[耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场].Lecture.14
《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)课程目录及下载地址(不断更新中)
《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)简介★小羊羊村长★大学开发课程粉丝Q群：122798308课程类型：金融课程简介：金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。
它们为投资活动提供支持及风险管理。
如果我们想要预测金融机构动态及他们在这个信息时代中的发展态势，我们必须对其业务有所了解。
本课程将涉及的内容有：金融学理论、金融业的发展历程、金融机构（例如银行、保险公司、证券公司、期货公司及其他衍生市场）的优势与缺陷以及这些机构的未来发展前景。
课程结构：本课程每讲75分钟，一周两次，在2008年春季录制并收入耶鲁大学公开课程系列。
关于教授罗伯特希勒Robert J. Shiller是Yale大学Arthur M. Okun经济学讲座教授和Yale大学管理学院国际金融中心研究员. Shiller教授的研究领域包括行为金融学和房地产，并在“金融经济学杂志”,“美国经济评论”,“金融学杂志”,“华尔街杂志”和“金融时报”等著名刊物发表文章. 主要著作包括“市场波动”,“宏观市场”(凭借此书他获得了TIAA-CREF的保罗 A. 萨缪尔森奖),“非理性繁荣和金融新秩序：二十一世纪的风险”Robert J. Shiller is Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University and a Fellow at the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management. Specializing in behavioral finance and real estate, Professor Shiller has published in Journal of Financial Economics, American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times. His books include Market V olatility, Macro Markets (for which he won the TIAA-CREF's Paul A. Samuelson Award), Irrational Exuberance and The New Financial Order: Risk in the Twenty-First Century.目录:1.Finance and Insurance as Powerful Forces in Our Economy and Society金融和保险在我们经济和社会中的强大作用2. The Universal Principle of Risk Management: Pooling and the Hedging of Risks风险管理中的普遍原理:风险聚集和对冲3. Technology and Invention in Finance金融中的科技与发明4. Portfolio Diversification and Supporting Financial Institutions (CAPM Model)投资组合多元化和辅助性的金融机构(资本资产定价模型)5. Insurance: The Archetypal Risk Management Institution保险:典型的风险管理制度6. Efficient Markets vs. Excess V olatility有效市场与过度波动之争7. Behavioral Finance: The Role of Psychology行为金融学:心理的作用8. Human Foibles, Fraud, Manipulation, and Regulation 人性弱点,欺诈,操纵与管制9. Guest Lecture by David Swensen大卫•斯文森的客座演讲10. Debt Markets: Term Structure债券市场:期限结构11. Stocks股票12. Real Estate Finance and Its Vulnerability to Crisis 房地产金融和其易受危机影响的脆弱性13. Banking: Successes and Failures银行业:成功和失败14. Guest Lecture by Andrew Redleaf安德鲁•雷德利夫的客座演讲15. Guest Lecture by Carl Icahn卡尔•伊坎的客座演讲16. The Evolution and Perfection of Monetary Policy货币政策的进化和完善17. Investment Banking and Secondary Markets投资银行和二级市场18. Professional Money Managers and Their Influence金融市场翻译团队介绍友情奉献世界顶级大学开放课程的博客/。
耶鲁大学开放性课程金融市场
金融市场：第一讲2008年1月14日罗伯特.希勒教授：这是经济学系课程编号为252的金融市场课程，我是鲍勃.希勒，首先，请允许我以介绍这门课的教学研究员。
我们现有5名教研人员，来自世界各地。
我将把他们的照片张贴在这里以便你们知道他们是谁。
教学研究员们非常国际化，这反应了我把这门课也教得国际化的意图，这是因为当今经济学是全世界的课题，而非美国独有，所以我们的教学目标涵盖了全世界（的金融状况）。
奥斯曼.阿里来自巴基斯坦的拉合尔，他毕业于拉合尔大学管理科学系，他现在是经济学博士研究生，在做股票分析推荐和股票市场回报关系的博士论文，他同时对行为金融学，即心理学在金融学中的应用很感兴趣。
第二位助教，我看见他在那边，（对助教说）如果可以请举下手，桑托什.阿纳戈尔(Santos h Anagol),美国的一名议员，同时，他跟印度有很好的联系。
事实上他已经在美国经济评论上发表了一篇关于加纳资本回报的论文。
他与当地经济部门主席，克里斯.尤迪(Chris Ud ry)。
他花了很多时间调查乡村经济。
你过去在分发母牛，对么？学生：不，我仍在做跟母牛有关的工作，但我并不负责分发母牛。
罗伯特.希勒教授：好吧，这是本门课程中最后一次你们听到关于母牛的话题。
这个想法是给村民分发母牛然后观察产出。
在某些贫困地区得到一头母牛生活将得到很大的改善。
克里斯坦.阿武库布杜（Christian AwukuBudu）来自加纳的阿卡拉(Accra),但他是在美国的莫尔豪斯学院上的大学，他也是耶鲁大学经济学的博士研究生，在做发展中国家金融市场的研究。
段雅心（Yaxin Duan）来自中国，她从南京大学获得硕士学位，错了？你来自南京，我的资料搞错了么？你从哪所学院毕业的？好吧，很抱歉我搞错了。
她也是耶鲁大学经济学博士研究生，在做期权价格行为学中被称为“期权微笑”的现象，正如她现在对我微笑一样。
她同时对行为金融学感兴趣，对我来说很很重要，因为这也是我的兴趣之一。
耶鲁大学开放课程
耶鲁大学开放课程1。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：聆听音乐》(Open Yale course：Listening to Music)[YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2832525/2。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：基础物理》(Open Yale course：Fundamentals ofPhysics)[YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2834907/3。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：生物医学工程探索》(Open Yale course：Frontiers of Biomedical Engineering) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2834278/4。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：1871年后的法国》(Open Yale course：France Since 1871) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2835256/5。
《耶鲁大学开放课程—哲学：死亡》(Open Yale course—Philosophy：Death) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2824902/6。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场》(Open Yale course：Financial Markets)[YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2830134/7。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：心理学导论》(Open Yale course：Introduction to Psychology) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2827597/8。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：博弈论》(Open Yale course：Game Theory)[YYeTs人人影视出品] [中英双语字幕]/topics/2832107/9。
《耶鲁大学开放课程：1648-1945年的欧洲文明》(Open Yale course：European Civiliza tion,1648-1945) [YYeTs人人影视出品][中英双语字幕]/topics/2832611/10。
金融市场学Chapter_14
（二）行为金融学的研究方法 实验室研究 划分实证研究和规范研究的新视角 （三）行为金融学的发展趋势 行为金融学的一个重要发展方向是，将现行的 理论模型合并为一个较为完整的理论体系，并 能够获得实践的检验。 一些学者们开始意识到把行为金融理论与现代 金融理论完全对立起来是没有意义的，应该将 两者结合起来。这是行为金融理论的另一个重 要的发展方向。
根据行为金融学家泰勒 (Thaler) 的观点，包括 行为金融学在内的金融学研究将会出现下述趋 势： 经济模型中关于经济人的假设将有所变化。 经济学家将研究人类认知。 经济人将会更加情绪化。
第四节 随机贴现因子模型
2001年科克伦 (J.M.Cochrane) 出版《资产定价》 (Asset Pricing)一书，这本书在更高的层次上建 立起以随机贴现因子为核心的适用于信息经济 学和行为经济学的资产定价理论。
一、一个简单的资产定价模型：基于 消费的模型
假设一个投资者今天买了一只股票，则在t+1 时刻他的回报等于t+1时刻的股票价格加上当 时的红利，即
xt 1 pt 1 dt 1
由于投资者并不知道他在未来的回报是多少， 他只能猜测各种可能结果的概率，所以xt 1是个 随机变量。
假设该投资者的效用函数由今天(用t表示)和未 来(用t+1表示)的消费决定：
一、1969年至1980年的主要发展
连续时间金融模型在期权定价领域的应用： BS期权定价模型的一个基本假定：标的证券 价格的运动是连续变化的，遵循一种带漂移的 几何布朗运动：
dSt dt dWt St
BS模型是在严格的假设下提出的：股票价格 服从对数正态分布，股票收益的方差是常数； 股票不分红；买卖股票和期权没有交易费用等 等。
耶鲁大学开放课程：金融市场2风险管理中的普遍原理风险聚集和对冲
今天我想... 今天这堂课的主题是风险管理的普遍原则: 风险汇聚和风险对冲, 今天我要教授的知识,我认为是金融理论中最基本最核心的概念,我想先说说这个, 就是概率论,以及通过风险汇聚来分摊风险, 这一极具智慧的概念, 诞生于某一特定历史时期, 并且应用广泛, 金融是其一, 对于部分人来说,这堂课相对于我其他的课程较为专业,而且不巧的是, 这门课在学期伊始就开始了,对于已经,学过概率和统计的同学来说,这堂课就没什么新鲜的了, 当然那是从数学角度来说的, 但概率论是个新知识, 其他的我想告诉你们不必..., 如果你还在挑选课程..., 昨天有个学生来问我, 他的数学有点荒废了, 他该不该选这门课,我说如果你能听懂明天的课,也就是今天这课, 那你不会有问题的我想从概率的概念开始讲起,你们知道什么是概率吗,我们举个实例吧好吗, 今年的股票市场,会走高的概率是多少, 我会说我个人猜想的概率是0.45, 那是因为我对股市持悲观态度但,你们知道那是什么意思吗?, 就是股票市场会走高的可能性是45%,剩下的55%,市场会走平或者走低,那就是概率, 现在你们觉得这个概念似曾相识了吧,如果有人提到概率是0.55 或者0.45, 你就知道他说的是什么意思了, 我想说概率的表述并非一贯如此,这个概念成型于十七世纪，那时概率被第一次提出，伊恩•哈金为概率论追根溯源，他查遍世界所有关于概率的文献, 发现无法追溯到十七世纪以前, 也就是说十七世纪中, 诞生了一次智慧的飞跃, 用概率来表述成了件很时髦的事，引用概率的这种表述方式很快传遍世界，但这... 很有意思的是，如此简单的方式此前从未被使用过，哈金指出概率这个词或者说可能已经存在于英语中事实上莎士比亚用过，但你知道它代表什么吗他举了一个年轻小姐的例子，一位小姐描述她喜欢的男子她说道，我太喜欢他了我觉得他有很大可能，你们觉得她是什么意思有人能回答吗，有擅长近代英语的同学能回答我吗，什么是一个"很可能"的年轻男子，我在征求回答，好像没人知道，有人敢猜一下吗，没人想试试吗是不是说他生殖能力旺盛，你是说他" 精"力旺盛吗，我想她不是那个意思但也有可能，不是的她的意思显然是" 值得信赖"，我想那是为人的重要品质，所以如果有什么是很可能的，说的是你可以信赖它，也就是说这里的可能性等于可信赖度，所以你可以清楚地了解到，概率是如何由那个定义，转变为今天的定义的，但是这位优秀的历史学家伊恩•哈金认为，一定有人在更早时候就用过概率这个概念，即便他们没有用数字来表述，但他们一定有过类似的想法他遍览全球文献，试图寻找这个词在十七世纪前的使用证据，并且总结说很可能有许多人，有过相同的想法但没有公开阐述过，并且从未成文发表过，他说部分原因是纵观人类历史，赌博曾风靡一时而概率论，对于一个赌徒来说是大有裨益的，哈金相信历史上有很多赌博理论家，曾多次构想了概率论，但从来没有记录下来并且恐为人知，他举了个例子... 我想要...，他举了一本书上的例子，或者说是本作品集，有谁知道这本作品集吗，这是本用梵文编著的史诗作品集，可以追溯到...，事实上这本作品的创作时间历时近千年，最终完稿于公元四世纪，有那么一个故事，在摩诃婆罗多一书中有篇长故事，有关一个名叫那勒的国王，他有个妻子叫妲玛言狄，他是个非常纯洁善良的人，有个名叫迦梨的恶魔很讨厌那勒，并且想使他一蹶不振，所以他必须要找到那勒的弱点，他最终得逞，尽管那勒是那么地纯洁和完美，迦梨还是找到了一个弱点那就是赌博，那勒无法抵挡赌博的魅力，所以恶魔就诱使他痴迷赌博，你们知道有时你输了就会把赌注加倍，并且总想把失去的都赢回来，在赌性的驱使下，那勒最终押上了他的整个王国并输了赌局，这是个很可怕的故事，那勒不得不离开王国和他的妻子，他们被流放数年，而他又在流亡中与妻子走散，他们在森林里流浪那勒陷入绝望，他失去了一切，但后来他遇到一个名叫...，我们说到过谁，有那勒他遇到的这个人叫睿都巴若那，这就到了讲概率论的时候了，睿都巴若那对那勒说他了解赌博术，并且会传授给那勒，但只能是口耳相传,因为这是一个秘密,那勒心存怀疑,睿都巴若那怎么会知道如何赌博, 所以睿都巴若那就试图证明自己的能力,他说看那边的树,我只需数一根枝杈上的叶子, 就能估算出树上叶子的总数,睿都巴若那查看了一根树枝, 然后估算了一个总数,但是那勒仍然心存怀疑, 他彻夜未眠数了树上的每一片叶子,发现结果和睿都巴若那所言相差无几, 所以他在... 第二天早晨..., 相信了睿都巴若那, 哈金说这很有趣, 抽样理论是那勒所学知识的一部分, 你不必数树上所有的叶子, 你可以抽样然后计数再相乘即可, 不管怎样在故事结尾那勒回去了我们知道他已经掌握了概率论的知识,他回到祖国并且再次求赌, 但除了妻子他别无赌资,所以他以她作赌注, 不过要记住现在他知道自己在做什么, 所以他并不是真的要拿妻子来冒险, 他真的是个很纯洁并且值得尊敬的人, 于是他赢回了整个王国故事就此结束不管怎样这个故事表明概率论, 确实有很悠久的历史但,那时它并非以学科形式存在, 也没有对金融理论的产生有过指导意义, 若没有理论基础支撑, 你就无法做到思维缜密, 所以直到十七世纪概率论, 才被记录下来形成理论, 并且在那个世纪里诞生了, 金融和保险的雏形, 例如在十七世纪时, 人们开始制作寿命表,什么是寿命表, 这个图表反映了两性在不同年龄段中, 死亡的概率,如果你想从事人寿保险,你必须对它有所了解,他们开始收集死亡率的数据并且发展出精算学,用来估算人在各年龄段死亡的概率, 那便是保险诞生的基础,事实上从某种意义来说,保险业可以追溯到古罗马, 在古罗马时期有种东西叫丧葬险,你可以买份保单能使你避免, 因家庭贫困而无钱供你死后下葬, 在古文明时期, 人们很重视死后能否安然入葬, 所以那是个很有意思的想法,人们在古罗马时期销售丧葬险, 你可能会想为什么只有丧葬险为什么不发展成全面的人寿险呢, 你可能有些疑惑, 我想可能是因为, 当时的人们并没有理论体系的支撑,在文艺复兴时期的意大利人们开始编写保单, 我看过其中一份, 刊登在《风险和保险杂志》上, 他们翻译了一份文艺复兴时期的保单, 但是很难理解那份保单到底想说什么, 我猜当时并没有专业的词汇他们未能..., 他们有想法却无法表述, 所以我认为那只是保险业的雏形,我认为是概率论的诞生,真正促生了保险业那也是为什么, 我认为理论对于金融来说非常重要, 有些人将火险的历史追溯到,1666 年的伦敦火灾, 大火几乎烧毁了整座城市紧随着那场伦敦大火, 火险订单的数量激增, 但是你也许会疑惑, 对于阐述火险来说这是不是个好例子,因为如果整个城市被烧毁,那么保险公司就会破产对吧,伦敦的保险公司之所以开展火险,是因为整个保险理念,就是将独立事件发生的风险汇聚起来, 不过那只是个开始, 不管怎么说我们得承认, 保险起步缓慢因为..., 我相信是因为..., 人们无法理解概率的概念,他们脑海里没有这个概念,这有多方面的原因, 为了理解概率,你要把事件想象成是随机发生的,但人们没有那样, 清晰直观的认识,他们也许觉得我可以通过意愿或者许愿,来影响事件的发展也许..., 我说不定有神力相助, 如此概率这个概念就有些模棱两可了, 即便如今人们似乎仍然无法理解概率, 从直觉上来说他们并不真的认为, 概率是客观的, 比如说如果你问人们, 他们愿意出多少钱去赌掷硬币, 如果他们可以掷硬币, 或在硬币还没被掷出前, 他们会下更大的注,但也许硬币已经被掷出且藏了起来, 为什么会那样呢这可能是因为,人们有种直觉觉得我能..., 也许是... 我有种魔力,我能改变事物, 而概率论的观点是, 不你无法改变事物, 世间万物遵循客观的概率,它们即是定律, 世上的大多数语言, 对运气和风险或者说运气和机遇都有另一种表达方式,运气像是可以用来描述一个人, 好比我是个幸运的人我不知道那是什么意思..., 是说上帝或者众神眷顾我所以我很幸运, 或者说这是我的幸运日, 概率论实在与此无关. 于是我们有了一门精确严谨的学科作为工具.现在我要讨论一些概率论上的术语. 对你们一些人来说这是个回顾. 但这是我们之后课上一直要用的知识. 所以我会用字母P.或者Prob来表示概率.概率一定是一个在0和1之间的数字.或者说0%和1 0 0%之间. Percent 在拉丁语里就是除以100 的意思.所以100 Percent 就等于1.如果概率等于0 就意味着事件不会发生. 如果概率等于 1 就意味着一定会发生. 如果概率是... 大家都能看清黑板吗.不知道这黑板能不能移一下. 看来能移现在看得见了吗.你的位置最不好了但你也能看见吧. 这是概率论中最基本的概念. 概率论中最基本的一个原则. 就是独立性的概念. 概率是用来描述某一结果发生的可能性. 比方说某一试验的结果比如抛硬币.如果你抛一枚硬币, 正面向上的概率一定是50%,因为正反哪一面向上的可能性是相同的, 独立试验的概念就意味着每一个试验, 和其他试验的结果没有关系, 如果你抛两次硬币,第一次的结果并不影响第二次的结果, 所以我们说他们是相互独立的, 这两次试验没有关系, 概率论的最基本的原则, 有一条叫乘法原理, 意思是几个相互独立的事件, 其中两个事件同时发生的概率, 等于他们分别发生的概率的乘积，用Prob(A and B)=Prob(A)*Prob(B)表示，如果A和B不独立这个式子就不成立, 保险理论就是在理想状态下, 保险公司为独立事件承保, 理想状态下人寿保险或者是火灾险，承保的对象都是独立事件，伦敦大火的例子不在讨论范围，有时候会出现这种问题，一个人把自己家里的油灯弄翻了，然后把自己的房子点着了，由于火灾是独立事件，他的房子着火了并不会烧毁别人的房子，在这样的假设下整个城市都被烧掉的概率，是非常非常小的，简单的说A和B和C同时发生的概率，等于A发生的概率乘以B发生的概率，乘以C发生的概率以此类推，如果一栋房子着火的概率是千分之一，然后假设有1000栋房子，那么这一千栋房子全都着火被烧掉的概率，就等于千分之一的一千次方基本上就是0了，所以如果保险公司，卖了很多保单出去，他们基本上就没有什么风险了，刚才讲的就是最基本的概念，可能看起来比较简单明显，但这些概念刚出现时并不被广泛理解，顺便说一句我们有一套习题，我希望你你们从今天就开始做，不要求下个礼拜交，因为马丁•路德•金日要放假，等放完假后的礼拜一交，如果继续往下看，在概率论里有一个基本的概念，叫做二项分布，我不想在二项分布上花太多时间，二项分布给出了在N次试验中成功X次的概率，在刚才保险的例子中，如果你为某一事件保险，在N次试验中发生X次意外的概率就服从二项分布，二项分布，通过X 的函数给出概率，公式是，P 代表某一事件发生的概率，，这就是当保险公司需要评估一系列的独立事件中一定数量的独立事件，发生的可能性时使用的公式，保险公司都会担心太多事故同时发生，这样的话保险公司可能就会赔个精光，保险公司一般都有准备金，准备金的数量一般保持在，刚刚够赔偿一定数量的保单，保险公司就可以用二项分布公式，来计算特定数目事故发生的概率，二项分布的介绍到此为止，我不准备拓展这一部分，毕竟这节课不是概率论，但我希望你们能记住这个公式，并且学会应用，有没有不清楚的地方，你们能看见我写的字吗，概率论中另外一个常用的重要的概念是期望值或者也叫均值，，这两个概念可以互换，，们可以用期望值，或者是平均值［译注:两个词均翻译成平均值，我们有几种不同的方式去定义这个概念，取决于我们指的是样本均值还是总体均值，最基本的定义，某一个随机变量X 的期望值E(x)，我应该提到过，随机变量是一个可以取值的数，如果你有一个试验，这个试验的结果是一个数，那么相对应的随机变量，指的就是这个试验结果所对应的那个数，比方说抛硬币的试验，我将正面向上的结果对应数字1，反面向上的结果对应数字0，这样我就定义了一个随机变量，就像刚定义的是一个离散型随机变量，随机变量还可以有无限种取值，也就是连续型随机变量，随机变量可以取某一区间的一切值，比方说做这样一个试验，将两种化学试剂混合然后测定反应温度，顺便说一下温度计也是十七世纪的发明，那时候的人才刚刚开始理解温度的概念，虽然对我们来说这是个很自然的概念，，但在十七世纪确实是个新玩意，扯远了但温度是连续的对吧，把两种试剂混合的时候温度可以取任何值，，温度的取值有无数种可能，也就是说是连续的，对于离散的随机变量可以这样定义期望值，这是希腊字母，对每个变量的值Xi和对应概率的乘积，求和”对于这个随机变量X，可能的取值个数是无限的，在抛硬币的例子里只有两个取值，但是一般都会有无限个可能值，但随机变量是离散的话，我们可以把所有的可能值列出来，然后算出加权平均值，这个加权平均值就是期望值，也可以叫做平均值，但注意这个公式是基于概率论的，这些数值是概率，必须知道真实的概率值是多少，对与连续分布的随机变量，还有另外一个适用的公式，两个公式的思想是一样的，都可以用卩x表示不过是一个积分，积分下限是负无穷，上限是正无穷然后对f(x)*x 积分,, 其实这两个式子是一样的, 因为积分也就是另一种形式的求和,, 这是两种对总体的定义,F(x)是x 的连续型随机变量的概率分布和离散型随机变量的分布不同的是，连续型随机变量的分布中，某一点的概率值始终是零，温度恰好是整100 摄氏度的概率是零，因为还可以是100.0001 等等无数个值，所以有无限种可能性，所以我们用概率密度的概念来描述，连续型随机变量的情况，对于本门课程来说你不必，对刚才讲的概率的知识有很深入的了解，我只想介绍一些概率论的基本概念，这些是用来度量总体的变量，因为他们对应的是总体中所有的结果，度量的是所有事件的概率，这些是真实的值但同时也有样本均值，如果你... 像数叶子的睿都巴若那一样，只有部分样本的话你可以来估计总体均值，总体均值一般写作X 拔，如果你有n个观测值，对Xi从i=1到n求和再除以n,能看懂这个公式吧，你数了n片叶子… 不对, 一共有n根树枝，你数了叶子的数量然后把他们加起来，这个1是指我好像把这个式子，和睿都巴若那的故事弄混了，但你们应该懂我的意思应该明白均值的概念，均值是最基本的概念可以用这个公式来估算离散的，或者是连续变量的期望值，在金融里我们经常提到另外一种均值，在杰里米•西格尔的书里多次提及，这种均值叫做几何平均，我这里只讲样本的表达式，G(x)等于所有Xi的乘积的1/n次方，大家都能看见吗，可能有些同学看不太清楚，我把所有的乘在一起然后开n 次方，而不是把他们加总再除以个数，这种平均叫几何平均，只能用于正的数值，所以如果中间有负数就会有问题，如果这当中有一个负数，乘积就会变成负的，如果你对一个负数开根号，你就会得到一个虚数，而我们并不想要得到复数，刚才讲的是杰里米•西格尔书上的附录，他认为这个理论最重要的应用，就是衡量一个投资者的收益，假设有一个人投资，怎么来评价他做的怎么样，你可能会想他把钱投资在，不止一年的期间里，那就把每年的收益率求一个平均数吧，假设有人投资了n年，Xi是第i年的收益率，平均数代表的是什么，很自然的想法是对收益率求平均值，但是杰里米觉得这不是一个好办法，他认为应该，对每年的收益求几何平均，投资的收益是指你在整个投资中赚的钱占本金的百分比，总收益率就是收益率加上1，在投资上最糟糕的情况就是，把本金也全亏完也就是亏100%，然后加上1，你永远也得不到一个负数，然后我们对这个值求几何平均，杰里米•西格尔认为在金融上应该用几何平均，而不是算术平均，为什么呢举个简单的例子，假设一个人帮你投资而且他声称，我投资回报很高，我过去的十年中有九年的收益都是20%，你觉得很不错但最后一年怎么样呢这个人说哦我亏了100%，你可能说那还行，把9个20%加起来，然后加一个0，前面说错了把9 个120%加起来，然后加上最后一年的0%，看起来还不错是吧，但想一下如果你去投资，收益和这个人一样你最后能得到什么，你最后一分钱都不剩，如果你最后一年全亏完了，不管之前收益多高最后分文不剩，杰里米在书里说几何平均，总是比算术平均小，当然如果所有数字都一样两个均值相等，几何平均相比算术平均更加严谨，所以我们应该用这个指标金融界反感使用几何平均，因为它比其他平均数都来得小，他们为自己的收益率做广告时，当然希望数字越大越好，我们也需要其他的指标，目前为止我们只讨论了集中趋势指标，在金融学中我们同样需要，离散趋势指标以衡量参数的变化程度，集中趋势用以描述一组概率分布的中心，集中趋势...，而方差衡量的是各个观察值之间的变化，方差这个指标我们通常写作(T 2,这是希腊字母西格玛的小写平方，又或者在讨论方差估计的时候，我们常用S2 称为标准差的平方，标准差是方差的平方根，总体方差是指一系列随机变量x的方差，我们是这样定义的,x=xi的概率乘以xi-卩的平方，在i取1到无穷大时的累加，卩带下标x,我们刚定义了卩下标x,表示x的期望值或者写成E(x)，这是偏离均值平方数的概率加权平均，如果距离均值的变动很大，那么这个平方数也会很大，参数的变动越多方差就越大，还有另一个离散指标，我们用以考察样本，有时用Var 表示我们用刀2,这是另一个离散指标用于考察样本，当有n个观察值，这就是在i取1到n时,x减去x均值的平方除以n的累加，这就是样本方差，另一种用法里分母是n-1,我觉得两个都可以接受, 这里想说的简单一点, 当除以n-1 表示的是对总体的无偏估计, 我在这里只是说的简单一点，你会看到这个指标，衡量的是x与平均值的偏离，而且这里有个平方，使偏离的权重更大, 一个数的平方是一个更大的数, 这就是方差, 这样我们就介绍完了集中趋势和离散趋势，接下来我们讨论它们在金融学中的应用，从收益的角度来说，一般我们都渴望高收益，我们希望收益的期望值较高，并且稳定，期望值越高越好方差就相反，因为方差代表着风险也就是不确定性，整个金融理论的中心，就是如何获得高收益，同时降低风险，另一个基本的概念是协方差，协方差衡量的是两个变量一起变动的情况，协方差是... 我们有两个随机变量，x 和y 的协方差是从样本的角度来说，在i取1到n时,x减去x均值乘以y减去y均值再除以n的累加，这个是X 的偏离度... 这里有下标I，表示每一次观察值对应着某个Xi 和Yi，这里说的是由试验产生的，每一次试验可以获得一组x 与y 的观察值，当x 值大的时候y 值可能也大，或者相反，如果x和y同向变动，当x值和y值同时都很大，协方差的结果将会是一个正值，如果x取值小同时y 值也小，这将是一个负值这个也是负值，负负得正结果是正值，一个正值的协方差表示两个变量同向变动，负值的协方差就表示，二者反向变动，如果x比x均值要大这个为正，而y比y均值小，这个为负，这样乘积就是负数，很多个负值的结果相加，就会使协方差是一个负值，接下来我们讲相关性，这个指标是相关系数，我们习惯用希腊字母rho 表示，如果你使用Excel，会用correl 表示，有时我也用corr，这表示的是相关性，这个数的取值在-1 到+1 之间，定义为，rho 等于xy 的协方差比xy 各自的标准差的乘积，这就是相关系数，这个概念已经进入了日常语言，你们也能看到，有时它会被报纸所引用，我不清楚你们是否熟悉，你们会在什么情况下见到相关性呢，媒体会说SAT 成绩，和大学里的平均学分相关性很低，或相关性很高，有人明白这是什么意思吗，你可以估计一下，相关系数很可能是个正值，结果很可能是接近0 的正数，但肯定有些相关性的，比如说0.3,这意味着SAT的高分考生，更有可能拿到高的绩点，如果这是个负值… 这不太可能…，这可能是负值，否则就是说拿到SAT高分的人，在大学里会表现的比较差，如果你可以量化二者有多相关，那你就可以考察相关性了，下一个部分是回归，这是统计学中又一个基本概念，在金融学中广泛使用，那我就举一个金融领域的例子，回归这个概念要追溯到数学家高斯，讨论的是从若干散点中切合出一条直线，我们来画一条切合散点的直线，我把这个轴作为股票市场的收益，这个轴作为某个公司的收益，比如说微软，将每一年的数据作为一个观察值，我不应该用这个公司名，因为我没法重现它的数据，不用微软了，就用希勒公司. 吧，这是个虚构的公司，所以我可以随意作假设，这里做零点注意这不是总收益，而是年度收益有可能是负数的，假设某一年... 这里设为-5，这里+5 这是-5 这是+5，我们假设第一年中，希勒公司. 和市场都获利5%，在（5，5）这个位置点一个点，另一年，股票市场下跌了5%，希勒公司. 下跌了7%，在这里（-5，-7）又有一点，假设这里是1979年，这里是1980年，一直添加数据点就形成了一个散点图，斜率应该是正的对吧，很有可能当股票市场的总体表现好，希勒公司. 的表现也一样好，高斯说做这样的一条直线，切合所有散点这就是回归直线，高斯选的这条线，所有点距离这条直线的平方和，是所有直线中最小的，这些线段的长度就是距离，要找到最切合的直线就是要使，这些距离的平方和最小，这就是回归直线这个是截点，用alpha 表示... 这里是alpha，斜率用beta 表示，这个概念你们应该很熟悉了，在金融学中这是个很重要的概念，希勒公司.的beta 值，就是这条直线的斜率，alpha 是截距，我们也可以它来表示超额收益，迟一些我会讲到，就是用这个轴表示收益减去利率，这个轴表示市场收益率减去利率，这样的话alpha 就用以衡量，希勒公司. 表现超过市场平均水平多少，回到原先的话题，beta 用以衡量，本公司跟随市场变化的程度，alpha 衡量超过市场的表现，让我们回到这些基本的概念来，另一个概念...，刚才这些我都讲明白了吧...，有一个分布叫正态分布，大家有所耳闻吧，大概是这样的一个分布，钟形的这里是x，我要画的对称一点，可能我画不好，这里是f（x）这就是正态分布，公式如下。
耶鲁《金融市场》视频笔记
I thought I would just remember a couple of highlights from the first two lectures to consolidate what we said then.我想重申一下上两节课的几个重点，以便巩固我们讲过的内容In the first lecture, I talked about a lot of things,but one theme that comes to my mind is the theme of the moral purpose and mission of the finance community.第一课里，我讲了很多东西，但中心主旨就是金融界的道德目标和使命We talked about the sense that, I think, young people have a sort of prejudice against the field and they think that finance is a field that you go into if you really value money rather than people.我们谈论了年轻人对这一行业的偏见，他们认为进入金融业的人金钱至上而不尊重他人I want to reiterate again that’s not the way I view the field at all.我想重申一下，我对金融界的看法与他们截然不同I was just yesterday, I gave a talk in Montreal at the Caisse de Dep----昨天，我刚在蒙特利的魁北克储蓄投资集团做了一个讲演which is the big wealth management fund for the Province of Quebec这个投资集团是魁北克省的一所大型财产管理基金机构I met a lot of people there and I never once got the idea that anyone there was evil or grasping.在那我见了很多人，但是我没有察觉到任何恶毒或者贪婪的气息I think they have a moral purpose, which is to preserve the livelihoods of the people of the Province of Quebec.我认为他们都有一个共同的道德目标，就是维持魁北克省居民的生计You get a very different view of things when you meet the people.只有当你亲身面对这些人的时候，你会看到事情的另一面I think our entertainment industry likes to make movies about people in finance, but they are inevitably portrayed as evil and I don’t know why that is.娱乐产业喜欢制作关于金融业的电影，但里面的人物总是被刻画的很恶毒，我也不知道为什么I don’t think there has ever been a major motion picture about a financial person who ended up a philanthropist. Why is that?我觉得好像没有一部正儿八经的电影里金融业者最终成为了慈善家，为什么？I just don’t--people don’t like-- people would rather hate--我不…人们不喜欢…人们宁愿厌恶…I don’t know why it’s something--我不明白为什么It wouldn’t be a good movie theme, would it? Anyway, you have to overcome these--那不是好的电影主题吗？不管怎样，你们要克服这种想法…You have to think that if you go into the field you would probably and if you’re successful, you would probably end up as a philanthropist. but no movie will be made about your life and you may eccounter hostility the whole way.你们要认为，如果你进入这一行，你很可能，如果你成功了，你很可能成为一位慈善家，但是不会有电影记录你的人生，而且你可能整天遭受白眼It’s especially true right now with the subprime crisis.在次贷危机下，情况更是如此People are blaming the financial community for our troubles now.现在，人们都把危机怪罪到金融界的头上It is true that we’re seeing some people thrown out of their houses, in some cases, because of some rather questionable financial practices that got people into mortgages that they shouldn’t have gotten into.确实我们看到有些人被赶出他们的房子，在有些案例中，确实是有些有问题的金融操纵，使人们背上本不该背负的债务But overall, I think that the people in this field are good people.但是总体来说，这一行业的人是好人In the last lecture, I talke about－－上一课，我讲了…In the second lecture, I talked about the pooling of risks and the basic theme of that lecture was that we now have a mathematical theory, probability theory.第二课，我讲了风险汇聚及分摊，那节课的主题是一门数学理论，即概率论When you look at this theory, you realize that it suggests a very important technology for improving human welfare and by spreading risks.这一理论，提出了一个重要的技术即可以通过分散风险，提高收益The economy, and technology, and the weather and all sorts of factors create risks.经济，科技，天气各种其他因素都可能创造风险But the real technoloty is-- the technology that works to eliminate risks is to spread them out to pool them, to share them among many different people.但是真正的技术，能够降低风险，通过风险汇聚，将风险分散，让很多人共同承担So, the idea that therists suggest and it may be unreachable, but the perfect financial system would have all of our risks pooled completely.理论家提出的这一理论，可能无法达到, 但是一个完美的金融体系，能够将所有的风险完全分摊That is, nobody suffers alone.也就是说，没有人独自承担损失If anything happens to me in my livelihood, then it’s spread out over everybody and everybody means the whole world.如果我的生计出问题了，他将分散到每个人身上，每个人指全世界的人Whatever happens to me, when it’s spread out over six billion plus people, it ends up divided by six billion and it becomes unobservable.发生在我身上的事，分散到六十多亿人口上被六十亿除，就变得难以察觉It becomes so small that it’s meaningless and that’s the ideal.小到微不足道，这就是完美模型That’s what, in principle, we can do and what I think is the most important concept in finance--this concept of risk pooling.原则上，这就是我们能做的，我认为这也是金融业最重要的概念，即风险汇聚及分摊We live in a world where people suffer all kinds of misfortunes.我们生活的这个世界，人们会经历各种的不幸Of course, we can try to get rid of these misfortunes. We can do research on disease prevention and weather modification and global warming.当然，我们能够避免这些不幸。
econ-252-11_05耶鲁大学公开课金融市场
PRINTECON-252-11: FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011)Lecture 5 - Insurance, the Archetypal Risk Management Institution: Its Opportunities and Vulnerabilities [January 31, 2011]Chapter 1. Introduction [00:00:00]Professor Robert Shiller:OK, good morning. I've been running to get over here. I just got back from The World Economic Forum. We talked to a lot of the world's financial leaders. And I was thinking what I would tell you about it, but then I realized, it's all off the record, so I'm not supposed to say anything to you.I was going to talk instead today about insurance, which is one of the major risk management institutions that is not always considered part of finance, because people think of finance and insurance as separate.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller:We talked about basic principles of risk management in the preceding lecture. It's all the same for finance and insurance. And yet, we tend to consider them as separate businesses. That's partly, I think, an accident of history, and it's partly a product of regulation because of certain ideas--that we'll come to in a few minutes--that has kept the insurance industry separate from other financial industries. Last period, we talked about the mean-variance risk management problem, and about the Capital Asset Pricing Model. That's fundamental to insurance as well. The basic idea is pooling of risks and preventing people from being subjected to extreme risks through the concept of risk pooling.So, what I wanted to start today is talking about insurance, starting with the concept of insurance. And then, I wanted to reiterate a theme of this course, that financial institutions are inventions, they're structures that someone had to design and make work right. Sometimes they don't work right. Then, I wanted to move to a particular example of insurance, which was until recently the biggest insurance company in the world, called the American International Group, or AIG. And it's particularly important that we talk about this example, because on March 2 we have the former CEO of AIG, Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, coming to our class. So, I thought it's appropriate that we use AIG--well not only because it was the biggest insurance company in the world, but also because he's coming here.And then, I want to talk about regulation of insurance, that the insurance industry has always been subject to government regulation. I'll talk about types of insurance. Your chapter in Fabozzi et al. is mostly about types of insurance, so I think you can mostly get that from the textbook, but I wanted to say some things about it. And then, I was going to conclude with thoughts about insurance, and how important it is to our lives, and what progress it still has to make.Chapter 2. Concepts and Principles of Insurance [00:03:53]So, insurance, it doesn't sound like a very exciting topic, does it? I'm going to try to make it more exciting. I guess you think of the insurance salesman coming, knocking on your door. They don't do that so much anymore, they used to go around door-to-door. And that was a depressing moment, when the life insurance salesman came. And if you invited this person into your house, he would tell you about the probability of dying, how tough it will be on your family, that sort of thing. But, to me, I think insurance is an exciting issue, because it's about making our lives work. And it's really about preventing horrible catastrophes from--and it involves mathematical theory that underlies the concept. To me, it's exciting, but I don't know if I canconvey that.The fundamental concept, again, is risk pooling. The idea of insurance goes back to ancient Rome, but only in very limited forms. But the idea of risk pooling is kind of an obvious one. People form organizations partly to risk-pool. So, in ancient Rome, a common form of insurance was death insurance that would pay funeral bills. People in the ancient world believed that you had to get a proper burial, or your soul would wander forever. So, insurance salespeople associated with guilds or business organizations would sell funeral insurance. But they didn't have a very clear idea of the risk pooling concept. It must have underlain their thinking.But it wasn't until much later that people began to understand the concept. There were examples of insurance throughout ancient and medieval times, but they're very blurred and sparse. I remember reading an insurance, supposedly, an insurance contract written in Renaissance Italy, translated into English, but it was hardly recognizable to me as an insurance contract. They didn't have the concepts down. It seemed to have a lot of religious language in it, which normally we don't think of as something that's part of an insurance contract. But it seems like insurance came in in the 1600s, at the same time that certain concepts of mathematics began to be developed. Notably, the concept of probability became more widely known in the 1600s. According to one historian, the oldest known description of the insurance concept goes back to a Count Oldenburg. Actually, it's an anonymous letter to Count Oldenburg, written in 1609.And the letter says, why don't we start--I'm paraphrasing at the moment--why don't we start a fund, in which people pay 1% of the value of their home every year into the fund, and then we will use the fund to replace the house if there's a fire? And now, quoting this anonymous writer, this writer said he had "no doubt that it would be fully proved, if a calculation were made of the number of houses consumed by fire within a certain space in the course of 30 years, that the loss would not amount, by a good deal, to the sum that would be collected in that time." OK? It was just intuitive. He said, there can't be that many fires. And if we collect that amount of money every year, we can pay for all the houses that are burned down. So, he didn't express any mathematical law, but it's the concept of insurance. You don't find that before that, before 1609. So, I guess we don't have any clear statement of insurance before then.Actually, you can find an approximate statement of the law of large numbers--and I'm thinking of Aristotle, the philosopher. This is in ancient times, and I'm quoting from De Caelo, his book. Aristotle: "To succeed in many things or many times is difficult. For instance, to repeat the same throw 10,000 times with the dice would be impossible, whereas to make it once or twice is comparatively easy." He doesn't have the language of probability, but he knows you can't throw the dice 1,000 times and come up with the same number every time.Now, we have a probability theory about it. So, we know that if you have n events, each occurring with the probability of p, then the average proportion out of the n events that occur--I'm sorry, we have n trials, an event occurring with probability p--then the standard deviation of this proportion of events that occur isAnd that's a theorem from probability theory. The standard deviation of the proportion of trials for which the event occurred, assuming independence, is given by this. And so, you note that it goes down with n. As n increases, it goes down with--I should say, the √n. So, that means that if n gets very large, if you write a lot of policies, then the probability of deviating from the mean by more than one or two standard deviations becomes very small, which is what Aristotle said.But making insurance work as an institution, to actually protect people against risk, is rather difficult to achieve. And that's because things have to be done right. So, let me just remind you, what are the basic types of insurance? This is what Fabozzi talks about. There's life insurance that insures people against earlydeath. Of course, you still die. What it really insures, is your family against the loss of a bread winner, the father or the mother. So, life insurance is suitably given to families, especially with young children, to protect the children. It used to be very important when there was a lot more early deaths. Now, very few young people lose their parents. So, life insurance has receded in importance.Another example is health insurance. This is insurance, of course, that you get sick and you need medical care. Then, there's property and casualty insurance, insuring your house or your car. And then, there's other kinds of [what] you might call investment-oriented products, like annuities. This is a table in your textbook by Fabozzi, which lists these categories of insurance. But any of these insurance types are inventions, and I want to specify that. We have the idea that an insurance company could be set up that would, say, insure houses against fires. And we just heard it, intuitively, in this letter to Oldenburg long ago. But to make it work, and to make it work reliably, involves a lot of detail. You can think of the idea of making an airplane, but to make it really work, and to make it work safely, is another matter.So first of all, insurance needs a contract design that specifies risks, and excludes risks that are inappropriate. An issue that insurance companies reach is moral hazard.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller: Moral hazard is an expression that appeared in the 19th century to refer to the effects of insurance on people's behavior that are undesirable. So, the classic example is, you take out fire insurance on your house, and then you burn it down deliberately in order to collect on the house. Or another example is, you take out life insurance, and then you kill yourself to support your family. These are undesirable outcomes, and they could be fatal to the whole concept of insurance, because if you don't control moral hazard, obviously the whole thing is not going to work. So, what they do in an insurance contract is they exclude risks that are particularly vulnerable to moral hazard. And so, that means you would exclude certain causes of death that might look like suicide. You can do other things to control moral hazard than excluding certain causes.You can also make sure that you don't insure the house for more than it's worth. Right? If someone insures a house, and the insurance does not cover the full value of the house, then there's no incentive to burn it down. You might as well just sell the house, right? No point in burning it down if you'll still lose a little bit of money. So, that's one of the problems that insurance companies face. And part of the design of [the] insurance contract has to prevent moral hazard from becoming excessive.An analogous thing is selection bias. That occurs when--chalk keeps breaking--selection bias occurs when the people who sign up for your contract know that they are higher risk. For example, health. People who know they have a terminal disease and are about to die, they'll all come signing up for your life insurance contract. That will put immense costs on the insurance company, and if they don't control the selection bias, they will have to charge very high premiums. And that will force other people, who don't know they're going to die, out of buying insurance. And so, that's the fundamental problem. Again, something has to be done to define the policy. So, one thing you can do is, exclude, in life insurance, certain causes of death that are likely to be known. And you only put on causes of death that people wouldn't be able to predict about themselves.Another aspect of insurance is that you have to have very specific, precise definitions of the loss, and what constitutes proof of the insured loss. If you're not clear about that, there's going to be ambiguities later, which will involve legal wrangling and dissatisfaction. We'll see, in a minute, that these problems are not minor and they keep coming up. It's a constant challenge for the insurance industry. Third, we need a mathematical model of risk pooling. Well, I just wrote one down here, but it might be more complicated insome circumstances. This is assuming independence. If you don't assume independence, you can make more complicated models. Then, fourth, you need a collection of statistics on risks, and you need to evaluate the quality of those statistics. So for example, in the 1600s, people started collecting mortality tables for the first time. There was no data on ages at death. It began in the 1600s, because people were building an insurance industry and they needed to know those things.Then, you need a form for the company. What is the insurance company? Who owns it? It could be a corporate form. There are shareholders who are investing in the company. And they're taking the risk that some of our policy modeling, or handling of moral hazard, or selection bias wasn't right. Some insurance companies are mutual, rather than share. The insurance is run for the benefit of the policyholders, and they're like a nonprofit in the sense that the founders of the company pay themselves salaries, but the benefits go entirely to the policy holders.Then, you need a government design, so that the government verifies all of these things about the insurance company. The problem with insurance is that people will pay in for many, many years before they ever collect, right? Especially if you're buying life insurance, you hope never to collect. And so, you don't know whether it's going to work right. That's why you need government regulation, you need government insurance regulators. And that's part of the design of insurance. It doesn't work if you don't have the regulators, because you wouldn't trust the insurance company. So, these are problems that have inhibited making insurance work.Chapter 3. The Story behind AIG [00:19:14]I wanted to give you an example. I think it makes it more concrete if we start off with talking about a particular example. And I said I was going to talk about AIG, which is a very important example, not only because it was the biggest insurance company. It was also the biggest bailout in the entire financial crisis we've seen now. And it has an interesting story.[SIDE CONVERSATION]Professor Robert Shiller: So AIG, it's an interesting story. It was founded in 1919 in Shanghai. And you wonder, why is it called American International Group if it's founded in Shanghai? It was founded in Shanghai, called American Asiatic Underwriters. And it was founded by Cornelius Vander Starr, who was an American who just decided to go to Asia and start an insurance business. Shanghai, in 1919, was a world city. It was not really under the Chinese government, it was something like Hong Kong. It had constituencies representing many different countries. And so, it was a very lively business center. It's kind of interesting that the biggest insurance company in the world emerged from Shanghai, and also one of the biggest banks in the world, HSBC. You know what HSBC means? They don't emphasize it anymore. It's Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation [correction: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation]. So, AIG was founded by Mr. Starr in 1919, and started doing an insurance business in China. And moved their headquarters to New York just before Chairman Mao took over at China. And then, it became kind of a Chinese investment company in the United States.Cornelius Vander Starr ran the company from 1919 until he died in 1968. So, he was CEO for 49 years, a half-century. And then, just before he died, he appointed Hank Greenberg, who will visit us, as the CEO in 1962. So, that was 49 years under Starr, and then Greenberg took on, and then ran the company until 2005. So, it was 37 years under Greenberg. So, two men ran the company for almost a century. Since 2005, Greenberg has been succeeded by three CEOs, the usual thing. The usual company turns over CEOs.There's another interesting story that we might ask about Hank Greenberg.He joined the U.S. Army and fought in World War II. And among his jobs, then, was to liberate Dachau, which was a concentration camp. This is not one of the extermination camps, it was a concentration camp for Jews and others under the Nazis. And people were starving and dying, it was awful. At a Council on Foreign Relations meeting, Greenberg met with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is the president of Iran. And Ahmadinejad said something about the Holocaust, doubting that it ever happened. Greenberg stood up indignantly and said, it happened. I saw it. I was there. It's kind of interesting to me to think about this.This is an aside, momentarily. The other person I've met who--do you know Geoffrey Hartman, who's a professor here at Yale in literature? He and his wife, both Jewish, were teenagers during World War II. And Hartman escaped by what they called Kindertransport. But his wife, Renee, was in another concentration camp. Not Dachau, it was in Bratislava. And she was starving to death. And it really happened, by the way. It's awful. And I asked her, why do you think they were starving you to death? And she said, we didn't know. We thought maybe they were keeping us as hostages, or something. So anyway, we could ask him about that.What did these people do? Both Starr and Greenberg created a wide variety of risk management products. It became the largest underwriter of commercial and industrial insurance in the world. It became a very large automobile insurer, and also a travel insurance company. But Greenberg was forced out of the company after 37 years, when Eliot Spitzer, who was the Attorney General for the state of New York, claimed that there were some irregularities. And Greenberg was forced to resign. It turns out, though, that nothing that Spitzer said has held up, so apparently Greenberg was innocent of any of the allegations. The real problem occurred with AIG after Greenberg left. So, Greenberg left in 2005, and then the company absolutely blew up, and it absolutely had to be bailed out.The reason they had to be bailed out was, it was almost entirely due to a failure of the independence assumption, I would say. That under their risk modeling, namely, the company became exposed to real estate risk. And the idea that their risk modelers had was that it doesn't matter that we take on risk that home prices might fall, because they can never fall everywhere. They can fall in one city, but it won't matter to us. That's just one city, and it all averages out. But what actually happened after Greenberg left was the company took huge exposures toward real estate risk and it fell everywhere. Home prices fell everywhere, just exactly what they thought couldn't happen.So, the company was writing credit default swaps--I told you about those before--they were taking the risk. They were insuring, basically, against defaults on companies whose credit depended on the real estate market. They were also investing directly in real estate security, in mortgage-backed securities that depended on the real estate market for their success. And when all this failed at once, the AIG was about to fail. That meant that the federal government decided, in 2008, to bail out AIG. And the total bailout bill, well, the total amount committed by the U.S. federal government was $182 billion. It didn't all actually get spent. It was $182 billion committed to bail out AIG. That's a lot of money, I think that's the biggest bailout anywhere, at any time.A lot of people are angry about this. Part of this bailout came from what we called TARP. This is the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which was created under the Bush administration. And it was a proposal of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. It was initially run by Paulson. But it was not just TARP. There was also loans from the Federal Reserve. It was a complicated string of things that were done to bail out AIG. So, why did they do that? Why did the government bail out this insurance company? The main reason why they did so was their concern about systemic risk. I'll come back to other kinds of bailouts of insurance companies.The problem was that AIG--if it went under, all kinds of things would go wrong. All kinds of things would go wrong. All these insurance policies that it wrote on people's casualties, their travel insurance, any of these policies, would all now be subject to failure. Because people who had these insurance would find that the company that they bought it through was disappearing. But it would go on even beyond that. Lots of other companies, investment companies, banks, would fail too, or may fail too, because they're involved in some kind of business dealings with AIG, which would now become part of the AIG bankruptcy. If AIG failed, anybody who had any business with AIG would be starting to wonder, what's this going to mean to me? AIG owes me money, what's going to happen? And so, there was a worry that it would destroy the whole financial system.This was big enough to cause everybody to pull back, and if everybody pulls back, then the business world stops. It would be like a stampede for the exits. Everyone hears, AIG goes under, and so many people do business with AIG, they decided it was intolerable. And so, the government came up with the money, massively and quickly. If you remember the story, Henry Paulson, who was Treasury Secretary, first went to Congress asking for a blank check. He didn't say to bail out AIG, but that's what he did. He got sort of a blank check from Congress, because Paulson told the story that if we don't do this, if we let the company--he didn't say AIG, he actually asked for the TARP money before the AIG bailout--but he said if we don't do something to prevent a collapse, we could have the Great Depression again.Nobody liked to hear that, but they believed him, and they didn't know what else to do. And so, they allowed the TARP money, and they allowed the Federal Reserve to bail out this company. Some people misunderstand what this in fact means, though, for the shareholders in AIG. The AIG shareholders lost almost everything, because the government arranged the bailout in such a way that AIG got practically wiped out. The government took preferred shares in the company at a very low price in exchange for helping the company survive. And that diluted down the other shareholders in the company into a very low status. The company lost over 90% of its shareholder value, despite this bailout.In July of 2009, AIG did a 1-to-20 split. Remember, I told you about splits before? That's a reverse split. Usually, the stock goes up in a company and the shares, which originally sold for $30 a share, are now selling for $100 a share. And they think, well that's too high a price per share, so let's do a three-for-one split, and let's make every share into three shares. That's the usual split story. This is going the other way massively. They made every 20 shares into one share. So, if you look at the price recently, it's been something like $30 to $40 dollars a share. That's what we do on the stock exchange, we always like to keep it, it's an American tradition. Not so much true in other countries, they have different traditions about what is the preferred price about a stock. So, AIG lost--the shareholders lost just about everything. So, the public anger about a bailout of AIG is really a little bit inappropriate, because they lost almost everything. They could've lost everything. This company did not fail, it was bailed out and it survived. But it lost almost everything. I think the real anger is not anger about the shareholders of AIG, who lost almost everything.The real anger is that the business partners of AIG didn't lose anything, notably Goldman Sachs, which was a major partner taking the other side of contracts with AIG. It didn't lose a penny, all right? But, of course, Goldman Sachs was not being bailed out. It was not in danger. The government didn't know what to do with AIG, because it felt that it was such a big company doing so many things that if we let them fail, who knows, Goldman Sachs might fail. The government didn't know, they didn't know whether Goldman Sachs might fail. Because it didn't have the information, because the regulators had not collected such information. So, they decided the only thing they could do responsibly was to keep AIG alive, somehow alive, as an insurance company. Maybe, they lose almost all of their value to the shareholders, but they keep going. So, that's what happened. And AIG continues to this day. It survived after the bailout.Chapter 4. Regulation of the Insurance Industry [00:35:51]Now, I wanted to talk about something else that many of you may not know about insurance companies. Mainly, that we do have something like deposit insurance for insurance companies. You know, when you go into a bank, there will be a little sign saying FDIC Insured? Do you notice that when you go into a bank? They're required to post that. Bank accounts are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation up to a limit, $250,000 now. It's only for relatively small savers, because $250,000 is not big time, a lot of money. We don't want innocent people who walk into a bank and put their money there to lose their money. So, you wonder about insurance. Do we have something like that for insurance? Yes we do.We have state insurance guarantee funds that protect insurance companies. They're not as old, though. The oldest insurance guarantee fund is 1941, and that's in New York. And this fund was the first, but now virtually every state in the United States has these funds. Connecticut got its first insurance guarantee fund in 1972. So, these are supposed to protect you, as an individual, if you take out an insurance policy, and then your insurance company, like AIG, blows up. So, then you wonder, well, why didn't the insurance guarantee fund handle AIG? Any idea where the answer is? Why did we need the special bailout? Well, maybe the answer is obvious. The insurance guarantee fund, like the FDIC, is to protect the little guy, right? AIG was way too big for these state insurance funds. There's a limit to how much you can collect from a state insurance fund if your insurance company goes under, and in New York it's $500,000, and in Connecticut it's the same. These are two of the most generous states. Typically, in a state in the United States, you only collect $300,000 maximum.That may sound like a lot of money to you, but think of it this way: Suppose you bought a life insurance policy for your family. What would you typically buy? Ever thought about it? Well, you have two children. You're thinking of sending them both to Yale, or some place like that. It's going to cost you like $500,000 right there, just sending them to college. So, if that's all you get in your insurance, it's not enough, not big. So, these are small, they don't guarantee you enough. There's another thing about, at least I know about the Connecticut insurance guarantee fund, and that is that you can't play the trick that you do with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank accounts for 250,000, all right? But all you do is, you put your money over many different banks. So, if you've got $2.5 million, you put it in 10 different banks. The FDIC will insure every one of those, so you can insure $2.5 million. But the Connecticut insurance guarantee fund won't do that, they'll limit you to $500,000, no matter how many different policies you got.There's another important difference between deposit insurance and banks and state insurance guarantee funds, at least in Connecticut. I know Connecticut does not allow an insurance company to advertise that they're insured. It's quite the opposite with deposit insurance, where the FDIC requires that they post that they're insured. So that's why you don't hear about this. But there's a fundamental lesson that I'm trying to get to with all of this, and that is that you have to look at the insurance company that you buy insurance from. It's still a wild world out there in the sense that if you buy insurance from an insurance company that goes under, well, you're protected up to $500,000, but beyond that, not. And you're supposed to watch out. Now, we also have state insurance regulators who are supposed to watch out that insurance companies are good, but they won't make good on you. So, we have a Connecticut Insurance Department, for example, which regulates insurance companies.Now, another interesting thing about insurance that separates it from finance is that insurance is done by the state government. It's regulated and the guarantee funds are state. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a federal--it's a national insurance program. But insurance is done entirely by the states.。
耶鲁金融市场第14课
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记14耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第14课] 安德鲁·雷德利夫的客座演讲（时长1小时15分）（关于安德鲁·雷德利夫，在上节课开头已有过介绍，所以，在这个讲座，安德鲁·雷德利夫上来就开讲了）我要说的第一件事，是我认为，当你们在考虑金融市场时，大多数人所想的第一件事或第一个问题是，那些市场是否有效？是否包含了所有已知的信息？如果能够做到这些，那在一定程度上，金融市场显然就比整个市场还好（笑）。
我不确定，曾经是绝对吸纳了经济学智慧的金融市场，就是有效了？我认为，到现在，这种观点还是主流的学术观点。
但是，对此存在着激烈的争论，双方都有代言人。
对我来说，实际上，这是一个非常简单的问题。
关于市场有效的概念，源于一个先验的理论，该理论是关于所有市场的，认为有很多动机，激励人们按照自己的兴趣采取行动，也只能这样去做。
这是一种非常吸引人的先验理论，但是，作为理论，是用来进行预测的。
如果预测的一些事情并没有成为事实，那么这个理论就被摒弃，这样的理论有很多很多。
有很多与金融市场有效性相反的例子。
在某种程度上，有这样的事情，有些公司拥有两种不同类别的股票，而在经济意义上相同。
比如，皇家壳牌公司（Royal Shell）就曾经拥有过在荷兰交易的荷兰股份，以及在英国交易的英国股份，两者在经济意义上相同，但价格会有波动且非常剧烈。
在1998年时期，有一只这种类型的股票，比起另一只股票要打折20%，并持续了好几年。
因此，你拥有经济意义上相同的东西，会以不同的价格进行交易。
例如，你持有封闭式基金（closed end funds），这是一种拥有一组其他证券的金融工具，封闭式基金是作为一种债券在证券交易所进行挂牌交易，而这种基金所做的事，就是持有其他的证券。
耶鲁大学《金融市场》
耶鲁公开课：金融市场lecture 1Endeavor努力Fundamentala.基本的，根本的n.基本原理fundament n.基础，臀部Vocational职业的，行业的Underpinning / underpinning of sth基础，…的基础Be on leave休假Divide /divide up把…分开Separate分开Self-contained独立的，自足的Mathematics数学Subsequent后来的，随后的Turn sb off 倒胃口，使生气In a minute马上Get through 打通电话，到达，完成，通过Back down 放弃，让步Prominent突出的，显著的，卓越的Drop out 退出，退学In the sense 就…意义而言Reserven/v储存，储备Faculty 学校中的全体教师，教员，科，系，能力Optional可选择的n.选修科目Reasonably 合理地，适当地，恰当地Intellect才智，智力，才华Assign 指定，指派，分配Ever since 从当时到现在Shelve 搁置，放置Perennial 永久的，常年的，长期的，四季不断的perennial classic Emphasize强调Thesis 论文treatise 专著Readable易读的Distinction 区别，差别；荣誉Poll调查，问卷调查Irrational exuberance 非理性繁荣Boom vi/vt繁荣，兴旺Bust v 破碎，爆裂，破产Refer to指的是Housing market 房地产市场Chain store连锁店Shut down 关闭Grade成绩Incorporate 吸收，合并，包含Behavioral finance 行为金融学Avant-garde 先锋，先驱Unity团结，一致，联合Subprime crisis 次贷危机subprime 次级的Default n.违约，缺席，缺乏v.拖欠，不到场，不履行Ramification n.分流，分叉，分支，衍生物Financial instrument 金融工具Virtually adv.几乎，实质上Financial community 金融界Financial consultant 金融顾问=financial counselor ，financial adviser金融从业人员---29：30---Less developed country 发展中国家Emerge v.摆脱，浮现，出现Nonetheless 尽管如此，但是Longstanding 长期存在的Contempt n.轻视，藐视despise v.轻视，藐视Human capital 人力资本Hostility n.敌意，敌对情绪Jealousy n.嫉妒Show off 炫耀，卖弄Servant 仆人，雇工livery n.制服Social class社会地位，社会阶层Skull and bones 骷髅会（Yale著名学生会）Initiator 发起人，倡导者Led to=lead to 引起，导致Philosopher 哲学家Poverty 贫穷Philanthropy慈善，慈善事业Endowment n. 捐赠，捐款，（基金）Slightly adv.轻微地，些微地Physical plant 硬件设施，实业Foundation= fund 基金Mutual fund 互惠基金Hedge fund 对冲基金Portfolio n.（证券）投资组合Syllabus 教学大纲Perspective n.观点，透视，透视图Incidentally adv.顺便提及，附带地Delineate v. 描述，描绘Outline n.轮廓，大纲，概要Underlie vt.成为…的基础，在…之下Insurance n.保险学，保险业Reduce 减少reduced a.减少的Statistics n.统计学，统计Probability theory n.概率论Game theory 博弈论Variance 方差covariance 协方差Correlation n.[数]相关系数，相互关系Dramatic a.引人注目的，激动人心的Progress 进步Process 过程In the abstract 理论上地，概括地，抽象地Hypothetical a.假设的，假想的Patent vt/a/n. 专利，专利权，专利的，授予/取得…专利权Diversification n.多样化，多元化Capital asset n.资本资产，固定资产Security market 证券市场Theorem n.定律βcoefficient β系数coefficient系数policyholder n.投保人，保险客户assemble v.集合，装配，聚集efficient market theory 有效市场假设exhilarate vt.是高兴，使振奋，使愉快sth ~ sb /sb be ~ed by sth interact v. 互相影响，互相作用prospect theory 前景理论oversight of markets 市场监督so-called a.号称的，所谓的self-regulatory organization 自律组织high-minded a.高尚的onerous a.繁重的，负有义务的，艰巨的bond market=debt market 债券市场maturity n.到期perpetuities n.永续年金，终身年金perpetual a.永恒的expiration n.终期，期满fluctuate v.波动，摇摆，动摇term 学期，期限interest rate 利率interest 利息currency 货币；通货episode n.有趣的时间，一段情节，插话ambiguity n.含糊，模棱两可的话，不明确，暧昧real estate n.不动产，房地产speculative a.投机的speculator n. 投机商money multiplier货币乘数monetary policy 货币政策stabilize v.稳定，使稳定commercial bank 商业银行deposit存款loan 贷款investment bank 投资银行underwrite v.承购包销money manager 短期资本经营者competitive 充满竞争的brokerages n.经纪人业务brokerage n. 佣金futures market 期货市场futures期货forward market 远期市场Variable n. 变量a.可变的，变量的，多变的，易变的Options market 期权市场Typically adv.往往，代表性地typical a.典型的，特有的，象征性的Esoteric a.难懂的，限于圈内人的，秘传的Sophisticated a.复杂的，精细的，精明的，高级的Mortgage vt.抵押n.抵押按揭Exploitation n.利用，开发，开采Hazard n.危险，冒险vt.赌运气，冒…危险。
诺奖得主席勒耶鲁公开课-金融市场20140211
诺奖得主席勒耶鲁公开课-金融市场房地产这类资产是最大最重要的资产，现今美国房地产的价值也是居民直接持有的房地产的价值，大概有20万亿美元，这与股票市场总值相当，可能更大。
居民直接持有的股票总值只有6万亿美元，对一个典型的美国家庭来说，他们积累的主要财富是住宅，另外通过金融机构间接持有股票。
但是直接持有的角度看，人们拥有的主要财产就是住宅，除此之外还有商业地产，商业地产市场比自由住房市场要小，但人们也可以间接持有商业地产，人们可以通过持有股份及参加一些机构的方式来持有，这一点很重要，一些重要的金融机构就是为了解决房地产行业的基本需求而设立的，首先讲下商业地产和投资商业地产的一类金融机构，其次讲的抵押贷款可以为商业地产和自住房产提供融资，最后讲房地产市场繁荣现状。
首先金融机构或者叫商业地产，商业地产适用于商业用途而不是个人居住，有一种机构叫做DPP，即直接参股项目，传统上这是最重要的。
商业地产持股方式，当你开车时看到一些高楼大厦是谁的，有时候他们属于一些企业，但是我认为更为重要的是DPP，DPP代表投资人持有，商业地产的金融机构，最重要的一类DPP叫做有限责任合伙制，简称LP。
人们之所以通过有限合伙的形式而不是以公司的形式来持有商业地产原因就是公司需要上缴利润税，但DPP不需要，如果你要成立一个组织来持有商业地产，你尽可能使用DPP，这样就不用交利润税了，那就用DPP来设立商业地产的所有权代理机构，有限合伙制是DPP 的一种，是合伙制不是公司制，如果几个人一起做生意，这就是最简单的合伙企业，因为你是以一个合伙人的身份来做生意，所以要对你征税而不是合伙制企业，通常合伙制企业的问题是合伙人具有无限责任，公司是一个实体，他可能被起诉或者亏损额超过了自身的价值，但是对于投资者而言，公司的价值永远不会小于零，因为投资者对公司的过失不负有责任。
如果你买了一个公司的股票，你最多会赔掉投进去的钱，所有这叫做有限责任，如果你加入了合伙制企业，个人需要对企业的债务承担责任，这就是合伙制企业的一个问题，如果你加入了一个合伙制企业，然而企业经营出现失误，损失超过了投入，有人就会要求你承担这项损失，然而也有一种有限合伙制，包括两类合伙人，普通合伙人和有限合伙人，或者通常会有多个有限合伙人，普通合伙人要承担责任，有限合伙人则不需要承担责任（以出资额为限来承担责任），以有限合伙制形式持有房地产，选择有限合伙制是因为如果人们要为投资承担无限连带责任，无法说服别人参加合伙投资，有限责任合伙由普通合伙人承担责任，而其他多个有限合伙人则不需要承担责任，普通合伙人往往就是合伙制企业的组织者。
耶鲁公开课笔记3
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记3耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第3课] 金融中的技术与发明（时长1小时14分）开课伊始，希勒先对前两次课做了重点回顾。
第一次课的主题是金融界的道德目标和使命，谈了年轻人对金融行业的一些偏见，认为进入金融界的人都是金钱至上，而不尊重他人。
希勒再次重申，他的看法截然不同。
希勒说，他昨天刚在蒙特利的魁北克投资集团作了一个演讲，该投资集团是魁北克省的一家大型财产管理基金机构，在那里见到了很多人，并没有感觉到任何罪恶或者贪婪的气息，（笑）。
希勒认为他们都有一个共同的道德目标，要保护魁北克省居民的生活。
只有亲身面对这些人，就会得到对事情的非常不同的看法。
希勒觉得，娱乐行业喜欢制作的一些金融界人士的影片，总将他们描绘成邪恶之人。
（笑）也不知是为什么。
好像没有哪部主题影片表演一位金融界人士最终成为慈善家的，这是为什么呢（笑）？人们不喜欢而宁愿去厌恶，真不明白是因为什么，（“金融界人士成为慈善家”）不是好的电影主题吗？希勒呼吁学生们要克服这种偏见，建议学生们换一种想法，即，如果你进入金融界，你成功了，你最终就会成为慈善家。
但是，不会有电影记录你的人生（笑），而且在人生道路上，你可能会遭受敌视。
特别是在目前的次贷危机中，更是如此，人们都把所遇到的麻烦归罪到金融界，人们确实在看到，有些人被赶出自己的房屋，在某些案例中，由于一些相当可疑的金融操作，让人们做了本不该做的抵押贷款。
但是，希勒认为，总体而言，从事金融业的人士是好人（good people）。
在第二次课，讲了风险汇聚和分摊，主题是数学理论即概率论。
学了概率论，可以意识到，概率论提供了非常重要的技术，即通过分散风险，能够提高人类的福利。
经济、技术、气候等等所有各种因素都会引起风险，但是，真正的技术是用于减轻风险，通过汇聚风险，将其分散出去，由许多不同的人们来分担。
耶鲁公开课笔记之二
美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记1耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。
共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。
[第1课] 金融和保险在经济和社会中的强大作用（时长1小时14分）希勒教授上来就通报自己姓氏，随即介绍本课程的5位助教，都是来自世界各地的博士生，希望由此能有助于本课程的国际化视角，因为金融行业关系到世界各个国家，并不是仅仅局限于美国国内。
这5名助教分别来自巴基斯坦、美国（印度人）、加纳、中国（2位女生），都在作着不同的经济学题目。
希勒教这门课已经20多年了，他很为自己的毕业生而骄傲，很多毕业生都在金融领域工作。
希勒常出去做讲座，当在华尔街或世界其他地方讲座时，他就会问到，“你们有谁上过我的课吗？”有时会有一、两个人举手，说上过他所教的经济学252号课程，希勒就非常高兴。
希勒同时调侃到，他也为那些上过他的课，但没在金融领域工作的毕业生自豪。
希勒认为，《金融市场》这门课，不仅是为立志从事金融业的学生所开设，因为金融是一门很重要的技术（important technology），要理解现实世界发生了什么，了解金融知识是很重要的，因为人类的任何行为都与金融有关。
“我想做个诗人，跟金融有关吗？”希勒举例说明，“作为一个诗人，你想发表诗作，就得和出版商谈谈，他们会说自己的财务状况，看你是否适合在他们公司出版，”这就理所当然地与金融有联系啦，这是非常重要的。
《金融市场》这门课不是为就业所设计的课程，并不集中探讨业务知识，而是一门关于事件实际运作的智慧课程（an intellectual course about how things really work）。
希勒认为金融是所有发生诸多事件的基础，是蕴含在各种现象之中的一股强大力量。
他希望能通过本课程将其描绘出来（I hope we can draw that out in this course）。
耶鲁《金融市场》视频笔记（3）
I thought I would just remember a couple of highlights from the first two lectures to consolidate what we said then.我想重申一下上两节课的几个重点，以便巩固我们讲过的内容In the first lecture, I talked about a lot of things,but one theme that comes to my mind is the theme of the moral purpose and mission of the finance community.第一课里，我讲了很多东西，但中心主旨就是金融界的道德目标和使命We talked about the sense that, I think, young people have a sort of prejudice against the field and they think that finance is a field that you go into if you really value money rather than people.我们谈论了年轻人对这一行业的偏见，他们认为进入金融业的人金钱至上而不尊重他人I want to reiterate again that’s not the way I view the field at all.我想重申一下，我对金融界的看法与他们截然不同I was just yesterday, I gave a talk in Montreal at the Caisse de Dep----昨天，我刚在蒙特利的魁北克储蓄投资集团做了一个讲演which is the big wealth management fund for the Province of Quebec这个投资集团是魁北克省的一所大型财产管理基金机构I met a lot of people there and I never once got the idea that anyone there was evil or grasping.在那我见了很多人，但是我没有察觉到任何恶毒或者贪婪的气息I think they have a moral purpose, which is to preserve the livelihoods of the people of the Province of Quebec.我认为他们都有一个共同的道德目标，就是维持魁北克省居民的生计Y ou get a very different view of things when you meet the people.只有当你亲身面对这些人的时候，你会看到事情的另一面I think our entertainment industry likes to make movies about people in finance, but they are inevitably portrayed as evil and I don’t know why that is.娱乐产业喜欢制作关于金融业的电影，但里面的人物总是被刻画的很恶毒，我也不知道为什么I don’t think there has ever been a major motion picture about a financial person who ended up a philanthropist. Why is that?我觉得好像没有一部正儿八经的电影里金融业者最终成为了慈善家，为什么？I just don’t--people don’t like-- people would rather hate--我不…人们不喜欢…人们宁愿厌恶…I don’t know why it’s something--我不明白为什么It wouldn’t be a good movie theme, would it? Anyway, you have to overcome these--那不是好的电影主题吗？不管怎样，你们要克服这种想法…Y ou have to think that if you go into the field you would probably and if you’re successful, you would probably end up as a philanthropist. but no movie will be made about your life and you may eccounter hostility the whole way.你们要认为，如果你进入这一行，你很可能，如果你成功了，你很可能成为一位慈善家，但是不会有电影记录你的人生，而且你可能整天遭受白眼It’s especially true right now with the subprime crisis.在次贷危机下，情况更是如此People are blaming the financial community for our troubles now.现在，人们都把危机怪罪到金融界的头上It is true that we’re seeing some people thrown out of their houses, in some cases, because of some rather questionable financial practices that got people into mortgages that they shouldn’t have gotten into.确实我们看到有些人被赶出他们的房子，在有些案例中，确实是有些有问题的金融操纵，使人们背上本不该背负的债务But overall, I think that the people in this field are good people.但是总体来说，这一行业的人是好人In the last lecture, I talke about－－上一课，我讲了…In the second lecture, I talked about the pooling of risks and the basic theme of that lecture was that we now have a mathematical theory, probability theory.第二课，我讲了风险汇聚及分摊，那节课的主题是一门数学理论，即概率论When you look at this theory, you realize that it suggests a very important technology for improving human welfare and by spreading risks.这一理论，提出了一个重要的技术即可以通过分散风险，提高收益The economy, and technology, and the weather and all sorts of factors create risks.经济，科技，天气各种其他因素都可能创造风险But the real technoloty is-- the technology that works to eliminate risks is to spread them out to pool them, to share them among many different people.但是真正的技术，能够降低风险，通过风险汇聚，将风险分散，让很多人共同承担So, the idea that therists suggest and it may be unreachable, but the perfect financial system would have all of our risks pooled completely.理论家提出的这一理论，可能无法达到, 但是一个完美的金融体系，能够将所有的风险完全分摊That is, nobody suffers alone.也就是说，没有人独自承担损失If anything happens to me in my livelihood, then it’s spread out over everybody and everybody means the whole world.如果我的生计出问题了，他将分散到每个人身上，每个人指全世界的人Whatever happens to me, when it’s spread out over six billion plus people, it ends up divided by six billion and it becomes unobservable.发生在我身上的事，分散到六十多亿人口上被六十亿除，就变得难以察觉It becomes so small that it’s meaningless and that’s the ideal.小到微不足道，这就是完美模型That’s what, in principle, we can do and what I think is the most important concept in finance--this concept of risk pooling.原则上，这就是我们能做的，我认为这也是金融业最重要的概念，即风险汇聚及分摊We live in a world where people suffer all kinds of misfortunes.我们生活的这个世界，人们会经历各种的不幸Of course, we can try to get rid of these misfortunes. We can do research on disease prevention and weather modification and global warming.当然，我们能够避免这些不幸。
Lecture 14 Intro to HVAC
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Constant Volume Bypass
Bypass replaces reheat coil Total flow of system remains constant but flow of air to space is varied Excess flow is bypassed around zone and directly into return duct Saves the energy that would be used by the reheat coil Requires a return fan to avoid air short circuiting back into the room from the bypass; still have contact supply fan energy Usually only used in smaller applications where humidity control is not as important
Lecture 14a: Introduction to Secondary Systems
Material prepared by GARD Analytics, Inc. and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign under contract to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. All material Copyright 2002-2003 U.S.D.O.E. - All rights reserved
7
Advantages vs. Other System Types
Flexible: high degree of flexibility on how to meet loads, distribute air, etc. Low noise: most equipment kept away from occupied spaces Control: probably the best control of both temperature and humidity can be achieved with air systems (precise control situations) Most easily understood and popular Indoor air quality: IAQ is part of the system (not an “afterthought”)
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001.28,002.42我认为I think...the, sort of,002.42,006.45当你谈到金融市场时first thing that I think most people think about 006.45,007.26大多数人首先想到的事情or the first question007.26,011.11或者说首先想到的问题when you're thinking about financial markets is 011.11,012.43应该是市场是否有效whether they're efficient or not012.43,018.97市场是否已经包含了所有已知信息Whether they incorporate all known information018.97,020.75我们是否能够获得if it's possible to do, sort of,020.75,027.21比市场整体显著更佳的收益significantly better than the market as a whole.029.26,031.46我不太确定I'm not sure031.46,035.04曾经经济学绝对的共识是Used to be absolutely received economic wisdom035.04,037.79金融市场是有效的that financial markets were efficient.037.79,038.99现在呢Now it's...038.99,043.44我觉得从学术角度来讲这还是主流观点I think it's still the dominant academic view,043.45,048.46但出现了较大的争议but there's a big debate and048.46,051.74两方都有不少支持者there are partisans on both sides.051.74,052.97事实上对我而言It's actually...to me,052.97,055.64其实是个简单明了的问题it's actually a fairly simple question. 055.64,000.49市场有效性这个概念The efficient...the notion that markets are efficient000.49,003.16是从一个先验理论衍生而来derives from an a priori theory,003.16,006.38与所有市场理论同出一门which is the same sort of theory about all markets.006.38,007.38市场中有很多激励因素There are lots of incentives,007.38,011.57人根据自己的利益来行动people acting in their own interests,011.57,014.23他们就是这样they have to do that.014.23,019.95这是很诱人的先验理论It's a very appealing kind of a priori theory, 019.95,023.76可是任何理论的问题在于but the thing about theories is023.76,025.33它们要能拿来做预测they're supposed to make predictions.025.33,029.71如果预测的事情没有出现If some of the things they predict don't come true,029.71,031.63那么这个理论就得被抛弃the theory has to be disregarded031.63,033.48有非常多的例子and there are many, many,033.48,040.36可以推翻金融市场有效假说many counter examples to financial market efficiencies.041.35,044.84比如一些公司会发行On one level, there are things like companies 044.84,048.23两支不同的股票that have two different classes of stock048.23,050.86但是这两只股票在经济意义上完全相同that are economically identical. 052.82,059.86皇家壳牌曾经在荷兰发行过股份Royal Shell used to have Dutch shares 059.86,02:10.55也在伦敦发行过股份that traded in Holland and U.K. Shares traded in London.02:10.55,02:13.22经济意义上两者完全相同Economically identical,02:13.22,02:18.62但价格却有波动和极大的差别变化but their prices would fluctuate and fairly dramatically.02:21.92,02:24.1798年我忘了是哪一边In '98, I forget which way,02:24.17,02:29.21价格比另一方少了百分之二十but one of the share classes was at a 20% discount to the other02:29.21,02:31.72而且这一情况持续数年and that persisted for several years,02:31.72,02:34.07经济意义上一样的东西so you have economically identical things 02:34.07,02:35.99却以不同的价格交易trading at different prices.02:36.50,02:38.40再比如封闭式基金You have closed end funds,02:38.40,02:44.60是投资于其他证券一种方式which are vehicles that own a set of other securities02:44.60,02:46.82它的基金券也当成证券在交易所交易trade as a security listed on the stock exchange,02:46.82,02:49.94但它的作用在于持有别的证券but what they do is own other securities.02:50.32,02:53.74封基基金券是否以折价进行交易And whether they trade to a discount 02:53.74,02:55.54封基基金券的价格相对基金持有的whether the security in the closed end fund02:55.54,02:58.65证券的价值是否会出现折价或者溢价trades at a discount or a premium to the stuff they own02:59.86,03:03.44这种波动现象很能说明问题fluctuates meaningfully in a way03:03.44,03:07.49也就是说我们很难认可that's sort of difficult to recognize with the idea03:07.49,03:16.28"证券应该反映其经济价值"这一理念that the securities should be reflecting economic value.03:18.00,03:20.87当一家上市公司You have what are called stubs,03:20.87,03:24.33拥有另一家上市公司的大量股权时where one public company owns a significant stake03:24.33,03:26.88就会出现所谓的残股价值in another public company.03:24.33,03:26.88{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}[注释: 残股Stub 指当一家公司的主体价值被剥离之后\N剩余部分的股权价值]03:29.53,03:36.793Com就曾经拥有Palm的股份In instances where the one 3Com owned Palm,03:29.53,03:33.08{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}[注释Palm在上市前就由3Com控股此时3Com已经是上市公司了03:33.08,03:36.79{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}上市时3COM决定按照1股3COM股票对1.5股PALM股票的比例\N置换原3COM股东的股份03:36.79,03:39.52而且它持有的Palm股份价值and the value of its Palm stake greatly exceeded03:36.79,03:39.52{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}因此PALM上市后 3COM的股票价值应是PALM股票价值的1.5倍03:39.52,03:45.51远远超过3Com的总市值the total value of the market capitalization of 3Com;03:39.52,03:42.75{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}结果PALM上市价格是95.06美元\N3COM的价格则跌到了81.81美元03:42.75,03:45.51{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}这使得股权置换能够获得60.78美元/3COM股的无风险收益03:45.51,03:51.33这持续了很多年that persisted for a number of years.03:45.51,03:51.33{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}这个案例是对金融市场有效性的彻底否定]03:52.14,03:58.69一般说来波动性小的股票In general, less volatile stocks have done better03:52.14,03:58.69{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}[注释因为根据有效市场如果波动性小的股票确实收益较好03:58.69,04:02.10长期内的表现要比波动性大的股票好over time than more volatile stocks, which is somewhat03:58.69,04:02.10{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}那么投资者就会买入这种股票\N结果是使其价格升高收益率降低04:02.10,04:08.26这就和有效市场理论有出入inconsistent with the notion of efficient markets.04:02.10,04:08.26{\an8}{\fn方正黑体简体\fs18\b1\bord1\shad1\3c&H2F2F2F&}那么在长期就不应该总是收益率偏高]04:11.42,04:17.34还有很大一部分个人投资者Lastly, there is a meaningful number of individuals04:17.34,04:24.36和机构投资者其业绩...and institutions whose, sort of, performance look04:24.36,04:28.58在投资组合上的业绩whose performance in portfolios04:28.58,04:34.27与市场有效的理论预测很不相同is really inconsistent with the markets being efficient.04:34.27,04:42.02很难解释其中一些It can't really be explained away by some of them can but04:42.02,04:47.88也许是靠运气内部消息或者别的by luck or by inside information or by something,04:52.82,04:57.24当中就有一些理论上的争议while there's sort of a big academic debate.04:57.24,05:01.37还比如像互联网泡沫Then lastly, there are things like the Internet bubble,05:01.37,05:04.35或是最近的房地产泡沫or more recently the housing bubble,05:04.35,05:08.96他们一般不这么叫or they're not usually called this,05:08.96,05:14.56借贷泡沫或者次贷危机butthe lending bubble where or the subprime mess.05:14.56,05:17.04许多的贷款Lots and lots of loans,05:17.04,05:20.74人们以票面价购入的债券the securities that people bought at par 05:20.74,05:22.77现在的市场价格大概that were worth about somewhere05:22.77,05:28.96不超过0.15或者0.2美元between zero and $.15 or $.20 and now trade there.05:32.54,05:35.21我不认为市场是有效的I don't believe that markets are efficient05:35.21,05:39.75而且实际看起来也不像and it doesn't really seem like05:39.75,05:41.58这个争议还没有定论it should be an open question.05:41.58,05:45.45坚信市场有效的人终将逝去The people that believe it have to die 05:45.45,05:48.10他们之后则不会有人再崇信有效市场and then nobody will believe it anymore.05:48.77,05:50.50他们中的大多数不会改变想法Not very many of them change their mind 05:50.50,05:54.65于是想出更多复杂的解释though they come up with more convoluted explanations05:54.65,06:04.44以聪明而复杂的方式来解释那些反例clever, convoluted explanations for the counter factual06:04.44,06:06.60解释那些理论预测不到for the things that happen in reality06:06.60,06:11.17但在现实中出现的事情that the theory doesn't predict.06:13.09,06:17.35所以市场并不是那么有效So, markets aren't that efficient. 06:17.35,06:20.56另一方面On the other hand,06:20.56,06:25.33要比市场表现得更好sort of doing better than the markets06:25.33,06:28.77却不是轻易就能做到is a non-trivial exercise06:28.77,06:37.18而且不像看起来那么简单and it's not as easy as it might appear or as06:37.18,06:38.86我的意思是有些人觉得不可能I mean, some people think it's impossible;06:38.86,06:42.32另一些人觉得很容易other people think it's really easy.06:42.32,06:46.20事实上不是不可能不过很难实现It's actually not impossible, but hard,06:46.20,06:50.00这里面有许多考验and there are a number of challenges.06:50.68,06:54.11首先对个人而言First, for individuals,06:54.11,06:58.77最基本的考验就是I think the primary challenge is06:58.77,07:00.67如果某人专注于if an individual sticks to, sort of,07:00.67,07:04.30一些他们拥有信息优势的领域areas where they might have an informational advantage07:04.30,07:07.80或者说至少没有信息劣势or at least don't have an informational disadvantage,07:07.80,07:14.15那么他们就不会有分散化的投资组合they won't own a diversified portfolio of securities07:14.15,07:21.44因为他们的信息优势领域范围太小because their informational advantage will be narrow.07:21.71,07:30.62他们在大范围内获取产品的途径也是有限的They also have sort of limited access to the gamut of products07:30.62,07:32.43诸如此类的and so forth07:33.04,07:37.91受限的途径和受限的供应restricted access and restricted offerings.07:37.91,07:42.88是对个体的考验So, that's a challenge for individuals.07:44.07,07:52.72而机构更像是专业的投资人Institutions are sort of professional investors;07:52.72,07:57.86他们在信息的获取上花大量的金钱all spend a lot of money oninformation,08:03.87,08:06.96这需要一整套基础架构和资源等等which requires infrastructure and resources and so forth.08:06.96,08:09.27很大程度上But the very, sort of,08:09.27,08:15.34机构的特性限制住了所有的人nature of being an institution constrains almost everybody08:15.34,08:19.57不管如何whether it's,08:19.57,08:23.10在我们的例子中in our case,08:23.10,08:25.13所有投资人都要求月流动性all our investors have thirty-day liquidity.08:25.13,08:28.93在共同基金里They can, in mutual funds,08:28.93,08:29.94要求的是日流动性it's daily liquidity,08:29.94,08:35.69但它们的投资人往往不够警醒but their investors tend not to be as wide-awake.08:35.69,08:40.36不过这对我们是个约束But that's a constraint on us that,08:40.36,08:43.40除掉本金以外except for the principles,08:43.40,08:46.16可能整个基金家族也可能不是maybe their families maybe not, 08:46.16,08:48.65所有钱都可能在一个月里清空all our money can disappear in thirty days,08:48.65,08:52.67我们需要认识到这点so we have to be cognizant of that.08:55.28,08:57.18有部分客户We have clients that have, sort of,08:57.18,09:03.11有一系列期望a set of expectations,09:03.11,09:06.23即便你没有意识到which you also have to,09:06.23,09:12.66你也不得不处理这些if not be cognizant about, sort of deal with. 09:12.66,09:16.61还有一些Then there are, kind of,09:16.61,09:22.64普遍的心理考验universal psychological challenges09:22.64,09:29.25人类思维的偏差biases in people's thinking09:29.25,09:34.15以及很多其他的and a number of things that are just, sort of, 09:34.15,09:37.67对人类而言difficult for human beings09:37.67,09:41.67很难处理并作出明智的决定to process and make intelligent decisions.09:41.67,09:47.47这些问题属于我的研究范围I think that's kind of in the area of mine 09:47.47,09:48.67其中一个and one of the things09:48.67,09:55.44驱使我去请教了希勒教授that drew me to Professor Shiller09:55.44,09:57.74以及他的一些同僚and some of his other colleagues09:57.74,103.19这很普遍不仅仅是在金融市场上and that's really universal to not just financial markets113.04,115.26在所有决策问题中都会遇到but to all decision making.115.26,119.50特别是这里面I think, particularly in the kinds of the things119.50,126.11混合了一系列随机性以及技巧性that have a serious mix of randomness and skill126.11,131.18这是人类最难处理的问题-that's sort of the hardest thing for human beings to process131.18,132.52这中间混合了 -something that's kind of132.52,136.98未知的随机性和技巧an unknown mix of randomness and skill.140.27,143.34也许我们理解一些完全随机的东西We can understand something that's fully random143.34,147.60算出统计数字 and work out the statistics147.60,153.53获得某程度上的满意and be comfortable with that to some degree. 155.57,159.57那些板上钉钉的东西Things that are sort of completely cut and dry, 159.57,106.39完全决定性的我们也爱fully determinative, we like those too, 106.39,114.30但混合起来的就变得很难很难了but stuff that's mixed is very, very hard.114.68,118.46像量子力学对一般人而言毫无意义Quantum mechanics makes sense to no human being,120.89,122.33在我看来in my view.123.92,126.70在某些方面In those areas,126.70,132.85人们会倾向于做一些奇怪的事情people are inclined to do sort of strange things.132.85,135.02我想说的是I mean, one thing136.57,138.75我玩过不少I play a fair amount of138.75,140.09我玩扑克牌I play a little bit of poker140.09,141.52我对此很感兴趣and I'm very interested in the game.141.52,142.78这有点像It's sort of142.78,144.64有点像市场it's a little like the markets144.64,146.87还有一点就是and other things in that146.87,149.66也有一些随机的元素there's an element of randomness149.66,153.21和一些技术的元素and an element of skill.153.21,158.87我发现一点有趣的是One thing that I find interesting158.87,12:03.60通常如果你在牌室或赌场里玩扑克typically, if you play poker in a card room or a casino,12:03.60,12:08.98牌桌上的人十有八九I would say nine times out of ten somebody sitting at the table12:08.98,12:11.31会说他们没有尽力will tell you that they're not trying;12:11.31,12:13.27经常都是这样it almost always happens.12:13.27,12:15.99他们会说They'll say,12:15.99,12:18.30我平常玩的更大I usually play for more money12:18.30,12:19.65这次难以引起我的兴趣and it's hard to concentrate12:19.65,12:25.69或者说我只是随便玩玩or I'm just screwing around.12:27.27,12:28.38他们为什么这么做Why do they do that?12:28.38,12:31.84是什么原因What's why do they not12:31.84,12:33.33他们可能真的只是随便玩玩they could just be screwing around, 12:33.33,12:36.20可为什么他们要告诉你but why do they tell you?12:36.20,12:45.90我自己杜撰了一个理论就是It's kind of my pet theory that they would rather12:45.90,12:48.81他们提前做出输的假设they're setting up in advance to lose. 12:48.81,12:50.17他们宁愿以输为前提They would rather lose12:50.17,12:53.15因为随便玩玩而输了because they're sort of screwing around than12:53.15,12:55.26他们也会好接受一些 -that's easier for them to,12:55.26,12:58.38于是再说出最好的成绩 sort of, deal with than to12:58.38,13:01.97证明他们可以做得更好-they could put out their best game and they would do better,13:01.97,13:05.71可随机的情况下 but they might lose anyone given its,13:05.71,13:07.21他们有可能输给任意一个人sort of, randomness.13:07.21,13:13.11就像一个扑克高手It is that's the thing about really good poker players13:13.11,13:14.84对上一个稍逊的对手versus less good poker players.13:14.84,13:18.99真正的高手每一次都能发挥近乎自己最高的水平Really good poker players play close to their best all the time13:18.99,13:24.44而且他们输的时候也不会烦恼and they're not really bothered when they lose;13:24.44,13:30.25金融市场里也是一样I think that's true in markets too.13:30.25,13:32.10在做各种决策时In all sorts of decisions,13:32.10,13:35.22人们会倾向于what people are inclined to do13:35.22,13:40.79或者说喜欢的做法是or are very interested in doing is13:40.79,13:43.27先竖立起值得信任的姿态setting up posturing for credit13:43.27,13:45.78并预先归咎好责任and blame in advance13:45.78,13:50.56如果事情并不如意的话 and sort of having a pre-made excuse 13:50.56,13:52.29可以说是提前找好一个借口if things don't go right.13:52.29,13:55.31他们更感兴趣的是They're more interested,13:55.31,13:56.45至少在某程度上to some degree at least,13:56.45,14:00.23在事情不如意时找借口in having an excuse if things don't go right, 14:00.23,14:03.41也比尽可能让事情如愿更好办than in sort of maximizing the chance that things go right14:03.41,14:08.98毕竟再如何最大化实现的可能性because even maximizing the chance that things go right,14:09.78,14:11.42你也不能百分百保证you can't get it to be 100%;14:11.42,14:14.19这就是随机性的原理there's an element of randomness.14:15.29,14:18.21不好的事情总有可能发生Bad things can happen,14:18.21,14:22.28所以很难so it's really, really hard14:22.28,14:25.20只专于于好的一面 to just focus on getting things right14:25.20,14:28.04而且也不能在争论中胜出and not winning the argument.14:28.04,14:29.72在事前为自己找好退路Setting yourself up before the fact14:29.72,14:32.46这样在事后的争论中才能胜出so that you can win an argument after the fact,14:32.46,14:39.31于是你并非...只是倒霉而已so that you didn't you just got unlucky. 14:45.33,14:48.80人们更倾向于People are very inclined to see things14:48.80,14:53.32以成败来论英雄as determinative to attribute14:53.32,14:54.49这不仅仅是在市场里and not just in markets,14:54.49,14:59.34在心理学文献里but in the psychology literature15:00.25,15:01.64如果to believe if15:01.64,15:03.01固有的思维定式是you're wired to believe if something15:03.01,15:08.82如果A在B之前发生那么A是B的原因if A happened before B, A caused B.15:08.82,15:12.03B一定是某件事的结果B has to be caused by something15:12.03,15:14.69而A是先发生的and A happened first,15:15.22,15:23.88所以A是原因人们依此认定因果关系before it, so that's what so they assign causality.15:23.88,15:28.48人们还倾向于参照就近的事物They're also inclined to focus on sort of recent things15:28.48,15:40.05即便你明知道这些事物是不相关的things they see even if you know they're irrelevant.15:40.05,15:43.11举个例子心理学文献里For example, in the psychology literature, 15:43.11,15:45.49有个很出名的例子famous example is15:45.49,15:49.00是个很有名的测试问题famous kind of test question is:15:49.68,15:55.96测试人会给被测人a tester will give the person taking the test 15:55.96,15:57.06两个从未听过的the name of two cities15:57.06,15:58.75城市名称that they've never heard of15:58.75,16:01.55以及这两个城市相距多远and the distance that they're apart. 16:01.98,16:04.87比如说随便两个城市So, two random cities,16:04.87,16:07.44XYZ和ABCXYZ and ABC,16:07.44,16:11.35相距4200英里are 4,200 miles apart.16:11.35,16:13.64然后再给他们另外两个Then they'll give them two other cities 16:13.64,16:15.11同样没听说过的城市that they've never heard of16:15.11,16:18.51让他们猜两个城市相距多远and ask them how far apart they think they are.16:18.51,16:21.41人们都会被已知的信息禁锢People anchor to the information they were given,16:21.41,16:24.15尽管没有任何因果关系even though there's kind of no causality 16:24.15,16:25.62也没有or no sort of reason16:25.62,16:27.56为何会有所不同的原因why it should make any difference.16:27.56,16:29.83假如参照的城市If the referenced cities,16:29.83,16:32.52第一组相聚4200英里the first cities, are 4,200 miles apart, 16:32.52,16:36.68那么另一组的回答就会在4200英里左右the answers for the next two will center around 4,200 miles.16:36.68,16:42.27如果参照城市之间相聚2500英里If the referenced cities were 2,500 miles apart,16:42.27,16:46.74回答也大约在那个数字的左右they'll center about that.16:52.36,16:53.77我认为这是很有用的I think it's useful to, sort of,16:53.77,16:56.13我们需要了解所有固有的心理偏见know all the hard-wiring biases 16:56.13,17:06.52人们应该努力修正这些思维偏见that people have to try and de-bias your thinking,17:06.52,17:12.94但这很不容易而且很多情况下but it's not easy and in lots of cases 17:12.94,17:16.07人们志不在此it's not actually people's objectives.17:16.94,17:21.59有人看CNBC的《我为钱狂》吗吉姆·克拉默那部Any of you watch Mad Money on CNBC Jim Cramer?17:21.59,17:26.12有克拉默的粉丝吗没有吗Any Cramerites? Nobody?17:28.27,17:32.14节目开始时他说Well he starts his show,17:33.08,17:35.25"有些人想交朋友"Some people want to make friends;17:35.25,17:37.59而我只想赚钱"I just want to make money."17:37.59,17:40.14如果你有看过节目里的克拉默If you watch the show and you see Cramer,17:40.14,17:42.53其实是很可信的it's pretty believable.17:42.53,17:47.03我觉得是真的I think it's true.17:49.38,17:55.05金融市场里几乎每个人都可以这么说Almost everybody in financial markets is capable of saying that.17:56.97,17:58.15"我不想交朋友"I don't want to make friends,17:58.15,17:59.35我只想赚钱"I just want to make money."17:59.35,18:01.88不过大多数人都不是这样But for most of them it's not true.18:01.88,18:04.42除了赚钱外They have all sorts of things18:04.42,18:08.39他们还有很多想做的事that they want to do other than make money. 18:08.39,18:09.62他们有办公室政治They have office politics;18:09.62,18:20.60还有其他各种动力they have any number of other motivations. 18:21.74,18:26.66这方面的心理学很难That psychology is really hard18:26.66,18:31.80某程度上不仅适用于市场and somewhat applicable to not just markets,18:31.80,18:34.76还有其他事物but other things.18:41.14,18:42.17市场并不是有效的Markets aren't efficient,18:42.17,18:48.12不过要击败市场也不那么容易but it's not that easy to beat them. 18:48.90,18:51.13我们该怎么做呢What do we try to do?18:51.13,18:52.58像我的话I, kind of,18:52.58,18:57.75会强调我所认为的would highlight what I view18:57.75,19:01.42三种原则as three sorts of principles.19:01.42,19:03.94第一种The first,19:05.08,19:08.07在投资领域里the investment world,19:08.07,19:09.19我相信I believe,19:09.19,19:12.81存在一类息票投资者divides between coupon clippers19:12.81,19:18.76债券一直都支付息票bonds historically came with coupons,19:18.76,19:20.11相当于现实中的优惠券actual sort of coupons19:20.11,19:24.61就是那种你拿去去杂货店like the thing you bring to the grocery store19:24.61,19:29.09一杯咖啡可以便宜个二十五美分的那种and get twenty-five cents off a can of coffee.19:29.09,19:30.87就像有一支债券So, we have this security19:30.87,19:36.39期限十年附有二十张息票优惠券and a ten-year bond would have twenty coupons attached,19:36.39,19:38.11每一张都有日期each with a date on them.19:38.11,19:40.48当时间到了When the date came,19:40.48,19:42.13就可以把优惠券剪下来you would cut the coupon off19:42.13,19:46.23去银行拿你该得的利息and go to the bank and get your interestpayment.19:46.23,19:48.53这就叫剪息票So, that was called coupon clipping.19:49.09,19:52.32基本上息票是Basically, something that you would19:52.32,19:53.09息票就是coupons are things19:53.09,19:57.24你赎回的一笔现金流that you redeem for a stream of money and, 19:57.24,19:57.70在我看来in my view,19:57.70,202.26投资世界里分为息票投资者the world divides between coupon clippers 202.26,205.27即对现金流感兴趣people that are interested in cash flow205.27,207.85想获得持续现金收益的人and taking in cash flow207.85,209.82而另一类我称为and, what I would call,209.82,212.37证券转售者security resellers213.07,214.68这类人希望将拥有的资产people that own things that214.68,220.04在未来以更高的价格they intend to sell to somebody220.04,224.27卖给别的人in the future at a higher price.225.19,226.86既有成功的息票投资者There are successful coupon clippers226.86,229.93也有成功的证券转售者and there are successful securities resellers and 229.93,232.18他们倾向于they tend to make their money off232.18,239.55从其他投资失败者那里赚钱of the unsuccessful people in the other class.242.07,243.54我们尽量We try to be243.54,248.30我认为投资目的还是获得息票I think investing is about clipping coupons,248.30,250.96获得现金流收益about getting cash flow250.96,257.21获得并且控制这些现金流and getting and controlling cash flow,257.21,200.45不过仍然有成功的转售者but there are good resellers.200.45,205.43我认为转售的原理和风险投资类似I think reselling is an element of things like venture capital.205.43,209.23最好的风险投资家The best venture capitalists209.23,213.11不仅有好的理念don't just have great ideas or whatever,213.11,216.98而且在有了理念后but they take an idea,216.98,219.54能够先于他人实践理念they advance it a little bit,219.54,221.37把它包装起来and then they sex it up221.37,224.79然后推销出去他们对公众会接受什么and promote it and have a good sense224.79,227.27很有一套for what the public will buy227.27,231.26并能获得公众的良好评价and they get a nice valuation from the public. 231.26,238.09我认为这至少和拥有好的理念一样I think that's at least as much a distinguishing feature238.09,242.59是成功的风险投资家between good venture capitalists among each other 242.59,246.74区别于一般人的显著特质as the quality of their ideas.246.74,249.73有一些像克拉默这样的\NThere are sort of–Cramer,249.73,256.83克拉默是很好的证券转售者Cramer was a good security reseller256.83,258.98可以说非常棒had sort of a really good258.98,22:01.85他花了大量的时间精力去找出spent a lot of time and effort kind offiguring out22:01.85,22:04.96公众下周想买什么what is it that people will want to buy next week. 22:04.96,22:08.84也就是我今天要买的That's what I'll buy today22:08.84,22:12.99不是因为我可以从中获得什么not because I'll derive income off of it,22:12.99,22:19.71而是因为人们下周会想要买but because it's what people are going to want next week22:19.71,22:21.58这样我就能以高价卖出and I'll be able to sell it higher.22:21.58,22:23.87这是一种艺术That's some art,22:23.87,22:24.77一种学问some science,22:24.77,22:29.82有些人的确非常精于此道and there are people that are very, very good at it.22:33.40,22:36.69我们努力获得息票收益We try to clip coupons.22:39.86,22:41.32对于一些人As to some22:41.32,22:45.22像是沃伦·巴菲特的理念it's a Warren Buffetism22:45.22,22:52.96他说所有投资都可以看做剪息票he says, all investing is about coupon clipping and22:52.96,22:55.76不过股票与债券不同的是the difference between equities and bonds 22:55.76,22:59.68债券的息票是固定的are that bonds come with a coupon that's known 22:59.68,23:01.38而股票的未来收益and equities have earnings23:01.38,23:04.73我们是不知道的in the future that you don't know.23:04.73,23:05.71你也不知道You also don't know that23:05.71,23:09.19把收入给了大股东和管理层以后they'll give them to the equity owners and to management and not to23:09.19,23:13.91他们会不会乱花掉they won't squander in the future.23:13.91,23:17.26不过对巴菲特而言是一样的But to Buffet it's sort of same thing 23:17.26,23:19.18都是剪息票 -it's clipping coupons23:19.18,23:20.73他说他的工作只是and he describes his job23:20.73,23:24.92发现股票当中的息票收益as figuring out what the coupon is in an equity23:25.52,23:29.04收益足够高的股票才合他的胃口and if it's high enough he likes it. 23:30.25,23:34.19所以我的第一个原则就是获得息票收益The first sort of principle to me is clipping coupons.23:36.99,23:45.48第二原则所谓风险是指The second is that risk is primarily about 23:45.48,23:48.72有可能发生的最糟糕的事what is the worst thing that can happen. 23:49.24,23:52.60典型的In a typical security23:52.60,23:55.38华尔街式证券风险管理Wall Street risk management23:57.33,24:00.54重点关注a lot of focus is in24:00.54,24:05.78可能结果的概率区间what is the range of moderately probable outcomes.24:05.78,24:09.72所以人们常常谈论VaRSo, people talk about VaR,24:09.72,24:12.05在险价值value at risk,24:12.05,24:16.42许多人尝试建立一套在险价值体系and lots of people try and build VaR systems.24:16.85,24:19.54他们努力确定的是What they are trying to determine is24:19.54,24:22.76某个可能结果的范围有多广how wide is the band of outcomes.24:22.76,24:24.73比如说以95%或者98%的可能性How wide is the band of stuff24:24.73,24:31.36结果会落在多大的范围内that has a 95% probability or a 98% probability24:31.36,24:37.54通常是95%或者98% 不会是99.9%usually 95% or 98%, but not 99.9%. 24:37.54,24:45.23如果知道有98%的可能性If you know I have a 98% chance24:45.23,24:48.24你的损失不会超过1美元of not losing a dollar24:48.24,24:53.26这可以在VaR系统中显示出来that works in the VaR screen and the 24:53.26,24:55.19可它却不会告诉你and it won't tell you24:55.19,24:56.36不会明白地告诉你-won't distinguish between24:56.36,25:02.14剩下2%的可能你是损失10美元还是100美元whether the 2% chance is of losing $10 or losing $100.25:02.68,25:06.78对我而言To me,25:09.19,25:14.43这根本是错误的方法that's a fundamentally wrong approach25:14.43,25:15.53但实际上就这么操作and it's actually done25:15.53,25:19.57因为这些because it's the sort of thing25:19.57,25:23.38是统计学家擅长的that statisticians are good at.25:24.41,25:25.11某程度上To some degree,25:25.11,25:27.92预测最差的结果要比it's harder to imagine the worst thing25:27.92,25:35.03用统计方法找出中间范围要难得多than to statistically sort of figure out the middle band.25:35.50,25:37.26有个著名的说法There's a famous saying,25:37.26,25:41.15"利锤在手万物皆钉""If you're good with a hammer, everything looks like a nail."25:41.15,25:47.63说的就是这么一回事That's sort of what that's like,25:47.63,25:51.55真正重要的应该是but the really important thing is25:51.55,25:55.06有可能发生的最糟情况是什么what's the worst thing that can happen. 25:57.06,26:02.26最后一个原则就是The last sort of principle,26:02.26,26:12.72这也是学术界和一般认知which is actually most at odds with the academic community and even,26:12.72,26:18.67最大的争论所在the general perception is that26:18.67,26:21.84人们不因承受风险而得到补偿you don't get paid for taking risk, 26:21.84,26:24.99而是因为消除风险而获得报酬you get paid for eliminating risk. 26:24.99,26:30.49事实上我相信历史上I actually believe in the history of the planet,26:30.49,26:32.77只有极少数的例子there are very, very few instances of people 26:32.77,26:34.77是由于承担风险而获得了补偿getting paid for taking risk;26:34.77,26:37.59人们大都是消除了风险而获得报酬they get paid for eliminating it. 26:39.19,26:42.42举个例子As an example,26:42.42,26:52.10你试想一下在马戏团里走钢丝的人if you think about a tightrope walker in the circus,26:53.50,26:55.57有个这样一种观点there's a conception26:55.57,26:58.32他获得报酬是因为这是份危险的工作that he gets paid because it's arisky job26:58.32,27:01.58他有可能摔下来he might fall down,27:01.58,27:03.33死掉kill himself.27:03.33,27:06.11我觉得这种观点是完全错误的I think that conception is completely wrong.27:06.11,27:11.45从有生之年获得的报酬来看The lifetime earnings of a tightwire walker who falls down27:11.45,27:15.03一位摔死的走钢丝者挣的没多好and kills himself aren't very good. 27:15.03,27:16.30事实上In fact,27:16.30,27:18.01他获得的报酬是依靠what he's getting paid for is27:18.01,27:19.75从小进行大量练习that he practiced a whole lot27:19.75,27:23.30如果从钢丝上摔下来when he was a little kid on a wire27:23.30,27:26.53怎样做才不会受伤that if he fell off of he wasn't going to get hurt 27:27.79,27:30.17他真正是靠练习and that he's really getting paid27:30.17,27:33.15来消除从钢丝上摔下的风险for eliminating the risk of falling off 27:33.15,27:37.81从而获得报酬via practice as opposed to taking it.27:37.81,27:40.16你可以想想药物开发You think about drug development27:40.16,27:43.55像制药公司有人会说pharmaceutical companies and people will say,27:43.55,27:47.95开发能用于生产有效药剂的化合物well discovering compounds27:47.95,27:52.25是一门无法预测的that are effective drugs is an uncertain,27:52.25,27:57.46很有风险的生意所以制药公司risky business and so pharmaceutical companies are27:57.46,28:03.17靠承担风险获得报酬able to get paid for taking that risk.28:03.66,28:04.52我不这么认为I don't think so.28:04.52,28:10.20我认为他们获得报酬是靠才智I think they get paid for applying intelligence28:10.20,28:12.55不是去测试每一样and not testing every28:12.55,28:14.00不是靠对化合物进行测试来撞运not for the compounds they test, 28:14.00,28:18.15而是借助掌握的化学原理but for the ones that they've eliminated testing for28:18.15,28:24.77或者某个疾病的机理because they understand the chemistry28:24.77,28:26.62筛去不符的化合物or a disease process28:26.62,28:28.60并且形成and have some idea28:28.60,28:40.90什么样的化合物会更有效的构想what sort of compounds are more likely to work than others.28:40.90,28:43.00不知道希勒教授还记不记得I don't know if he remembers this. 28:43.00,28:47.27上一次我把这个解释给他听时When I last explained this to Professor Shiller,28:47.27,28:49.44他说那保险公司又怎样he said, well what about insurance companies?28:49.44,28:55.91我说正好可以证明我的观点I said, proves my point the sort of exact case.28:57.74,29:09.94个人面临特定的坏事件所带来的风险An individual has risk of。