耶鲁-Robert Shiller-金融市场-Lect08Human Foibles, Fraud, and Regulation

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《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)课程目录及下载地址(不断更新中)

《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)简介★小羊羊村长★大学开发课程粉丝Q群：122798308课程类型：金融课程简介：金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。

它们为投资活动提供支持及风险管理。

如果我们想要预测金融机构动态及他们在这个信息时代中的发展态势，我们必须对其业务有所了解。

本课程将涉及的内容有：金融学理论、金融业的发展历程、金融机构（例如银行、保险公司、证券公司、期货公司及其他衍生市场）的优势与缺陷以及这些机构的未来发展前景。

课程结构：本课程每讲75分钟，一周两次，在2008年春季录制并收入耶鲁大学公开课程系列。

关于教授罗伯特希勒Robert J. Shiller是Yale大学Arthur M. Okun经济学讲座教授和Yale大学管理学院国际金融中心研究员. Shiller教授的研究领域包括行为金融学和房地产，并在“金融经济学杂志”,“美国经济评论”,“金融学杂志”,“华尔街杂志”和“金融时报”等著名刊物发表文章. 主要著作包括“市场波动”,“宏观市场”(凭借此书他获得了TIAA-CREF的保罗 A. 萨缪尔森奖),“非理性繁荣和金融新秩序：二十一世纪的风险”Robert J. Shiller is Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University and a Fellow at the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management. Specializing in behavioral finance and real estate, Professor Shiller has published in Journal of Financial Economics, American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times. His books include Market V olatility, Macro Markets (for which he won the TIAA-CREF's Paul A. Samuelson Award), Irrational Exuberance and The New Financial Order: Risk in the Twenty-First Century.目录:1.Finance and Insurance as Powerful Forces in Our Economy and Society金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用2. The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and the Hedging of Risks风险管理中的普遍原理:风险聚集和对冲3. Technology and Invention in Finance金融中的科技与发明4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model)投资组合多元化和辅助性的金融机构(资本资产定价模型)5. Insurance: The Archetypal Risk Management Institution保险:典型的风险管理制度6. Efficient Markets vs. Excess V olatility有效市场与过度波动之争7. Behavioral Finance: The Role of Psychology行为金融学:心理的作用8. Human Foibles, Fraud, Manipulation, and Regulation 人性弱点,欺诈,操纵与管制9. Guest Lecture by David Swensen大卫•斯文森的客座演讲10. Debt Markets: Term Structure债券市场:期限结构11. Stocks股票12. Real Estate Finance and Its Vulnerability to Crisis 房地产金融和其易受危机影响的脆弱性13. Banking: Successes and Failures银行业:成功和失败14. Guest Lecture by Andrew Redleaf安德鲁•雷德利夫的客座演讲15. Guest Lecture by Carl Icahn卡尔•伊坎的客座演讲16. The Evolution and Perfection of Monetary Policy货币政策的进化和完善17. Investment Banking and Secondary Markets投资银行和二级市场18. Professional Money Managers and Their Influence金融市场翻译团队介绍友情奉献世界顶级大学开放课程的博客/。

耶鲁金融市场第8课

美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记8耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。

共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。

[第8课] 人性弱点，欺诈，操纵与管制（时长1小时12分）希勒上来先预告下次课的内容。

下次课是请大卫.斯文森（David Swensen）给大家做个讲座。

大卫.斯文森负责耶鲁大学捐赠基金的投资。

希勒在教学大纲中列出一篇《纽约时报New York Times 》的文章，是大卫.斯文森的传记，同时也列出了大卫.斯文森近期的书籍。

希望大家能够从大卫.斯文森身上学到更多的东西。

大卫.斯文森不是耶鲁的本科毕业生（在开课那次介绍时有误），而是耶鲁的经济学博士。

他的本科毕业于威廉康辛大学（University of Wisconsin ），但是他在耶鲁的时间很长。

大卫.斯文森于1985年从华尔街来到耶鲁，当时耶鲁捐赠基金总值大约为10亿美元，在他的管理下，目前基金总计达225亿美元。

这正是说明了学生们生活的许多质量来源于此（笑）。

因为这意味着，每位学生能摊到二百万美元。

二百万美元的获利是多少呢？大约一年为十万美元。

这就是为什么耶鲁在资金支持方面比其他学校慷慨得多；也是为什么有美丽的校园；学校的许多设施都受益。

在去年，耶鲁通过投资组合获得了28%的收益，在全美高校捐赠基金收益中排名第一。

而且，在过去的十年，耶鲁的年均收益为17.8%，在高校中也是排名第一。

耶鲁打败了哈佛、打败了普林斯顿（笑）。

但是，实际上，普林斯顿基金的头是大卫.斯文森的门徒（笑），这些人一定会聚在一起交谈。

所有的主要大学，像哈佛也做得非常好，还有杜克（Duke）、麻省理工、阿默斯特（Amhersta）等等，似乎各大学管理投资都非常好，至少在最近几十年是这样。

对此，希勒有个理论，他认为，这一定是与某种因素有关，比如大学里的学术氛围。

这就是说，投资非常需要仔细地研究，而在大学里的学术传统有助于推进研究。

耶鲁大学开放性课程金融市场

金融市场：第一讲2008年1月14日罗伯特.希勒教授：这是经济学系课程编号为252的金融市场课程，我是鲍勃.希勒，首先，请允许我以介绍这门课的教学研究员。

我们现有5名教研人员，来自世界各地。

我将把他们的照片张贴在这里以便你们知道他们是谁。

教学研究员们非常国际化，这反应了我把这门课也教得国际化的意图，这是因为当今经济学是全世界的课题，而非美国独有，所以我们的教学目标涵盖了全世界（的金融状况）。

奥斯曼.阿里来自巴基斯坦的拉合尔，他毕业于拉合尔大学管理科学系，他现在是经济学博士研究生，在做股票分析推荐和股票市场回报关系的博士论文，他同时对行为金融学，即心理学在金融学中的应用很感兴趣。

第二位助教，我看见他在那边，（对助教说）如果可以请举下手，桑托什.阿纳戈尔(Santos h Anagol),美国的一名议员，同时，他跟印度有很好的联系。

事实上他已经在美国经济评论上发表了一篇关于加纳资本回报的论文。

他与当地经济部门主席，克里斯.尤迪(Chris Ud ry)。

他花了很多时间调查乡村经济。

你过去在分发母牛，对么？学生：不，我仍在做跟母牛有关的工作，但我并不负责分发母牛。

罗伯特.希勒教授：好吧，这是本门课程中最后一次你们听到关于母牛的话题。

这个想法是给村民分发母牛然后观察产出。

在某些贫困地区得到一头母牛生活将得到很大的改善。

克里斯坦.阿武库布杜（Christian AwukuBudu）来自加纳的阿卡拉(Accra),但他是在美国的莫尔豪斯学院上的大学，他也是耶鲁大学经济学的博士研究生，在做发展中国家金融市场的研究。

段雅心（Yaxin Duan）来自中国，她从南京大学获得硕士学位，错了？你来自南京，我的资料搞错了么？你从哪所学院毕业的？好吧，很抱歉我搞错了。

她也是耶鲁大学经济学博士研究生，在做期权价格行为学中被称为“期权微笑”的现象，正如她现在对我微笑一样。

她同时对行为金融学感兴趣，对我来说很很重要，因为这也是我的兴趣之一。

最新耶鲁大学金融市场英文文本Financial-MarketsLecture-10-Transcript

Financial Markets: Lecture 10 TranscriptProfessor Robert Shiller: Before I begin, I just wanted to say that I was very--I found last period's lecture with David Swensen very interesting. Also, I liked being serenaded by New Blue, which is a first experience for me. Swensen--He gave, I thought, a very interesting talk. I've heard him talk before but it's always interesting. He really emphasized diversification. But, I don't know what you were thinking, we got a 28% portfolio return last year. There's something else going on besides diversification; diversification means we get the average return. And I was glad that you asked questions at the end. Some of your questions seemed to draw out other things that he doesn't plan to talk about, like what he really did to make money. One thing was that he said that they shorted the Internet stocks in the late 1990s. That's a brilliant market timing device that--I think enlightened people thought that those prices were getting high--and also made some play on credit spreads and now on real estate, he said.How does he do it? Again, it's my theory that there's no--you can't entirely be taught, but partly though I think that he does it, as do other good portfolio managers, by just keeping a very broad base of knowledge and listening to people and collecting information and watching the big trends and thinking about them. One of, I think, Swensen's best talents is he's a good listener and he incorporates basic facts and acts on them. You might have--it would be incorrect, I think, in listening to what he said and conclude that he just says diversify because he's obviously done something very different from that.By the way, I have another speaker who told me that he would like to talk to our class and I hope we can work it out. His name is Carl Icahn, who is one of the biggest Wall Street--powerful and enlightened people on Wall Street--who can also maybe tell us something about how he makes money or how he makes it a better world. The problem is that he has a--these people have very tight schedules and he's involved in various takeovers and things right now. He said he could do it if we could arrange to meet after 3:00 p.m., so I'm going to--on a Monday or a Wednesday, perhaps at3:00 p.m. or later. He said--his assistant said it might even be 7:00 p.m., so that's the way he works. I don't think he gets up at 9:00 a.m., apparently. So, I take that that's all right with you--that you can come to a special section of this class. We would have to see if we can arrange that. Again, I don't guarantee that it will happen because the reality is, someone who is involved in as many things as he is--it's going to be something. We do have Stephen Schwarzman coming February 22nd and we have Andrew Redleaf coming March 5th, so we have a really strong set of outside speakers this year. Again, the mid-term exam is Monday; sorry that I misstated that last week. You've already seen last year's mid-term and it's going to look a lot like that.We're talking today about interest rates and bonds. Interest rates are an old, old thing. They go back to ancient times, but I'm going to talk about some of our modern institutions and I'm going to talk first about discount bonds. This is a little bit more of a technical lecture, but I find it just as interesting myself. We're talking about discount bonds, and then coupon-carrying bonds, and then talk about the term structure of interest rates and why we have interest rates. I think that's my Blackberry beeping. I'm trying not to live in too electronic a world. That's the way it is these days. It's giving its last gasp. Then finally, talk about inflation index bonds. The first thing is adiscount bond. It's the most simple--or often called a bill--a discount bond does not pay interest; it's sold at a discount. You have the principle, which is the amount owed, which is, let's say it's $100, that will be paid to you at some date in the future, specified in the contract. And nothing, you would just get $100. Effectively, you get interest from this because it's sold at a discount, so the price that you pay is equal to one hundred minus the discount. You wouldn't buy this bond at par because--at par, meaning at $100--because then you wouldn't get any interest on it. So you buy it at a discount and the return you get is of course a hundred minus--the return you get is the discount.The U.S. Government is a big issuer of discount bonds and they're called Treasury bills. I have them up on the screen here. This is from a U.S. Government website called and you can get on and access it at any time. It isshowing--since the U.S. Government issues these bonds, it's showing its data on these bonds. The bonds are auctioned off on regular dates and you cannot participate in the auction; I assume you can't. You'd have to be an authorized participant, but if you become an institution you can get authorized to trade in the auction. These are the dates; the latest auction was February 14th. I guess that was yesterday, right? The term means it was a sixty-day Treasury bill; that means it pays not $100, it would start at $10,000. Treasury bills--maybe you have to realize there's a distinction between savings bonds and Treasury bills. Treasury bills are for serious investors and so they don't come in small denominations. The U.S. Government also issues small denomination debt to individuals to help them called savings bonds, but we aren't talking about those. At the February 14th auction, Treasury bills were--sixty-day treasury bills were sold and the auction price is given. Well, here's the price of the bill. The issue date was today, February 15th, and they mature in what should be exactly sixty days--on April 15th. If you want to buy one you would pay this price.This number, CUSIP number, is a number that identifies any security. It's like you have a social security number or other ID number, which positively--there might be another person with the same name as you, God forbid, but you at least have your own number, which is guaranteed to be unique to you. So every security has an identical CUSIP, which identifies it.I want to start by explaining the numbers here. How did they get--how do these numbers interrelate? Well, the discount rate is sort of the--you notice there are two different interest rates here and you might be confused by them. The discount rate that is shown is the number that you plug into a formula to get the price. What really matters to you as an investor is how much you have to pay today to get $100 in sixty days. So, how do we get the price from the discount rate? Well, there's a formulathat's been used by bond traders for hundreds of years and it's a traditional expression, which goes from the discount rate to the price. In this case, price is $99.58 and what does that equal? It equals 2.51--that's the discount rate that you see up there--well, (2.510 x 60)/360. As you know, the maturity is 60-days and, as you know, there are about 360 days in a year. By tradition, they divide by 360, not 365, and so you understand that dealers of Treasury bills tend to "discounts."It's like a language, a language of finance. So what everybody knows is that the discount is converted into a price according to this formula. You might ask, well is this an approximate formula? No, it's an exact formula. Then you say, well why didn'tthey divide by 365, because I know there are 365 days in a year? The answer is--this goes way back--it's an old tradition and they used to have to do this by hand. They had to divide by hand and so they didn't like the number 365, so they thought, let's just round it to 360. As long as everybody knows that's what we're doing, what difference does it make, right? That's what you're supposed to know. If your dealer quotes you a discount rate of 2.51%, you know how to convert that into the price and that's all that matters--all that really matters is the price you have to pay. They also have something up here called the investment rate. Yes?Student: I'm sorry, I don't understand since the left hand side of your equation does not equal the right hand side, isn't that discount, not price?Professor Robert Shiller: I'm sorry, glad you--that's the difference between 1 and 99.58. Yes, thank you--between 100 and 99.58. Are you okay now? I'm sorry I made a--now the thing is, to convert that into--what is this other--there's another interest rate up here called the investment rate. Well, that's supposed to be your percentage return on an annualized basis. Remember, this thing only runs for sixty days and you could compute your sixty-day return, but people like to compare annual returns--once again, a tradition we have. Now, there's nothing special about annual--that's the time it take the Earth to go around the sun, but it doesn't have any relevance to finance--but we are just accustomed to using that. What we're going to do, however, is take account of another problem. That is, you might think that this quantity here is my return but you have to actually divide it by the price, which is less than a hundred, to get a return. You're not putting in $100 to this investment; you're putting in $99.58 for the investment and you're getting out the difference between $100 and $99.58. So, that is not--your return is actually higher than 2.51% on an annualized basis.What we do--I'll show you how they got their number. 2.563%, which is the number you see under investment rate, is equal to 1/(.9958 – 1), corrected for the number of days in a year. How do we do that correction? When I first tried this, I thought, fineI'll multiply by 365/60, but I forgot this is a leap year. So, times 366/60. So, that's how you go from the discount rate to the investment rate. Do you understand why we had to do this? The investment rate is telling you how much money you're really making on an annualized basis, so it's very simple. I put in .9958 for every dollar I got out, so my appreciation of my money is 1/.9958. Subtract that by $1, which is what I put in, and that's how much money I made as a fraction of a dollar. All I have to do then is correct that for the number of days in a year, so that's what I did. That's how we go from the discount rate to the investment rate.Now you might ask, well if we did 360 here, why don't we just do 360 over here? Well, it's one of the mysteries of Wall Street. They like to--when they're computing the investment yield, they want to be completely honest and not use any rules of thumb. So you have to understand that it's 360 a year because that's just a convention and everybody knows that it's just the way we quote prices. Rather than say $99.58, we just quote the 2.51 and everybody knows how to convert. When you ask for the investment rate, you want to know the truth--how much am I really getting--so they don't monkey around here. Also, they don't have to actually--in the old days, they didn't actually have to compute the investment rate. If you were talking to your broker--if you go really old days, you'd send a boy running over to your broker. They didn't have telephones; they used to have runners. The boy would go say, we'reoffering to pay a discount rate of 2.51--that was the formula--and then anyone could do these calculations; they knew what it meant. This calculation wasn't done very frequently; that's just if you had one of the satisfactions of knowing how much money you were making.I think we pretty much explained--there's another thing I want to say about Treasury bills. I used to have up here a page--I used to take--instead of Treasury Direct, which is a website, I used to get a clipping from The Wall Street Journal that showed much the same information that you see on this chart. But, it showed additional information that you won't find on Treasury Direct; it showed bid and ask for dealers. Now, you have to understand that the Treasury has these auctions only on these dates. On February 14th, they only sold sixty-day ones, nothing else. On February 11th they sold only thirteen-week ones and nothing else. What if you want to buy a Treasury bill on some other day? Well, you can go to Treasury Direct as an individual and buy a Treasury bill, but it may not be the best place to buy. What you normally do is you go to a dealer and a dealer is someone, a professional, who participated in the auction and bought these up to accumulate an inventory to then sell off to you, the customer. So normally, you don't deal with Treasury Direct, you deal with a dealer.The Wall Street Journal calls around to the dealer, which has an inventory of all these maturities and asks them for their bid and ask. And a dealer--what a dealer does is it maintains an inventory of, in this case, Treasury bills and then it stands ready to buy and sell. So, the bid price is the--they don't do it in terms of price, they do it in terms of discount--so the bid discount rate--there would be two numbers for each. One is the bid, which is what they'll pay you for a Treasury bill if you want to sell to them. The ask is what you have to pay them through this formula. The formula is--I could write it this way: price equals one hundred minus this. Normally, when you have a dealer, the dealer has a--when we talk in terms of price the dealer has an ask, which is higher than the bid. If you go to an antique dealer--maybe you're familiar or maybe you've done this if you've bought furniture for some apartment or something. The dealer will charge a higher price for you to buy the furniture than will give to you to purchase the furniture from you; that's how the dealer makes a difference. The difference between bid and ask is the profit for the dealer and the bid-ask spread is the profit for the dealer.You can see these--you can see the bid and ask in The Wall Street Journal. It's interesting to look at it because you note that the bid-ask spread, which is the difference between the bid and the ask for the dealer, is narrower in the more liquid securities and some of the securities that are small and unimportant have a widebid-ask spread. That means that it's harder to make a market for it, so the dealer wants to charge more. This doesn't show this here. Unfortunately, The Wall Street Journal stopped carrying this and I thought--it's an interesting story about what goes on. The Wall Street Journal is the most influential financial publication in this country but it has been going through financial difficulties with the Internet age.In the last five years, the stock in Dow Jones Company has fallen by half. What's happening? Well, there are many factors, but one important factor is, the rise of the Internet has competed with--people used to buy The Wall Street Journal to get data like this. You see how I completely bypassed The Wall Street Journal and I went to Treasury Direct? There are a million websites that give away financial data so TheWall Street Journal was not doing as well. Do you know what happened finally? I'll give this as an aside; they reduced the size of the newspaper in 2005. It used to be a big, broad sheet and they made it smaller in 2005 and they started--they keep cutting out data. There's less and less data in The Wall Street Journal. It used to be this big, thick thing and you would go there everyday to look up--and everything was in there. But now, the Web is competing with it, so they're scaling down the size of the paper and trying to survive.So, they created Wall Street Journal Online, which is , and they were trying to make money off of that, but people weren't willing to pay for it. You know how it is on the Web? You can get so much for free, why should I pay for ? That wasn't working well, so last year--about one year ago--they announced, is absolutely free and we're going to give away all the data, basically all the data that used to be in the newspaper, free to anyone. I thought that was great. Now we can all get The Wall Street Journal without paying for it. There's some problem with that; it's not economic, so let's not be too jubilant.What ended up happening is, you know the news, Rupert Murdoch bought The Wall Street Journal last fall and he announced that Wall Street --will no longer be free. So, this is the reality of the world. I thought it was interesting to look at Rupert Murdoch--this is finance. This may sound like an aside, but this is all finance. Rupert Murdoch, you may have heard of him, is a huge newspaper baron who buys up newspapers all over the world. It's interesting, he's been at it--he's continuing what his father did. To become the biggest publishing monolith in the world, it takes maybe a hundred years, so his father in Australia started buying up newspapers. His father was born in 1886 and now Rupert Murdoch is continuing. Rupert Murdoch is in his 70s and he's still buying newspapers. He kind of makes them survive and NewsCorp doubled its price--that's his company--doubled in the last five years.You can see, this is how the unseen rule of finance--The Wall Street Journal is a venerable newspaper and source of information about finance, but it's not making money. The world is changing and The Wall Street Journal is flagging. So NewsCorp, whose price doubled when The Wall Street Journal's fell in half, eats up and The Wall Street Journal is gobbled up by the bigger company. You can see why stock prices matter. The Newscorp's rising stock price was a sign that Rupert Murdoch had some idea how to make money and The Wall Street Journal was not doing as well, so it got gobbled up. The question is, what will happen to The Wall Street Journal now? Well, they have to make money; that's the real world. So Rupert Murdoch tends to bring papers around.I'm just going to go a little bit further on--Rupert Murdoch bought The Times of London in 1981--that was twenty-seven years ago. The Times of London is one of the most venerable newspapers in the world and it was losing money fast; it might have disappeared if Murdoch hadn't taken over. But, Murdoch turned it around and it's still around. They turned it into a tabloid. It was the most dignified newspaper in the world and he kind of decided that, in order to survive, they had to get a little bit more down to earth. So, they reduced the size, so it looks like one of those--like New York Daily News newspapers now. It's still a great newspaper. He added celebrity gossip too,which The London Times would never do in the past. But you go to do it, right? That's the thing about the real world and finance is very much about the real world. Murdoch claims he will not alter the editorial content of The Wall Street Journal. The thing that we have seen him doing is charging more, but I guess we've got to allow that. So we may feel annoyed that we now have to pay to get our Wall Street Journal Online. In the long run, we want The Wall Street Journal and so I guess that--we just have to accept that. If you want to find--by the way, if you want to read The Wall Street Journal online at Yale, you can do it no problem. You go to ABI Inform, which is one of the things that Yale subscribes to, on your laptop and it puts you right into the text of The Wall Street Journal. But it doesn't put you, as far as I can tell, into Wall Street Journal Online. We have other--lots of data sources--that Yale subscribes to and there are lots of free data sources, but Wall Street Journal Online is not free. Anyway, I want to talk--you understand now about discount bonds? It's pretty simple, right? I just wanted to get the pricing formula. The critical thing about a discount bond is it pays no interest. Treasury bills in the United States are limited to one year out; well, that's the name of it. We call an instrument of the U.S. Treasury with a maturity less than or equal to one year--we call that a bill--and they used to be the only discount bonds issued by the U.S. Government. Now, they also have longer maturity, called Treasury strips, but let me move to the other. So we have--U.S. Government issues bills and that's less than or equal to one year and they pay no interest. They also have government-issued notes and that's from one to ten years and bonds--this is just jargon--these are ten or more, well actually more than ten.I'll show you from Treasury Direct--I have notes--this should be greater than ten. These are the recent auctions of the Treasury of notes. Now, these are different from bills, as I emphasized, because they pay interest. They carry what's called a coupon. And then we have the bonds. You see there aren't as many of these issued. We issue a lot of–there are a lot of auctions of Treasury bills and there are comparatively fewer of bonds. So, let's talk about a bond. A bond differs from a bill in that it carries what's called a coupon, which I will denote by the letter C, and it has a principal, which it pays out at the end--of one hundred. Of course, there would be larger denominations than $100, but by tradition, we speak of them as if they were bonds that you paid $100 to get. Now, another Wall Street tradition is that bonds pay a coupon; they pay C/2 every six months. The coupon is expressed as an annual amount; you get half of it every six months. The reason they call them coupons is that, in the old days, you used to actually--when you bought a bond, there would be a piece of paper and the piece of paper would have attached to it a lot of little coupons that you would clip. If it was a twenty-year bond, there would be forty coupons, one for each six-month period, and each one would have a date on it. What you used to do is, every six months you'd pull out your bonds and you'd clip the coupons with a pair of scissors; you take them to a bank and they would give you cash for your coupons. So, we still call them coupons, but now we don't do it--we do things electronically. You don't have to clip coupons anymore.If you want to see bonds as they used to look, with their coupons, there are a number of them at the International Center for Finance down the street here with their coupons still attached. So they've got a lot of--Will Goetzmann and Geert Rouwenhorst are collectors of old bonds and they've got lots of bonds with theircoupons still attached. You know what that means when they're framed there on the wall with their coupons still attached? It means the company went bankrupt and never paid; otherwise, the coupons would have been clipped. It's actually--our International Center for Finance is sort of a museum for defaulted bonds. The ones that are beautiful for framing are the ones that failed, so you can see all the coupons. Some of them have some of the coupons clipped and then they stop and you know that it was bad news when they stopped clipping them. We still call them coupons.If you have a bond with an interest rate of 4.375%--that's not an easy one to divide by two--but you would get half of that every six months until maturity. We have to ask then, how do we get the price and the yield from this? What we do is we take the interest rate, which I'll call r, and plug it into a formula, which I didn't actually do the arithmetic to check--to check their number. The price is just the present value of the coupons at the interest rate r, so the price of a bond is the present discounted value of coupons and principal, at rate r. Now, you have to understand that when you buy a bond, if you buy it at issue, you get the first coupon in six months, the second coupon in one year, the third coupon in eighteen months, and the last coupon you get at the maturity date. So that means--what is the stream of payments? You get C/2 in six months, C/2 again in a year, C/2 again in eighteen months, and that continues until the last date--the maturity date--when you get 100 + C/2.The price is just the present value of that stream, discounted at the interest rate. The formula can also be written and expanded out--P = (c/2) x [(1/(r/2)--which is the consol formula, if this were applied to an infinite stream-- - 1/(1+(r/2))2T x 1/(r/2)]. Let me make sure I've got this right-- +100 (1/(1+(r/2))2T. This should be obvious--if I did that right--this should be obvious from what you learned about in present value formulas. If you had a perpetuity, which paid C/2 forever, you already know from the perpetuity formula that the value of that would be C/2 divided by r/2 if r/2 is the discount rate. It's not forever because it terminates after 2T periods of six-month interval each. You want to subtract off the value of a perpetuity that starts after 2T, six-month intervals, so this is the present value of the perpetuity that starts after 2T, six-month intervals. Then you want to add the present value of the principal and that's the formula. That's another conventional formula that goes from interest rate to price of the security.Now, I want to talk about the term structure of interest rates and that's my next plot here. That's the term structure as of now on the chart. We've identified the prices and yields of bonds of various maturities. How do the prices and yields look at various points in time? So, I've got here a term structure; well, the term structure is the plot of yield-to-maturity against time-to-maturity. This is January of this year, before the Fed cut interest rates, and this is the term structure. I've got the Federal Funds Rate--it's the shortest interest rate, an overnight rate--it was at 4% at that time and then there was a sharp drop. The three-month Treasury bill rate is shown there--it was much lower--it was under 3%. Then the--so the term structure was downward-sloping until about two and a half years and then it was upward sloping.The interesting question from the standpoint of economic theory is, why did it have that funny shape? I want to compare it with other examples of the term structure recently. This is the term structure just a short while ago--of December 2006--very different. The Federal Funds Rate was 5.5% and then the whole term structure--all theway--almost all the way. Well, there's this funny glitch here between three-month and one-year, but then it just continued to decline. That's a strongly downward-sloping term structure. This is another example, not so long ago--this is December 2003. Now, the term structure was pretty much upward-sloping everywhere. At that time, the Fed had cut the Federal Funds Rate to 1%, we had very low short rates. And thethree-month Treasury bill rate was about the same, at 1%. Going further out, the term structure just kept rising.It's one of the questions of economics--what determines the term structure? You have to understand that it's determined in the market. The Fed has these auctions but it auctions them off at what price the public will pay, so the Fed doesn't determine the term structure. Neither do the dealers determine the term structure; the dealers have to buy and sell at prices that are in the market. It has to stay relevant to the market, so nobody really knows where these interest rates come from because no one person sets them. If you're a dealer, you've got to keep your bid-ask at market; otherwise, you'll get only one side or the other, right? You'll be selling too cheaply or you'll be buying too dearly. You've got to do it so you're right in the middle, so that the market is in the middle. Nobody really sees the reason for this; it's all a question of theory, so we have to think a little bit about theory.The term structure is one of the most interesting things in economics because it shows the price of time at various maturities. In 2003, time was almost free out three months. It didn't--if you needed more time to get some business done you'd have to borrow, but you'd only have to pay 1% a year. That would be like a quarter of 1% to postpone your payment by another year; so time was really cheap. But if you wanted to postpone it over seven years or so, time got a lot more expensive. Why is this and why is the price of time changing? One thing to do is to go back and ask, what really are the reasons for interest? I wanted to talk about the theory of interest as presented by Professor Irving Fisher at Yale, who is famous for having exposited that. I imagine he did it at this very blackboard because, as I said, he had his office in this building and he didn't die until 1940s, so he must have been--this building was--this room goes back to the '30s. He had a diagram, which illustrated what is the ultimate cause of interest, and it helps us to think about this diagram whenever we try to understand the term structure.What his diagram--this is the famous Irving Fisher diagram--depicted, there's only one period; there's today on this axis and tomorrow–well, I shouldn't say tomorrow, that suggests one day--next period on this axis. Let's say it's one year and I'm going to actually plot on this axis a person's income this year. I should say income today on this axis and on this, income next period. So for each person, there is a point representing my income today and my income next period. Let's assume that I know what I'm earning next year; there is actually uncertainty about it. If I draw this down this--this point is this year's income down here and this point here is next year's income; I'll use Y for income. This is Y today and this is Y next period.。

fama和shiller对金融学的贡献

fama和shiller对金融学的贡献Eugene Fama和Robert Shiller都被誉为金融学领域的巨匠，他们对金融学有着重大的贡献。

Fama领导了有效市场假说的发展，而Shiller则推动了行为金融学的诞生。

首先，Eugene Fama是有效市场假说的创始人。

有效市场假说（EMH）是金融学中最具争议性的理论之一。

根据EMH，资本市场是高效的，所有基本面信息都被准确地反映在股票价格中。

这表明，股票价格的变化完全是由未来的信息或新的市场变化所主导，不存在可以被预测或获得利润的机会。

Fama在20世纪60年代提出该理论，并于1970年发表了里程碑式的研究"Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work"。

Fama的贡献是带领金融学走向系统化的理论建设，将大量的经验性证据、模型和假说编织在一起，并指出资本市场效率是不可避免的事实。

尽管EMH在近些年遭受了质疑和批评，但这是在一定程度上阻止了投资者有意或无意地从市场中获得过度的利润。

其次，Robert Shiller是行为金融学的奠基人之一。

行为金融学是一种研究跑赢市场或项目化预测的投资策略的学科。

Shiller认为投资者会在情感和人类行为因素的影响下，偏离合理的预期，从而导致价格上涨或下跌。

2000年，Shiller发表了名为"Irrational Exuberance"的书，预测了公司收益和股票价格的长期下降。

他在该书中指出，股市泡沫是由投资者的情感和投机推动的，价格的波动不是由股票的基本面因素引起的，而是由投资者的情感和行为所决定的。

Shiller的预测在2007年的金融危机中得到证实。

Shiller的贡献是揭示了投资者行为与金融市场的关系，此外，还引入了新的金融工具，如衍生品。

他的行为金融学的重要贡献是扩展了投资者的视角，并提供了更多的投资选项。

耶鲁公开课笔记2

美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记2耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。

共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。

[第2课] 风险管理中的普遍原理：风险汇聚和对冲（时长1小时09分）本课主题是风险管理中的普遍原理----风险汇聚和对冲（Pooling and Hedging of Risk）。

希勒认为这是金融理论中最基本、最核心的概念。

本课先讲概率论(Probability Theory)，再讲通过风险汇聚来分摊风险的概念。

概率论是极具智慧的构想，诞生于历史上的特定时期，并令人意想不到地获得广泛应用，金融是其应用领域之一。

对部分学生来说，本课相对所讲的其他课会显出更多的技术性，并且遗憾的是又安排在学期初。

对于学过概率和统计的学生而言，就不是新知识了。

这是从数学角度的看法。

概率论是新知识，但不要太畏惧。

课前有个学生告诉希勒，他的数学有些生疏了，是否还能选这门课？希勒说，如果你能听懂这堂课，那就不会有问题。

什么是概率？通过举例说明。

比如，今年股票市场会走高的概率是多少？例如认为概率是0.45，是因为对股市悲观，预测股市会走高的可能性是45%，而股市会走平或走低的可能性是55%。

这就是概率。

听了这个例子，人们就会觉得这个概念是熟悉的，如果有人提到概率是0.55或0.45，也就知道他说的意思了。

话锋一转，希勒强调，概率并非总是以这种方式来表述的。

概率论成形于十七世纪，此前没有人提出过。

撰写概率论历史的作者伊恩.哈金（Ian Hacking），查遍世界所有关于概率论的文献，没有发现在十七世纪之前有概率论的文献，也就是说，在十七世纪产生了一次智慧的飞跃，当时用概率词汇来表述非常时髦，引用概率进行表述的方式很快传遍世界。

但是，有意思的是，如此简单的概念此前从未使用过。

下面希勒详细介绍哈金的成果。

哈金研究表明，概率词汇早已存在于英语中，莎士比亚就用过，但其所代表的意思是什么呢？哈金举了一个年轻小姐的例子，这位小姐描述她喜欢的男子，说道，“我太喜欢他了，我觉得他有很大‘可能’”(probable)。

一生值得反复读的5本书

一生值得反复读的5本书罗伯特·希勒注定是个悲情人物！身为耶鲁大学金融学教授，标普/凯斯-希勒全国房价指数的联合创始人之一，他在金融学研究领域的成就没有多少人可与之比肩。

但在2022年，诺贝尔经济学奖呼声最高且已经入围的罗伯特·希勒最终与诺贝尔经济学奖失之交臂。

但罗伯特·希勒的学术造诣与学术地位却一直为众多人士和读者津津乐道。

摆在你面前的这本《金融与好的社会》可以说是罗伯特·希勒的集大成之作。

首席执行官、投资经理、银行家、投资银行家、放贷者、交易员、做市商、保险商、市场设计者、金融工程师、衍生品供应商、律师、金融顾问、游说者、监管者、会计师、公共商品融资商、政策制定者，这些你知道的或者不知道的角色，在希勒的这本书里都会娓娓道来——你可以透彻地了解金融到底是怎么回事了。

内容简介：一部真正把金融看懂的书、全方位展现金融行业规则。

在金融领域，著名经济学家罗伯特·希勒的成就几乎无人可比肩——他是耶鲁大学金融学教授、标普·凯斯—希勒房价指数的联合创始人、《纽约时报》畅销书作家，他还在2022年获得了诺贝尔经济学奖提名；他或许还是唯一一位既预测到2000年股票市场泡沫，又成功预言了房地产泡沫终将引发次贷危机的学者。

罗伯特·希勒阐述认为，金融并不是社会的寄生虫，社会离不开金融，而金融也应当服务于社会，而且我们需要有更多的金融创新。

在这本书里，金融行业的关键角色首席执行官、投资经理、银行家、投资银行家、放贷者、交易员、做市商、保险商纷纷登场，希勒一一揭开了他们的神秘面纱。

而市场设计者、金融工程师、衍生品供应商、律师、金融顾问、游说者、监管者、会计师、公共商品融资商、政策制定者，几乎没有人知道这些游离于金融行业周围的人到底扮演了什么角色。

通过阅读这本书，你一定会知道，这些幕后策划者如何操纵了金融社会。

这是一部金融行业的必读书，同时也是一部了解金融行业的必读书。

耶鲁《金融市场》视频笔记

I thought I would just remember a couple of highlights from the first two lectures to consolidate what we said then.我想重申一下上两节课的几个重点，以便巩固我们讲过的内容In the first lecture, I talked about a lot of things,but one theme that comes to my mind is the theme of the moral purpose and mission of the finance community.第一课里，我讲了很多东西，但中心主旨就是金融界的道德目标和使命We talked about the sense that, I think, young people have a sort of prejudice against the field and they think that finance is a field that you go into if you really value money rather than people.我们谈论了年轻人对这一行业的偏见，他们认为进入金融业的人金钱至上而不尊重他人I want to reiterate again that’s not the way I view the field at all.我想重申一下，我对金融界的看法与他们截然不同I was just yesterday, I gave a talk in Montreal at the Caisse de Dep----昨天，我刚在蒙特利的魁北克储蓄投资集团做了一个讲演which is the big wealth management fund for the Province of Quebec这个投资集团是魁北克省的一所大型财产管理基金机构I met a lot of people there and I never once got the idea that anyone there was evil or grasping.在那我见了很多人，但是我没有察觉到任何恶毒或者贪婪的气息I think they have a moral purpose, which is to preserve the livelihoods of the people of the Province of Quebec.我认为他们都有一个共同的道德目标，就是维持魁北克省居民的生计You get a very different view of things when you meet the people.只有当你亲身面对这些人的时候，你会看到事情的另一面I think our entertainment industry likes to make movies about people in finance, but they are inevitably portrayed as evil and I don’t know why that is.娱乐产业喜欢制作关于金融业的电影，但里面的人物总是被刻画的很恶毒，我也不知道为什么I don’t think there has ever been a major motion picture about a financial person who ended up a philanthropist. Why is that?我觉得好像没有一部正儿八经的电影里金融业者最终成为了慈善家，为什么？I just don’t--people don’t like-- people would rather hate--我不…人们不喜欢…人们宁愿厌恶…I don’t know why it’s something--我不明白为什么It wouldn’t be a good movie theme, would it? Anyway, you have to overcome these--那不是好的电影主题吗？不管怎样，你们要克服这种想法…You have to think that if you go into the field you would probably and if you’re successful, you would probably end up as a philanthropist. but no movie will be made about your life and you may eccounter hostility the whole way.你们要认为，如果你进入这一行，你很可能，如果你成功了，你很可能成为一位慈善家，但是不会有电影记录你的人生，而且你可能整天遭受白眼It’s especially true right now with the subprime crisis.在次贷危机下，情况更是如此People are blaming the financial community for our troubles now.现在，人们都把危机怪罪到金融界的头上It is true that we’re seeing some people thrown out of their houses, in some cases, because of some rather questionable financial practices that got people into mortgages that they shouldn’t have gotten into.确实我们看到有些人被赶出他们的房子，在有些案例中，确实是有些有问题的金融操纵，使人们背上本不该背负的债务But overall, I think that the people in this field are good people.但是总体来说，这一行业的人是好人In the last lecture, I talke about－－上一课，我讲了…In the second lecture, I talked about the pooling of risks and the basic theme of that lecture was that we now have a mathematical theory, probability theory.第二课，我讲了风险汇聚及分摊，那节课的主题是一门数学理论，即概率论When you look at this theory, you realize that it suggests a very important technology for improving human welfare and by spreading risks.这一理论，提出了一个重要的技术即可以通过分散风险，提高收益The economy, and technology, and the weather and all sorts of factors create risks.经济，科技，天气各种其他因素都可能创造风险But the real technoloty is-- the technology that works to eliminate risks is to spread them out to pool them, to share them among many different people.但是真正的技术，能够降低风险，通过风险汇聚，将风险分散，让很多人共同承担So, the idea that therists suggest and it may be unreachable, but the perfect financial system would have all of our risks pooled completely.理论家提出的这一理论，可能无法达到, 但是一个完美的金融体系，能够将所有的风险完全分摊That is, nobody suffers alone.也就是说，没有人独自承担损失If anything happens to me in my livelihood, then it’s spread out over everybody and everybody means the whole world.如果我的生计出问题了，他将分散到每个人身上，每个人指全世界的人Whatever happens to me, when it’s spread out over six billion plus people, it ends up divided by six billion and it becomes unobservable.发生在我身上的事，分散到六十多亿人口上被六十亿除，就变得难以察觉It becomes so small that it’s meaningless and that’s the ideal.小到微不足道，这就是完美模型That’s what, in principle, we can do and what I think is the most important concept in finance--this concept of risk pooling.原则上，这就是我们能做的，我认为这也是金融业最重要的概念，即风险汇聚及分摊We live in a world where people suffer all kinds of misfortunes.我们生活的这个世界，人们会经历各种的不幸Of course, we can try to get rid of these misfortunes. We can do research on disease prevention and weather modification and global warming.当然，我们能够避免这些不幸。

《金融市场(26课全)》(FinancialMarkets)

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耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open Yale course：Financial Markets.01.Chi_Eng.640X360-YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open Yale course：Financial Markets.02.Chi_Eng.640X360-YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open Yale course：Financial Markets.03.Chi_Eng.640X360-YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.04.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.05.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.06.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.07.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.08.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.09.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb 耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场.Open.Yale.course： Financial.Markets.10.Chi_Eng.640X360YYeTs人人影视制作.rmvb

耶鲁金融市场第7课

美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记7耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。

共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。

[第7课] 行为金融学：心理的作用（时长1小时5分）本课主题是行为金融学（Behavioral Finance）。

这一术语大约在20世纪90年代中期才出现在公众视野，此前并不为人所知。

而“有效市场”这一术语就老得多了，前面介绍过是在19世纪提出的。

行为金融学这一术语是20世纪60年代提出的。

行为金融学是金融领域一场新兴的革命，希勒教授在这方面参与颇多，他从1991年开始，与芝加哥大学的查德.塞勒（Richard Thaler）教授一起，组织关于行为金融学的研讨会，已经坚持举办了18年，时间挺长的了（笑）。

刚开始时，完全不为人们所重视，他们想过，没人欣赏我们，而希勒是终身教授，所以就能一直研究。

但是，问题在于，谁都不愿意去研究过于冷门的领域，幸运的是，我们具有允许这样做的体系，这是令人欣喜之处。

行为金融学是人们对于在有效市场理论中、或在数理金融学中极端情况的反应。

希勒认为数理金融学是一门精美结构的学科，他很钦佩这方面学者的成就，他也曾参与过。

但是，数理金融学具有其局限性，人们都知道一种范式发展的途径，当发展到一定阶段，都会出现这种情况。

在20世纪60年代，数理金融学是门新学科，充满着令人振奋的事情，没有人再想研究其他的情况，人们都要去做令人振奋的事。

当到了70年代和80年代，在这方面有点过了头，人们跑得太远了，他们以为这就是人类所要的一切，不需要再考虑其他事情了。

随后便时常显得有点疯狂。

然而，我们必须反思，其实一切不尽完美（笑），世界并不完美（笑），世上存在着真实的人。

所以，就引申出行为金融学。

行为金融学指的是什么呢？它不同于行为心理学，也不是意味着将行为心理学应用于金融学，其实际含义要广泛得多。

行为金融学意味着是将所有的其他社会科学应用于金融学。

耶鲁大学《金融市场》

耶鲁公开课：金融市场lecture 1Endeavor努力Fundamentala.基本的，根本的n.基本原理fundament n.基础，臀部Vocational职业的，行业的Underpinning / underpinning of sth基础，…的基础Be on leave休假Divide /divide up把…分开Separate分开Self-contained独立的，自足的Mathematics数学Subsequent后来的，随后的Turn sb off 倒胃口，使生气In a minute马上Get through 打通电话，到达，完成，通过Back down 放弃，让步Prominent突出的，显著的，卓越的Drop out 退出，退学In the sense 就…意义而言Reserven/v储存，储备Faculty 学校中的全体教师，教员，科，系，能力Optional可选择的n.选修科目Reasonably 合理地，适当地，恰当地Intellect才智，智力，才华Assign 指定，指派，分配Ever since 从当时到现在Shelve 搁置，放置Perennial 永久的，常年的，长期的，四季不断的perennial classic Emphasize强调Thesis 论文treatise 专著Readable易读的Distinction 区别，差别；荣誉Poll调查，问卷调查Irrational exuberance 非理性繁荣Boom vi/vt繁荣，兴旺Bust v 破碎，爆裂，破产Refer to指的是Housing market 房地产市场Chain store连锁店Shut down 关闭Grade成绩Incorporate 吸收，合并，包含Behavioral finance 行为金融学Avant-garde 先锋，先驱Unity团结，一致，联合Subprime crisis 次贷危机subprime 次级的Default n.违约，缺席，缺乏v.拖欠，不到场，不履行Ramification n.分流，分叉，分支，衍生物Financial instrument 金融工具Virtually adv.几乎，实质上Financial community 金融界Financial consultant 金融顾问=financial counselor ，financial adviser金融从业人员---29：30---Less developed country 发展中国家Emerge v.摆脱，浮现，出现Nonetheless 尽管如此，但是Longstanding 长期存在的Contempt n.轻视，藐视despise v.轻视，藐视Human capital 人力资本Hostility n.敌意，敌对情绪Jealousy n.嫉妒Show off 炫耀，卖弄Servant 仆人，雇工livery n.制服Social class社会地位，社会阶层Skull and bones 骷髅会（Yale著名学生会）Initiator 发起人，倡导者Led to=lead to 引起，导致Philosopher 哲学家Poverty 贫穷Philanthropy慈善，慈善事业Endowment n. 捐赠，捐款，（基金）Slightly adv.轻微地，些微地Physical plant 硬件设施，实业Foundation= fund 基金Mutual fund 互惠基金Hedge fund 对冲基金Portfolio n.（证券）投资组合Syllabus 教学大纲Perspective n.观点，透视，透视图Incidentally adv.顺便提及，附带地Delineate v. 描述，描绘Outline n.轮廓，大纲，概要Underlie vt.成为…的基础，在…之下Insurance n.保险学，保险业Reduce 减少reduced a.减少的Statistics n.统计学，统计Probability theory n.概率论Game theory 博弈论Variance 方差covariance 协方差Correlation n.[数]相关系数，相互关系Dramatic a.引人注目的，激动人心的Progress 进步Process 过程In the abstract 理论上地，概括地，抽象地Hypothetical a.假设的，假想的Patent vt/a/n. 专利，专利权，专利的，授予/取得…专利权Diversification n.多样化，多元化Capital asset n.资本资产，固定资产Security market 证券市场Theorem n.定律βcoefficient β系数coefficient系数policyholder n.投保人，保险客户assemble v.集合，装配，聚集efficient market theory 有效市场假设exhilarate vt.是高兴，使振奋，使愉快sth ~ sb /sb be ~ed by sth interact v. 互相影响，互相作用prospect theory 前景理论oversight of markets 市场监督so-called a.号称的，所谓的self-regulatory organization 自律组织high-minded a.高尚的onerous a.繁重的，负有义务的，艰巨的bond market=debt market 债券市场maturity n.到期perpetuities n.永续年金，终身年金perpetual a.永恒的expiration n.终期，期满fluctuate v.波动，摇摆，动摇term 学期，期限interest rate 利率interest 利息currency 货币；通货episode n.有趣的时间，一段情节，插话ambiguity n.含糊，模棱两可的话，不明确，暧昧real estate n.不动产，房地产speculative a.投机的speculator n. 投机商money multiplier货币乘数monetary policy 货币政策stabilize v.稳定，使稳定commercial bank 商业银行deposit存款loan 贷款investment bank 投资银行underwrite v.承购包销money manager 短期资本经营者competitive 充满竞争的brokerages n.经纪人业务brokerage n. 佣金futures market 期货市场futures期货forward market 远期市场Variable n. 变量a.可变的，变量的，多变的，易变的Options market 期权市场Typically adv.往往，代表性地typical a.典型的，特有的，象征性的Esoteric a.难懂的，限于圈内人的，秘传的Sophisticated a.复杂的，精细的，精明的，高级的Mortgage vt.抵押n.抵押按揭Exploitation n.利用，开发，开采Hazard n.危险，冒险vt.赌运气，冒…危险。

耶鲁开放课程金融市场

Securities and Exchange Commission
Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money, 1914 was intellectual origin. Disclosure Blue Sky Laws of Progressive Era 1920s were period of much fraud, manipulation. SEC part of Roosevelt’s New Deal, 1934. Initially viewed by business as a radical, almost socialist, institution. Peculiar that it started in US, imitated by other countries.
Emulex Corporation
Mark S. Jacob, 23, had shorted stock of his former employer, stood to lose money Sent fake news release to Internet wire, was picked up by Bloomberg, Dow Jones News Wire and CNBC. He immediately covered. FBI, using Internet Protocol Numbers, tracked down initial news to El Camino Community College library. Police questioned librarians, and eventually tracked him down.
1896 Thomas Sperry & Shelly Hutchinson started first trading stamp business. Zero interest bonds. 1913 Two members of the Beinecke family, who had married into Sperry family, bought the company. Beinecke Library. In 1950s, S&H discovered stamps were better received if paid in merchandise, rather than cash. By 1956, almost half US households were pasting stamps into books.

哈佛金融学书单

哈佛金融学书单标题：哈佛金融学书单哈佛金融学书单是一份为金融学爱好者和学习者准备的书单，涵盖了广泛的金融学领域，旨在帮助读者深入了解金融市场和金融理论。

以下是一份精选的哈佛金融学书单，供大家参考。

1.《金融市场的随机过程》-Robert J.Elliott和Lakhdar Aggoun本书介绍了金融市场的随机过程理论及其应用，为读者提供了深入了解金融市场波动性和风险管理的基础知识。

2.《金融衍生品与风险管理》-Robert L.McDonald该书详细介绍了金融衍生品的基本概念、定价模型和风险管理策略，对金融工程领域的学习者和从业者都具有重要意义。

3.《金融市场分析与策略》-Frank J.Fabozzi这本书提供了分析和评估金融市场的方法和工具，包括技术分析、基本分析和定量分析等。

它帮助读者了解金融市场的运作和投资决策。

4.《金融学基础》-Eugene F.Brigham和Joel F.Houston该书是金融学入门的经典教材，介绍了金融学的基本概念、理论和实践。

它涵盖了投资、融资、资本市场和企业金融等重要内容。

5.《金融市场、机构与工具》-Frank J.Fabozzi和Franco Modigliani本书详细介绍了金融市场的运作机制、金融机构的角色和金融工具的特点。

它对于理解金融市场的结构和功能非常有帮助。

6.《金融风险管理》-Steve L.Allen该书系统地介绍了金融风险管理的各个方面，包括市场风险、信用风险、操作风险和战略风险等。

它为读者提供了有效管理金融风险的方法和工具。

7.《金融市场与机构》-Frederic S.Mishkin和Stanley G. Eakins这本书介绍了金融市场和金融机构的运作机制和关系，对理解金融系统的结构和功能非常有帮助。

8.《金融学》-Stephen A.Ross、Randolph W.Westerfield和Jeffrey Jaffe该书是金融学领域的经典教材，涵盖了投资、融资、资本市场和金融管理等重要内容，对金融学的学习者和从业者都具有重要价值。

耶鲁大学：金融市场__课程文字内容

关于这门课程金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。

它们为投资活动提供支持及风险管理。

如果我们想要预测金融机构动态，及他们在这个信息时代中的发展态势，我们必须对其业务有所了解。

本课程将涉及的内容有：金融学理论、金融业的发展历程、金融机构（例如银行、保险公司、证券公司、期货公司及其他衍生市场）的优势与缺陷，以及这些机构的未来发展前景。

检视课程表>>课程结构：本课程每讲75分钟，一周两次，在2008年春季录制并收入耶鲁大学开放式课程系列。

关于Robert Shiller 教授Robert J. Shiller是Yale大学Arthur M. Okun经济学讲座教授和Yale大学管理学院国际金融中心研究员。

Shiller教授的研究领域包括行为金融学和房地产，并在《金融经济学杂志》、《美国经济评论》、《金融学杂志》、《华尔街杂志》和《金融时报》等著名刊物发表文章。

主要著作包括《市场波动》、《宏观市场》(凭借此书他获得了TIAA-CREF的保罗A. 萨缪尔森奖),《非理性繁荣和金融新秩序：二十一世纪的风险》。

影片请按此下载阅读中文字幕纯文字版本讲座1–金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用第一讲概述：Shiller教授概述了金融市场这门课的内容，包括行政细节，及每堂课所讨论的主题。

他简要地论述了学习金融学和每个关键主题的重要性。

讲座主题包括：行为金融学、金融技术、金融工具、商业银行、投资银行、金融市场和金融机构、房地产、金融监管、货币政策及金融民主化。

阅读作业：弗兰克·法博齐等人着，《金融市场与机构通论》，第一章（1-11页）和第二章罗伯特·希勒着，《非理性繁荣》，前言和第一章资源：PowerPoint 幻灯片－第一讲[PDF]讲座1–金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用2008年1月14日Robert Shiller教授：这是经济类252号课程，金融市场。

我是罗伯特•希勒。

课程伊始，先介绍下课程助教，我把他们的简历展示在这里。

耶鲁-Robert Shiller-金融市场-Lect01 Intro

Finance and Psychology
• The Behavioral Finance Revolution • NBER-Sage Seminars on Behavioral Finance, with Richard Thaler, starting 1991 /~shiller • A Revolution in the finance profession. But not everyone has been captured by it.
Lecture 2: The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and Hedging of Risk
Lecture 3: Technology and Invention in Finance
• Financial institutions are inventions as much as engines are • Once discovered, inventions copied around the world • Relation to new information technology • Evolving role of patent law
Finance and Management
• Most central discipline for managers is finance • Integration into all aspects of business management, including accounting, corporate strategy, industrial organization • Integration into government finance as well • Integration growing through time

耶鲁公开课笔记之二

美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记1耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。

共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。

[第1课] 金融和保险在经济和社会中的强大作用（时长1小时14分）希勒教授上来就通报自己姓氏，随即介绍本课程的5位助教，都是来自世界各地的博士生，希望由此能有助于本课程的国际化视角，因为金融行业关系到世界各个国家，并不是仅仅局限于美国国内。

这5名助教分别来自巴基斯坦、美国（印度人）、加纳、中国（2位女生），都在作着不同的经济学题目。

希勒教这门课已经20多年了，他很为自己的毕业生而骄傲，很多毕业生都在金融领域工作。

希勒常出去做讲座，当在华尔街或世界其他地方讲座时，他就会问到，“你们有谁上过我的课吗？”有时会有一、两个人举手，说上过他所教的经济学252号课程，希勒就非常高兴。

希勒同时调侃到，他也为那些上过他的课，但没在金融领域工作的毕业生自豪。

希勒认为，《金融市场》这门课，不仅是为立志从事金融业的学生所开设，因为金融是一门很重要的技术（important technology），要理解现实世界发生了什么，了解金融知识是很重要的，因为人类的任何行为都与金融有关。

“我想做个诗人，跟金融有关吗？”希勒举例说明，“作为一个诗人，你想发表诗作，就得和出版商谈谈，他们会说自己的财务状况，看你是否适合在他们公司出版，”这就理所当然地与金融有联系啦，这是非常重要的。

《金融市场》这门课不是为就业所设计的课程，并不集中探讨业务知识，而是一门关于事件实际运作的智慧课程（an intellectual course about how things really work）。

希勒认为金融是所有发生诸多事件的基础，是蕴含在各种现象之中的一股强大力量。

他希望能通过本课程将其描绘出来（I hope we can draw that out in this course）。

耶鲁金融市场第6课

美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记6耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。

共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。

[第6课] 有效市场与过度波动之争（时长1小时8分）本课主题是有效市场假说（Efficient Markets Hypothesis）。

上节课讲的是保险业，介绍了保险的理论、保险业历年来怎样演进的、是如何产生出一些实际的好处。

希勒在讲课时，尽力将这些内容结合已经发生或将要发生的形成重大事件的保险业亮点来讲述，由此指出保险机构的优势和弱点。

几年前，新奥尔良经历了一场严重的飓风，这场称为卡特里娜的飓风狂袭了这座城市，（希勒在开始讲的是洛杉矶，在意识到说错之后，笑着说，当我说得明显错的时候，你们要制止我呀，我的大脑有时也会失误的，呵呵~~，应该是新奥尔良，据我所知，洛杉矶是不会担心飓风的~~呵呵~~，除非气候剧变啦~~。

）在新奥尔良，卡特里娜飓风摧毁了城市周围的堤坝，造成洪水进城。

主要是什么救助了城市的人们呢？应该说，就是保险机构。

由于城市受到严重损坏，而房屋基本都有保险。

每当这种巨大的灾难降临，就会产生一些争议，一些人有风暴险，一些人有水灾险，这就成为难题，即灾难是风暴还是水灾？（笑）因为风暴引起了水灾，那么，如果只有风暴险，能包括在内吗？随后引发了大量的争吵和辩论。

然而，实际运作挺好的。

在灾难过后，客户满意度调查表明，总体而言，人们对所选择的保险公司是满意的，当然，也有不满意的，就是那些没有包括在内的人们。

但对于整体来说，实际运作良好。

在上节课中，还有一个内容，就是随着金融进步的持续发展，保险与风险管理的其他形式就会变得几无区别。

正在发生着一件非常有意思的事，就是我们开始看到，已经有了另外一种（避险）机制，称为巨灾债券（Catastrophe Bond）。

这是人们应对巨大灾难保护自己的另一种方式，而这不是保险。