TheLongTail(长尾理论)完整中译版
长尾理论
长尾理论第一章：长尾市场传统娱乐市场的市场存在两个限制：①区域限制：必须找到本地顾客是传统零售业的一个软肋，在地理位置的限制下，消费者太分散等于没有完全没有消费者。
②物理限制：物理世界的另一个限制是物理学本身。
在过去的一个世纪里，娱乐业化解这两个限制的方法：聚焦于大热门，即热门经济学。
它诞生于一个供给不足的时代，我们没有足够的空间为每一个人提供每一样东西，这样的世界是一个匮乏的世界。
但是网络的兴起使得我们正在进入一个丰饶的世界。
无尽的长尾市场：案例：在线流媒体音乐服务商（虾米、QQ、酷狗…）下载次数/曲目排名：长尾曲线突破规模限制（数字生产成本为零）：长尾具有可怕的规模，足够多的非热门产品组合在一起可以形成一个堪与热门市场相匹敌的大市场。
网络的长尾市场可以提供传统零售商根本无法提供的产品。
数学集合论原理：一个极大的数字（长尾中的产品）乘以一个相对较小的数（每一种长尾产品的规模）仍然等于一个极大的数。
突破地理限制（网络流通成本为零）：在长尾曲线的右端，曲线并没有降到零点，需求量并不是零，无数的曲目中几乎每一首都有人购买。
这是因为网络产品在征服了地理位置和规模的限制之后，这些企业不但扩展了现有市场，还发现了崭新的市场，即长尾市场。
这个市场的规模比人们想象的大，而且会越来越大。
第二章：大热门的兴衰起伏工业革命之前（衰）本地化的文化。
小范围文化的早期阶段，决定因素是地理位置而不是共同的兴趣。
①人口由于地理距离被分散，文化因此被分割。
②缺乏快速的交通和通信手段，文化的融合以及新理念和新趋势的传播受到限制。
工业革命之后：（兴）大众化的文化：流行文化①社会因素：现代工业时期的来临和铁路系统的发展造就了风起云涌的城市化浪潮和欧洲大城市的崛起，这些新的商业中心和交通枢纽史无前例地将形形色色的人聚集在一起。
②技术因素：新兴大众媒体：商用印刷技术→摄影技术→留声机→电磁波广播→电视（大一统文化的终极传媒就此诞生）网络诞生之后：热门文化的终结（衰）音乐流行榜的终结：音乐工业整体上在衰退，热门音乐市场的衰退更惨痛，顾客转向非主流的选择，散向了无数的亚流派。
长尾理论经典案例分析（Longtailtheory,classiccaseanalysis）
长尾理论经典案例分析（Long tail theory, classic case analysis）Long tail theory, classic case analysisHan letter?You lie?(School of economics, Huazhong Normal UniversityHubei?Wuhan)Summary?The diversification of economy has spawned many new economic ideas, and the long tail theory can be said to be a unique innovation after the "Blue Ocean Strategy"Dimension. A new economic phenomenon growing up in the crack of the mainstream economy. The long tail theory is not a real sense of creation, but it is our own disciplineThe small market which is often overlooked has been pushed to a new stage. Is the classic theory of reverse thinking. This paper focuses on the application of the long tail theory in practical cases.Keywords?Long tail theory?Long tail effect?20/80 ruleAbstract?The, diversity, of, the, economy, many, new, ideas, on, the, economy., The, theory, cretive, ofLong, Tail,, is, said, be, toUnique, innovative, thinking, after, the, BlueOcean., is, a, new, It, Economic, phenomenon., The, theory,, ofLong, is,, not, a, ture, crea?Tive, it, is, a, discovery., This, paper, analyzes, the, long, tail,, in, the, actual, case.Keywords?The, theory, of, long, Tai, l, 20/80rulesThe so-called long tail is actually the distribution of Power, Laws and Pareto in StatisticsA colloquial expression. Long tail terms are also widely used and mathematically. The long tail theoryWas first proposed by ChrisAnderson. It's in the 2004 issue of Wired magazineThe first vocabulary used in the chapter to describe an economic model. Long tail terms are also commonUsed in statistics, as of wealth distribution or vocabulary.The basic principle of the long tail theory is that as long as the channels of storage and circulation are large enough, demandThe market share of products that are not booming or sold poorly can be shared with those fewThe market share of the product is even greater. That is, many small markets convergeMarket power comparable to the mainstream big market. The long tail theory overturns the original 20/80 law. The 20/80 principle emphasizes a small number of important principles, namely, 20% of the populationThe value of 80%, while the long tail theory emphasizes that those behind are considered not to bringLooking for a profit in the tail of profit. The process of the Internet has reached the age of mass customizationCustom made is the mode of production in the agricultural society. Customization is a mass production in an industrial societyOn the contrary, economies of scale, customization, and high re - added in the information societyThe primary mode of production of value. The advantages of customization are obvious: first, the products are rare and customizedThe product often has higher value; second, because of the personal knowledge contained in the valueHigher, customized products are often at the top of the value chain; third, because customized products are not availableThan to avoid competition. Informatization has changed production conditions so that small-scale production can be obtainedIt was only possible to achieve a low cost level by mass production and could even be achievedLower cost.1?In the field of e-commerce, the long tail effect is prominent. The following are the main basis:1.1?decreasing marginal costIn traditional industries, people usually have all kinds of expenses and expensesMaximum output under demand scale economy. Produce as large as possible on a large scale; make greatFixed costs and sunk costs are apportioned among most goods. Such as large books and notesA supplier of products like CD or a book to sell to 100 thousand flat managementCosts, profits, sales of such a best-selling product may not even be 1%. howeverNot everyone needs a few best-selling books, for non mainstream consumersIt is said that the traditional law of conduct is not applicable. But the long tail theory mainly emphasizes the non - PrincipalThe great value of streaming products, in the network, network products can just be fullFoot needs, an example of online music retailer Rhapsondy, offers over 1 million 500 thousand titlesThe songs, of course, are among the most popular songs, followed by popularity along with the rankingsDecline and fall sharply. But we found out those non popular songs after tens of thousands of yearsThe song still has about 22 million downloads per month -- almost Rhapsondy totalDownloads of 1/4. The repertoire at the end of the long tail may be in any of the traditional retailersYou can't find it there. But almost every capital is being ordered and purchased. These little onesThe need to get together became a great asset.1.2?Expansion of economies of scaleThe traditional large-scale production is the economies of scale of the producer; and the new economy is characterized byDemand side economies of scale. The demand side, economies of scale and creativity are related to creativity and phaseRelated products,Happens to reflect the positive feedback and positive externalities of the most obvious features, and positive andnegativeFeed and positive externalities are the basis of demand side economies of scale. The demand side is different in the networkIn the real life demand side, the virtualization of network products can better integrate the needsResources。
长尾理论
长尾理论长尾理论就是网络时代兴起的一种新理论，由于成本和效率的因素，当商品储存、流通、展示的场地和渠道足够宽广，商品生产成本急剧下降以至于个人都可以进行生产，并且商品的销售成本急剧降低时，几乎任何以前看似需求极低的产品，只要有卖，都会有人买。
这些需求和销量不高的产品所占据的共同市场份额，可以和主流产品的市场份额相当，甚至更大。
长尾(The Long Tail)这一概念是由《连线》杂志主编Chris Anderson在2004年十月的"长尾" 一文中最早提出，用来描述诸如亚马逊和Netflix之类网站的商业和经济模式。
长尾理论"长尾"实际上是统计学中幂律(Power Laws)和帕累托分布(Pareto distributions)特征的一个口语化表达。
过去人们只能关注重要的人或重要的事，如果用正态分布曲线来描绘这些人或事，人们只能关注曲线的"头部"，而将处于曲线"尾部"、需要更多的精力和成本才能关注到的大多数人或事忽略。
例如，在销售产品时，厂商关注的是少数几个所谓"VIP"客户，"无暇"顾及在人数上居于大多数的普通消费者。
而在网络时代，由于关注的成本大大降低，人们有可能以很低的成本关注正态分布曲线的"尾部"，关注"尾部"产生的总体效益甚至会超过"头部"。
例如，某著名网站是世界上最大的网络广告商，它没有一个大客户，收入完全来自被其他广告商忽略的中小企业。
安德森认为，网络时代是关注"长尾"、发挥"长尾"效益的时代。
举例来说，我们常用的汉字实际上不多，但因出现频次高，所以这些为数不多的汉字占据了上图广大长尾理论的红区;绝大部分的汉字难得一用，它们就属于长尾。
Chris 认为，只要存储和流通的渠道足够大，需求不旺或销量不佳的产品共同占据的市场份额就可以和那些数量不多的热卖品所占据的市场份额相匹敌甚至更大。
长尾效应-长尾理论
长尾效应-“长尾理论”长尾效应，英文名称Long Tail Effect。
"头”(head)和“尾"(tail)是两个统计学名词。
正态曲线中间的突起部分叫“头”；两边相对平缓的部分叫“尾”。
从人们需求的角度来看，大多数的需求会集中在头部，而这部分我们可以称之为流行，而分布在尾部的需求是个性化的，零散的小量的需求。
而这部分差异化的、少量的需求会在需求曲线上面形成一条长长的“尾巴”，而所谓长尾效应就在于它的数量上，将所有非流行的市场累加起来就会形成一个比流行市场还大的市场。
长尾效应的根本就是强调“个性化”，“客户力量”和“小利润大市场”，也就是要赚很少的钱，但是要赚很多人的钱。
要将市场细分到很细很小的时候，然后就会发现这些细小市场的累计会带来明显的长尾的效应。
以图书为例:Barnes&Noble的平均上架书目为13万种。
而Amazon有超过一半的销售量都来自于在它排行榜上位于13万名开外的图书。
如果以Amazon的统计数据为依据的话，这就意味着那些不在一般书店里出售的图书要比那些摆在书店书架上的图书形成的市场更大。
长尾理论起源2004年10月，美国《连线》杂志主编克里斯•安德森(ChrisAnderson)在他的文章中第一次提出长尾(Long Tail)理论，他告诉读者：商业和文化的未来不在热门产品，不在传统需求曲线的头部，而在于需求曲线中那条无穷长的尾巴。
克里斯举例：在互联网的音乐与歌曲、新书甚至旧书等等的销售中，尽管单项的热门制品畅销，高居营业额的前列，但是，由于仓储的无限和联邦特快的存在，使得那些看上去不太热门的制品也在创造着出乎意料的营业额，竟然成为这些新媒体销售收入的主要部分！HIM巧些版长曲族hl-bfa I K I E *最经典案例：余额宝就被称为“屈丝理财神器”，不但对银行业产生了不小震动，而且让互联网金融特别是货币基金（简称货基）为越来越多人熟知和热衷。
长尾理论
學習不必要決心？石滋宜/全球華人競爭力基金會董事長 有一回在演講時，當我在投影片打出「學習不必要決心」斗大的六個字，在場的聽眾，有的人滿臉狐疑，當場就問我：「做事情不是都要專注，學習也應該是一樣的，並且更需要決心，不是嗎？」 我聽了，並沒有急著回答，而說：可以再想一想這七個字，為什麼它不是決心的問題？ 隨後打出以下這幾個字：「學習不必要承諾。
學習不必要痛苦。
」請他們再想想。
為什麼呢？最後我告訴他們：學習最重要的是一定要有樂趣，這樣你才會有動力，就如做自己喜歡做的事情一樣，不會感覺累和痛苦。
因為有樂趣的學習是一種無上的享受。
但在場有一位企業經營者說：「企業變革要學習，我們很認同，但不是每一個員工就像博士一樣會把學習當做樂趣！」 我說確實，如果員工沒有學習興趣，很難使他們對於學習產生樂趣，因此要達到「自我超越」及「改變心智模式」更是困難。
事實上，組織學習卻可以帶動個人學習。
就像是我們對於某項活動有興趣，一群志同道合的人組成一個同好會，大家一起分享其中的樂趣，促進了學習的成效。
也像是網絡上的社群，大家對於一個議題有興趣，即會自發性的投入分享與討論。
現代物理學家Werner Heisenberg就說：「合作學習有令人震驚的潛能；集體可以做到比個人更有洞察力、更聰明的表現。
所以團隊智商遠大於個人的智商。
」 但組織學習也必須有方法來提高學習效率，故我才會提出「情境式組織學習」(相關的文章可在總裁學苑網站檢索) 。
因為過去我們的學習都是運用左腦，發揮了邏輯、理性、分析的能力，而忽略了右腦：非邏輯、感性、整合、創意的能力。
當然，我在前面所提出：學習不必要決心。
是提醒大家要反思學習，很多人或企業都喜歡喊學習的口號，但要怎麼從人性面去培養學習的樂趣達到想要的成果呢？(黃祖強整理)■對話引發思考，思考創造智慧！歡迎進入互動討論區；閱讀更多經營與領導文章，歡迎進入「文章中心」。
氣候經濟第02講：浪費水資源的農業弗里德黑姆˙施瓦茨(Friedhelm Schwarz)/-經濟議題觀察家 1995年，全球抽取的水有22%用在工業，8%用在服務業和家戶用水上，其餘最主要的70%是用於農業。
the long tail or the short tail
定义参数
评论数量
数据搜集
1、09，2.2-2.9； 10，10.4-10.11 2、亚马逊网上商城 3、两组：有无评论服务
数据分析 验证假设
1、累计分布函数 2、秩和检验
累计分布函数：对于连续函数，所有小于等于a的值，其出现概率的和 累计分布函数 秩和检验：从两个非正态总体中所得到的两个样本之间的比较，其零假设为 秩和检验 从同一个总体中抽取的。
引证部分——产品分类 产品分类 引证部分
消 费 者 的 购 物 习 惯
产 品 分 类
日用品 选购品 特殊产品 非需品
购买频繁，较少比较品牌、价格 购买频率较低，会仔细比较 有特殊性质或品牌识别的消费品 有待商家挖掘的需求
消 费 者
搜索产品 体验产品
购买前对产品的质量和适用性能够了解，如CD
的
购买前对产品的主要属性没有直接体验，无法 了解，且搜索成本比较高，如香水 无法验证某种品牌的产品所具有某种特性 的质量，通常只能给予信任，如医药品
商品属性对用户购买行为的影响 1、如果商品有较客观的评价标准时，顾客对 商品的评价会比较一致，从而愿跟随他人观点 2、反之，顾客的品味不一样，不愿跟随他人 观点
商品分类的穷尽性
假设 成立
由于产品分类是基于客观属性评价的比重 ，所以产品覆盖面很广
文献论据——数据分析 数据分析 文献论据
研究方法
数学统计
文章前言
消费者对从网络口碑中获取的商品信息有怎样的反应？ 消费者对从网络口碑中获取的商品信息有怎样的反应？ 在消费者处理网络口碑时，商品种类如何区分消费者行为？ 在消费者处理网络口碑时，商品种类如何区分消费者行为？ 不同的消费者行为是如何导致不同的销售分布模式？ 不同的消费者行为是如何导致不同的销售分布模式？
PCR试剂 长尾理论
PCR试剂长尾理论
PCR试剂：
PCR试剂，就是在进行荧光定量PCR检测中需要使用的诊断试剂，根据需要检测的病原体不同，试剂的种类也不同。
荧光定量PCR检测试剂，是为定性和定量检测血液中不同病原体的分子诊断试剂。
主要是依据病原体的基因信息进行序列分析设计引物，微球粒原理获得核酸，荧光标记和Real Time-PCR等检测技术，开发的可以一次性定性和定量检测血液中一种或多种病原体的诊断
试剂。
如可以单独定量检测，也可以同时检测血液中艾滋病病毒（HIV），乙型肝炎病毒（HBV），丙型肝炎病毒（HCV）等多种病原体。
包括反应液、逆转录酶、Taq酶、各类病原体阴性或阳性对照液等。
长尾效应：
长尾效应，英文名称Long Tail Effect。
“头”（head）和“尾”（tail）是两个统计学名词。
正态曲线中间的突起部分叫“头”；两边相对平缓的部分叫“尾”。
从人们需求的角度来看，大多数的需求会集中在头部，而这部分我们可以称之为流行，而分布在尾部的需求是个性化的，零散的小量的需求。
而这部分差异化的、少量的需求会在需求曲线上面形成一条长长的“尾巴”，而所谓长尾效应就在于它的数量上，将所有非流行的市场累加起来就会形成一个比流行市场还大的市场。
长尾理论_经典(电子书)
2、亚马逊： 一个前亚马逊公司员工精辟地概述了公司的“长尾”本质： 现在我们所卖的那些过去根本卖不动的书比我们现在所卖的那些 过去可以卖得动的书多得多。 此外还有很多，诸如维基百科、Netflix等等。 《长尾》一直在深刻地影响着全球各地互联网业的发展。他 所提出的推动型模式与拉动型模式的结合，广泛性与个性化的统 一，已经成为网络产品设计开发的一个重要策略。 非常感谢”雷声大雨点大“和”拙尘“的辛勤工作，使广大 中文读者可以完整领略长尾的妙处。如果您觉得有价值，请把本 文中文译文。:)有兴趣的话可以加入 我们，一起把有价值的外文资料带给中文读者。
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人群中，有多少人会对此感兴趣。 很多出色的娱乐产品，在全国范围内会有大量热情的观众和 听众，却难以跨越上述障碍。比如《疯狂约会美丽都（Tripletsof Belleville）》这部广受好评，并获得奥斯卡最佳动画片提名的片 子，只在全美6个影院上映过。一个更明显的例子是印度电影业 在美国的遭遇。每年印度电影业有超过800部故事片出品；在美 国有大约一百七十万印度裔；但最佳印度语影片《印度往事 （Lagaan:OnceUponaTimeinIndia）》（依据Amazon互联 网电影数据库的评价）只在两家影院上映过。在美国上映过的印 度影片总共也只有屈指可数的几部。受空间因素的制约，零星分 布的观众和没有观众几乎没有分别。 另一个限制来自于物理定律本身。一定频谱范围内的无线电 波只能搭载有限的广播频道；同轴电缆只能传 输有限的电视频 道。而一天又只有24小时播放节目的时间。广播和电视节目的传 送要占用大量的有限资源。其结果呢，也是需要在一定的地域范 围内有大量的听 众和观众。这同样成为很多节目难以逾越的障 碍。
the long tail长尾理论
Chris is expanding this article into a book, due out in May 2006. Follow his continuing coverage of the subject on The Long Tail blog.In 1988, a British mountain climber named Joe Simpson wrote a book called Touching the Void, a harrowing account of near death in the Peruvian Andes. It got good reviews but, only a modest success, it was soon forgotten. Then, a decade later, a strange thing happened. Jon Krakauer wrote Into Thin Air, another book about a mountain-climbing tragedy, which became a publishing sensation. Suddenly Touching the Void started to sell again.Random House rushed out a new edition to keep up with demand. Booksellers began to promote it next to their Into Thin Air displays, and sales rose further. A revised paperback edition, which came out in January, spent 14 weeks on the New York Times bestseller list. That same month, IFC Films released a docudrama of the story to critical acclaim. Now Touching the Void outsells Into Thin Air more than two to one.What happened? In short, recommendations. The online bookseller's software noted patterns in buying behavior and suggested that readers who liked Into Thin Air would also like Touching the Void. People took the suggestion, agreed wholeheartedly, wrote rhapsodic reviews. More sales, more algorithm-fueled recommendations, and the positive feedback loop kicked in.Particularly notable is that when Krakauer's book hit shelves, Simpson's was nearly out of print. A few years ago, readers of Krakauer would never even have learned about Simpson's book - and if they had, they wouldn't have been able to find it. Amazon changed that. It created the Touching the Void phenomenon by combining infinite shelf space with real-time information about buying trends and public opinion. The result: rising demand for an obscure book.This is not just a virtue of online booksellers; it is an example of an entirely new economic model for the media and entertainment industries, one that is just beginning to show its power. Unlimited selection is revealing truths about what consumers want and how they want to get it in service after service, from DVDs at Netflix to music videos on Yahoo! Launch to songs in the iTunes Music Store and Rhapsody. People are going deep into the catalog, down the long, long list of available titles, far past what's available at Blockbuster Video, Tower Records, and Barnes & Noble. And the more they find, the more they like. As they wander further from the beaten path, they discover their taste is not as mainstream as they thought (or as they had been led to believe by marketing, a lack of alternatives, and a hit-driven culture).An analysis of the sales data and trends from these services and others like them shows that the emerging digital entertainment economy is going to be radically different from today's mass market. If the 20th- century entertainment industry was about hits, the 21st will be equally about misses.For too long we've been suffering the tyranny of lowest-common-denominator fare, subjected to brain-dead summer blockbusters and manufactured pop. Why? Economics. Many of our assumptions about popular taste are actually artifacts of poor supply-and-demand matching - amarket response to inefficient distribution.The main problem, if that's the word, is that we live in the physical world and, until recently, most of our entertainment media did, too. But that world puts two dramatic limitations on our entertainment.The first is the need to find local audiences. An average movie theater will not show a film unless it can attract at least 1,500 people over a two-week run; that's essentially the rent for a screen. An average record store needs to sell at least two copies of a CD per year to make it worth carrying; that's the rent for a half inch of shelf space. And so on for DVD rental shops, videogame stores, booksellers, and newsstands.In each case, retailers will carry only content that can generate sufficient demand to earn its keep. But each can pull only from a limited local population - perhaps a 10-mile radius for a typical movie theater, less than that for music and bookstores, and even less (just a mile or two) for video rental shops. It's not enough for a great documentary to have a potential national audience of half a million; what matters is how many it has in the northern part of Rockville, Maryland, and among the mall shoppers of Walnut Creek, California.There is plenty of great entertainment with potentially large, even rapturous, national audiences that cannot clear that bar. For instance, The Triplets of Belleville, a critically acclaimed film that was nominated for the best animated feature Oscar this year, opened on just six screens nationwide. An even more striking example is the plight of Bollywood in America. Each year, India's film industry puts out more than 800 feature films. There are an estimated 1.7 million Indians in the US. Yet the top-rated (according to Amazon's Internet Movie Database)Hindi-language film, Lagaan: Once Upon a Time in India, opened on just two screens, and it was one of only a handful of Indian films to get any US distribution at all. In the tyranny of physical space, an audience too thinly spread is the same as no audience at all.The other constraint of the physical world is physics itself. The radio spectrum can carry only so many stations, and a coaxial cable so many TV channels. And, of course, there are only 24 hours a day of programming. The curse of broadcast technologies is that they are profligate users of limited resources. The result is yet another instance of having to aggregate large audiences in one geographic area - another high bar, above which only a fraction of potential content rises.The past century of entertainment has offered an easy solution to these constraints. Hits fill theaters, fly off shelves, and keep listeners and viewers from touching their dials and remotes. Nothing wrong with that; indeed, sociologists will tell you that hits are hardwired into human psychology, the combinatorial effect of conformity and word of mouth. And to be sure, a healthy share of hits earn their place: Great songs, movies, and books attract big, broad audiences.But most of us want more than just hits. Everyone's taste departs from the mainstream somewhere, and the more we explore alternatives, the more we're drawn to them. Unfortunately, in recent decades such alternatives have been pushed to the fringes by pumped-up marketing vehicles built to order by industries that desperately need them.Hit-driven economics is a creation of an age without enough room to carry everything for everybody. Not enough shelf space for all the CDs, DVDs, and games produced. Not enough screens to show all the available movies. Not enough channels to broadcast all the TV programs, not enough radio waves to play all the music created, and not enough hours in the day to squeeze everything out through either of those sets of slots.This is the world of scarcity. Now, with online distribution and retail, we are entering a world of abundance. And the differences are profound.To see how, meet Robbie Vann-Adib鬠the CEO of Ecast, a digital jukebox company whose barroom players offer more than 150,000 tracks - and some surprising usage statistics. He hints at them with a question that visitors invariably get wrong: "What percentage of the top 10,000 titles in any online media store (Netflix, iTunes, Amazon, or any other) will rent or sell at least once a month?"Most people guess 20 percent, and for good reason: We've been trained to think that way. The80-20 rule, also known as Pareto's principle (after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who devised the concept in 1906), is all around us. Only 20 percent of major studio films will be hits. Same for TV shows, games, and mass-market books - 20 percent all. The odds are even worse for major-label CDs, where fewer than 10 percent are profitable, according to the Recording Industry Association of America.But the right answer, says Vann-Adib鬠is 99 percent. There is demand for nearly every one of those top 10,000 tracks. He sees it in his own jukebox statistics; each month, thousands of people put in their dollars for songs that no traditional jukebox anywhere has ever carried.People get Vann-Adib駳question wrong because the answer is counterintuitive in two ways. The first is we forget that the 20 percent rule in the entertainment industry is about hits, not sales of any sort. We're stuck in a hit-driven mindset - we think that if something isn't a hit, it won't make money and so won't return the cost of its production. We assume, in other words, that only hits deserve to exist. But Vann-Adib鬠like executives at iTunes, Amazon, and Netflix, has discovered that the "misses" usually make money, too. And because there are so many more of them, that money can add up quickly to a huge new market.With no shelf space to pay for and, in the case of purely digital services like iTunes, no manufacturing costs and hardly any distribution fees, a miss sold is just another sale, with the same margins as a hit. A hit and a miss are on equal economic footing, both just entries in a database called up on demand, both equally worthy of being carried. Suddenly, popularity no longer has a monopoly on profitability.The second reason for the wrong answer is that the industry has a poor sense of what people want. Indeed, we have a poor sense of what we want. We assume, for instance, that there is little demand for the stuff that isn't carried by Wal-Mart and other major retailers; if people wanted it, surely it would be sold. The rest, the bottom 80 percent, must be subcommercial at best.But as egalitarian as Wal-Mart may seem, it is actually extraordinarily elitist. Wal-Mart must sell at least 100,000 copies of a CD to cover its retail overhead and make a sufficient profit; less than 1 percent of CDs do that kind of volume. What about the 60,000 people who would like to buy the latest Fountains of Wayne or Crystal Method album, or any other nonmainstream fare? They have to go somewhere else. Bookstores, the megaplex, radio, and network TV can be equally demanding. We equate mass market with quality and demand, when in fact it often just represents familiarity, savvy advertising, and broad if somewhat shallow appeal. What do we really want? We're only just discovering, but it clearly starts with more.To get a sense of our true taste, unfiltered by the economics of scarcity, look at Rhapsody, a subscription-based streaming music service (owned by RealNetworks) that currently offers more than 735,000 tracks.Chart Rhapsody's monthly statistics and you get a "power law" demand curve that looks much like any record store's, with huge appeal for the top tracks, tailing off quickly for less popular ones. But a really interesting thing happens once you dig below the top 40,000 tracks, which is about the amount of the fluid inventory (the albums carried that will eventually be sold) of the averagereal-world record store. Here, the Wal-Marts of the world go to zero - either they don't carry any more CDs, or the few potential local takers for such fringy fare never find it or never even enter the store.The Rhapsody demand, however, keeps going. Not only is every one of Rhapsody's top 100,000 tracks streamed at least once each month, the same is true for its top 200,000, top 300,000, and top 400,000. As fast as Rhapsody adds tracks to its library, those songs find an audience, even if it's just a few people a month, somewhere in the country.This is the Long Tail.You can find everything out there on the Long Tail. There's the back catalog, older albums still fondly remembered by longtime fans or rediscovered by new ones. There are live tracks, B-sides, remixes, even (gasp) covers. There are niches by the thousands, genre within genre within genre: Imagine an entire Tower Records devoted to '80s hair bands or ambient dub. There are foreign bands, once priced out of reach in the Import aisle, and obscure bands on even more obscure labels, many of which don't have the distribution clout to get into Tower at all.Oh sure, there's also a lot of crap. But there's a lot of crap hiding between the radio tracks on hit albums, too. People have to skip over it on CDs, but they can more easily avoid it online, since the collaborative filters typically won't steer you to it. Unlike the CD, where each crap track costs perhaps one-twelfth of a $15 album price, online it just sits harmlessly on some server, ignored in a market that sells by the song and evaluates tracks on their own merit.What's really amazing about the Long Tail is the sheer size of it. Combine enough nonhits on the Long Tail and you've got a market bigger than the hits. Take books: The average Barnes & Noble carries 130,000 titles. Yet more than half of Amazon's book sales come from outside its top 130,000 titles. Consider the implication: If the Amazon statistics are any guide, the market forbooks that are not even sold in the average bookstore is larger than the market for those that are (see "Anatomy of the Long Tail"). In other words, the potential book market may be twice as big as it appears to be, if only we can get over the economics of scarcity. Venture capitalist and former music industry consultant Kevin Laws puts it this way: "The biggest money is in the smallest sales."The same is true for all other aspects of the entertainment business, to one degree or another. Just compare online and offline businesses: The average Blockbuster carries fewer than 3,000 DVDs. Yet a fifth of Netflix rentals are outside its top 3,000 titles. Rhapsody streams more songs each month beyond its top 10,000 than it does its top 10,000. In each case, the market that lies outside the reach of the physical retailer is big and getting bigger.When you think about it, most successful businesses on the Internet are about aggregating the Long Tail in one way or another. Google, for instance, makes most of its money off small advertisers (the long tail of advertising), and eBay is mostly tail as well - niche and one-off products. By overcoming the limitations of geography and scale, just as Rhapsody and Amazon have, Google and eBay have discovered new markets and expanded existing ones.This is the power of the Long Tail. The companies at the vanguard of it are showing the way with three big lessons. Call them the new rules for the new entertainment economy.Rule 1: Make everything availableIf you love documentaries, Blockbuster is not for you. Nor is any other video store - there are too many documentaries, and they sell too poorly to justify stocking more than a few dozen of them on physical shelves. Instead, you'll want to join Netflix, which offers more than a thousand documentaries - because it can. Such profligacy is giving a boost to the documentary business; last year, Netflix accounted for half of all US rental revenue for Capturing the Friedmans, a documentary about a family destroyed by allegations of pedophilia.Netflix CEO Reed Hastings, who's something of a documentary buff, took this newfound clout to PBS, which had produced Daughter From Danang, a documentary about the children of US soldiers and Vietnamese women. In 2002, the film was nominated for an Oscar and was named best documentary at Sundance, but PBS had no plans to release it on DVD. Hastings offered to handle the manufacturing and distribution if PBS would make it available as a Netflix exclusive. Now Daughter From Danang consistently ranks in the top 15 on Netflix documentary charts. That amounts to a market of tens of thousands of documentary renters that did not otherwise exist.There are any number of equally attractive genres and subgenres neglected by the traditional DVD channels: foreign films, anime, independent movies, British television dramas, old American TV sitcoms. These underserved markets make up a big chunk of Netflix rentals. Bollywood alone accounts for nearly 100,000 rentals each month. The availability of offbeat content drives new customers to Netflix - and anything that cuts the cost of customer acquisition is gold for a subscription business. Thus the company's first lesson: Embrace niches.Netflix has made a good business out of what's unprofitable fare in movie theaters and video rental shops because it can aggregate dispersed audiences. It doesn't matter if the several thousand people who rent Doctor Who episodes each month are in one city or spread, one per town, across the country - the economics are the same to Netflix. It has, in short, broken the tyranny of physical space. What matters is not where customers are, or even how many of them are seeking a particular title, but only that some number of them exist, anywhere.As a result, almost anything is worth offering on the off chance it will find a buyer. This is the opposite of the way the entertainment industry now thinks. Today, the decision about whether or when to release an old film on DVD is based on estimates of demand, availability of extras such as commentary and additional material, and marketing opportunities such as anniversaries, awards, and generational windows (Disney briefly rereleases its classics every 10 years or so as a new wave of kids come of age). It's a high bar, which is why only a fraction of movies ever made are available on DVD.That model may make sense for the true classics, but it's way too much fuss for everything else. The Long Tail approach, by contrast, is to simply dump huge chunks of the archive ontobare-bones DVDs, without any extras or marketing. Call it the Silver Series and charge half the price. Same for independent films. This year, nearly 6,000 movies were submitted to the Sundance Film Festival. Of those, 255 were accepted, and just two dozen have been picked up for distribution; to see the others, you had to be there. Why not release all 255 on DVD each year as part of a discount Sundance Series?In a Long Tail economy, it's more expensive to evaluate than to release. Just do it!The same is true for the music industry. It should be securing the rights to release all the titles inall the back catalogs as quickly as it can - thoughtlessly, automatically, and at industrial scale. (This is one of those rare moments where the world needs more lawyers, not fewer.) So too for videogames. Retro gaming, including simulators of classic game consoles that run on modern PCs, is a growing phenomenon driven by the nostalgia of the first joystick generation. Game publishers could release every title as a 99-cent download three years after its release - no support, no guarantees, no packaging.All this, of course, applies equally to books. Already, we're seeing a blurring of the line between in and out of print. Amazon and other networks of used booksellers have made it almost as easy to find and buy a second-hand book as it is a new one. By divorcing bookselling from geography, these networks create a liquid market at low volume, dramatically increasing both their own business and the overall demand for used books. Combine that with the rapidly dropping costs of print-on-demand technologies and it's clear why any book should always be available. Indeed, it is a fair bet that children today will grow up never knowing the meaning of out of print.Rule 2: Cut the price in half. Now lower it.Thanks to the success of Apple's iTunes, we now have a standard price for a downloaded track: 99 cents. But is it the right one?Ask the labels and they'll tell you it's too low: Even though 99 cents per track works out to about the same price as a CD, most consumers just buy a track or two from an album online, rather than the full CD. In effect, online music has seen a return to the singles-driven business of the 1950s. So from a label perspective, consumers should pay more for the privilege of purchasing ࠬa carte to compensate for the lost album revenue.Ask consumers, on the other hand, and they'll tell you that 99 cents is too high. It is, for starters, 99 cents more than Kazaa. But piracy aside, 99 cents violates our innate sense of economic justice: If it clearly costs less for a record label to deliver a song online, with no packaging, manufacturing, distribution, or shelf space overheads, why shouldn't the price be less, too?Surprisingly enough, there's been little good economic analysis on what the right price for online music should be. The main reason for this is that pricing isn't set by the market today but by the record label demi-cartel. Record companies charge a wholesale price of around 65 cents per track, leaving little room for price experimentation by the retailers.That wholesale price is set to roughly match the price of CDs, to avoid dreaded "channel conflict." The labels fear that if they price online music lower, their CD retailers (still the vast majority of the business) will revolt or, more likely, go out of business even more quickly than they already are. In either case, it would be a serious disruption of the status quo, which terrifies the already spooked record companies. No wonder they're doing price calculations with an eye on the downsides in their traditional CD business rather than the upside in their new online business.But what if the record labels stopped playing defense? A brave new look at the economics of music would calculate what it really costs to simply put a song on an iTunes server and adjust pricing accordingly. The results are surprising.Take away the unnecessary costs of the retail channel - CD manufacturing, distribution, and retail overheads. That leaves the costs of finding, making, and marketing music. Keep them as they are, to ensure that the people on the creative and label side of the business make as much as they currently do. For a popular album that sells 300,000 copies, the creative costs work out to about $7.50 per disc, or around 60 cents a track. Add to that the actual cost of delivering music online, which is mostly the cost of building and maintaining the online service rather than the negligible storage and bandwidth costs. Current price tag: around 17 cents a track. By this calculation, hit music is overpriced by 25 percent online - it should cost just 79 cents a track, reflecting the savings of digital delivery.Putting channel conflict aside for the moment, if the incremental cost of making content that was originally produced for physical distribution available online is low, the price should be, too. Price according to digital costs, not physical ones.All this good news for consumers doesn't have to hurt the industry. When you lower prices, people tend to buy more. Last year, Rhapsody did an experiment in elastic demand that suggested it could be a lot more. For a brief period, the service offered tracks at 99 cents, 79 cents, and 49 cents. Although the 49-cent tracks were only half the price of the 99-cent tracks, Rhapsody sold threetimes as many of them.Since the record companies still charged 65 cents a track - and Rhapsody paid another 8 cents per track to the copyright-holding publishers - Rhapsody lost money on that experiment (but, as the old joke goes, made it up in volume). Yet much of the content on the Long Tail is older material that has already made back its money (or been written off for failing to do so): music from bands that had little record company investment and was thus cheap to make, or live recordings, remixes, and other material that came at low cost.Such "misses" cost less to make available than hits, so why not charge even less for them? Imagine if prices declined the further you went down the Tail, with popularity (the market) effectively dictating pricing. All it would take is for the labels to lower the wholesale price for the vast majority of their content not in heavy rotation; even a two- or three-tiered pricing structure could work wonders. And because so much of that content is not available in record stores, the risk of channel conflict is greatly diminished. The lesson: Pull consumers down the tail with lower prices.How low should the labels go? The answer comes by examining the psychology of the music consumer. The choice facing fans is not how many songs to buy from iTunes and Rhapsody, but how many songs to buy rather than download for free from Kazaa and other peer-to-peer networks. Intuitively, consumers know that free music is not really free: Aside from any legal risks, it's a time-consuming hassle to build a collection that way. Labeling is inconsistent, quality varies, and an estimated 30 percent of tracks are defective in one way or another. As Steve Jobs put it at the iTunes Music Store launch, you may save a little money downloading from Kazaa, but "you're working for under minimum wage." And what's true for music is doubly true for movies and games, where the quality of pirated products can be even more dismal, viruses are a risk, and downloads take so much longer.So free has a cost: the psychological value of convenience. This is the "not worth it" moment where the wallet opens. The exact amount is an impossible calculus involving the bank balance of the average college student multiplied by their available free time. But imagine that for music, at least, it's around 20 cents a track. That, in effect, is the dividing line between the commercial world of the Long Tail and the underground. Both worlds will continue to exist in parallel, but it's crucial for Long Tail thinkers to exploit the opportunities between 20 and 99 cents to maximize their share. By offering fair pricing, ease of use, and consistent quality, you can compete with free.Perhaps the best way to do that is to stop charging for individual tracks at all. Danny Stein, whose private equity firm owns eMusic, thinks the future of the business is to move away from the ownership model entirely. With ubiquitous broadband, both wired and wireless, more consumers will turn to the celestial jukebox of music services that offer every track ever made, playable on demand. Some of those tracks will be free to listeners and advertising-supported, like radio. Others, like eMusic and Rhapsody, will be subscription services. Today, digital music economics are dominated by the iPod, with its notion of a paid-up library of personal tracks. But as the networks improve, the comparative economic advantages of unlimited streamed music, either financed by advertising or a flat fee (infinite choice for $9.99 a month), may shift the market thatway. And drive another nail in the coffin of the retail music model.Rule 3: Help me find itIn 1997, an entrepreneur named Michael Robertson started what looked like a classic Long Tail business. Called , it let anyone upload music files that would be available to all. The idea was the service would bypass the record labels, allowing artists to connect directly to listeners. would make its money in fees paid by bands to have their music promoted on the site. The tyranny of the labels would be broken, and a thousand flowers would bloom.Putting aside the fact that many people actually used the service to illegally upload and share commercial tracks, leading the labels to sue , the model failed at its intended purpose, too. Struggling bands did not, as a rule, find new audiences, and independent music was not transformed. Indeed, got a reputation for being exactly what it was: an undifferentiated mass of mostly bad music that deserved its obscurity.The problem with was that it was only Long Tail. It didn't have license agreements with the labels to offer mainstream fare or much popular commercial music at all. Therefore, there was no familiar point of entry for consumers, no known quantity from which further exploring could begin.Offering only hits is no better. Think of the struggling video-on-demand services of the cable companies. Or think of Movielink, the feeble video download service run by the studios. Due to overcontrolling providers and high costs, they suffer from limited content: in most cases just a few hundred recent releases. There's not enough choice to change consumer behavior, to become a real force in the entertainment economy.By contrast, the success of Netflix, Amazon, and the commercial music services shows that you need both ends of the curve. Their huge libraries of less-mainstream fare set them apart, but hits still matter in attracting consumers in the first place. Great Long Tail businesses can then guide consumers further afield by following the contours of their likes and dislikes, easing their exploration of the unknown.For instance, the front screen of Rhapsody features Britney Spears, unsurprisingly. Next to the listings of her work is a box of "similar artists." Among them is Pink. If you click on that and are pleased with what you hear, you may do the same for Pink's similar artists, which include No Doubt. And on No Doubt's page, the list includes a few "followers" and "influencers," the last of which includes the Selecter, a 1980s ska band from Coventry, England. In three clicks, Rhapsody may have enticed a Britney Spears fan to try an album that can hardly be found in a record store.Rhapsody does this with a combination of human editors and genre guides. But Netflix, where 60 percent of rentals come from recommendations, and Amazon do this with collaborative filtering, which uses the browsing and purchasing patterns of users to guide those who follow them ("Customers who bought this also bought ..."). In each, the aim is the same: Use recommendations to drive demand down the Long Tail.。
long tail model 长尾理论
Long-tail model长尾理论、长尾效应提出者：克里斯·安德森（Chris Anderson）。
2004年10月，他在自己负责主编的杂志《Wired》上发表了文章，最早提到了长尾理论。
然后他的书《The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More》进一步深化了这一概念。
源起：“二八定律”“二八定律”（又称Paretoprinciple）意思是对于大多数事情来说，约80%的结果是由20%的原因引起的。
这一点在商业上的应用非常广泛，可以称为一个拇指法则，例如80%的产品销量源于20%的主要消费者。
对于零售行业来说，消费者对于不同产品的需求是不一样的，统计上有一个分布（如上图），只有小部分的产品（所谓的20%）是有大量的消费者需求的畅销品（图中的红色“头部”），而其余大部分产品（所谓的80%）的消费者需求很小（图中黄色的“长尾”）。
因此作为一个理性的追求利润的商人，由于资源所限，我们很自然地会关注于头部的产品市场，而忽略长尾产品市场。
转变：互联网与“长尾”的逆袭长尾市场一直处于被忽视的地位，直到互联网的出现，她使得网站可以销售那些销量小、但种类多的产品，由于这些产品的总量庞大，因此这些小众产品累计起来依然能给网站带来巨大的收益。
长尾市场上消费者的需求得到了满足，基于长尾理商业模式的商人获得了利润和成功，因为互联网的普及，“长尾”实现了逆袭！应用条件长尾效应在基于互联网的商业模式中最为显著，因为互联网时代创造了出适于该商业模式发展的条件：（1）足够多的商品选择（2）足够庞大的消费群体（3）可以忽略不计的库存和分销成本前两点保证了长尾在市场上是存在的，后一点让针对长尾进行销售是有利可图的。
很多互联网企业就利用或体现了长尾效应，例如eBay，Amazon，Google，iTunes Store。
有的互联网企业最初并不是有意利用长尾理论，只不过它们提供了低交易成本、存货和分销成本的网络平台，因此促使长尾市场的需求得到满足，并且贡献了很大比例的利润。
翻译15讲之二
【例 48】 The school bully threatened Martin with a thick ear.
×学校的小霸王打了马丁一个耳光以此作为威胁。
【译文】 学校的小霸王扬言要打马丁的耳光。
【例 49】 The computer makes possible a marvelous leap in
8. The quality of attendance, enhanced by an exhibit-admission
fee of $50 per day, was widely extolled. The quantity was in doubt,
however. All of the 14 exhibitors interviewed questioned the figure of
受了采访，都对交易会主任霍佛尔提供的 5,200 人这个数字表示怀疑，
一般估计是 2,500 人。
44
红宝书 网址：
通用网址：红宝书
V、课外练习（正确理解下列短文，并将其译成汉语）
：
One of my favourite moments of the day is among the last -- the
last conscious one, anyway. After several attempts at keeping my
eyelids from fluttering closed and the book from collapsing onto my
chest, I know it really is time to go to sleep. I affectionately place the
TheLongTail完整中译版
《长尾》The Long Tail完整中译版翻译：拙尘、雷声大雨点大（）PDF整理：佯跳跳（）一、“长尾”的由来及含义：长尾理论这个概念是Wired杂志主编Chris Anderson 在2004年提出。
最简单的例子:在一个XY的坐标系里面,y对应销售收入,x对应同一产业中不同品牌的产品或服务.一般会出现名列前茅的几个品牌占据大部分的部分,其他无数的小品牌占据小部分.举例来说，我们常用的汉字实际上不多，但因出现频次高，所以这些为数不多的汉字占据了上图广大的红区；绝大部分的汉字难得一用，它们就属于那长长的蓝尾。
二、成功的“长尾”案例：1、Google是一个最典型的“长尾”公司，其成长历程就是把广告商和出版商的“长尾”商业化的过程。
数以百万计的小企业和个人，此前他们从未打过广告，或从没大规模地打过广告。
他们小得让广告商不屑，甚至连他们自己都不曾想过可以打广告。
但Google的AdSense把广告这一门槛降下来了：广告不再高不可攀，它是自助的，价廉的，谁都可以做的；另一方面，对成千上万的Blog站点和小规模的商业网站来说，在自己的站点放上广告已成举手之劳。
Google目前有一半的生意来自这些小网站而不是搜索结果中放置的广告。
数以百万计的中小企业代表了一个巨大的长尾广告市场。
这条长尾能有多长，恐怕谁也无法预知。
2、亚马逊：一个前亚马逊公司员工精辟地概述了公司的“长尾”本质：现在我们所卖的那些过去根本卖不动的书比我们现在所卖的那些过去可以卖得动的书多得多。
此外还有很多，诸如维基百科、Netflix等等。
《长尾》一直在深刻地影响着全球各地互联网业的发展。
他所提出的推动型模式与拉动型模式的结合，广泛性与个性化的统一，已经成为网络产品设计开发的一个重要策略。
非常感谢”雷声大雨点大“和”拙尘“的辛勤工作，使广大中文读者可以完整领略长尾的妙处。
如果您觉得有价值，请把本文推荐给您的朋友、同事。
希望不久的将来，在Baidu长尾时，不要在前十页中都找不到长尾的中文译文。
长尾理论（TheLongTail）
长尾理论（TheLongTail）长尾理论（The Long Tail）是网络时代兴起的一种新理论，由美国人克里斯·安德森提出。
长尾理论认为，由于成本和效率的因素，当商品储存流通展示的场地和渠道足够宽广，商品生产成本急剧下降以至于个人都可以进行生产，并且商品的销售成本急剧降低时，几乎任何以前看似需求极低的产品，只要有卖，都会有人买。
这些需求和销量不高的产品所占据的共同市场份额，可以和主流产品的市场份额相比，甚至更大。
[1]含义根据维基百科，长尾（The Long Tail）这一概念是由《连线》杂志主编Chris Anderson在2004年十月的“长尾” 一文中最早提出，用来描述诸如亚马逊和Netflix之类网站的商业和经济模式。
“长尾”实际上是统计学中幂律（Power Laws）和帕累托分布（Pareto distributions）特征的一个口语化表达。
过去人们只能关注重要的人或重要的事，如果用正态分布曲线来描绘这些人或事，人们只能关注曲线的“头部”，而将处于曲线“尾部”、需要更多的精力和成本才能关注到的大多数人或事忽略。
例如，在销售产品时，厂商关注的是少数几个所谓“VIP”客户，“无暇”顾及在人数上居于大多数的普通消费者。
而在网络时代，由于关注的成本大大降低，人们有可能以很低的成本关注正态分布曲线的“尾部”，关注“尾部”产生的总体效益甚至会超过“头部”。
例如，某著名网站是世界上最大的网络广告商，它没有一个大客户，收入完全来自被其他广告商忽略的中小企业。
安德森认为，网络时代是关注“长尾”、发挥“长尾”效益的时代。
长尾市场也称之为“利基市场”。
“利基”一词是英文“Niche” 的音译，意译为“壁龛”，有拾遗补缺或见缝插针的意思。
菲利普·科特勒在《营销管理》中给利基下的定义为：利基是更窄地确定某些群体，这是一个小市场并且它的需要没有被服务好，或者说“有获取利益的基础”。
通过对市场的细分，企业集中力量于某个特定的目标市场，或严格针对一个细分市场，或重点经营一个产品和服务，创造出产品和服务优势。
Long Tail 长尾理论
40,000
20,000
0
0
5,000
10,000
15,000 歌曲排名
20,000
25,000
长尾的尾巴
……繼續延伸下去 (從第十萬首到第八十萬首)
长尾理论
克里斯· 安德森
简介
Chris Anderson Wired Magazine主编 2004年10月提出长尾现象 2006年6月英文版书籍： The Long Tail:
Why the future of business is selling less of more 2006年12月中文版：《长尾理论》（中信出版社） 2009年5月《长尾理论 2.0》
推动长尾市场的三种力量
1. 生产工具大众化（电脑）——生产它
生产更多的产品，尾巴更长 2. 传播工具降低了消费成本（互联网）——传播它 接触的成本更低，尾巴变宽 3. 连接供给与需求（搜索）——消费它 扩大利基产品的需求，使曲线重心右移，趋于扁平
长尾法则——提供所有的产品，帮我找到它
票 房 收 入
好莱坞一年只拍100多部电影？
1
10
100
1000
货架争夺战
货架象征着与长尾相对应的“短头” 一寸货架一寸金（通道、存货成本） 贩卖热门商品
原子时代：匮乏导致了热门
80/20法则的演变
市场提供的产品比以前更多了（货架延伸，成本降低） 找到这些产品比以前更容易了（推荐系统和过滤器） 销售额在大热门和小市场之间的分配更均匀了 小市场的经济学和大热门市场相差无几，任何产品都
长尾理论
东华大学 旭日工商管理学院
工商管理系
管理学前沿第三讲
长尾理论
——The Long Tail
《 长 尾 理 论 》 【美】克里斯·安德森/著
乔江涛/译
《长尾理论》简介
作者——克里斯·德森(Chris Anderson)
自2001年起担任美国《连线》杂志（Wired）总编辑。
在他的领导之下，《连线》杂志五度获得杂志五度 “美国国家杂志”（National Magazine Award）的提名， 并在2005年获得“卓越杂志奖卓越”（General Excellence）金奖。
存货的消亡
降低成本的最终方法就是完全消灭原子，用字节处理一切。
第六章 新时尚领军人
如果蚂蚁也有扩音器，它们会说些什么？
过滤器
这些技术和服务可以细查数之不尽的各 种选择，然后把最适合你的哪一个摆在 你的面前。
主要作用：帮助人们沿着一条既舒适又 符合个人品味的道路从已知世界（“大 热门”）走向未来世界（“小领域”）。
数千万个搜索词就等于兴趣和意愿的数千万次表达。
第十三章 长尾法则
怎样创造一个消费天堂？
降低成本
法则1：让存货集中或分散 法则2：让顾客参与生产
考虑小市场
法则3：一种传播途径并不适合所有人 法则4：一种产品并不适合所有人 法则5：一种价格并不适合所有人
的产品选择
进入集合器
Alibris
能将数之不尽的各类产品集合起来（通常集合 在同一个地方），将它们变得易于寻找、唾手 可得的公司或服务。
集合器印证了长尾的第二大力量：
——普及传播工具
商业集合器
长尾理论
LOGO
三、长尾理论的运用
互联网行业—亚马逊
而实现这一切既不需
要庞大的建筑，又不需要 众多的工作人员，亚马逊
书店的1600名员工人均
销售额37.5万美元，比全 球最大的拥有2.7万名员 工的Bames & Noble图 书公司要高3倍以上。这 一切的实现，电子商务在
22
其中所起的作用十分关键。
26
LOGO
三、长尾理论的运用
亚马逊的货物实行零库存运转。
库存图书少
步骤三 零 库 存 运 转 财务周转顺畅 维持库存的只有200种 最受欢迎的畅销书。
边际利润
顾客下订单，以信用卡向亚马逊公司 支付书款，亚马逊却在图书售出 46 天后才向出版商付款
由于不再需要货架，也没有 制造成本和分销费用，卖出 一件非流行品与卖出一件流 行品之间没有任何区别
3
LOGO
一、长尾理论概述
2004年10月，《连线》杂志 主编克里斯·安德森（Chris Anderson）在一篇文章中，首
次提出了一个”长尾理论”：只
要渠道足够大，非主流的、需求 需求量大的商品销量相匹敌。
4
量小的商品销量也能够和主流的、
LOGO
一、长尾理论概述
• 长尾理论起源
5
LOGO
一、长尾理论概述
LOGO
长尾理论
研究分析
1
LOGO 目录页
Contents Page
一
长尾理论概述 长尾理论的经济学原理 长尾理论的运用 长尾理论应用三大法宝
二
三 四
五
长尾理论的延续：创客
2
LOGO 开篇
Introductory parts
一、长尾理论概述
long-tail-anderson-c
“长尾理论阐述的 实际上是丰饶经济 学，当我们文化中 的供需瓶颈开始消 失，人人都能各取 所需，长尾故事便 会自然发生。”
“只有少数商品会 大卖，多数商品都 滞销。”
“商品是否受大众 欢迎，不再是利润 的唯一保证。”
如果用棒球术语作比喻，沃尔玛和其它大型的零售商只能经营好比是“本垒打” 和“全垒打”的商品。但那些网上的，长期销售利基商品的供应商，其商品应有 尽有，却在经营好比是“短打”、“一垒安打”、“跑垒”的商品时就能够盈利。 而且，当他们卖出一系列的“击打”和“短打”后，便获得了利润，就像棒球得 分一样。举例来说，一位典型的NetFlix的顾客，不出家门便可在网上租到既是 流行的也可能是大量默默无闻的电影，价格是普通的DVD影片租赁店的三倍。当 今，全美国5%的购物是在网上完成的。亚马逊首席执行官杰夫•贝索斯则预测网 上零售额将达到零售总额的15%。 让我们来看看另一个体现长尾影响力的事例吧。一位名叫乔•辛普森的英国作家 和登山家写了一本叫《触及巅峰》的书，讲述了他在秘鲁登山时的生死历险经历。 此书在1988年出版，尽管得到了不错的评价，但还是很快就被人遗忘了。十年后 当另一本内容类似的书，即乔恩•克拉考尔描写攀登珠穆朗玛峰传奇故事的《走 进空气稀薄地带》成为畅销书时，《触及巅峰》的命运随之得到了极大的改变。 几位读者在亚马逊网上书店将两书进行对比，他们对《触及巅峰》的称赞将其送 上了纽约时报的畅销书之列。延伸的尾部所代表的网上读者的特定偏好，能让一 本书商早已遗忘的书重新热卖。这个事例力证了亚马逊和其它在线零售商从利基 商品中获取利润的强大能力。 大热门的兴衰沉浮 在工业革命之前，文化和消费都是本地化的现象。人类散居和距离造就了区域性 的爱好、口味和特色。但是到了20世纪初，随着几个世纪以来城市化的进程，媒 体印刷技术、留声机以及其它革新技术的出现，引发了大规模文化和社会变迁的 第一次浪潮。在20世纪，确切的说是在第二次世界大战之后，传播领域的革新成 就了电视和广播的“黄金时代”。大多数美国人都是先看完沃尔特•克朗凯特的 晚间新闻，然后去看最受欢迎的节目，比如“烟枪”和“太空仙女恋”。如此风 光的黄金时代一直延续到了90年代甚至是新世纪的初期。 进入21世纪后，统治传统娱乐市场的力量仍然在发挥着作用。从1990年到2000年 间，凭借着“小甜甜”布兰妮、后街男孩、超级男孩以及其他流行艺人带来的流 行金曲，使唱片销量翻了一番。但当互联网泡沫破灭后，流行歌曲的泡沫也随着 破裂。唱片销量在2001年下降了2.5%，接着在2002年又下滑了将近7%。到了2005 年末，销量又下跌了7%。唱片销量整体下降了25%，而热门唱片的销售额更是下 滑了将近一半。人们的选择从代表主流唱片的曲线顶部开始向延伸的长尾区域转 移。Napster（免费文件交换网站）、家用电脑CD刻录，对等文件交换的出现制 约了传统音乐流通业的发展。 由于可供选择的音乐总量在增加，传统的音像制品零售商失去了更多的市场份额。 其它领域，比如报纸、电影、网络电视和杂志也同样出现了类似的趋势。市场上 流行的热门产品的地位降低了。这改变了娱乐和信息业销售市场的格局；也许有 一天，其它消费品市场也会面临同样的变化。这样的趋势已经开始形成。 西尔斯的经验 在你习惯使用eBay或亚马逊购物之前，长尾现象早就存在了。具有讽刺意味的是，
长尾理论
化表达。
举例来说，我们常用的汉字实际上不多，但因出现频次高，所以这些为数不多的汉字占据了―长尾‖至今尚无正式定义，Chris Anderson 认为，最理想的长尾定义应解释―长尾理论‖的三个关键组成部分：目前最接近的定义是：∙―长尾实现的是许许多多小市场的总和等于，如果不是大于，一些大市场‖–Jason Foster ∙―长尾就是当籍籍无名的变成无处不在的时候你可以得到的‖– Eric Akawie∙―长尾就是80%的过去不值得一卖的东西‖–Greg∙―长尾讲述的是这样一个故事：以前被认为是边缘化的、地下的、独立（艺人？）的产品现在共同占据了一块市场份额，足以可与最畅销的热卖品匹敌‖ –Bob Baker最佳口号：长尾理论阐述的实际是丰饶经济学。
企业采取差异化战略，―小块需求‖通过―小块渠道‖了一个赞助商、电视台、唱片公司、演艺公司多赢的文化奇迹，充分体现草根文化―自我表现、追求情感宣泄和压力释放‖的强烈心理需求。
再次，长尾产品或服务通常具有较高的效用价值。
长尾理论挖掘传统市场边界之外的潜在需求，不断改进商品或服务的质量性能，持续保持与众不同的差异性，不断给人们以焕然一新的感受，从而不断提高消费者效用的满足程度。
而且，该价值中包含的个人知识成分往往比较高。
由于消费者拥有的知识越多，对知识的需求就越多，而拥有一定的知识后，就会对掌握更多的知识产生更为迫切的需要，以形成知识的累积效应。
5. 长尾理论是范围经济与规模经济的完美结合（1）长尾理论产品需求的范围经济效应。
首先，效用与需求的同向依赖关系决定需求曲线向右上方倾斜。
需求曲线向右下方倾斜是经济学的一个基本假设之一，其意指需求量与价格负相关。
长尾理论通过摆脱现有市场中与对手的竞争和博弈，在现有产业之外开创蕴涵庞大需求的利基市场空间，进入全新的领域，商品或服务所蕴含的效用价值成为影响需求的决定性因素，价格蜕化为次要因素。
换句话说，在长尾利基市场里，消费者更多关心的是效用价值，而不是价格。
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有不到百分之十的唱片能够盈利。
但是， Vann-Adibe 告诉我们说， 正确的答案应该是99%，
也就是说， 市场对于排行榜前1 万首曲目当中的几乎每一首都会
有所需求。Vann-Adibe 在他自己公司的统计数据中观察到了这
— —为传统娱乐业服务的市场营销对此根本不屑一顾。
以流行为主导的经济是旧时代的产物， 在这个时代里， 没有
足够的库存空间来存放所有的东西， 以满足每个人的需要。比如
说， 没有足够的货架来存放所制作的CD、DVD 和游戏； 没有足
够的银幕来放映所有的电影； 没有足够的频道来播放所有的电视
节目； 也没有足够的无线电波段来播放所有的音乐； 甚至没有足
书销售商把《触摸巅峰》放在《进入稀薄空气》旁边来促销。《触
摸巅峰》越卖越火。来年一月， 该书的简装版再版， 并连续高居
《纽约时报》畅销书排行榜14 周之久。同月，IFC 制片公司出品
了以该书为背景的纪实片， 倍受好评。到今天《触摸巅峰》的销
售量超过《进入稀薄空气》一倍还多。
到底发生了什么呢？ 简单地说， 是Amazon (亚马逊)的推荐
此外还有很多， 诸如维基百科、Netflix 等等。
《长尾》一直在深刻地影响着全球各地互联网业的发展。他
所提出的推动型模式与拉动型模式的结合， 广泛性与个性化的统
一， 已经成为网络产品设计开发的一个重要策略。
非常感谢” 雷声大雨点大“ 和” 拙尘“ 的辛勤工作， 使广大
中文读者可以完整领略长尾的妙处。如果您觉得有价值， 请把本
值得注意的是，当Krakauer 的书出版时，Simpson 的书几
乎已经绝版了。若是再早几年的话，《进入稀薄空气》的读者根本
不会知道《触摸巅峰》的存在。即便知道， 这本书也买不到了。
但Amazon 改变了这一切。通过把无限多的产品种类、实时的购
买趋势和用户评价结合起来，Amazon 创造了一个把《触摸巅峰》
主流意识仅仅是被强大的市场营销、狭隘的产品选择以及亦步亦
趋的流行文化所误导而已。
对上述公司的销售数据和趋势进行的分析显示， 新兴的数字
娱乐经济和今天的主流娱乐市场截然不同。如果说20 世纪的娱乐
业是以流行内容为主导的，那么在21 世纪，那些非流行的内容将
占据同样重要的位置。
为什么我们一直忍受着迎合大众口味的无聊透顶的夏季大片
够的时间把所有的内容传播给用户。
这是一个资源稀缺的世界。但是， 随着在线分销和零售模式
的出现， 我们正迈入一个资源极大丰富的世界。这两个世界之间
有着天壤之别。
Robbie Vann-Adibe 是数字点唱公司Ecast 的首席执行
官。该公司有超过15 万首的曲目供其网络内的酒吧点唱。有一些
一现象： 每个月里都有数以千计的听众花钱点唱那些在其他传统
点唱服务中根本就不可能找到的曲目。
人们之所以答错Vann-Adibe 的问题， 是因为这个问题的
正确答案在两方面上都与人们的直觉背道而驰。第一点就是， 在
娱乐业中， 二八定律是关于流行的定律， 与销售没有任何关系。
我们被禁锢在以流行为主导的惯性思维中— — 我们以为如果一个
教的。二八定律， 也被称为帕累托定律（ 由意大利经济学家
Vilfredo Pareto 在1906 年提出）， 在我们周围随处可见。由顶
级制片公司制作的电影中， 只有20%能够成为畅销片。这种情况
同样发生在电视剧、游戏和通俗读物市场上。对于顶级音乐制作
公司推出的CD 来说， 这个百分比还会更低。根据美国唱片业协
度影片总共也只有屈指可数的几部。受空间因素的制约，零星分
布的观众和没有观众几乎没有分别。
另一个限制来自于物理定律本身。一定频谱范围内的无线电
波只能搭载有限的广播频道； 同轴电缆只能传输有限的电视频
道。而一天又只有24 小时播放节目的时间。广播和电视节目的传
送要占用大量的有限资源。其结果呢， 也是需要在一定的地域范
文推到长尾的中文译文。:)有兴趣的话可以加入
我们， 一起把有价值的外文资料带给中文读者。
读者很多是对互联网、创业感兴趣的朋友。长尾的本质似乎
也是众多互联网创业公司得以生存发展的原因。因此引用文章结
尾的一句话与大家共勉：
说， 电影院放映一部电影， 至少要在两周内吸引1500 名以上的
观众才能收回放映厅的租金。一个音乐制品店， 平均每张CD 至
少在一年中要卖出两张， 才能收回这张CD 所占用的半英寸货架
的租金。DVD 出租、电子游戏零售、书报零售等都面临同样的问
题。
在这些行业里， 商家的进货必须要保证有足够的销量， 才能
举例来说， 我们常用的汉字实际上不多， 但因出现频次高，
所以这些为数不多的汉字占据了上图广大的红区； 绝大部分的汉
字难得一用， 它们就属于那长长的蓝尾。
二、成功的“长尾”案例：
1、Google 是一个最典型的“ 长尾” 公司， 其成长历程就
是把广告商和出版商的“ 长尾” 商业化的过程。
数以百万计的小企业和个人， 此前他们从未打过广告， 或从
众心理和口碑效应的结合。而确实， 颇有一部分在大众中流行的
音乐、电影、书籍是高质量的。
但是， 仅有流行的东西， 对于我们当中的大多数来说， 是远
远不够的。每一个人的口味， 都会或多或少地偏离主流。而对这
些主流之外的东西探索得越多， 我们就会越发沉迷于此。不幸的
是， 在最近几十年里， 这些主流之外的东西统统被扫到了角落里
一、“ 长尾” 的由来及含义：
长尾理论这个概念是Wired 杂志主编Chris Anderson
在2004 年提出。最简单的例子: 在一个XY 的坐标系里面, y 对
应销售收入, x 对应同一产业中不同品牌的产品或服务. 一般会
出现名列前茅的几个品牌占据大部分的部分, 其他无数的小品牌
占据小部分.
穷多的产品可以选择， 用户真正喜好的产品被挖掘出来。这使得
传统商家如Blockbuster 录像租赁连锁店、Tower Records（ CD
零售连锁店）和Barnes & Noble （ 书店）望尘莫及。而这种前
所未有的选择让用户流连忘返。当他们越来越远离传统的购买模
式后， 他们发现自己的欣赏口味竟是那么与众不同。或许以前的
由绝版书变成畅销书的奇迹。
这一案例不仅仅适用于网上书商， 它其实揭示了一个全新的
适用于媒体和娱乐业的经济模型。这个模型正渐渐开始显示它的
威力。比如Netflix 的网上DVD 租赁、Yahoo! LaunchCast 的
MTV、iTunes 的网上音乐商城， 和Rhapsody。由于有几乎无
统计数据非常令人惊奇，Robbie 总是爱据此来向参观者们提问，
而所有的人无一例外都会答错。这个问题就是： 在随便一家在线
媒体商店（ 像Netflix， iTunes，Amazon， 等等） 的排行榜前1
万首曲目里， 那些每月至少被租出去或卖出去一次的曲目占多大
百分比呢？
大多数人都会猜是20%，原因很简单：我们一直都是被这样
这就是长尾的力量。它的时代已经到来。
（ 译者： 讨论长尾之前， 应该对原文有一个完整、准确的理
解。读了2005 年的一个中译版后， 感觉这个译本在若干关键点
上值得商榷。因此决定重译该文， 希望能给读者带来价值。）
1988 年，英国登山家Joe Simpson 写了一本名叫《触摸巅
峰》（ 译者： 这是Touching the Void 通用的中文翻译的书。该
书讲述了在秘鲁安第斯山脉发生的一次与死神擦肩而过的登山事
故。这本书颇受好评， 但不太畅销， 并很快就被人们淡忘了。可
十年后， 有趣的事发生了。Jon Krakauer 写的另一部描写登山
悲剧的书《进入稀薄空气》成为了畅销书。突然间读者又开始对
《触摸巅峰》产生了兴趣。
为满足读者要求，Random House 出版社立刻再版该书。图
对于iTunes 这样的纯数字服务来说， 由于不再需要货架，
也没有制造成本和分销费用， 卖出一件非流行品与卖出一件流行
品之间没有任何区别， 它们的边际利润都是一样的。流行与非流
行有同样的经济基础， 它们都只不过是数据库中的一条记录， 等
待对其需求做出响应， 因而具有同样的存货价值。于是乎， 流行
洛克威尔市北部地区， 或是加州Walnet Creek 地区购物中心的
人群中， 有多少人会对此感兴趣。
很多出色的娱乐产品， 在全国范围内会有大量热情的观众和
听众，却难以跨越上述障碍。比如《疯狂约会美丽都（Triplets of
Belleville ）》这部广受好评， 并获得奥斯卡最佳动画片提名的片
不再是利润的唯一代名词了。
第二个原因在于业界对于人们的需求没有正确的认识。事实
上， 我们对于自己想要什么也并不是很清楚。比如说， 我们以为
一件商品，如果没有摆在沃尔玛（Wal-Mart）或其它主要零售商
的货架上的话， 那么对这件商品的需求量一定很低； 否则沃尔玛
东西不流行的话， 就不可能赚钱， 也就不可能返还制作成本。也
就是说， 我们已经先入为主地认为， 只有流行的东西， 才有存在
的价值。但是，Vann-Adibe，也包括iTune、Amazon 和Netflix
的管理者们， 却发现那些非流行的东西同样能够赚钱； 并且由于