外文翻译---在分税制度股利政策与资本结构下的决策

中文3400字
原文：
The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes
1、The interaction of capital structure and dividend policy
Firm values are normalized with respect to the firm with zero debt and zero dividend payout. The panels in the figure indicate that the combined net impact of corporate dividend and capital structure policies on firm value is directly affected by the pertinent tax rates at the time.
We next discuss the implications of the model for dividend and capital structure policies under several historical tax regimes. Three representative tax regimes (1979–1981, 1988–1990, 1993–2002) were chosen for analysis out of the ten that were in existence at some time during the three decades since 1979. The three representative tax regimes exhibit distinctly different set of tax rates both in terms of absolute values and relative to each other. For this reason, these three contrasting regimes provide a suitable setting to test the value implications of our model. If our model provides a reasonable representation of firms’ capital structure and dividend policy decisions, the three contrasting tax regimes would be the ideal environment to observe the fit between the model’s predictions and the empirical o bservations.
2、Years 1979–1981
The application of the model using the tax rates from the period 1979–1981 reveals a subtle effect. The table and the figure depict normalized firm value, VD,Π/V0,0, as a function of the leverage D and the dividend payout π. The gain from leverage is positive only when the firm is at a relatively high payout ratio (above approximately 40%), with the maximum gain occurring at full (100%) payout. Interestingly, at a dividend payout level lower than 40%, increasing leverage lowers firm value.
The reversal of the leverage effect at lower payout ratios is driven by the relative levels of tax rates. During the years 1979–1981, the top marginal tax rate for personal
income was very high in comparison to the tax rate for corporate income (70% and 46% respectively). In a tax rate environment such as this, high taxes paid by the bondholders for their interest income proceeds exceed the benefit from the tax deductibility of interest payments at the firm level. Since debt financing can be assumed to have zero NPV, this additional burden is borne by the shareholders. At high levels of dividend payout on the other hand, the taxation of the dividend income makes dividend payout even more disadvantageous compared to paying interest. In other words, now it would be more beneficial for the firm to borrow and pay interest rather than dividends. The benefit reaped from the tax deductibility of interest payments tilts the balance in favor of debt financing, and makes leverage more attractive.
Another noteworthy observation about the 1979–1981 tax rate environment is the steep loss in firm value at very low debt levels in response to increasing dividend payout. According to our model, it was possible for an all-equity firm to experience losses in value up to 58%. The firm could mitigate this loss by maintaining a higher debt level.
The tax regime that made the interesting features discussed above possible is not a short-term anomaly confined to the years 1979–1981. Indeed, the entire period between the Great Depression and the late 1970s was characterized by a similar tax rate environment. Our model indicates that optimal policies to maximize firm value under such tax regimes required zero debt and zero dividend payout. This prescription interestingly comports with the observed leverage policies of the time, when numerous prominent companies such as IBM and Coca Cola had little, if any, debt before the 1980s. However, if a firm would need to maintain high dividend payout levels, it would be better off by carrying a relatively high debt level at the same time. Traditional electric utility companies are examples that appear to fit this mold.
3、Years 1988–1990 (and 1991–1992)
The situation during the years 1988–1990 is unique because during that time the top marginal tax rates on ordinary income (thus on dividend and interest income) were nominally the same as the tax rate on capital gains at 28%. In the following 2 years
(1991–1992), the two tax rates remained very close (at 31.0% and 28.9% respectively). The result of the convergence in tax rates is visible in Fig. 2 for the1988–1990 and 1991–1992 panels. There is little if any moderating influence of the dividend payout on the leverage-firm value relation. The maximum theoretical gain from leverage is close to 50% regardless of the level of dividend payout. As discussed and anticipated on the comparative statics for our model, the influence of the dividend payout ratio vanishes due to the near-zero tax rate differential (τpd−τpg) during the years 1988–1992.
4、Years 1993–2002
In contrast to the reversal effect observed under the tax regime during 1979–1981, and similar to the situation during 1988–1992, the gain from leverage is always positive under the 1993–2002 tax regimes. The details of the gain from leverage relation and the effect of the dividend payout for the years 1993–1994 and the year 2002 are available. As a departure from the previous tax regimes discussed above, throughout this decade-long time interval, the gain from leverage is significantly more pronounced for high payout firms. Although at low or zero debt levels increased dividend payout reduces the firm value, the negative impact of the dividend payout weakens as the debt level increases.
In contrast to the maximum potential gain from leverage during 1988–1992 that reached up to 50%, the tax rate changes throughout the 1990s significantly reduced the maximum potential gain. the maximum potential gain was near 30% in 1993, and by 1998, approximately 20%,remaining at that level through 2002.
5、Summary and empirical implications
The nature of the combined impact of financial leverage and dividend policy on firm value over the years 1979–2002 is found to be wide ranging as a direct result of the tax rate changes. We discussed above three distinct tax regime environments in detail. In the first interval 1979–1981, low leverage and low dividend payout leads to higher firm value. However, given a high dividend payout, the firm is better off by carrying a high debt level. That suggests a simultaneous increase or decrease in leverage and payout for firms. It is less likely to find firms with low leverage and high
payout (which results in the minimum possible firm value). The empirical implication of the model for the 1979–1981 time interval is a positive association between leverage and payout.
The same logic applies throughout the years following the 1979–1981 time interval up to 1987 and again after 1992. During the years 1979–1987, the tax rate were such that at low debt levels, firm value declined with increasing dividend payout ratios. Similarly, from 1993 until 2002, firms would suffer losses in value if they chose to increase dividend payout while maintaining low debt levels. In contrast, during the 1988–1992 time interval, there was no penalty for having a high dividend payout for a firm with a low debt level. Dividend payout was truly irrelevant during that time and would not be expected to systematically vary between firms that carry various levels of debt.
The breakdown in the interaction of dividend payout and capital structure during the 1988–1992 time period as implied by our model provides an opportunity to test the model empirically. If our model is a reasonable representation of the dividend payout-capital structure interaction under varying tax rate environments, we would expect a positive association between dividend payout and debt levels during the years 1979–1987 and 1993–2002 During the years 1988–1992, the association between dividend payout and leverage is expected to be weaker. We conduct several empirical tests in Section 5 to examine the validity of these predictions.
It is worth noting that, to the extent firms have shifted their distributions to their shareholders from dividends to stock repurchases over time, our empirical analysis, which only uses dividend payout data, will not be able to pick up this trend. Indeed, during the three decades under study there was a shift in firms’ attitudes toward share repurchases vis-à-vis dividend payout. We do not pursue stock repurchases empirically in this study due to data limitations. However, note that the model derived in this paper is implicitly capturing the valuation effect of repurchases via the capital gains term .Variable pay is an expanding field within compensation driven by the emerging trends of pay for performance and competitive advantage. Funding these new programs and developing the processes supporting long-term effectiveness is
critical.
In this paper we develop a valuation model that ties together capital structure and dividend payout polices while incorporating differential tax rates on dividend distributions and capital gains. As such it is an extension of the original Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend policy model and of the Miller (1977) model. We numerically and graphically demonstrate the implications of this new model under ten different tax regimes in effect since 1979 and derive the implications of the model for firm value as a function of debt ratio and dividend payout ratio.
Our analysis indicates a wide range of firm values depending on the particular set of tax rates applicable at the time. In the first interval, 1979–1981, when the tax regime featured a high rate on dividend income in comparison to the rates on corporate income and personal capital gains, increasing financial leverage would lead to losses in firm value, if the dividend payout was relatively small. At dividend payout ratios below 40%, the loss in firm value in response to increased debt ratio could potentially reach 23%. During the same time period, if the firm maintained a dividend payout ratio in excess of 40%, the firm value could almost double, if an all equity firm decided to take on debt. During the 1988–1990 time period, when the tax rates on dividend income and capital gains were both 28%, an all-equity firm (without regard to its dividend payout level) could increase in value by as much as50% as it took on more debt. Under the tax regimes prevailing after 1998, the maximum potential gain for a non-dividend paying all-equity firm was roughly 20%, whereas a firm with a high dividend payout could be worth 50% more if it were to boost its debt financing.
Using the analysis of the valuation model under a diverse set of tax regimes, we develop several predictions for empirical testing. The results of the empirical tests are strongly supportive of the basic predictions of our analysis in a static setting. The interaction between dividend policy and financial leverage decisions is significantly influenced by the prevailing tax rates. The more dynamic predictions of the model remain for subsequent examination.
By design, our tax-based model abstracts from the well-known and important contributions of previous studies on bankruptcy/financial distress costs, agency
considerations, and signaling theories. However, the insights gained from our extended tax-based model could contribute in a significant way to the understanding of corporate financial policy in both research and policy dimensions. It is a well established notion within the trade-off theory of corporate capital structure that a range of debt levels exists, in which debt financing has a positive impact on firm value. Over this range, our model has the potential to provide a valuable insight into the effect of dividend policy on capital structure.
In the near future, another major change in the U.S. tax environment is possible, especially if the JGTRRA is allowed to expire by the Congress. The ability of the model in this paper to easily incorporate the new levels of marginal tax rates on four types of income makes it a useful tool for corporate decision makers in analyzing dividend and debt decisions. For purposes of research, the model can be used to gain insights into the evolution of dividend policy over the past three decades.
Source: Ufuk Ince and James E. Owers. 2003 “The interaction of corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions under differential tax regimes”. Journal of Economics and Finance, August, pp. 29-32.
译文：
在分税制度股利政策与资本结构下的决策
1、互动的资本结构和股利政策
公司价值方面进行归一零债务和零股利支出。

基于公司价值上的公司股利和资本结构政策所带来的公司合并净影响是直接与当时的相关税率挂钩。

我们接下来讨论在不同历史税制下的股利和资本政策模型所带来的影响。

三个有代表性的税收制度（1979-1981年，1988-1990年，1993-2002年）被选定为用于分析出自从1979年开始三十年期间存在的十个。

三个有代表性的税收制度无论从绝对价值还是彼此间的相对价值来看都体现出截然不同的税率组合。

出于这个原因，这三个截然不同的制度提供了一个合适的设置来测试我们的模型的价值含义。

如果我们的模型提供了公司的资本结构和股利政策决定合理的表述，那么这三种截然不同的税制将会成为在模型预测和经验性观察中寻找合适点的理想环境。

2、1979-1981年
运用从1979年和1981年期间税率的模型的应用揭示了一个微妙的影响，表和图描绘了代表杠杆和股利支出功能的规格化公司价值，VD，Π/V0,0。

杠杆收益只有当公司处在一个相对高的派息率（约40％以上），并且伴有在全额支出（100%）下的最大增益的情况下才为正。

有趣的是，在分红水平低于40％的情况下，提升了的杠杆效应却降低了公司价值。

杠杆效应的支付率较低状况的逆转是由税率的相对水平所驱使造成的。

1979-1981年期间，个人所得税的最高边际税率相比较于企业所得税率已经是相当高的了（70%和46%），在这样的税率环境，为他们所得的利息收入债券持有人支付高额税收超过从在企业层面的利息减税好处。

因为债务融资可以被假定为具有零净现值，这个额外的负担是由股东承担。

在派息水平高，另一方面，对股息收入征税，使派息相比更加不利支付利息。

换言之，现在它会更利于公司的借款并支付利息，而不是分红。

从利息税扣除收获倾斜的好处在债务融资支持的平衡，使得利用更具吸引力。

另一个关于1979-1981年税率环境值得注意的现象是在回应增加派息以非常低的债务水平，公司价值大幅亏损。

根据我们的模型，它是一个全公司股权价
值可能遇到的损失高达58％（即，VD，Π/V0，0值范围从1.00至表2A中的第一列0.42）。

该公司可以减轻维持较高的债务水平这一损失。

税收制度，使得上述可能讨论的不是一个有趣的特点是短期异常仅限于1979-1981年。

事实上，两者的大萧条和70年代末整个时期的特点是一个类似的税率环境。

我们的模型表明，最优的政策，以最大限度地提高企业在这样的债务和所需的税收零零分红制度的价值。

有趣的是此方与当前关注的杠杆政策相一致，当诸如IBM和可口可乐公司在众多著名的20世纪80年代之前，几乎没有，债务杠杆观察政策。

但是，如果一个企业将需要维持高派息率的水平，这将是更好地执行在同一时间相对较高的债务水平了。

传统的电力公司的例子，似乎是符合这个模具。

3、1988-1990年（和1991-1992年）
1988-1990年期间的情况是独一无二的，因为在这段时间里最普通的收入（从而对股利和利息收入）的边际税率名义上与28％的资本利得税税率相同。

在随后的2年（1991-1992年），两税税率仍保持十分密切（在31.0％和28.9％）。

在公司杠杆价值关系上的股利分红基本上是没有缓和影响的趋势。

无论派息水平，从理论上的最大杠杆收益接近50％。

我们的预期比较静态模型，该派息率的影响消失是由于在1988-1992年期间的近零税率差（τpd？τpg）。

4、1993-2002年
在1979-81和1988-1992年期间与此相反的逆转作用下观察到的税制，类似的情况，从利用增益总是在1993-2002年的税收制度中显阳性。

在1993年到1994年以及2002年相关的杠杆关系增益和股利分红影响的详细状况可以看到。

从与上一个间隔10年之久的税收制度的角度来讲，杠杆收益对于高派息率公司来说显得更加明显和重要。

虽然负债水平低或零增长的派息降低公司价值，但是对派息的负面影响减弱了债务水平上升。

这种效果是明显的。

在1988-1992年期间相比，最大限度的利用潜力增益可达50％，在整个20世纪90年代显着降低税率变化的最大潜在收益。

在1993年，最大的潜在收益接近30％，到1998年，约20％，其余维持这一水平一直到2002年。

对财务杠杆和股利政策对公司价值的综合影响的性质，多年来79年至02年被发现有广泛变化作为税率变化的直接结果。

我们讨论了上述三种不同的税收制度，详细的环境。

在第一区间1979-1981，低杠杆和低派息导致较高的公司价值。

然而，由于高派息率，该公司正在通过实施更好的高债务水平了。

这表明了同步
增长的杠杆或减少对企业支出。

这是不太可能找到与低杠杆和高派息（这在公司的价值最小可能的结果）公司的。

在1979-1981年的时间间隔为模型的实证含义是一个杠杆和支出之间的正相关。

同样的逻辑也适用于整个1979-1981年之后的几年时间间隔直到1987年和1992年。

1979-1987年期间，税率在低负债水平上，公司价值增加派息比率下降。

同样，从1993年到2002年，公司将蒙受损失的价值，如果他们选择增加派息，同时保持较低的负债水平。

相比之下，在1988-1992年的时间间隔，较低的负债水平而高股利分红的公司并没有受到派息处罚。

派息确实无关紧要，在这段时间内不会改变预期，有系统地进行企业间的不同层次的债务。

5、总结和经验的影响
1979-2002年期间财务杠杆和股利政策对公司价值的综合影响，被发现是作为一种广泛的税率变化的直接结果。

我们详细地讨论了上述三种不同的税收制度环境。

在1979-1981年期间，低杠杆和低派息导致较高的公司价值。

然而，由于高派息率，该公司正在通过实施更好的高债务水平了。

这表明了在杠杆效应和企业支出上同步的增长或减少。

这是不太可能找到低杠杆和高派息（导致公司价值值最小的结果）的公司。

在1979-1981年的时间间隔为模型的实证含义是一个杠杆和支出之间的正相关。

在1988-1992年期间支付的股息和资本结构的相互作用，我们的模型所隐含的故障提供了一个机会来检验模型的实证。

如果我们的模型在浮动税率环境下能作为股利分红和资本结构互动的一个合理代表的话，
我们将期待在1979-1987年和1993-2002年期间的股利分红和债务水平将呈现正相关。

在1988-1992年期间，派息与杠杆效应间的联系预计将减弱。

我们在第5节进行实证检验，研究这些预测的有效性。

值得一提的是，企业的范围内，随着时间的推移已经从向股东分配股利转移到股票的回购，我们的实证分析，只使用派息数据，将不能够延续这一趋势。

事实上，相对于派息而言，在所研究的三十年有一个公司更加倾向于股票回购。

由于数据的限制，我们不追求股票回购的实证研究。

但是，请注意，本文得出的模型是通过捕捉隐含的资本利得的长期回购的估值效应。

这篇文章我们完善了相对公司在不同税率股利分配和资本增长下联系资本结构与股利支付政策的股价模型。

因此它是扩展的原来的米勒和莫迪里阿尼
(1961)的股利政策模型及米勒 (1977年)模型。

我们用数值和图形证明这个自1979年以来的新模型含义在实际10种不同的税收制度,派生出该模型内涵对于企业价值根据股利支付率和负债比率的计算。

我们的分析表明大范围的公司价值计算依靠当时特定设立的税率。

在第一个区间,1979-1981,当时税收制度上的一个特点在股利收入高税率相比与企业所得税和个人资本所得, 如果派利支付是相对较小,增加财政杠杆会导致企业价值损失。

在股利支付率低于40%，企业价值的损失作为对响应增加负债比率可能达到23%。

在同一时期,如果公司保持着股利支付率超过40%,如果一个股份公司决定担负债务,公司价值可以将近一半。

在1988 - 1990时期,当税率在股利收入和资本收益上都是28%,一个独资股权公司（没有关于它的股利支付水平）可能提高价值通过差不多2倍的负债。

在1998年之后盛行的税收制度,最大限度的潜在获利通过不支付股利股权公司大约20%,然而一个高股利支付率公司可能价值涨一倍如果增加其债务融资。

在不同的税收制度利用股价分析模式,我们建立几个预言来实证。

实证检验结果强烈支持我们分析的基本预测在一个静态环境。

摘要在股利政策和财务杠杆决策之间的相互作用显著影响通过现行税率。

更多模型的动态预测在后来实验中保持。

从构想来说，税务基础模式是从早期的银行破产，金融危机成本，机构分析，和相关理论中反映出来的。

然而，其延伸出的税务基础模式可以通过其研究和政策规模合理的了解公司金融政策。

公司资本结构中已经存在的债务水平在其权衡交易定论里面得到一个合理的建立。

合理的债务性融资可以对该公司起到一个正面的影响力。

概括这些，我们所提及的模式可以潜在性为资本结构中所涉及到的股息配股方面提供一个有价值的结果。

在不久的将来，关于美国现有税务环境的变化都是可能的，特别是如果美国现有公民关于其工作，税收增长中进行的减免政策是被允许使用到国会到期。

这章中涉及到现有模式的优点是可以更方便融入边际税率中所关于收入这一块，它可以更有效的去让一个公司的决策者更好的去分析公司的股权和债务。

研究调查的目的是希望能从过去的三十年相关的政策中获得有效的改变。

出处:[美]尤法克.恩斯，詹姆斯.E.欧文斯，《在分税制度下股利政策与资本结构决策的关系研究》, 经济金融期刊.2003(8)：29-32.。