second set of hypotheses relate to the size of the loan. As prior research has indicated that this may be influenced by theperceived quality of the project and the total amount of credit applied for by the business, thus these characteristics must be considered as part of the analysis. Furthermore, the size of the loan and the overall impact of denial are correlated with company size. Thus, the amount of the rejected loan will be examined in relation to the race of small business owners. The literature provides many different ways to measure overall company size: Total revenues, total individuals employed, total assets, the level of multinationality, the number of divisions, and so on. For the purpose of this research, the size of the firm will be determined by the total amount of revenue generated in a given period of time. Consequently, the second null and alternative hypotheses are:H0.2: The race of a small business owner has no effect on the amount of credit denied relative to firm size.H1.2: The race of a small business owner has an effect on the amount of creditdenied relative to firm size.If sufficient evidence is found to reject H0.2, then there is evidence of the possibility of racial discrimination taking place in the credit denial process.3.2. Data AcquisitionThe data utilized in this study came from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances. This database provided a nationally representative sample of small businesses in the United States and included a wide variety of variables. The research population is all for-profit non-financial non-agricultural non-subsidiary business enterprises. The selected companies employed fewer than 500 employees and were a going concern as of year-end 2003. The time coverage for this study is the years 2001-2003.The majority of the surveys in this database were completed during the latter half of 2004, with the cut-off period for the income statement and balance sheet being the firm's fiscal year end. Those whose fiscal year ended between July 1 and December 31 were reported as companies with fiscal year ends of 2003. Those who ended between January 1 and June 30 were reported as companies with fiscal year ends of 2004.The current study used a stratified random sample to ensure adequate representation of certain smaller subgroups within the population so that reliable estimates for these subgroups are possible. This technique is known as "oversampling." The sample itself was drawn from 72 strata based on a cross-classification of three variables: total employment size, urban/rural status, and census division. These strata were formed into five groups with closely connected characteristics, known as "implicates," which allow for the adjustment of the estimated standard errors and confidence intervals. As there were missing values within the dataset that had to be imputed, the use of implicates also allowed for the correction of additional variance that this process may have caused. Statistical tests on these imputed variables were conducted according to the procedures in the 2007 update to the Survey of Small Business Finances Technical Codebook, 2003. Within each implicate, a sample of 4,240 firms was randomly chosen. The final dataset for this analysis consisted of 21,200 of the 6.3 million small business firms in the original dataset available for academic research.3.3. VariablesTable 1 provides the full description of all of the variables utilized in the current study. "Approved" is an indicator dependent variable indicating whether the firm's loan applicationwas approved (1) or not approved (0) within the previous three years. Several independent variables were transformed through the use of the logarithmic function to reduce skewness: Wealth (LogWealth), return-on-equity (LogROE), debt-to-equity (LogD/E), and sales (LogSales).The Wealth variable measures of the owner's personal wealth and was used as an indicator of a company's creditworthiness. Firms are considered more creditworthy when owners of that firm possess higher level of personal asset as those assets might be pledged as collateral against the firm borrowings.Return-on-equity measures the profitability of the firm. It has been assumed that more profitable companies have a higher chance to be approved for a loan as they are in better position to pay that liability off due to their revenue stream (Coleman, 2001). Debt-to-equity measures a company's financial leverage. The ratio indicates the proportion of debt and equity that the company is using to finance its assets and represents a company's exposure to risk. In this study, a company's total debt is increased by the amount identified in the loan application. Unfortunately, the Survey of Small Business Finances 2003 provides no information about borrowers' collateral and guaranties on their most recent applications. Prior research has utilized total equity divided by the total amount of credit requested as a proxy for the potential availability of collateral to support a loan. The current model excludes this variable as the debt-to-equity ratio is already adjusted by the value of loan applications and thus serves as a substitute for the cover ratio.Total sales are used as a proxy for the size of a firm. Prior research discovered that larger firms have a better chance of getting a loan than their smaller counterparts (Coleman, 2005).This then raises the question of what is the appropriate measurement of firm's size. Most recent fiscal year sales have been proposed by some scholars as the most appropriate indicator for a company's size. Coleman (2004)asserts that expanding companies might be more attractive to lenders due to the constant growth of sales and revenues. According to Hardee (2007), more profitable firms with consistent annual sales growth are more likely to obtain credit. Therefore, the current study also controls for growth. This variable is calculated by comparing most recent annual total sales with those for the previous fiscal year.According to prior research, a decline in dissipative costs of collateral or an increase in the loan size leads to a lower equilibrium collateral utilization (Boot, Thakora, and Udel, 1991). Jiménez and Saurina (2004) fou nd a decreasing relationship between the size of the loan and the probability of default. They also indicated that financial institutions scrutinize loan characteristics more rigorously when lending larger amounts of money. However, Jacobson & Roszbach (2003) and Roszbach (2004) found that the total amount of the loan has no significant influence on the default risk of a credit portfolio. In the current research, it is assumed that the possibility of the denial of an application might be impacted by a proportionately increasing risk correlated with the total amount of the most recently applied- for loan.An additional variable that is known to strongly impact the probability of loan approval for small businesses in general is the relationship between the borrowing entity and the financial institution the entity is borrowing from. According to Robb & Wolken (2002), a firm that maintained a long-term relationshipwith a financial institution was most likely to get credit. Thus, "Relation" is a continuous variable representing the length of time in months of the relationship between a company and the financial institution that approved or denied the most recent credit application.Coleman (2003) also suggested that organizational structure of the firm might have a strong relationship to the approval/ denial of credit applications. He suggested companies organized as corporations have higher probabilities to get their loan applications approved since this form of organizational structure is more attractive to financial institutions. Organization type (Org) was included in the model as an indicator variable coded to indicate if the firm was organized as a limited liability corporation or partnership, or of it was an S-corporation or a C-corporation.According to Becker (1957), greater loan-market competition indicated by alower Herfindahl index should discourage taste-based discrimination. Therefore, an indicator variable (HHI) for Herfindahl index above 1800 has been included to measure loan-market competition. Firms located in urban areas might experience difficulties with securing debt capital due to red lining and the unwillingness of banks to locate in those areas (Coleman, 2005). Thus, another indicator variable (Urban) has been created to indicate whether a firm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area.It is general practice for financial providers to consider a firm's credit rating and the presence of bad credit in the decision-making process of loan approvals. An indicator variable (Risk) was created to indicate firms that are rated by Dun & Bradstreet as having "significant risk" or "high risk." The indicator variable (BadCred) indicates either (a) firms or principal owners that have declared bankruptcy within the last 7 years, (b) the principal owner was delinquent on personal obligations within the past 3 years, (c) the firm was delinquent on business obligations within the past 3 years, or (d) judgments were rendered against the owner or firm within the past 3 years.Some researchers have found a relationship between industry classification and access to debt capital (Coleman, 2002). Firms in non-asset intensive industries might have difficulty when providing collateral. To control for this, four indicator variables to indicate specific industries have been created: Transportation (Transp), insurance (Insre), retail (Retail) and construction or mining (Consmin). Due to the limited numbers of minority-owned firms in some industries, an indicator variable (Industry) indicating that a firm belonged to a manufacturing industry was used when considering credit rationing.Owner characteristic may also influence a firm's relationship with the bank (Coleman, 2003). Experience (Exp) is the weighted average of the owners' experience in managing or owning a business. The age of the owners and the age of the firm have been excluded due to being highly correlated with experience. Education (Edu) is an indicator variable indicating that at least one-third of a firm's owners have at least a college degree. As mentioned in the literature review, some scholars have found that race might affect the credit application denial/approval, with black and Hispanicbusiness owners experiencing higher denial rates than whites (Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzo, 1998, Cohn & Coleman, 2001). To measure the probability of the denial of loan application based on race, indicator variables were created to indicate at least 50%ownership by a Black (Black), a Hispanic (Hispan) or an Asian (Asian).3.4. LimitationsThe financial crisis of 2008 exposed weakness within the global financial system and added greater risk to credit markets. The chain reaction that resulted limited owners' ability to secure less expensive credit for small businesses assuming they could secure any credit at all. As the data used in this study was taken from a survey completed before this crisis occurred, this paper does not consider the effect of the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting economic disruption on the ability for small businesses to borrow after the economy fully recovers.3.5. ModelsBoth sets of hypotheses consider the impact of race once other potential confounding independent variables have been controlled. These variables, derived from studies on racial discrimination and credit denial, form the vectors of relevant firm and owner characteristics. In these vectors, race was separated into three indicator variables: Black, Hispanic, and Asian. The baseline state (Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0) indicates a firm that is not majority owned by persons of one of these particular races. The specific variables in these vectors are found in the appendices: X1 in Appendix 3 and X2 in Appendix 4 will be used to examine the first set of hypotheses, while X3 in Appendix 5 will be used to examine the second set. For the first set of hypotheses, each firm first needed to be evaluated based on whether it was likely to apply for a loan. As a firm either does so (Y1 = 1) or not (Y1 = 0), the dependent variable in this case is dichotomous. The probit selection model, as described by Cole (2009), is used for this. Probit models are a variation of regression that estimatesthe probability that an observation will be categorized into one of two groups based on the independent variables (Bliss, 1934). Specifically, (1)where [varepsilon]1 are independent and identically distributed Normal(0,1). Theparameters of this model were estimated by maximum likelihood and can be found in Appendix 3. As a selection model, those observations that have an estimated probability of applying for a loan that is greater than 0.5 were retained for the second stage for this evaluation. As a firm that applies is either approved (Y2 = 1) or not (Y2 = 0), the probit model is again used:(2)where [varepsilon]2 are independent and identically distributed Normal(0,1). The parameters for this model were also estimated by maximum likelihood and can be found in Appendix 4. As equation (2) models the probability of a firm being approved for credit, examination of the significance of the parameters related to the Black, Hispanic, and Asian independent variables for this model will establish the believability of H1.1.To test the second hypothesis about credit rationing, the dependent variable is now the amount of credit denied relative to firm size. As this is a ratio-scaled quantitative variable, ordinary least squares regression is used:(3)where [varepsilon]3 are independent and identically distributed Normal(0,1). As equation (3) models the amount of credit denied relative to firm size, the significance of the parameters related to the Black, Hispanic, and Asian independent variables for this model will establish the believability of H1.2.4. Results4.1. Univariate AnalysisA univariate analysis was to compare businesses owned by whites with those owned by minorities. Differences between the means for continuous variables and between the proportions for dichotomous variables are shown in Tables 2A and 2B. These tables examine the differences for businesses that applied for a loan, businesses that did not apply for a loan, businesses that had a loan application approved, and businesses that were denied.For businesses that applied for a loan in the last three years, there were significant differences between white and minority owned businesses for severalvariables. The average size of the loan applied for by minority owned businesses was only 63.1% of the average size of the loan applied for by white owned businesses. Generally speaking, minority owned businesses that successfully applied for loans were less profitable than those owned by whites. The average ROA for these minority owned businesses was 44.4% of the average ROA for white owned businesses.The average net profit for minority owned businesses was 43.1% of the average profit for white owned businesses. Interestingly, a higher proportion of minority owned businesses experienced growth (0.56) than white owned businesses (0.49). However, some of this may be due to the fact that minority owned businesses that applied for loans appear to be smaller than those owned by whites. Average total assets for minority owned businesses were 77.7% of the average total assets for white owned businesses. Average total liabilities for minority owned businesses were 62.1% of the average total liabilities for white owned businesses. Average sales for minority owned businesses were 74.2% of the average sales for white ownedbusinesses.Minority owned businesses appear to be more exposed to risk with an average adjusted D/E ratio that was 145.2% that of white owned businesses. The proportion of minority owned businesses (0.62) rated as having significant or high risk was higher than that for white owned businesses (0.46). These differences may also be influenced by the variation in location and industry based on racial group. A higher proportion of white owned businesses were in urban areas (0.23) and in areas with lesser loan market competition (0.51) than minority owned businesses (0.04 and 0.31 respectively). White owned businesses were less likely to be in service (0.39) and more likely to be in insurance or real estate (0.06) or in construction and mining (0.18) than minority businesses (0.59, 0.03, and 0.08 respectively) There were also significant differences in the owners' characteristics. Average personal wealth for minority owners was 58.3% that of white owners. Minority owners had on average 5.5 years less experience than white owners. Minority owners had on average slightly more than 2 years less time in relationship with the financial institution. Interestingly, the proportion of businesses that had at least one-third of the owners with a college degree was higher for minority owned businesses (0.87) thanwhite owned businesses (0.76).In general, minority owned businesses that were successful in securing a loan were smaller, less profitable, carried more debt and were more risky than white owned businesses that borrowed successfully.Many of the same significant differences were evident for businesses that did not apply for a loan during the last threeyears. The average Return on Assets (ROA) for minority owned businesses was 4.0% of the average ROA for white owned businesses. The average profit for minority owned businesses was 80.8% of the average profit for white owned businesses. Average total assets for minority owned businesses were 58.8% of the average total assets for white owned businesses. Average equity for minority owned businesses was 59.3% of the average equity for white owned businesses. Average total liabilities for minority owned businesses were 58.4% of the average total liabilities for white owned businesses. Unlike successful minority borrowers, minority owned businesses that did not apply for loans appear to be less exposed to risk with an average adjusted D/E ratio that was 18.4% that of white owned businesses. Despite the lower debt usage, the proportion of minority owned businesses rated as having significant or high risk was about the same as minority businesses that successfully secured a loan (0.62 for minority businesses compared to 0.44 for white owned businesses). White owned businesses (0.50) were more likely to be organized as a limited liability corporation or partnership, or as an S-corporation or a C-corporation than minority owned businesses (0.45). Also influencing these differences may be the variation in location and industry based on racial group. A higher proportion of white owned businesses were in urban areas (0.18) and in areas with lesser loan market competition (0.49) than minority owned businesses (0.09 and 0.35 respectively). The proportions of white owned businesses that did not apply for a loan were comparable to the white owned borrowing businesses, less likely to be in service (0.46) or retail (0.18) and more likely to be in transportation (0.04), insurance or real estate (0.08) or in construction and mining (0.11) than minority businesses (0.54,。

P2P网络借贷外文文献翻译最新

P2P网络借贷外文文献翻译最新

外文文献翻译原文及译文文献出处:Jensen Fabian. The research of P2P online lending [J] Business Research, 2017, 9(3):31-41.原文The research of P2P network LendingJensen FabianAbstractMicro, small and medium enterprises is facing with financing difficulties,rural poor areas also lack of financial services,which has always been plagued policy makers of the two factors, also seriously restricted the economic development and hinder the two factors in the construction of a fair society. After the positive study of the relevant departments and academia,finally figured out "small loan company" this kind of small financial institutions,in order to the transfusion organization become the rural development and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).Practice has proved that this kind of form does have some effect on the solution of the problem, but microfinance companies ’丨not deposit-taking’’policy, and become a big obstacle to influence its development. This makes the tighter credit environment,capital requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises and the vulnerable groups are far from satisfied. At the same time, the abnormal social folk capital abundant, high inflation,the stock market is tanking, strictlycontrol the real estate market economy, these funds need find investment breakthrough,and so a new kind of folk lending model,P2P network borrowing appeared.Keywords: P2P lending, Microfinance, Private lending1 IntroductionP2P lending (Peer - to - Peer lending) is an emerging in recent years the personal of personal credit model lending companies through the online platform set both a deaL Commitment to funding "connect”form of folk lending is emerging and increasingly prosperous. Is funding needs, while there is a desire to invest, such companies have to do is by their structures, network platform for the idle private capital looking for matches. And such companies provide essentially is a P2P (Peer to Peer or Person to Person, (individual financial information services for individuals) it is actually a kind of new flow of private capital. Platform itself the role of information intermediary,information disclosure, credit rating,fund settlement, overdue collection services, platform profit mainly comes from the customer to pay fees. In 2005, ZOPA,in London, the first microfinance website to personal online,pulled open the prelude of the P2P lending. After ten years of operation, a total of 750 million pounds of matching network. The platform Prosper2014 years accumulative total turnover of about $2.5 billion.P2Pnetwork, in countries such as Britain and the United States has been aloan in addition to the traditional savings and investment channels of the alternative (Slavin,2007).The success of the European and American practice for P2P network gradually towards the world.P2P lending in this form is in recent years the development of the abnormal rapidly, mainly because the form meets demand from both sides of the capital supply and demand of current economic situation. On the one hand, for money supply,in the face of high inflation and low bank deposits, bank deposit income is very small. At the same time, the stock market in the past two years is bad,real estate and gold investment door abuse is too high, and the current situation of risk is not small. In the face of all these various traditional investment present situation of the market situation is not optimistic, a large number of civilian capital urgently needs to find new breakthrough.P2P lending this form seems to be in order to meet the urgent demand, because this kind of investment model is unfolding the following several aspects: the advantages of high returns, basic around 20% annual return. Door, and the low just registered in relevant websites can become money lenders. High transparency, money lenders can according to the web site provides information about capital demanders object,to choose our willing to lend the money to lend,borrowers will provide regular use of funds, guarantee for capital lendersunderstand the usage and safety.2The origin of the P2P lending and the statusDue to the development of the P2P lending is less than 10 years, so the early literature focuses on introducing the origin and development of the network lending. Ferichs and Schumann (2008) mentioned that in 2005 the first lending site zopa,founded in the UK. Borrowing from a wide variety of network platforms appear in succession.Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) points out that facing the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection under asymmetric information, based on assumptions, such as disposable abandonment and anonymous trading orthodox financial institutions will be in accordance with the new market basic principles to be followed in the classical theory to its lending of small and medium-sized enterprises and farmers to provide collateral or guarantee. So those are unable to provide collateral poor farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises will be excluded from the formal financial institutions, in the end they will have to enter the network to meet the demand of their own money lending market. Slavin (2007) pointed out: the P2P loans in the United States and Britain has developed into a kind of savings and investment alternatives. Berger and Gleisner (2009) referred to in the United States first lending site prosper,com was established in 2006 in February,Germany’s first lending site was established in February 2007, at present, due to the legal system is different in different countries, almost all of the network platform lending operations are limited in the range of their own country. Ashta and Assadi (2009) research has shown that the type of online peer-to-peer lending platform and operation mode has its own features,in general they can be divided into two categories - for-profit and nonprofit platform, platform of for-profit business generally confined to the domestic, and non-profit platform to do business on a global scale. Both lenders is the biggest difference between the original and different requirements for earnings. For-profit platform lenders will risk requires a reasonable return for oneself, and non-profit lenders on the platform of general income does not make the request,they just want to ’’d o n a t e”part of his property,in order to help the poor people of the world.3The model of P2P network lendingPlatform is divided into two categories: basic for-profit and the for-profit (Ashta & Assadi,2009).Here the ’’p r o f i t”refers to the investment platform for investors- Investors profit type platform, hope by lending money to get match the economic benefits of risk. Non-profit platform of investors, the investment behavior is to help others, does not pay attention to taking economic returns. Nowadays the most profit type platforms are within the scope of its business,subject to regulatoryrequirements of the host countries (Berger, 2009)-Non-profit type platform is generally not subject to regional restriction, can operate on a global scale. The typical platform subdivided into three categories: public welfare,pure intermediary type and compound type mediation, after two classes are for-profit platform. The practice platform for the main service object as low-income people is in less developed areas. Simple mediation type platform only play the role of information intermediary, not to interfere in the user transaction. Compound intermediary platform to provide information service but also act as supervisors, joint chasing people, such as rate-setters role.3.1Public welfareKiva,founded in 2005, is an organization in Europe and the wealthy investors offering loans to small businesses in developing countries not for-profit P2P network platform. Basic obtained by raising its operating funds for small borrowers to provide low-interest loans and intermediary service free of charge. Because of the different national legal policy,Kiva f s business need to cooperate with local microfinance institutions (MFI),through its as a middleman to supervise and repay the loan (Ashta & Assadi,2009).3.2Simple mediation typeProsper in lending transactions only simple information intermediaryrole,through information disclosure and credit ratings provide the basis for both freedom of choice,Prosper after the deal itself is no longer involved in lending transactions. The entire Prosper platform has social security number, personal id number, bank accounts and personal credit scoring more than 520 American citizens can ’’l o a n s.First i t’s borrowing set similar EBay M double blind auction model This approach based on borrowing the preference,and strives to achieve the borrower loan conditions and investors' investment speed the acceptance and balance each other,by dynamic game to get the best interest rates (Chen et al”2014).3.3Composite mediation typeZOPA, as the ancestor of P2P network credit platform, has always been considered one of the most successful P2P network model, most scholars attribute the success to perfect risk control system. First,ZOPA .among cooperation with credit rating Company,it is according to its credit rating to determine the borrower's credit rating, and arrange it into the corresponding segment of the market, for investors to choose from. Second, ZOPA, almost all engage in transactions and related affairs. In addition to providing information to act as watchdogs,check the legality of the borrower loan procedures,completeness,supervise the borrower repayment on time,etc. ZOPA, provides a more real andtransparent financial services,at the same time,effective risk control measures can make the risk lower than traditional financial institutions.4The influence factors of P2P lendingNetwork, as it were, to borrow a thing has attracted the attention of many scholars since its birth, Klafft (2008) study that due to network lending type is a new thing, the lender lack the experience of the anonymous Internet loans, this will increase the risk of lending to network. Rothschild believes in a just grew up in the imperfect market, the researchers only indirectly through study the behavior of the borrower characteristics to obtain information about the development of the network of borrowing. But according to the behavior characteristics of the borrower and the study of the relationship lending to network events are not unified conclusion at present, such as those for borrowers loan application in the attached photos of research conclusions and even on the contrary,some research results such as Andrews (2008),it is concluded that the race, gender, personal characteristics such as little impact on the success rate of borrowing.Everett (2008) studies have found that if the loan borrowers in the group have acquaintances or merely know, makes the default rate be significantly decreased. Although Davis (2001) points out that the loan team a lack of clear ownership, while no significant characteristics andunified management decision-making mechanism, these decide whether people will join loan group is a random act. But as long as the team was able to set up loan,it can play the role of will be very important. D a t t a’s (2008) is one of the study found that the loan group leader role according to the relevant information to the t e a m’s members within the group of borrowers,and they do so power or is selfless attitude or is in order to get the corresponding reward. From this level, the loan group leaders mainly depends on the action of collecting and processing information to provide Suggestions for group members, through these behaviors, they in fact take on the role of the monitoring process of loan repayment, and in this way it indirectly promote the circulation of money lending website. According to e x p e r t’s research,in addition to loan group have a way to have obvious effect on reducing loan default rates that is to the network of group lending. This approach originated in the social network theory.5ConclusionsAfter the development history of P2P loans, theoretical basis and the development of P2P enterprise situation analysis of the P2P lending, we can find it is a full of potential and worth to continue to develop and put into lending to emerging patterns, especially considering it in solving the small micro enterprise financing difficulties and poor areas have played a huge role,need the government to make active efforts more,measures assoon as possible, in the right support and guide the development of this model.P2P网络借贷研宄Jensen Fabian摘要中小微企业融资难,贫闲地区农村缺乏金融服务,这一直是网扰政策制定者的两个因素,也是严重制约了经济发展、阻碍公平社会建设的两个因素。

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献,我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源,其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。

小额贷款公司经营风险外文文献翻译最新译文

小额贷款公司经营风险外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处:M Swan. The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan Companies [J]. Decision Support Systems, 2015,12(4): 828-838.原文The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan CompaniesM SwanAbstractSmall Loan Company is still in its infancy. Just in the process of its establishment and continuously explore, suffered a lot from themselves and the environment problems. As the regulators in the financial markets and relevant scholars, on how to locate small loan companies, how to make small loan companies play a real role in the national economy is full of concern. Small loan company capital source channel is narrow. Mechanisms involved in microfinance planning period is not long, after internal personnel practice survey, random diffusion time or disturbing both inside and outside conditions. Whether internal standard units or departments, professional analysis for such enterprises in the financial markets of rapid infiltration and perpetuate problems have been attached great importance to. As folk further liberalization of the capital market, therefore, small loan companies the management risk and financial risk is increasingly highlighted.Keywords: Small loan companies; Risk management; Control to prevent1 IntroductionIn the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, to summarize these appear in running the root cause of the risk management, it is more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective methods for these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention. Most scholars, according to the theory of small loan companies run the risk and prevention countermeasures of research, mainly concentrated in all kinds of risk and risk analysis is put forward, put small loan companies this new industrycompared with other financial industry environment, in the concrete for small loan companies on risk management in the operation of the fundamental problems, and how to guard against these problems has not conducted detailed discussed and countermeasures, and only in small loans risk aspects of problems in the operation of the company in theory emphasizes the overall risk of small loan companies and prevention. In the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, summed up in these. The root cause of the risk management in the operation of, is all the more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective means to these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention.2 Risk and risk managementSo-called hidden risks in small loan companies operating activities, mainly in the specific planning period internal profit performance on derivatives with the default index of conflicting phenomenon, especially given risk loss of effect. Combining normative power relatively broad regulatory body Angle of observation, the symptoms mainly joint mechanism disorders, loss events and the concrete performance of the amount of loss data. Under the background of this kind of developing system management, strategic planning can be established targets more completely, which along with all the fluctuations of will appropriate to eliminate, or make the disturbing factors have condition remains inside the company can accept the reasonable space structure, so as to strengthen the organization interest charge ability. Set of small loan companies, this article mainly emphasized by supervision, legal person or organization in the society structure transition to reverse the operation, one for the public deposits were rejected, hope to be able to operate in microfinance project implement profit motive for a long time under the control indicators. Need special attention is, the need to accept the country specific regulatory legal department, under the premise that the arrangement of all business, profit and loss or risk ofconflict will be borne by the company leadership comprehensive, and any shareholder will direct retain significant asset management personnel selection and accurate maintenance right content such as earnings results. After all these there is essential difference between companies and Banks, not synchronous open deposit business, will therefore shall be regarded as more formal financial management unit.The so-called risk management problem, that is, any enterprise during the period of Foreign Service accordingly to keep conflict prediction results and the prevention and control means, excluding the above factors still excessive crisis situation. Now comprehensive perfect the internal financial market regulation system in our country, but such risks does not2.1 Market riskIn its depth of stress is that when a specific enterprise marketing mode hidden conflicts hidden premise for market competition, the core area and actual occupy the share of late will produce certain gap preset indexes and as a result, under this background, a specific commodity technology innovation preparation procedure will breed a disorder or scale effect, which is difficult to cause the public recognition. Question on this part of the risk detailed analysis the following contents: first, the demand for consumer self satisfaction biased forecast results. Actually in such trouble enterprise product styles are different, but the late consumer activity development would be struggling, as for when to break free from the shackles of established the shackles of thinking is much more difficult to provide accurate answers. Second, the distortion of market core competitive power. In this kind of technology challenges of the corporate sector are often consumers and market regulators to double review, including the internal capital adequacy, executive’s comprehensive technical ability and moral quality level and finally improve the quality of our products means. At a particular stage based on enterprise competitive potential certification is trouble until trouble troubles you. Finally, the market demand curve from time to time. Market and product structure change activities must maintain synchronization effect, through heterogeneous mechanism connotation lap joint debugging, technical personnel will be left arbitrary cope with habits problem because of the weak.2.2 Technical riskRelative technical risk problems during the implementation of product shape transition depth, if you don't on any technical content cohesion, can make innovation activities. Such technical achievement to run from the initial transmission process through three levels, including scientific research experiments, quality testing and industrial structure promotion and so on, but the legacy of the potential risks will be more severe. During scientific research projects, the unit can content to cater to the preset standards are often difficult to conclude that negligence often because the operation subject facing failure situation. Mid-term test link, even the innovation product has production, but the public response to the information collection is not comprehensive, including side effects or ecosystem destruction in the planning process, etc. On this basis, to realize commercialization of research results will not be so easy. And large-scale production and sales stage, because the high-tech content in succession process has rough surface, make the products within the market to gain a foothold, especially under the condition of life is not long by the rest of the technology to replace the possibility is very high. So any a product no matter from the initial development stage for internal promotion is to the market and involving internal process is filled with all kinds of risk. In particular, technical risk mainly covers the detailed aspects: first, technology research and development activities extend range is not accurate verification; Second, the late in response to population fluctuations from time to time. Third, the market competition activity is participating in the lack of persistence.2.3 The financial riskIs mainly refers to project funding cannot achieve reasonable dredge out and make the result of the failure mechanism of innovation activities. Information funds for the financial position at risk enterprise how important, but in reality such enterprise expansion fund tends to have the following characteristics. First of all, the capital demand range is larger; Second, the concrete financing way too narrow. Late for venture enterprises economic benefits inherent fluctuation, makes any unit in to invest in its early after a long period of psychological war, so, its implementingoverall financing is still not enough reality. Financial control activities related to performance of the risk elements as follows: first, the financing sources and the number are difficult to textual research. Fortunately when such companies to adapt to the development stage, especially along with the expansion of business scope, make internal capital demand quantity full boom, if still can not get money as it should be within the prescribed period of time the number of support, will lose industry competitive advantage, eventually be eliminated by times. Second, money supply timeliness position shakes. Risk enterprises need to rely on money supply mechanism transition reform task, especially in well-funded, aging characteristics influence premise, despite the results spectacular gains phase, but may also be because cash shortage and make both industrial chain break, enabling enterprises to edge back intoa rout.2.4 Manage riskSpecific enterprise due to the default response mechanism in the process of implementation of the project planning result error and influence department reputation foundation, makes the development prospect of the late of blank, this kind of phenomenon also is late investment risk control activities need to focus on the core of the comprehensive technical problems. Combined with the morphology of risk enterprises, mismanagement signs are spreading, for enterprise management in the future bring depth limit crisis. Specific breeds reasons are: first, the enterprise established imbalance effect management organization structure design, especially with the field of technology transition entrepreneurial subject, often because under the background of knowledge management lack of license enterprises effect diffusion mechanism shortcomings; Secondly, the enterprise cohesion cooperation organizations cannot complete and enterprises in a task, even if is the size of the business situation is good, but neglected will derive more prominent contradiction, further into the root cause of risk management. About this part of the risk situation presents the following rules: (1) specific management thinking innovation main body is not strong enough, most of the internal rectification technology innovation risk firms simply focus on details, for the daily work of team quality form and technicalapplication ability almost unnoticed, makes the process structure, management content is difficult to meet the demand of era, it is bound to make enterprise strategy presents simplification feature in the future.(2) management experience is inadequate. In Chinese with the innovation of technology to realize the development of the corporate sector, will be because manager’s lack of personal ability makes it hard for business activities smoothly. (3) The personnel position structure arrangement conflict. Retain risk disadvantages enterprise position and corresponding matching, always involuntarily handover odds and enterprise development, has repeatedly let will only make the internal structure of high quality talents to pieces, make the business activities in the future as well as usual.3 Management risk control and prevention3.1 Strengthen the internal controlMost of the small loan companies will face professional’s scarce status, because small loans company belongs to the emerging of financial industry, industry system is not perfect. Therefore, the company's employees determine the small loan company can survive in the fierce market, and can be continuous development. Small loan company first to employ the persons with specialized knowledge and rich experience as executives, make financial institutions work and rich management experience of personnel to conduct regular training, less experienced practitioners organization personnel system to study the laws and regulations, familiar with financial knowledge of business and finance case, improve the staff's work ability and business level, strengthen the awareness of risk prevention.3.2 Open up the financing channels, the realization of diversified sources of fundingFirst of all, for subsequent insufficient funds become the greatest threat to the large-scale promotion in the future. At present, the company can only by the shareholders of a company constantly additional investment or developing new east and solve the problem of loan able funds, this makes the how to develop and maintain business steadily to become the biggest challenge. Second, countries to promote small loan credit, be in namely to promote the development of "agriculture, rural areas and farmers", small enterprises. Let go of small loan companies financing channels, togive financial institutions such as identity, fiscal and tax reduction policy support to process, small companies have the funds to solve legal channels, which naturally will not desperate to go "deposits" and off-balance-sheet financing illegally, this is the fundamental problem of small loan company funds source, as well as the development of basic problem, but as a small loan companies this is not the short-term investors, operators may change the status.3.3 Optimize the company's internal and external environment, strengthen the management of loansFirst of all, on the premise of guarantee its own environmental benign circulation, with the deepening of the company's business do more big, can slowly to such as Banks and other financial industry such as type of organization, benchmarking learning successful case of financial institutions, to further clear the requirement of the mortgaged property and improve the mortgaged property to accept mortgage threshold, so that we can effectively control the mortgaged property depreciation causes losses to the company. Secondly, establish and perfect the restraint mechanism with capital management as the core, and the traditional mainly denotation expansion of extensive growth mode to give priority to with connotation improve gradually intensive growth mode transformation. At the same time, small loans companies should adhere to market-oriented, commercial orientation, by high interest rates to reduce transaction risk and transaction costs, ensure that the company's earnings and normal operation. In risk control department and business department can through the establishment of "firewall system", strengthen the monitoring of loan risk, to timely feedback of loan quality deterioration, the loan provision for risk provisions for bad enough value. Give full play to the functions of small loan company's industry association, improve the industry self-discipline consciousness, and strengthen the financial accounting system, management personnel, registered capital of supervision and management, promoting its healthy development. Positive use of internal ratings and small credit has more mature technology, and through the way of market research, analysis of the demand for loans, and thus to develop a business strategy, so can make small loan co., LTD for the issuance of loans more tend to be more reasonable, and ismore practical and effective to control the loan risk.译文小额贷款公司经营风险防范M Swan摘要小额贷款公司目前仍处于起步阶段。

小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献

小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献

小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献1. 简介创业活动受到其所处环境的强烈影响(Baumol,1990,1993;Autio 和Acs,20XX年;Welter,20XX年)。

特别是在新兴市场,企业家面临着诸多挑战,例如创新成败参半(Bradley 等,20XX 年)、制度薄弱(Acemoglu,20XX年)和人力资本水平低下(Acs 和Virgill,20XX年)。

这些企业家面临的一个特别挑战是获得资金的机会(Honohan,20XX年),这可能导致他们陷入“贫困陷阱”(Berthelmy 和Varoudakis,1996),最终削弱了他们自由选择的能力(Gries 和Naudé,20XX年)和追求价值目标的能力(Alkire,20XX年)。

相反,一个发展良好的金融部门将使他们有能力更充分地参与到经济交流中(Sen,1999;Beck、Demirgüç-Kunt 和Levine,20XX年)。

为了应对发展中经济体特有的融资挑战,向企业家提供小额信贷已被视为可以改善生计战略的一个重要组成部分(Mair 和Marti,20XX年;Peredo 和Mclean,20XX年;Khavul,20XX年)。

小额信贷机构(MFIs)追求盈利战略,促进和1/ 7支持向企业家提供资本的持续活动,同时努力扩大服务范围,并推动外联(Morduch,1999;Fernando,20XX年)。

通过提供小额信贷、储蓄、保险和退休计划,个人能够获得资金,用于资助新企业的创建和生存(Campbell,20XX年;Khavul,20XX 年)。

因此,因此,小额信贷使企业家能够建立资产和经济资源,同时为当地社区创造就业机会和服务(Helms 20XX年)。

这最终可能会对个人能力和企业家的经营环境产生影响(Mair 和Marti,20XX年)。

目前关于小额信贷和小额融资的文献中的辩论侧重于小额信贷的部署动态,特别是对女性的小额信贷及其有效性(参见Mair、Marti 和Ventresca,20XX年;Milanov、Justo 和Bradley,20XX年;Chliova、Brinckmann 和Rosenbusch,20XX年),小额信贷机构如何运作(参见Morduch,1999;Armendariz 和Morduch,20XX年)小额信贷的可持续发展水平(参见Gonzalez-Vega,1994;Morduch,20XX年),以及小额信贷塑造其运作环境的能力(参见Mair 和Marti,20XX年;Khavul、Chavez 和Bruton,20XX年)。

外文翻译-----小额信贷的可持续发展问题

外文翻译-----小额信贷的可持续发展问题

中文3132字原文The Question of Sustainability forMicrofinance Institutions1.PrefaceMicroentrepreneurs have considerable difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. One key reason is that the costs of information about the characteristics and risk levels of borrowers are high. Relationship-based financing has been promoted as a potential solution to information asymmetry problems in the distribution of credit to small businesses. In this paper, we seek to better understand the implic ations for providers of ―microfinance‖ in pursuing such a strategy. We discuss relationship-based financing as practiced by microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the United States, analyze their lending process, and present a model for determining the break-even price of a microcredit product. Comparing the model’s results with actual prices offered by existing institutions reveals that credit is generally being offered at a range of subsidized rates to microentrepreneurs. This means that MFIs have to raise additional resources from grants or other funds each year to sustain their operations as few are able to survive on the income generated from their lending and related operations. Such subsidization of credit has implications for the long-term sustainability of institutions serving this market and can help explain why mainstream financial institutions have not directly funded microenterprises. We conclude with a discussion of the role of nonprofit organizations in small business credit markets, the impact of pricing on their potential sustainability and self-sufficiency, and the implications for strategies to better structure the credit market for microbusinesses.2.The MFI Lending Model in the United StatesMarketingMarketing drives the business model in terms of the volume of potential borrowers that an MFI is able to access and the pool of loans it can develop. Given that MFIs do not accept deposits and have no formal prior insight into a freshpotential customer base, they must invest in attracting new borrowers. Marketing leads are generated from a variety of sources: soliciting loan renewals fromexisting borrowers, marketing to existing clients for referrals, ―grassroots‖ networking with institutions possessing a complimentary footprint in the target environment, and the mass media.At the outset of operations, before a borrower base is developed, portfolio growth is determined by the effectiveness of marketing through network and mass media channels. Once a borrower pool is established, marketing efforts can be shifted toward lower-cost marketing to existing borrowers and their peer networks. Even so, loans will likely attrite from a portfolio at a faster rate than renewals and borrower referrals can replenish it—new leads must continue to be generated through other, less effective channels.The Loan Application ProcessIn economic terms, the loan application process represents an investment at origination with the aim of minimizing credit losses in the future. All else being equal, a greater investment in the credit application process will result in lower subsequent rates of delinquency and default; conversely, a less stringent process would result in greater rates of credit loss in the future. Setting the appropriate level of rigor in a credit application process is an exercise in analyzing loanapplicant characteristics and forecasted future behaviors while being cognizant of the cost of performing these analyses.Three steps characterize the loan application process.Preliminary Screen. The applicant is asked a short set of questions to establish the applicant’s eligibility for credit under the MFI’s guidelines. This is sufficient to determine the likely strength of an application and whether an offer of credit could, in principle, be extended.Interview. At the interview stage, due diligence is performed to ensure that the loan purpose is legitimate and that the borrower’s business has sufficient capacity and prospects to make consistent repayments. Cash-flow analysis is the core of the MFI due diligence procedure and for microfinance borrowers the data is often insufficiently formal, hindering easy examination of cash flow stability and loanpayment coverage. As a result, this is a less standardized, more timeconsuming task than its equivalent in the formal lending markets.Underwriting and Approval. If a loan is recommended by an officer following the interview the application is then stresstested by an underwriter, who validates the cash flow and performs auxiliary analysis to ensure that the loan represents a positive addition to the lending portfolio.The dynamics of loan origination illustrate the trade-offs to be made to ensure an efficient credit process. Improved rigor could lead to a higher rate of declined applicants, and so higher subsequent portfolio quality, but at the expense of increased processing costs. For medium and larger loans, as application costs increase past an optimal point, the marginal benefit of improved portfolio quality is outweighed by the marginal expense of the credit application itself. However, for small loans there exists no such balance point—the optimal application cost is the least that can be reasonably achieved. This motivates a less intensive credit application process, administered when a loan request falls beneath a certain threshold, typically a principal less than $5,000. MFIs can disburse such loans more quickly and cheaply by fast-tracking them through a transaction-based process and context learning.Loan MonitoringPost-loan monitoring is critical toward minimizing loss. In contrast to the credit application process, which attempts to preempt the onset of borrower delinquencyby declining high risk loans, monitoring efforts minimize the economic impact of delinquency once a borrower has fallen into arrears. In addition to the explicit risk to institutional equity through default, managing delinquent borrowers is an intensive and costly process.When dealing with repeat clients, there exists the opportunity to leverage information captured through monitoring on previous loans, enabling the MFI to shorten the full credit application without materially impacting the risk filter. In short, there is an opportunity to reduce operational costs without a corresponding increase in future loss rates. Repeat borrowers enable the information accrued during the relationship to be leveraged to mutual benefit of MFI and borrower. In this case, much of the information required to validate a loan application has been gathered during theprevious lending relationship. An MFI will also possess the borrower’s payment history, a more accurate indicator of future performance than an isolated financial snapshot taken during the standard application process. The challenge, however, is that for many MFI, a part of their mission is to graduate customers into mainstream commercial banking, which would not allow the MFI to collect additional interest payments from those customers.Overhead CostsFor an MFI to sustain itself, each outstanding balance must contribute a proportional amount to institutional costs. Institutional costs are driven primarily by the size of the portfolio being maintained. The necessary staff, tools, technology, work environment, and management are functions of portfolio scale.We outline in Table 2 the institutionallevel costs of five MFIs with varying portfolio sizes to identify the proportional cost loading necessary to guarantee that central costs are compensated for. The table shows that institutional costs increase at a slower rate than the rate at which the loan portfolio grows, so that the overhead allocation declines as an MFI achieves scale. We find that an MFI with a $500,000 portfolio will incur indirect costs of 26 percent, while an MFI with a $20 million portfolio will experience a much lower indirect cost loading of 6 percent. In the United States, the largest institution engaging solely in microfinance presently has a portfolio of $15 million.3.Discussion and ConclusionsContinued subsidization of credit also has implications for the long-term sustainability of MFIs. Our high-level analysis of projected self-sufficiency levels of various MFI sizes shows the importance of pricing appropriately. Even a modest deviation from the value-neutral price has a significant impact on the amount of subsidies needed to sustain the institution. As a consequence, it is imperative that MFIs rigorously analyze the true costs and review their pricing structures accordingly.It has yet to be demonstrated that microfinance can be performed profitablyin the United States. Nondepository MFIs may not have better information and/or technology to identify and serve less risky microbusinesses than formal institutions. Itwould therefore appear that formal institutions are acting rationally in choosing not to serve this market at present. However, MFIs have succeeded in channeling capital to microbusinesses. Still, MFIs often operate with certain public and/or private subsidies. Ultimately, more research is needed to ascertain whether the provision of microfinance offers a societal benefit in excess of economic costs. This paper is oneof the first to document a very wide dispersion in the difference between value-neutral and actual pricing for a sample of MFIs. This suggests a wide dispersion in the economic subsidies inferred by these MFIs. More specifically,these subsidies are not being allocated on a consistent basis.If subsidies are required to serve the market at palatable interest rates for lenders and borrowers, it is incumbent on the microfinance industry to demonstrate that theirs is an efficient mechanism for delivering such subsidies. Once a subsidy is justified, institutions must be motivated to improve their operational efficiency so that they may offer microfinance borrowers the lowest possible equitable prices while not jeopardizing institutional viability.外文题目:The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions 出处:Journal of Small Business Management 2007 45(1), pp.23–41.作者:J. Jordan Pollinger, John Outhwaite,and Hector Cordero-Guzmán译文:小额信贷的可持续发展问题(一)前言微型企业从主流金融机构获得资金有相当大的困难,其中的一个重要原因是对了解借款者所花费的信息费以及风险等级是很高的。

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献,我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源,其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。

小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译

小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译

文献出处:Dietrich A. The Research of Small loan Company Credit Risk [J]. Small Business Economics, 2015, 8(4): 481-494.原文The Research of Small loan Company Credit RiskDietrich A.AbstractMicrofinance is pointing to the tiny enterprises or individual enterprises provide credit service, small loans basic characteristics for the process simple, amount of small, unsecured, etc.The emergence of small loan companies before fill in the blank of traditional financial institutions, to ensure the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and individual enterprises need. However, due to the particularity of micro-credit Company itself exists, there are many deep level problems to be solved. Such as capital source, interest rate limits, etc., especially the credit risk control problem. Credit risk is the main risk facing microfinance institutions. Quality was monopolized by the original financial institutions, loan to customers rely mainly on credit personnel subjective judgments, the weakness of the service object group, partly due to the scarcity of high-quality professionals, in the specific operation and operation on the face of the numerous credit risk. Microfinance is a small loan company's core business, loan assets are an integral part of its assets, loan income is the main income, and credit risk will lead to microfinance institutions to produce a large amount of bad debts will not be repaid, will seriously affect the quality of credit assets. Previous management, risk management is equivalent to afterwards that the understanding for the loan risks management of collection, the processing of bad loans, etc.Practice has proved that this approach will only increase operating costs, and late is no guarantee of the company's asset quality. Risk control is the key to identify risk, credit risk is the main source of customers, choose good customer credit conditions at the time the loan is helpful to reduce the probability of credit risk. Therefore, we should from the source to control risk, when choosing loan customers, carefully screening customers, for customers to make the right evaluation. Key words: small loans; Credit risk; Prevention mechanism;1 IntroductionThe rise of small loan companies, making the private capital to enter the small loan companies, great convenience is provided for the small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households.Microcredit in absorbing private capital at the same time, broaden the financing channels. As a legitimate financial intermediation, enriched the organization form of the financial system. It also makes a lot of in the "underground" sunlight to folk financing mechanism; standardize the order of the financial market financing. Small Loan Company’s gradual development, make it’s become important force in the future diversified financial market.Small Loan Company since its establishment, has been for many small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households offers a wide range of financial support, guarantee the good operation of the economy. However, small loans company also has a lot of problems. First of all, according to the small loan companies operating conditions, the management mode for the "credit not only to save”. Can’t absorb deposits, which are also the biggest different microfinance companies and Banks. So its sources of funding are mostly shareholder investment and bank lending. This leads to the size of its capital is limited by great, when it comes to an amount loan amount, small loan company's business is difficult to maintain. Second, the small loan company's clients are difficult to loan from the bank's clients, in this high quality customer was monopolized by the traditional financial institutions, small loans company greatly increase the credit risk. Because we can not from the credit status of customer credit systems, company surveys every loan applicants need to spend a lot of time and energy. Finally, small loan company's products are mostly unsecured, completely by customer credit loans, which accelerate the speed and efficiency of the loan, but at the same time, the company's capital safety not guaranteed, when customer default, can calculate the loss of the company. These weaknesses can require small loan companies from the source to control risk, makes every effort to do it by reducing the credit risk to the minimum.In the process of field research, small loan companies do better on the credit riskcontrol, but also the above problems. Therefore, combined with the characteristics of small loan companies, a set of accord with the actual situation of the simple and easy to use credit evaluation system, through analyzing the characteristics of the default customer, for new loan customer default probability for effective judgment, control and reduce the risk of credit business is the main problems of small loan companies are facing at present stage.2 The necessity of research on theBased on the principle of small loans and related theory, under the guidance of conduct empirical study of Microfinance Company, through analysis of the situation, credit risk has the following practical significance:2.1 Promote microfinance company better risk controlExisting micro credit company risk control relies mainly on the subjective judgment of executives and the loan officer, lack of professional assessment of risk and risk management system, the risk is the intrinsic attributes of financial activities. For microfinance companies the special financial institutions, can effectively control and manage risk, related to the sustainable development of small loan companies can. Small Loan Company’s ultimate goal is profit, improve risk management, and help to reduce non-performing loans, to ensure the safety of the assets of the company, so as to realize the sustainable development of small loan companies.2.2 To perfect the existing financial system of risk controlTraditional financial institutions attach great importance to risk control, the state-owned commercial bank's risk management and internal control are better, on the basis of legal, effective and prudent, set up a specialist team of risk assessment methods. Such as 0, the agricultural bank of China credit rating for business customers, eventually will be divided into enterprise credit grade AAA, AA, A, B, C five grades, China construction bank efficacy coefficient method is used to determine the score, to measure the customer credit risk size, as according to the judgment of borrowers credit risk condition, and issuing different credit lines to different customers.3 Small loans company credit riskMicrofinance company time is not long, data is not complete, so dedicated to small loans of credit risk assessment model is less, because small loans business and loan business of commercial Banks and other financial institutions to traditional similar, so we can draw on the experience of credit risk assessment model of commercial Banks. In the context of index selection, developing countries believe that the most predictive power of microfinance credit risk assessment indicators are: customer own characteristics: age, gender, number of family members, etc;Family or corporate financial data; Loan characteristics and the status of the default in the past. Schreiner (2004) also think that risk is associated with the characteristics of lending institutions, such as the loan officer's experience and branch loan situation. n addition, policy changes, seasonal factors will have an effect to the default. In terms of developed countries, the evaluation index and the developing countries, James Copes take said (2007) through the questionnaire results showed that age, gender, household assets and labor quantity is the determinant of small loans to repay. Italian commercial Banks selected the explanatory power of higher indicators are: personal characteristics: the borrower characteristics and borrowing record; Business features: inventory, number of employees, revenue expenditure, etc; Other features: real estate properties, the current address live time, etc.3.1 Small loans company credit risk definitionCredit Risk (Credit Risk), also known as default Risk, refers to the borrower fails to carry out obligations in the contract within the prescribed time, the possibility of economic loss caused by small loans company. Specifically, the borrower may change because of its environment and cause credit conditions are poor and cannot afford the rest of the loan repayment, or false application materials when apply for a loan, get loans from microfinance company after not getting paid on time. The above conditions will lead to small loans company actual earnings deviating from the expected return, serious when still can cause company losses, credit risk has always been a traditional financial institutions risk, is also the main risk. According to the study, carries on the comparison to all kinds of risks, credit risk has the highest proportion, is considered to be all the factors which lead to debt repayment, thebiggest. This makes the credit risk control important. Small Loan Company profits from customers, but the company the biggest risk comes from the customer. From the causes of credit risk, mainly including: to understand the borrower's information is not complete, no accurate judgment to the borrower's credit status, colluding with collusion between the loan officer and the borrower, the loan examination and approval is not strict, a lack of understanding of customer credit situation, accredit risk arises from the whole process of lending, any mistakes will cause credit risk.3.2 Small loans company forms of credit riskMicro-credit companies are facing the credit risk is the main form of borrower default, delinquent loans, resulting in the delinquent loans, bad debt loss and etching order to prevent and reduce the possibility of loss, make. To minimize the loss, it is necessary for us to study on specialized default. Default refers to the borrowers did not follow the stipulations of the contract, within the prescribed time limit; pay off the loan, thus making the loan payments or delinquent loans. Different microfinance firm definition of default is not the same, if some agency interpret default loans for any overdue payment loans (American education to promote small business network, SEEP), also some think a loan is a loan default or delay paying behavior refers to the returned overdue loans. Specific how long overdue is recorded as the default; in practice of microfinance company is diverse.4 Prevention mechanism to reduce the credit riskThrough analysis, we believe that the individual situation, operation stability, loan borrowers credit records and other factors associated with small loans company customer credit risk, through the empirical study of small loan companies, we also found that good credit score model can help the loan officer found good potential defaulters, in view of the above situation, we put forward the following countermeasures.4.1 Starting from the customer, the establishment of customer resource filesFrom the article analysis shows that any risk assessment model is the basis of data collection, the role of the model is to extract important information from a large number of customer information, and according to the customer's payment tocustomer classification, and data collection is in accordance with the information provided by the customer. Make full use of by the customer, the information provided by the customer bank running water, such as accounts receivable bills for the record, and is an important factor analysis customers repay ability. Establish the borrower repayment ability analysis system, through to the borrower can bear the liabilities of the biggest limit the ability of analysis, control the loan amount and duration of the borrowers, in helping borrowers through financing difficulty, development business at the same time, reduce the loan funds transferred or misappropriate possibility, greatly reduce the occurrence of bad loans.4. 2 Establish and constantly improve microfinance credit reporting databaseBased on field research shows, small loan companies, now of small loan companies can only rely on the loan officer to spend a lot of time and energy to investigate the credit status of customers. As a result of the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection, there is a big risk of small loans to the company's business, if small loan companies can enter the credit reporting system for customer's credit standing, you can quickly understand the customer's information, speed up the lending, at the same time, saving manpower and financial resources, reduce the cost of operation.4. 3 Choose reasonable and scientific credit evaluation modelField survey found in small loan companies, petty loan company's risk management department is research and development of "score CARDS", the so-called "score card", is to report according to the customer manager of customer's basic situation, through certain technical means, the overall customer risk scores. The customer the higher the score, the more performance rate, the lower the score, the more possible risk of default. At present this technology for unsecured customers only, because this part of the customer is the biggest customer base, and because there is no collateral, so the risk is bigger. Unsecured customer loan program is relatively simple, the use of "score CARDS", can quickly determine the client's credit standing, making lending more convenient.译文小额贷款公司信用风险研究Dietrich A.摘要小额信贷是指向微型企业或个体经营户提供额度较小的贷款服务,基本特征为流程简易,额度较小,无抵押等。

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文:中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有:股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资,每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

小额贷款在帕恰斯,墨西哥:通过集体贷款减少贫困【外文翻译】

小额贷款在帕恰斯,墨西哥:通过集体贷款减少贫困【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Micro Credit in Chiapas, Me´xico: Poverty Reduction Through Group ending Material Source: Journal of Business Ethics, September 2009, V olume 88, Supplement 2, p283-299, DOI: 10.1007/s10551-009-0286-7;Author: Gustavo Barboza and Sandra TrejosIntroductionGeorge Akerlof (1970) brought the issues of asymmetric information and moral hazard (adverse selection) to the forefront of economic theory.While Akerlof relies on the example of the used car market to illustrate the existence of such informational problems, asymmetric information examples are found in everyday life situations, including the functioning of financial markets. In general, riskier borrowers pay higher interest rates to compensate for their higher probability of default, whereas safer borrowers pay lower interest rates. Financial markets use credit ratings to assess the borrowers’ probability of default and therefore, determine the corresponding interest rate to be charged. Collaterals, such as leans on cars or mortgages on land property, secure the loan in case of default. When neither collateral nor credit rating is available, no lending takes place. The lack of collateral or credit ratings inhibits the ability of financial institutions to internalize possible information asymmetries, and limits the prospects for economic activity to develop.Unfortunately, the above-mentioned scenario describes the reality of about half of t he world’s population. The lack of credit rating and/or collateral leaves about two to three billion people with no access to formal credit markets. They are unable to obtain loans for economic activities. This lack of access to financial markets is a major problem when trying to reduce poverty around the world.The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize2 was awarded to Mohammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh for their pioneer work on developing Micro Credit3 (MC) as a method to reduce poverty through the provision of financial resources to the poorest of the poor. MC programs have emerged in many countries and are aviable option for people with entrepreneurial skills and promising business projects. Under the new organizational model, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) managing MC programs receive financial support from donors, grants, or borrowed money from international organizations at preferential interest rates4 (sometimes interest rate free), to then lend to impoverished people. These programs bridge the gap between no access to financial markets and institutions, and one-time lump sum government aid programs.Poverty and Micro-creditThe recent rise of Micro Credit is a direct response to the failure of the formal financial markets to include the poor as different and unique economic agents. Governments have tried to improve this market failure by providing lump sum aid. But this solution does not correct the situation in which the poor lack access to loan funds. In the early 1970s,Mohammed Yunus initiated the Grameen Bank project, an MC program that provided small loans for poor people who lacked collateral. The Grameen Bank currently has similar and derived programs operating around the world. MC is an innovative approach to lend financial resources to the poor, without making use of collateral, by creating a network of trust where families, neighbors, friends, or even strangers come together to support each other financially. MC programs focus on the poorest of the poor, those that are shunned away from formal financial markets opportunities.How do MC programs work? MC programs receive financial support from socially responsible donors and international organizations because of their positive impact on poverty alleviation while promoting economic development. Financial viability of MC programs is crucial to continuing the provision of resources to those in the lowest income bracket. Achieving and consistently maintaining high repayment rates on outstanding loans is, hence, central not just for survival of the organization, but to achieve the goals of dissemination of wealth and integration into modern society. Alternatively, low repayment rates or high delinquency on outstanding loans would most likely create an adverse effect on the willingness of donors to support MC programs.MC programs are tailored to the specific needs of the clientele they target. For instance, some programs focus on urban areas and provide financial resourcesexclusively to the poor. Other MC programs concentrate their operations in rural areas, and provide access to financial resources and related services, such as educational programs and health services. Furthermore, some programs use the individual group lending model, while others lend to groups, or lend money individually under joint liability contracts. The unifying factor of these programs is that their final goal is to lift the poor out of poverty, not through charity, but through the efficient use of scarce resources and the development of feasible entrepreneurship projects that allow the borrowers to use their capabilities towards reaching their potential. In this regard, some programs, such as BancoSol, are defined as for-profit organizations, while most others are operated by NGOs with a clear non-profit status.The empirical results of MC performance and impacts are generally very impressive. According to the United Nations’ High Level Event fact sheet,65% of all Grameen Bank borrowers ‘‘have managed to lift themselves out of extreme poverty.’’However, there is still work to do given that a great proportion of people around the world still live on less than $1.25 a day (purchasing power parity in 2005 prices). Using this threshold, the World Bank estimates from August 2008 reveal that 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty.Perhaps the best known MC program in Me´xico is Compartamos, which is active in over 26 Mexican states and provides services mainly to rural borrowers. Compartamos, like many other MC programs, lends mostly to women, though recently its services has been extended to men. Compartamos is one of the first MC institutions to be listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange and it became a commercial bank in 2006 (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). However, Compartamos is different from most MC programs because MC programs operate at a much lower scale than the former.Very little research has been conducted on the impact of MC programs on poverty in Mexico. One Micro Credit in Chiapas, Me´xico 285 study reports that people who have been microfinance clients for more than one year are financially better off than new clients (Woodworth and Hiatt, 2003). The study reported that nonclients earned only $1.69 a day and 22% of the nonclients earned less than $1 a day. MCs offer these poorest of the poor a clear and feasible alternative that is already yielding positive effects for those in most need.A model of Micro-credit lendingFirst, lenders can either loan money directly to borrowers or use a financial intermediary. According to Prescott (1997), lending to the financial intermediary, under the riskier return projects, is the optimal solution for individual lenders. The main reasons are the high monitoring, screening, and administrative costs that the lender would have to incur to secure a full repayment. The financial intermediary has a comparative advantage in these regards (Prescott, 1997).Second, lenders can provide individual loans,group loans, or individual loans under group joint liability.Third, lenders can lend without monitoring but with liquidation, lend and monitor, or lend to groups and have them self-monitor.Fourth, MC institutions lending to small borrowers also need to consider private information on borrowers’ returns, liquidation costs, costly monitoring, and costly screening (Prescott, 1997). The existence of private information on the borrowers istypically unknown, which is one of the reasons why formal financial markets do not to lend to poor people. Borrowers can lie and claim bad performance which the lending institution is not able to verify. Finding mechanisms to ameliorate the existence of private information is the first task for the lending institution, both from the generation of revenue perspective and the use of funds to guarantee high repayment rates. The selected mechanisms will, in turn, dictate the lending approach,loan structure, and corresponding cost structure on the MC lending institution side.Fifth, the operating mechanisms of MC institutions preclude them from receiving direct deposits from savers.Sixth, loans from socially responsible lenders and donors, and other financial resources from donors,can be used either to lend to borrowers or to cover administrative expenses. The most common practice is for socially responsible lenders and donors to earmark that the money be allocated for specific uses.MethodologyOur objective is to provide empirical evidence on poverty reduction, repayment rates, and group dynamics to determine the role that donors can play in assuring thefinancial viability of MC programs. To determine the impact MC programs have on poverty alleviation, repayment rates, and approximate overall program sustainability were estimated using data from the ALSOL Micro Credit Program in Chiapas, Me´xico. The official transaction records of weekly payments were examined from July 2000 to July 2001 for a total of 2151 participants.ALSOL provides loans to urban borrowers at a 30% flat interest rate and rural borrowers at a 20% flat interest rate. Under the progressive loan structure, loans are given out in six levels. Borrowers move to the next loan level upon successful completion of the previous loan.FindingsThe findings reported below are organized based on the following analysis: (1) overall loan sample, (2) active loans versus inactive loans for the overall sample, (3) rural loans versus urban loans for the overall sample, (4) active rural loans versus active urban loans, (5) inactive rural loans versus inactive urban loans, (6) active loans by region and level, and (7) inactive loans by region and level.Overall loan sampleThere were significant weekly variations in loanrepayment patterns. Figure 1 indicates that ALSOL Micro Credit has overall weekly loan repayment rates ranging from a low of 84% (just prior to 9/1/00) to a high of 98% (shortly after 12/10/00), for the period July 2000 to July 2001. Multiple factors can explain this variation: differentiated learning-bydoing process between urban and rural settings, drop outs of poor performers, early cancellation of loans,recomposition among overall rural and urban participants,and relative loan structure recompositions.These elements represent the group dynamics that are inherent in an MC program in the form of peer monitoring, assortative matching, and response of program participants to a given set of dynamic incentives.Figure 1. ALSOL program performance in actual to expected payments.Active loans versus inactive loans for the overall sampleIn the case of active participants (see Figure 2), the lower performance numbers,Figure 2. ALSOL Micro Credit performance of active and inactive loans.relative to inactives,can be attributed to the prevalence of loans that decided to remain in the program as of July 2, 2001despite having a history of arrears (repayment difficulty).For inactives, the relative average performanceincludes two different types of participant groups: (1)women who paid off the loan in full many weeks ago anddecided not to receive a new loan and (2) women who received a loan recently and paid it off in less than 50 weeks. We also identified 21 defaulted cases.Rural loans versus urban loans for the overall samplePerformance differentials are more evident when a rigional specific classification is considered (see Figure 3) For instance, the evidence indicates positive difference in performance in favor of urban women over rural women. On average, urban women had stronger, and more consistent, performance.Urban loan performance, compared to rural loan performance, is closer or above the number one for a larger number of observations. Rural participants display more arrears in the loans, with an overall difference of about 15% for overall program,compared to 10–12% for actives.Figure 3. ALSOL rural and urban loan performance.ALSOL provides economic incentives to rural participants by charging a lower interest rate in comparison to urban loan. This incentive attempts to enhance the likelihood of repayment for rural participants,as it is assumed that they have a more difficult time accessing markets to sell their wares. The results in Figure 3 tend to suggest that the market conditions are indeed more difficult for rural participants. Two key factors come to play in this regard: (1) cash flows are not generated on a daily basis, and (2) the larger physical distance from markets makes it more difficult for these entrepreneurs to interact with consumers and obtain information about market performance. The combination of these elements results in greater difficulty to make payments on a weekly time schedule.A derived issue from the difficulties encountered rural participants is the slower advancement made along the progressive loan ladder. As rural participants are unable to generate a strong and consistent cash flow, their borrowing capacity is proportionally hindered because they are unable to repay as much as fast.Active rural loans versus active urban loansTo further understand the dynamics of repayment patterns, we analyzed the Active/Inactive categories by regional classification. Active urban loans carry relatively low arrears and tend to perform ahead of schedule (see Figure 4). The significant positive performance of active urban loans supports the assumption that projects with higher expected returns have lower levels and frequency of arrears. These require a lower need for peer monitoring and represent an overall reduction in monitoring and administrative costs to the lending institution. Active rural loans, despite displaying an upward trend on repayment rates, do not catch up with those of the urban participants.Figure 4. Active urban and rural loans.Inactive rural loans versus inactive urban loansSimilar patterns of behavior are observed in the inactive classification when dividing the groups into urban and rural categories (see Figure 5). Inactive urban participants tend to outperform inactive rural ones. The difference in performance, however, is not as strong as before. Indeed, during the period between July 2000 and January 2001, rural participants show a considerable improvement in repayment rates and catch up with the performance of urban loans several months into theanalysis.Figure 5. Inactive urban and rural loans.For rural participants this period corresponds to a significant number of cancellations on highly delinquent loans, which results in an improved overall performance. The catching up effect disappears as rural participants increase the number of arrears during the first half of 2001, because the remaining inactive rural loans continue to accumulate arrears. On the other hand, the inactive urban participants show a strong tendency towards early loan payments. The performance of inactive rural loans present a tendency to worsen as many loans are not cancelled and become inactive after accumulating more than 25 weeks without activity. Active loans by region and levelThe tendency of active urban loans to outperform active rural loans is consistently present at all loan levels (see Figures 6 and 7). Active urban loans have a strong tendency to be ahead in terms of payments with a low incidence of arrears. For rural loans, no single category of loan level has a performance indicator equal or greater than 1.Figure 6. Active rural loans by level.Figure 7. Active urban loans by level.Active rural loans by levelActive rural loans display a significantly differentiated performance when classified by level (see Figure 6).First level loans strongly pull down the overall performance. Performance at the first level is always below the average for the overall rural program,which indicates that there are differences associated with newcomers into the program compared to groups and centers that have acquired relevant business experience as they move up in the progressive loan structure.Even within the first loan level, there are distinctive patterns related to learning and improved performance as participants mature on their loans.This suggests that incentives positively affect behaviors. The poorer performance of the active rural first loan level is explained by those that are at the verge of strategic default. Out of a total of 320 active rural first loans, 26.25% are at high risk of default; for 161 second loans, 36.02%; and for 108 third loans, 20.37%. None of the 28 fourth loans are at high risk of default.Active urban loans by levelFigure 7 illustrates the existence of a considerable degree of convergence towards optimal performance for active urban loans. It is of particular relevance that the reduction in the overall variance and the coherent movement of most all categories are in the same direction. Even in the lowest level of performance towards the end of the period, the maximum level of arrears does not exceed 4–5%.Without doubt the active urban participants outperform the active rural ones in many regards.Repayment rates are better, the number and frequency of arrears are much lower with a strong tendency to be ahead of schedule, and there is a faster repayment of loans reinforced by consequently faster upward movement along the loan ladder. In addition, even though there is some small degree of variation in the time trend performance, there is also enough evidence to suggest that all categories tend to move toward the same level of performance for active urban centers.Why? Easier and prompt access to the market translates into a better and more stable cash flow that allows better repayment rates and fewer arrears on average. In addition, a higher return on economic activities is promoted by access to credit, resulting in successful business ventures. Access to credit through MC materializes those economic opportunities urban people have been developing that are economically feasible. This further promotes entrepreneurship development. None of these opportunities could have been propelled to the current status if borrowers relied on access to credit from formal markets.Inactive loans by region and levelAs indicated in Figures 8 and 9, the same general impressions made about active loans apply to Figure 8. There is a difference in magnitude of effects, but not in direction. The same basic structural factors affect both inactive urban and rural participants, but each region has identifying factors that ameliorate their respective performance. Further analysis of the inactive records indicates that the inactive urban loans are more consistent on their performance of repayments, havingsignificant low arrears and, in general, perform ahead of inactive rural loans.Figure 8. Inactive rural loans by level.Figure 9. Inactive urban loans by level.Comparing the degree of arrears of inactive rural loans suggests that these loans maintain a much better record of payments than active rural loans.On the other hand, urban participants, both active and inactive, have relatively comparable performance indicators that appear at first glance not to be correlated with the active/inactive classification. However, this tendency changes towards the end of the period of analysis when inactive rural loans start presenting a significant deterioration as theaverage number of arrears increases. This is particularly significant when one considers that the inactive urban participants considerably improved their performance, remaining ahead of schedule at about 8% for most of 2001.There are several possibilities for the significant performance divergence. First, from a purely statistical point of view, basic indicators for urban participants tend to have a more consistent pattern of repayment. Second, given that the number of urban participants grows faster than rural participants, the overall performance in the urban sector is more dynamic. Thus, instead of being associated with higher risk, the higher returns may be associated with better opportunities and ability of urban participants to use MC incentives.ConclusionsMicro Credit programs are a viable alternative for those in the lowest income bracket. A combination of available funding through socially responsible lenders and donors, and individual lending under joint liability, allows for significantly high recuperation rates on outstanding loans. The ALSOL Micro Credit in Chiapas, Me´xico case study shows that this new organizational approach, through the provision of financial resources to those considered unbankable by the formal financial system, can successfully achieve and maintain high recuperation rates. This, in turn, translates into opportunities for participants to migrate out of poverty.MC programs provide opportunities to poor people and their families in ways that the market fails to address. MC programs also fill empty holes left by market imperfections incapable of assimilating the existence of asymmetric information. These gaps in market functioning, due to the market’s inability to effectively account for private and asymmetric information, create severe and persistent problems for those less fortunate.Poverty alleviation is a persistent challenge requiring immediate attention. Spreading the goodness of access to the market is one form to address this problem. The research reported in this article suggests six implications for poverty reduction.First, contrary to common beliefs held by many formal lending institutions, the poor are capable of borrowing money, developing successful entrepreneurship ideas, making regular repayments, and successfully completing a full lending–borrowing cycle.Second, while formal lending markets fail to incorporate those in most need because of the existence of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, MC programs are able to bridge these differences and provide real opportunities toward poverty alleviation.Third, the existence of market imperfections precludes the poor from participating in resource allocation efficiency gains markets provide. Yet, access to markets benefits, precisely, the poor the most. At the margin, an increase in income has a much larger positive effect at initial low levels of income.Fourth, MC programs and full access to market participation complement each other. Differences in performance across urban and rural participants – in favor of the former – indicate that urban borrowers have better access to markets where they sell their wares. This allows urban borrowers to complete the borrowing cycle faster, progress to higher loan levels faster, and consequently escape away from poverty more rapidly.Fifth, despite the impressive performance of MC programs, administrative costs remain high. Continuous financial support from socially responsible lenders and donors is still in much need to secure a long-term positive effect on program development and consequent poverty reduction until an MC program reaches sustainability.Lastly, further research on the overall impact of MC programs is needed. Some issues of interest that remain unresolved include: overall MC program sustainability, actual extent of poverty reduction in Latin America derived fromMCprograms, incidence of social mobility because of MC programs, and inner group dynamics under non-collateralized borrowing.译文小额贷款在帕恰斯,墨西哥:通过集体贷款减少贫困资料来源:商业伦理[J].2009(9), 88卷,附录2, p283 – 299.作者:古斯塔沃·巴尔沃萨,桑德拉·特雷霍斯引言George Akerlof (1970)把信息不对称和道德风险(逆向选择)的问题推到了经济理论最前沿。

外文翻译--小额贷款机构外汇风险管理和小额信贷投资基金

外文翻译--小额贷款机构外汇风险管理和小额信贷投资基金

中文4100字,2400单词,12500英文字符出处:Barrès I. The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk by Microfinance Institutions and Microfinance Investment Funds[M]// Microfinance Investment Funds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006:115-146.原文:The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk by Microfinance Institutions and Microfinance Investment FundsIsabelle BarresThe term “MFI” is used broadly in this chapter to encompass institutions thatprovide small-scale financial services, such as loans, savings, insurance, remittancesand other services (generally in amounts less than 250 % of GNP per capita). Theterm encompasses a wide variety of organizations: NGOs, credit unions, non-bankfinancial intermediaries, rural banks, etc.Most microfinance investment funds (MFIFs) and other funders such as officialdevelopment agencies finance their activities in US dollars (USD) or Euros (EUR),which may be called “hard currencies.”However, most microfinance institutions(MFIs) operate in nondollarised or non-Euro-based economies and lend local currencyto their clients.Funding in one currency and lending in another, and the probability that therelative values of the two currencies will alter, creates foreign exchange (FX) risk.V olatile currency exchange rate fluctuations in many countries where MFIs operatemake FX risk a serious issue, but one that has often been accorded little urgency inmicrofinance. The accelerated development of microfinance through access to capitalmarkets makes it imperative that foreign exchange be managed in ways that areconsistent with best practice in finance. Until this is widely achieved, access to capitalmarkets for the benefit of microfinance will be retarded.Foreign exchange risk is one of many risks that MFIFs face. Interest rate risk isan additional risk that is related to FX risk. As currency values change, interestexpense or income will also change. And, spreads between interest rates on both sidesof the balance sheet may change, that is, interest rates on money borrowed in onecurrency by a microfinance institution, for example, may diverge from interest rates on money loaned to micro entrepreneurs by the MFI. Each of these effects has implications for MFIF and MFI profitability. For purposes of economy, these second order exchange risks are not discussed further here in.This chapter explores the nature of FX risk in debt funding by focusing on which party is likely to bear the risk of exchange rate fluctuations in different situations at different points in a funding transaction. The importance of hedging is noted, and mechanisms are listed that MFIFs and MFIs use to address their respective FX risks.The relationships between currency and risk described below apply to equity funds, while in the case of guarantee funds the situation is reversed. Equity investments, as capital, are always in the currency of the MFI. For the foreign equity investor, “foreign exchange risk becomes one of several risks associated with an investment rather than a central factor in making a loan.”Equity and guarantee funds, while not the focus of this chapter, are included in the Appendices with examples to identify when they face a currency risk and the hedging mechanisms they use.The most common foreign exchange risk possibilities are summarized in Table. These combinations involve positions in Euros (EUR) and local currency, US dollars (USD) and local currency, and between EUR and USD, that comprise the currencies in which assets and liabilities are held by MFIs and MFIFs. Generalizing, we assume that before the MFI receives funding, it has no currency mismatch. Its “operating currency,”the currency in which its assets are denominated, is the same as its “funding”currency, which is the currency in which its liabilities are denominated.The example of change in value of the EUR against the USD is an interesting one to examine. Over a 2-year period, the EUR gained close to 40% of its value against USD. This large change in the relative values of two “hard”currencies was underestimated by many MFIs and MFIFs. The EUR was launched in 2002 at USD 1.17, and subsequently fell to less than USD 0.90. Recently, however, the EUR has appreciated considerably against the USD, and many European MFIFs operating in EUR and lending in USD in dollarizsed countries in Latin America have incurredsignificant losses from the transactions.The sharp appreciation of the EUR against the USD has created significant exchange losses on the EUR loans of many MFIs, which in some cases will require restructuring. The ASN-Novib Fonds is an example. It is an MFIF in the Netherlands that lends in hard currency (both USD and EUR), with most of its portfolio concentrated in Latin America. It is seeking opportunities in Asia and Africa if the foreign exchange risks can be hedged. In the past, the ASN-Novib Fonds made EUR loans to MFIs operating in dollarised economies, but the lack of hedging by its client MFIs and subsequent losses have forced ASN-Novib Fonds to discontinue unhedged EUR funding, which it considers too risky for the MFIs. On the other hand, MFIs borrowing in USD and on-lending in EUR have experienced currency gains their Euro-equivalent USD repayments of principal and interest have diminished considerably.Regardless of who bears the direct currency risk (i. e., direct losses from currency fluctuations), both parties are at risk for indirect losses resulting from currency risk. For example, if an MFIF suffers losses and downscales operations or changes the allocation of countries in which it invests, client MFIs may lose access to a funder that has been helpful in the past. On the other hand, MFIFs face increased credit risk (i. e., an indirect currency risk in this case), when MFIs have not hedged their currency risk and suffer subsequent losses that affect their profitability and long term viability. In this sense, some dimensions of currency risk are always shared between the MFIF and the MFI, regardless of which bears the direct risk, as portrayed in the examples above.Because of direct and indirect FX risks, MFIFs and MFIs are working together to develop hedging mechanisms in countries where the capital markets may offer few of the hedging options that are available in developed countries. To mitigate indirect currency risks, most MFIFs try to assess whether it is reasonable for their client MFIs to borrow in a certain currency. They examine their funding and operating currencies and monitor their overall foreign currency exposure on a regular basis as part of their due diligence process. MFIFs that have adopted these procedures include BIO,Cordaid, Etimos, Incofin, Luxmint-ADA, Rabobank and Triodos. Exposure analysis varies, and is not used in every case. Informal cross-checking among MFIFs also helps raise their awareness of the foreign exchange exposure of their affiliates. Some MFIFs such as ASN-Novib Fonds have changed their policies to reduce MFI currency risks.Interviews conducted by ADA, CGAP, and The MIX for the KfW symposium in 2004 shed some light on MFIFs’perceptions of FX risk. The study found that perceptions of the degree of risk linked to currency fluctuations depend largely on direct currency exposure, although most MFIFs interviewed expressed great concern for the larger issue whether or not they directly faced a risk–because of the potential repercussions of a loss incurred by MFIs as a result of transactions with an MFIF.When asked: “Is foreign exchange risk a big issue for the MFIs that you invest in?”, MFIFs were almost unanimous in saying that foreign exchange risk is a major issue in lending to MFIs because it increases the risk of losses, regardless of who assumes the risk. MFIFs that shared this view included BIO, Cordaid, Luxmint-ADA, Rabobank, and Triodos. Some MFIFs, including BIO, Cordaid, and PlaNet Fund, were nevertheless willing to assume greater FX risk, or were generally less concerned about it, for several reasons: The potential currency losses linked to currency risk discussed previously contrast with the responses regarding risk mitigation. While levels of risk vary, not enough is being done from the perspectives of both MFIFs and MFIs. Many MFIFs and MFIs that should hedge because of the level of their exposure do not have hedging mechanisms in place, for a variety of reasons explored below. Of the 64 MFIFs analyzed for the KfW symposium and through The MIX Market, 49 provided the currency breakdown of their microfinance investment portfolios. Of these, 46 provided information about their hedging policies –or lack thereof. Only a little over 40% (19) of the MFIFs that gave details of their hedging policies indicated that they had a hedging policy in place.As noted previously, not all MFIFs need to hedge. MFIFs that offer funding in their currency of operations have no FX risk and therefore do not have hedging policies in place.Excepting the 7 MFIFs that were not exposed to direct currency risk, 20 MFIFs, about 50% of the 39 that faced exposure from currency risk, did not have hedging mechanisms in place, as illustrated in Table . Failures to hedge adequately created losses for several of the MFIFs studied, including many European microfinance investors, such as NOVIB (on local currency loans and participations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda), Cordaid (on loans in Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, etc, and others.How are exchange rate losses treated in accounting information? Some MFIFs show returns prior to exchange rate losses while others show returns after exchange rate losses. Lack of standardisation produces important differences in the overall return, often turning a positive return into a negative one. This difference should be taken into consideration when examining the financial statements of MFIFs. A forthcoming edition of the MicroBanking Bulletin, focusing on the supply side of MFI funding, will provide more details of issues arising from the lack of standardisation and transparency in MFIF reporting. MFIFs that reported having hedging mechanisms in place indicated differences in their degree of hedging: some fully hedged currency risk, while many hedged hard currency risk but not their local currency exposure. The most common reason for not hedging currency risk is that MFIFs are willing to assume the risk. MFIFs that had not hedged their currency exposure are identified in Appendix 5. Other MFIFs that were not hedging simply because they did not face direct currency risk are listed in Appendix 6. Some MFIFs also chose to bear the FX risk and not hedge, in order not to increase the costs of their loans and face the risk of losing potential customers.Appendix 3 indicates that a few investment funds, primarily social funds, are willing to assume direct currency risk by offering local currency loans to MFIs. However, most MFIFs invest in MFIs in hard currency, passing the FX risk to the MFIs, which then bear the responsibility for hedging by obtaining a hard currency guarantee or buying a derivative security that neutralises their risk. A number ofMFIFs are lending in hard currencies, sometimes recklessly, in countries where the devaluation risk is high and MFIs do not hedge. Similar to the MFIFs, MFIs face varying levels of risk that depend not only on the mix of currencies they borrow and on-lend to their clients, but also on the volume of funds borrowed and/or on-lent in different currencies.A recent survey conducted by CGAP and The MIX identified the funding structure and future funding projections of MFIs.Of the 216 MFIs that responded to the survey, 80 indicated that they were currently using hard currency funding (USD or EUR) and indicated the amount.Of these 80 MFIs, 8 operated in dollarised economies (Ecuador and El Salvador) or in Euros (Kosovo). The remaining 72 were exposed to either USD or EUR currency risk: 61 had an average exposure of USD 2.6 million and 11 had an average exposure of EUR 3.8 million.An average of 48% of USD loans and an average of 36% of EUR loans were hedged. Nevertheless, these averages hide important differences in hedging practices amongst MFIs. More interesting is the distribution of hedging (Table 4).In either USD or EUR exposures, 72 MFIs should have hedged: 54% were not hedging at all, while 24% were fully hedged. The remaining 16 MFIs (or 22%) partially hedged their currency risk. For more details on exposures and the percentage of hedging by the MFIs in the survey that were operating in a non-USD or non-EUR country, see Appendices 9, 10 and11.Most of the 216 surveyed MFIs had some exposure to currency risk through their transactions with an average of one foreign lender, and/or desired to increase their funding from foreign sources. In addition, 68 (or 31%) of the 216 MFIs surveyed indicated that foreign funders did not want to assume foreign exchange risk and that this was a challenge in obtaining foreign loans and equity. In addition, the sample results suggest that there is a high probability that MFIs that have access to foreign loans are not hedging properly. The hedging issue is therefore important: helping MFIs reduce currency risk will increase their interest in obtaining foreign lending and reducing FX losses.Similar to the MFIFs, the performance of MFIs is affected not only by theactual gains or losses incurred from foreign exchange, but also in the way these are accounted for. Adjustment methods used by external analysts such as rating agencies also contain considerable differences. It is important to examine the specific accounting treatments when comparing the performance of MFIs.Although FX risk occurs in almost every transaction between microfinance investors (especially foreign investors) and MFIs, too many MFIFs and MFIs are not hedging appropriately. Hedging is seldom used because common hedging mechanisms are not available in the countries where MFIs operate, or prohibitively costly for the small amounts of the transactions involved. While hedging increases transaction costs, lack of hedging results in losses that can be significant, especially for MFIs and MFIFs that do not have well diversified portfolios.In addition, MFIFs often compensate for FX risk by increasing their interest rates to MFIs to cover potential losses. FX risk therefore increases the lending costs for the MFIs (and ultimately, for their clients), regardless of whether or not they have access to local currency loans. Unless MFIFs are able to assume more of the FX risk linked to their lending to MFIs, other funding instruments such as guarantees may be more appropriate for MFIs that face small margins.“Best practices”for hedging by MFIFs should include strategies of when to hedge, how much to hedge, how to hedge. Sharing experiences with successful and innovative hedging mechanisms, such as FX insurance funds, would greatly encourage MFIFs to absorb more of the FX risk that MFIs are so ill equipped to address, reducing costs for MFIFs and MFIs.译文:小额贷款机构外汇风险管理和小额信贷投资基金术语“多边投资框架”在这一章中使用广泛,包括机构(一般金额小于人均国民生产总值250%)提供的小规模金融服务,如贷款,储蓄,保险,汇款和其他服务。

小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译

小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译

文献出处:Dietrich A. The Research of Small loan Company Credit Risk [J]. Small Business Economics, 2015, 8(4): 481-494.原文The Research of Small loan Company Credit RiskDietrich A.AbstractMicrofinance is pointing to the tiny enterprises or individual enterprises provide credit service, small loans basic characteristics for the process simple, amount of small, unsecured, etc.The emergence of small loan companies before fill in the blank of traditional financial institutions, to ensure the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and individual enterprises need. However, due to the particularity of micro-credit Company itself exists, there are many deep level problems to be solved. Such as capital source, interest rate limits, etc., especially the credit risk control problem. Credit risk is the main risk facing microfinance institutions. Quality was monopolized by the original financial institutions, loan to customers rely mainly on credit personnel subjective judgments, the weakness of the service object group, partly due to the scarcity of high-quality professionals, in the specific operation and operation on the face of the numerous credit risk. Microfinance is a small loan company's core business, loan assets are an integral part of its assets, loan income is the main income, and credit risk will lead to microfinance institutions to produce a large amount of bad debts will not be repaid, will seriously affect the quality of credit assets. Previous management, risk management is equivalent to afterwards that the understanding for the loan risks management of collection, the processing of bad loans, etc.Practice has proved that this approach will only increase operating costs, and late is no guarantee of the company's asset quality. Risk control is the key to identify risk, credit risk is the main source of customers, choose good customer credit conditions at the time the loan is helpful to reduce the probability of credit risk. Therefore, we should from the source to control risk, when choosing loan customers, carefully screening customers, for customers to make the right evaluation. Key words: small loans; Credit risk; Prevention mechanism;1 IntroductionThe rise of small loan companies, making the private capital to enter the small loan companies, great convenience is provided for the small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households.Microcredit in absorbing private capital at the same time, broaden the financing channels. As a legitimate financial intermediation, enriched the organization form of the financial system. It also makes a lot of in the "underground" sunlight to folk financing mechanism; standardize the order of the financial market financing. Small Loan Company’s gradual development, make it’s become important force in the future diversified financial market.Small Loan Company since its establishment, has been for many small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households offers a wide range of financial support, guarantee the good operation of the economy. However, small loans company also has a lot of problems. First of all, according to the small loan companies operating conditions, the management mode for the "credit not only to save”. Can’t absorb deposits, which are also the biggest different microfinance companies and Banks. So its sources of funding are mostly shareholder investment and bank lending. This leads to the size of its capital is limited by great, when it comes to an amount loan amount, small loan company's business is difficult to maintain. Second, the small loan company's clients are difficult to loan from the bank's clients, in this high quality customer was monopolized by the traditional financial institutions, small loans company greatly increase the credit risk. Because we can not from the credit status of customer credit systems, company surveys every loan applicants need to spend a lot of time and energy. Finally, small loan company's products are mostly unsecured, completely by customer credit loans, which accelerate the speed and efficiency of the loan, but at the same time, the company's capital safety not guaranteed, when customer default, can calculate the loss of the company. These weaknesses can require small loan companies from the source to control risk, makes every effort to do it by reducing the credit risk to the minimum.In the process of field research, small loan companies do better on the credit riskcontrol, but also the above problems. Therefore, combined with the characteristics of small loan companies, a set of accord with the actual situation of the simple and easy to use credit evaluation system, through analyzing the characteristics of the default customer, for new loan customer default probability for effective judgment, control and reduce the risk of credit business is the main problems of small loan companies are facing at present stage.2 The necessity of research on theBased on the principle of small loans and related theory, under the guidance of conduct empirical study of Microfinance Company, through analysis of the situation, credit risk has the following practical significance:2.1 Promote microfinance company better risk controlExisting micro credit company risk control relies mainly on the subjective judgment of executives and the loan officer, lack of professional assessment of risk and risk management system, the risk is the intrinsic attributes of financial activities. For microfinance companies the special financial institutions, can effectively control and manage risk, related to the sustainable development of small loan companies can. Small Loan Company’s ultimate goal is profit, improve risk management, and help to reduce non-performing loans, to ensure the safety of the assets of the company, so as to realize the sustainable development of small loan companies.2.2 To perfect the existing financial system of risk controlTraditional financial institutions attach great importance to risk control, the state-owned commercial bank's risk management and internal control are better, on the basis of legal, effective and prudent, set up a specialist team of risk assessment methods. Such as 0, the agricultural bank of China credit rating for business customers, eventually will be divided into enterprise credit grade AAA, AA, A, B, C five grades, China construction bank efficacy coefficient method is used to determine the score, to measure the customer credit risk size, as according to the judgment of borrowers credit risk condition, and issuing different credit lines to different customers.3 Small loans company credit riskMicrofinance company time is not long, data is not complete, so dedicated to small loans of credit risk assessment model is less, because small loans business and loan business of commercial Banks and other financial institutions to traditional similar, so we can draw on the experience of credit risk assessment model of commercial Banks. In the context of index selection, developing countries believe that the most predictive power of microfinance credit risk assessment indicators are: customer own characteristics: age, gender, number of family members, etc;Family or corporate financial data; Loan characteristics and the status of the default in the past. Schreiner (2004) also think that risk is associated with the characteristics of lending institutions, such as the loan officer's experience and branch loan situation. n addition, policy changes, seasonal factors will have an effect to the default. In terms of developed countries, the evaluation index and the developing countries, James Copes take said (2007) through the questionnaire results showed that age, gender, household assets and labor quantity is the determinant of small loans to repay. Italian commercial Banks selected the explanatory power of higher indicators are: personal characteristics: the borrower characteristics and borrowing record; Business features: inventory, number of employees, revenue expenditure, etc; Other features: real estate properties, the current address live time, etc.3.1 Small loans company credit risk definitionCredit Risk (Credit Risk), also known as default Risk, refers to the borrower fails to carry out obligations in the contract within the prescribed time, the possibility of economic loss caused by small loans company. Specifically, the borrower may change because of its environment and cause credit conditions are poor and cannot afford the rest of the loan repayment, or false application materials when apply for a loan, get loans from microfinance company after not getting paid on time. The above conditions will lead to small loans company actual earnings deviating from the expected return, serious when still can cause company losses, credit risk has always been a traditional financial institutions risk, is also the main risk. According to the study, carries on the comparison to all kinds of risks, credit risk has the highest proportion, is considered to be all the factors which lead to debt repayment, thebiggest. This makes the credit risk control important. Small Loan Company profits from customers, but the company the biggest risk comes from the customer. From the causes of credit risk, mainly including: to understand the borrower's information is not complete, no accurate judgment to the borrower's credit status, colluding with collusion between the loan officer and the borrower, the loan examination and approval is not strict, a lack of understanding of customer credit situation, accredit risk arises from the whole process of lending, any mistakes will cause credit risk.3.2 Small loans company forms of credit riskMicro-credit companies are facing the credit risk is the main form of borrower default, delinquent loans, resulting in the delinquent loans, bad debt loss and etching order to prevent and reduce the possibility of loss, make. To minimize the loss, it is necessary for us to study on specialized default. Default refers to the borrowers did not follow the stipulations of the contract, within the prescribed time limit; pay off the loan, thus making the loan payments or delinquent loans. Different microfinance firm definition of default is not the same, if some agency interpret default loans for any overdue payment loans (American education to promote small business network, SEEP), also some think a loan is a loan default or delay paying behavior refers to the returned overdue loans. Specific how long overdue is recorded as the default; in practice of microfinance company is diverse.4 Prevention mechanism to reduce the credit riskThrough analysis, we believe that the individual situation, operation stability, loan borrowers credit records and other factors associated with small loans company customer credit risk, through the empirical study of small loan companies, we also found that good credit score model can help the loan officer found good potential defaulters, in view of the above situation, we put forward the following countermeasures.4.1 Starting from the customer, the establishment of customer resource filesFrom the article analysis shows that any risk assessment model is the basis of data collection, the role of the model is to extract important information from a large number of customer information, and according to the customer's payment tocustomer classification, and data collection is in accordance with the information provided by the customer. Make full use of by the customer, the information provided by the customer bank running water, such as accounts receivable bills for the record, and is an important factor analysis customers repay ability. Establish the borrower repayment ability analysis system, through to the borrower can bear the liabilities of the biggest limit the ability of analysis, control the loan amount and duration of the borrowers, in helping borrowers through financing difficulty, development business at the same time, reduce the loan funds transferred or misappropriate possibility, greatly reduce the occurrence of bad loans.4. 2 Establish and constantly improve microfinance credit reporting databaseBased on field research shows, small loan companies, now of small loan companies can only rely on the loan officer to spend a lot of time and energy to investigate the credit status of customers. As a result of the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection, there is a big risk of small loans to the company's business, if small loan companies can enter the credit reporting system for customer's credit standing, you can quickly understand the customer's information, speed up the lending, at the same time, saving manpower and financial resources, reduce the cost of operation.4. 3 Choose reasonable and scientific credit evaluation modelField survey found in small loan companies, petty loan company's risk management department is research and development of "score CARDS", the so-called "score card", is to report according to the customer manager of customer's basic situation, through certain technical means, the overall customer risk scores. The customer the higher the score, the more performance rate, the lower the score, the more possible risk of default. At present this technology for unsecured customers only, because this part of the customer is the biggest customer base, and because there is no collateral, so the risk is bigger. Unsecured customer loan program is relatively simple, the use of "score CARDS", can quickly determine the client's credit standing, making lending more convenient.译文小额贷款公司信用风险研究Dietrich A.摘要小额信贷是指向微型企业或个体经营户提供额度较小的贷款服务,基本特征为流程简易,额度较小,无抵押等。

小额信贷外文

小额信贷外文

原文The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions1.PrefaceMicroentrepreneurs have considerable difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. One key reason is that the costs of informationabout the characteristics and risk levels of borrowers are high. Relationship-based financing has been promoted as a potential solution to information as ymmetry problems in the distribution of credit to small businesses. In this paper we seek tobetter understand the implications for providers of “microfinance” in pursuing such as trategy. We discuss relationship-based financing as practiced by microfinance institutions MFIs in the United States analyze their lending process and present amodel for determining the break-even price of a microcredit product. Comparing themodel’s results with actual prices offered by existing institutions reveals that credit isgenerally being offered at a range of subsidized rates to microentrepreneurs. This means that MFIs have to raise additional resources from grants or other funds eachyear to sustain their operations as few are able to survive on the income generated from their lending and related operations. Such subsidization of credit has implications for the long-term sustainability of institutions serving this market andcan help explain why mainstream financial institutions have not directly funded microenterprises. We conclude with a discussion of the role of nonprofit organizations in small business credit markets the impact of pricing on their potential sustain ability and self-sufficiency and the implications for strategies to better structure the creditmarket for microbusinesses.2.The MFI Lending Model in the United StatesMarketing drives the business model in terms of the volume of potential borrowers that an MFI is able to access and the pool of loans it can develop. Given that MFIs do not accept deposits and have no formal prior insight into a fresh potential customer base they must invest in attracting new borrowers. Marketing leads are generated from a variety of sources: soliciting loan renewals from existing borrowers marketing to existing clients for referrals “grassroots” networking with institutions possessing a complimentary footprint in the target environment andthe mass media. At the outset of operations before a borrower base is developed portfolio growth is determined by the effectiveness of marketing through network and mass media channels. Once a borrower pool is established marketing efforts can be shifted toward lower-cost marketing to existing borrowers and their peer networks. Even solo ans will likely attrite from a portfolio at a faster rate than renewals and borrower referrals can replenish it—new leads must continue to be generated through other less effective channels.The Loan Application Process In economic terms the loan application process represents an investment at origination with the aim of minimizing credit losses in the future. All else being equal a greater investment in the credit application process will result in lower subsequent rates of delinquency and default conversely a less stringent process would result in greater rates of credit loss in the future. Setting the appropriate level of rigor in acredit application process is an exercise in analyzing loan applicant characteristics and forecasted future behaviors while being cognizant of thecost of performing these analyses.Three steps characterize the loan application process. Preliminary Screen. The applicant is asked a short set of questions to establish th e applicant’s eligibility for credit under the MFI’s guidelines. This is sufficient todetermine the likely strength of an application and whether an offer of credit could inprinciple be extended. Interview. At the interview stage due diligence is performed to ensure that theloan purpose is legitimate and that the borrower’s business has sufficient capacity andprospects to make consistent repayments. Cash-flow analysis is the core of the MFIdue diligence procedureand for microfinance borrowers the data is often insufficiently formal hindering easy examination of cash flow stability and loan payment coverage. As a result this is a less standardized more timeconsuming task than its equivalent in the formal lending markets. Underwriting and Approval. If a loan is recommended by an officer followingthe interview the application is then stress tested by an underwriter who validates thecash flow and performs auxiliary analysis to ensure that the loan represents a positive addition to the lending portfolio. The dynamics of loan origination illustrate the trade-offs to be made to ensure anefficient credit process. Improved rigor could lead to a higher rate of declined applicants and so higher subsequent portfolio quality but at the expense of increased processing costs. For medium and larger loans as application costs increase past an optimal point the marginal benefit of improved portfolio quality is outweighed by them arginal expense of the credit application itself. However for small loans there exists no such balance point—the optimal application cost is the least that can be reasonably achieved. This motivates a less intensive credit application process administered when a loan request falls beneath a certain threshold typically a principal less than 5000. MFIs can disburse such loans more quickly and cheaply by fast-tracking them through a transaction-based process and context learning.Loan Monitoring Post-loan monitoring is critical toward minimizing loss. In contrast to the credit application process which attempts to preempt the onset of borrower delinquency by declining high risk loans monitoring efforts minimize the economic impact of delinquency once a borrower has fallen into arrears. In addition to the explicit risk to institutional equity through default managing delinquent borrowers is an intensive and costly process. When dealing with repeat clients there exists the opportunity to lever age information captured through monitoring on previous loans enabling the MFI toshorten the full credit application without materially impacting the risk filter. In short there is an opportunity to reduce operational costs without a corresponding increase infuture loss rates. Repeat borrowers enable the information accrued during therelationship to be leveraged to mutual benefit of MFI and borrower. In this case muchof the information required to validate a loan application has been gathered during theprevious lending relationship. An MFI will also possess the borrower’s paymen this tory a more accurate indicator of future performance than an isolated financial snapshot taken during the standard application process. The challenge however isthat for many MFI a part of their mission is to graduate customers into mainstream commercial banking which would not allow the MFI to collect additional interest payments from those customers.Overhead Costs For an MFI to sustain itself each outstanding balance must contribute aproportional amount to institutional costs. Institutional costs are driven primarily bythe size of the portfolio being maintained. The necessary staff tools technology work environment and management are functions of portfolio scale. We outline in Table 2 t he institutional level costs of five MFIs with varying portfolio sizes to identify the proportional cost loading necessary to guarantee that central costs are compensated for. The table shows that institutional costs increase at as lower rate than the rate at which the loan portfolio grows so that the overhead all ocation declines as an MFI achieves scale. We find that an MFI with a 500000portfolio will incur indirect costs of 26 percent while an MFI with a 20 million portfolio will experience a much lower indirect cost loading of 6 percent. In theUnited States the largest institution engaging solely in microfinance presently has aport folio of 15 million.3.Discussion and ConclusionsContinued subsidization of credit also has implications for the long-term sustainability of MFIs. Our high-level analysis of projected self-sufficiency levels ofvarious MFI sizes shows theimportance of pricing appropriately. Even a modest deviation from the value-neutral price has a significant impact on the amount of subsidies needed to sustain the institution. As a consequence it is imperative that MFIs rigorously analyze the true costs and review their pricing structures accordingly. It has yet to be demonstrated that microfinance can be performed profitably in the United States. Nondepository MFIs may not have better information and/or echnology to identify and serve less risky microbusinesses than formal institutions. Itwould therefore appear that formal institutions are acting rationally in choosing not toserve this market at present. However MFIs have succeeded in channeling capital to crouinesses. Still MFIs often operate with certain public and/or private subsidies.Ultimately more research is needed to ascertain whether the provision of microfinance offers a societal benefit in excess of economic costs. This paper is oneof the first to document a very wide dispersion in the difference between value-neutral and actual pricing for a sample of MFIs. This suggests a wide dispersion in theeconomic subsidies inferred by these MFIs. More specifically these subsidies are notbeing allocated on a consistent basis. If subsidies are required to serve the market at palatable interest rates for lender sand borrowers it is incumbent on the microfinance industry to demonstrate that theirs is an efficient mechanism for delivering such subsidies. Once a subsidy is justified institutions must be motivated to improve their operational efficiency so that they may offer microfinance borrowers the lowest possible equitable prices while not jeopardizing institutional viability.外文题目:The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions出处:Journal of Small Business Management 2007 451 pp. 23–41.作者:J. Jordan Pollinger John Outhwaiteand Hector Cordero-Guzmán。

小额贷款的危害及影响英语作文

小额贷款的危害及影响英语作文

小额贷款的危害及影响英语作文The Hazards and Effects of MicroloansMicroloans, often touted as a tool for poverty alleviation and economic empowerment, have gained popularity in recent years. However, beneath the veneer of benevolence, these small-scale loans carry significant hazards and can havefar-reaching negative impacts. This essay aims to explore the multifaceted dangers and effects of microloans, shedding light on the complexities surrounding this seemingly beneficial financial tool.One of the most pressing issues associated with microloans is the cycle of debt they can perpetuate. While initially intended to provide a financial lifeline to those in need, the high interest rates and stringent repayment terms often trap borrowers in a cycle of perpetual indebtedness. As a result, instead of lifting themselves out of poverty, borrowers find themselves sinking deeper into financial distress, with the burden of loan repayments overshadowing any potential benefits derived from the initial injection of funds.Furthermore, the proliferation of microloans has led to an increase in predatory lending practices, particularly in developing countries where regulatory frameworks may be lax. Unscrupulous lenders capitalize on the vulnerability of impoverished individuals, luring them into accepting loans under misleading terms and conditions. This exploitation not only exacerbates the financial plight of borrowers but also erodes their trust in financial institutions, perpetuating a cycle of disenfranchisement and disillusionment.In addition to the individual level, the widespread availability of microloans can have broader societal implications. By fostering a culture of dependency on credit, these loans can undermine traditional community-based support systems. Instead of relying on mutual aid and collective resources, individuals may turn to microloans as a quick fix, inadvertently weakening the social fabric that underpins resilient and cohesive communities.Moreover, the influx of microloans into local economies can distort market dynamics and perpetuate inequality. Small-scale entrepreneurs, who are often the target demographic for microfinance, may find themselves competing in an overcrowded marketplace, driving down prices and diminishing their earning potential. This can further entrench economic disparities, as larger, more established businesses capitalize on the influx of credit to consolidate their dominance in the market.The adverse effects of microloans are not confined to the economic sphere; they also have profound social and psychological ramifications. The stress and anxiety associated with mounting debt can take a toll on borrowers' mental well-being, perpetuating a cycle of poverty that extends beyond financial constraints. Moreover, the erosion of social capital and community cohesion, as individuals become increasingly isolated in their pursuit of financial stability, can have enduring consequences for societal harmony and collective resilience.In conclusion, while microloans are often heralded as a panacea for poverty, it is imperative to critically examine their hazards and effects. From perpetuating cycles of debt and fostering predatory lending practices to undermining community solidarity and exacerbating economic inequality, the ramifications of microloans are far-reaching and multifaceted. As we navigate the complexities of financial inclusion and poverty alleviation, it is essential to adopt a nuanced approach that considers the broader implications of microfinance, ensuring that the pursuit of economic empowerment does not come at the cost of perpetuating vulnerability and disenfranchisement.。

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文献信息文献标题:An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities (小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究)文献作者:Jonathan Kimmitt, Mariarosa Scarlata,Dimo Dimov文献出处:《Venture Capital》 ,2016,18(3):257–276字数统计:英文3661单词,21609字符;中文6504汉字外文文献An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities Abstract Understanding under which conditions microcredit is used by new, growing ventures is becoming increasingly pertinent to scholars. This paper investigates the interplay of the use of microcredit with entrepreneurial capabilities and the moderating role of institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings show that higher constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities are associated with higher use of microcredit. In addition, we find that new, growing ventures use microcredit more where either economic or political institutions are less developed. Our findings suggest the importance of the existence of some type of institutional strength that must be in place to form the basis for microcredit activity. This allows for speculation as to whether microcredit works as the literature currently assumes.KEYWORDS: Capabilities; entrepreneurial finance; institutions; microfinance1.IntroductionEntrepreneurial activity is strongly influenced by the context it is embedded in (Baumol 1990, 1993; Autio and Acs 2010; Welter 2011). Particularly in emerging markets, entrepreneurs face a number of challenges, such as the mixed success ofinnovation (Bradley et al. 2012), weak institutions (Acemoglu 2003), and low human capital levels (Acs and Virgill 2010). One particular challenge for these entrepreneurs is access to finance (Honohan 2007) which can lead them into “poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996), ultimately undermining their ability to freely choose among options (Gries and Naudé 2011) and pursue the goals they value (Alkire 2005). A financial sector that is well developed, on the contrary, would give them the instrumental capability to more adequately participate in economic exchange (Sen 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007).To respond to funding challenges that particularly characterize developing economies, the provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs has been regarded as an important part of the strategy through which livelihoods could be improved (Mair and Marti 2006; Peredo and Mclean 2006; Khavul 2010). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) pursue profit-making strategies that facilitate and support the ongoing activity of capital provision to entrepreneurs while also trying to extend their services and drive outreach (Morduch 1999; Fernando 2006). By providing microcredit, savings, insurance, and retirement plans, individuals are able to obtain capital which can be used to finance the creation and the survival of new ventures (Campbell 2010; Khavul 2010). As such, microcredit allows entrepreneurs to build assets and economic resources, while creating employment opportunities and services for local communities (Helms 2006). This can ultimately have an effect on individuals’ capabilities and the contexts entrepreneurs operate in (Mair and Marti 2009).Current debates in the microcredit and microfinance literature have focused on the dynamics through which microcredit is deployed, particularly to women, as well as its effectiveness (cfr. among others Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Milanov, Justo, and Bradley 2015; Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch 2015), how microfinance institutions function (cfr. among others, Morduch 1999; Armendariz and Morduch 2007) as well as their level of sustainability (cfr. among others, Gonzalez-Vega 1994; Morduch 2000), and their ability to shape the context they operate in (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013). Research has also indicated that institutional quality determines theperformance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and Chávez 2015) and that institutions influence how entrepreneurial finance is channeled to entrepreneurs in developing economies (Eid 2005). However, Beck (2007) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) indicate that small and medium-sized businesses, often called “missing middle,” offer high returns on investments in these contexts. Yet, they remain underserved financially and overlooked by researchers. We also know that empirical access to finance is a critical issue for firms in developing economies and microcredit is a particular type of high-risk debt which may not always be sought after (Hulme 2000; George 2005).In addition, if context shapes entrepreneurship and sets the boundaries for entrepreneurial action (Welter 2011), it is not clear (a) whether ventures using microcredit are those whose capabilities are constrained the most by the environment they operate in and (b) under which institutional conditions these ventures actually use microfinance to fund their business needs. The question about when and where entrepreneurs decide to pursue or forgo the option of using microfinance loans still remains unanswered (Khavul 2010). In this paper, we ask the following question: How do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? To answer these questions, our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit by firms in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized as a context with a high level of constrained capabilities. Often viewed as institutionally homogenous (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), we highlight the institutional heterogeneity of this context and the varying capabilities associated with it. We test predictions using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, the Economic Freedom of the World Report index (2011), as well as the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). Our findings indicate that microcredit is indeed used in areas where individuals’ entrepreneurial capabilities are more constrained. At the same time, in these contexts, microcredit tends to be mostly used where there is either a well-developed market or a well-functioning political–judicial system which guarantee a minimal“rule of game”. It is only under those institutional conditions that firms, constrained by their capabilities, are prone to/can use microcredit to financetheir business activities.2.Theoretical backgroundSen’s (1999, 2005) “capabilities approach” introduced the notion that development should be conceptualized as freedoms, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their ability to act. Because individuals have ideas about the type of lives they want to live, they act in accordance with such aims (Sen 1999). Following the capabilities approach, antecedents and consequences of individual circumstances can be highlighted using non-monetary indicators: Capability constraints need to be understood with respect to the individual’s freedom, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their abilities to do or to be (Alkire 2005). In the capabilities approach, a person’s freedom refers to the genuine opportunity to realize whatever it is that they are trying to achieve (Alkire 2005). This, in turn, determines“what they do” (Anand et al. 2009). Building on Sen’s (1999) argument, Nambiar (2013) further reports that capabilities are synonymous with individuals feeling constrained or enabled by their immediate circumstances, whereas Robeyns (2005), Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) indicate that it is an individual’s environment which creates heterogeneities in capabilities. Severely restricted capabilities are therefore associated with an inability to act in accordance with ones’ aims.Prior work shows that context is particularly important in shaping entrepreneurial capabilities: By setting boundaries, it can be the space for the emergence of opportunities while also placing limitations upon them (Welter 2011; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013). Context influences enterprising activities at the intersection of different levels of analysis, situating theories, and empirical patterns within their natural settings (Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014). Evans (2002) and Sen (1999), among others, indicate that the institutional context indeed influences capability development. Both Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) explain that expanding individual freedoms are central to advancing capabilities; this expansion is guided by institutional frameworks. The proposition here is thatinstitutional development impacts freedoms, such as those related to economic opportunities, property, finance, and other basic services (Stiglitz 1998; Nussbaum 2000), and this impacts capability development. On the one hand, as Robeyns (2005) reports, the capabilities of entrepreneurs require appreciating that there are heterogeneities in their abilities to achieve their aims. On the other hand, institutional failure can increase transaction costs which limit the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, reducing the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities and leading to suppression of entrepreneurial activity (Baker, Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin 2005).The development of financial institutions, which provide adequate financial services, is categorized by Sen (1999) as an instrumental capability. Contexts where financial institutions are underdeveloped contribute to the creation of“poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996) as it reduces the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities. This, in turn, hinders the ability of individuals to adequately participate in economic exchange and overall capabilities (Sen 1999). Microcredit developed in contexts characterized by limited access to resources (Peredo and Chrisman 2006) as a solution for individuals who are constrained by the environment, which inhibits the pursuit of lucrative opportunities (Sen 2005). As such, microcredit acts as a means toward the expansion of entrepreneurs’ capabilities (Ansari, Munir, and Gregg 2012) who can incrementally improve their capabilities of achieving small-scale solutions to macro social problems (Moyo 2009). This leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:Hypothesis 1. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where capabilities are constrained.Hypothesis 2. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where economic institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 3. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where political-judicial institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 4. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit in environments characterized by high constrained capabilities where economic institutions are more(less) developed and political-judicial institutions less (more) developed.3.MethodologyTo test our hypotheses, we used data by the World Bank through its annual Enterprise Survey. We focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa since this has been consistently depicted as one of the areas with seriously restricted capabilities. In particular, the World Bank (2012) reports an increase in sub-Saharan urban population by 114% between 1990 and 2009, and an increase in people living with less than $1 a day by 183%; also, the average life expectancy at birth results to be 52.5 years, compared with 71.5 years for North Africa and 69.2 years for the world. Still, the prevalence of HIV for people aged 15–49 is nearly 7 times the world’s average (World Bank 2012).Twenty-seven sub-Saharan countries were included in the survey. The enterprise surveys collect firm level information on the business environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and the various constraints to firm performance and growth (World Bank 2011). Firm-level data are available from 2002; however, since data prior to 2006 were collected by different units within the World Bank and employed different survey questions for different countries, our analysis focuses on data collected from 2006. In addition, the enterprise survey is addressed to operating businesses that employ a minimum of five employees; this eliminates most of the subsistence-driven and self-employment forms of entrepreneurship, something that Karnani (2007) has defined as “misguiding” in that the focus on subsistence entrepreneurship does not help us in understanding and/or explaining economic development. Similarly, Mead and Liedholm (1998) have shown that within an African context, small and medium-sized enterprises generate significantly more jobs than larger scale enterprises yet remain chronically underfunded. By concentrating on ventures with five or more employees, we are able to focus on the“missing middle” of the microfinance sector which have the greatest potential for driving economic growth and is consistently under-researched (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002). To date, this is a group of entrepreneurs who havereceived sparse attention within the microfinance literature, which has heavily focused on microfinance institutions themselves rather than on recipients of their services (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Moss, Neubam, and Meyskens 2015; Silva and Chávez 2015).For what concerns our conceptualization of entrepreneurship as new ventures, consistent with prior research in both developed and developing countries, we limited our analysis to those firms that were not part of larger firms and were less than 10 years old (Benson 2001; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Reuber and Fischer 2002; Barnir, Gallaugher, and Auger 2003; Park and Bae 2004; Bhagavatula et al. 2010). Based on these parameters, our sample size for analysis was 5255 of the 16847 firms in the original Enterprise Survey data set.4.Discussion, limitations, and future researchScholars have consistently linked entrepreneurial activity with economic growth. However, in developing countries, individuals often lack the capabilities to access the market and obtain capital to fund new business opportunities. Acknowledging these challenges, microcredit developed to provide small amount of loans to allow such individuals to efficiently engage in economic exchange and build their ventures, thus making wider economic contributions (Mcmullen 2011). However, entrepreneurship researchers have argued that contextual factors, both at the individual and institutional level, augment entrepreneurial activity (Baumol 1990; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013).This paper highlights the contextual conditions under which new, growing ventures use microcredit. These ventures are classified as the“missing middle” and have been overlooked by mainstream academic research and practitioners’ work, where a focus has been on individuals receiving microcredit for subsistence purposes and/or to develop micro-enterprises (Beck 2007). Yet, we know that microcredit developed as a solution to offer individuals the necessary financial instruments that would enable building entrepreneurial capabilities by developing new businesses. As such, this “missing middle” represents smaller firms within developing economiesthat have limited financial options even though they may offer returns on investments in these contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) and potentially provide much more significant economic externalities in terms of job and wealth creation (Karnani 2007). Although the term “missing middle” has been used for some time, there is very little research on this group of firms even though they are becoming a more prominent part of the microfinance picture and have a more significant economic impact than their micro counterparts (Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013).Because sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized by high constraints to individual capabilities and little attention has been paid to heterogeneity of capabilities across the continent (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit in“missing middle” ventures in such countries. Specifically, we examine the degree to which microcredit is utilized by new ventures as a function of the country’s institutional environment, measured as the development of economic and political institutions, and of the degree of constraints to a firm’s capabilities, measured by the fruitfulness of the commercial environment. We then argue that microcredit is more likely to be used by those ventures that have higher restrictions to their capabilities only when there is some institutional arrangement, either at an economic or political–judicial level that sets “the rules of the game.”Our empirical results suggest that microcredit is indeed used by these new, missing middle ventures in contexts that present challenges both at the firm and institutional level of analysis. The identification of a positive effect between the use of microcredit and the constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities reinforces Sen’s (1999) view and the notion that microcredit facilitates access to capital for those entrepreneurs that operate in regions with the most restricted capabilities. However, our results also show this happens only when there are appropriate supporting institutional mechanisms, further suggesting that contextual features of the institutional environment shape microfinance activity. Particularly, the use of microcredit by the“missing middle” increases in contexts characterized by restricted capabilities and either (a) well (less) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions or (b) less (well) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions. Theunderdevelopment of economic institutions can prevent entrepreneurs from forming contracts, ultimately increasing business uncertainty and compounding their ability to create wealth (Seelos and Mair 2007). This is theoretically consistent with the Mair and Marti (2009) argument who assert that MFIs act as institutional entrepreneurs in contexts of institutional weakness left open by underdeveloped economic institutions. Similarly, contexts where political–judicial institutions are characterized by high levels of corruption raise the fundamental threat of rent and asset expropriation, generating uncertainty in the business environment. This uncertainty undermines entrepreneurial aspirations of individuals and has a stronger effect on new ventures than on established ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In such contexts, institutions in charge of transferring resources to one party to another, and designed to serve on behalf of the government or the people (including, thus, the government itself ), may not be answerable to their principals.However, our results also do show that we should consider the interaction between development of economic and political institutions to fully understand the use of microcredit by new, growing firms and that heterogeneity of capabilities drives such relationship. Particularly, microcredit may help shape institutional contexts characterized by heterogeneous capabilities, but foundational institutional support is needed in order to tackle such capability problems. Whereas prior work (Mair and Marti 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013) has indicated that microcredit is used in contexts where only economic institutions are to be developed, our work shows that there must be some formal institutional political framework in place for entrepreneurs to use microcredit in such contexts. Without it, the developmental role of microcredit may be overstated.At the same time, we also show that microcredit is used in contexts where there is development of economic institutions. Yet, we identify that the use of microcredit is to be found in contexts with stronger economic institutions and weak political ones. It is precisely this interaction between developed economic institutions and underdevelopment of political ones that the literature has not addressed this far. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the distinction between extractive and inclusiveinstitutions, arguing that extractive contexts (e.g., autocratic rule/weak governance) can have strong economic institutions. However, because these are less open politically, they may deter potentially novel businesses that spur economic growth. If microcredit is utilized by capability-constrained firms in potentially extractive contexts, this suggests that the entrepreneurial activity being stimulated, even within the “missing middle”, may be less productive for economic development (Baumol 1990). Our work, therefore, highlights the institutional conditions within which microcredit is used to fund the development of new entrepreneurial opportunities: if less favorable political contexts may lead entrepreneurs to capture opportunities which are less conducive to the overall development of the economy, the impact of microcredit in these nations may be somehow minimalistic. Conversely, in more politically inclusive economies, microcredit may help spur the creation of more competitive and innovative markets which can help diversify markets beyond the basic services (e.g., food goods, provisions) often provided (Banerjee 2007). As such, the relationship between the nature of the institutional environment and the type of business opportunity pursued in the microfinance industry would be an interesting avenue for further study. Indeed, further study needs to dig deeper into the role of informal institutions in this process.Overall, this encourages us to consider whether the relationship between microcredit, entrepreneurship, and capabilities works as the literature currently assumes – microcredit is used by entrepreneurs in the most resource constrained environments where only economic institutions are to be shaped. As such, our findings suggest a more complex picture than extant research currently suggests and contribute to a better understanding of the use of microcredit at the level of the firm receiving it (Silva and Chávez 2015), with a need to consider institutional heterogeneities both within and across developing countries (Roth and Kostova 2003) and the interaction between a complex constellation of factors of institutions and capabilities (Nambiar 2013). It is therefore of key importance for future work to understand the dynamics through which microcredit is developed in contexts characterized by political institutional weakness. From a political perspective, mostresearch has focused on the role of regulation in the microfinance sector (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2011) without considering the other aspects of political institutions we have theorized, and empirically identified, here. This would help scholars and practitioners alike in gaining a better understanding how microcredit works in varying political environments.From a policy perspective, our findings which suggest that new ventures need some level of institutional support to be able to pursue and fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, something that has strong implications given the recent political upheaval in North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In post-conflict contexts, often characterized by the lowest level of capability development, and where political institutions (or economic ones) are still in the process of being redefined and shaped, the intervention of MFIs may be of key importance in stimulating entrepreneurial activity and the economy in some of the most challenging contexts. Emerging evidence suggests that many nations in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond are developing the appropriate institutions through which financial institutions can stimulate the private sector (Naudé 2010). Microcredit could be an appropriate tool for augmenting entrepreneurial activity in those environments where individuals lack the basic individual and institutional infrastructure to fulfill their aspirations. As such, the ability of entrepreneurs to have access to improved instrumental capabilities is likely to be shaped by how varying institutional arrangements support them, determining where investors see scalable operations and therefore the diversity of financial services at the disposal of entrepreneurs.Aside from the contribution and further reflection that our results stimulate, there are limitations to our study that need to be considered in any further extrapolation from our results. First, the study was cross sectional in nature and, as such, cannot make a reliable inference on the direction of the interplay between the effectiveness of the provision of microcredit on capabilities or on the institutional development over time. The nature of our data enabled us to study only the use of microcredit as a function of capability constraints, but a promising and much needed extension of the work concerns the reverse relationship, i.e., how the use of microcredit helps inimproving entrepreneurial capabilities. Second, while large-scale data are difficult to collect on this topic, the availability of the enterprise survey has enabled us to throw a glimpse at the use of microcredit across a large group of African countries. At the same time, as is true for any secondary data set, the data offer limited insight into the conditions and rationale under which microcredit was (or was not) obtained. We hope that our insights can stimulate further research that would seek to elucidate this mechanism through more suitable research designs.中文译文小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究摘要学者们越来越多关注,在哪种条件下,小额信贷才会被新的、成长中的企业所使用。

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