[X.229] Protocol Specification for the Remote Operations Service Element,
IPv6 演进技术要求 基于 IPv6 段路由(SRv6)的 IP 承载网络-最新国标
IPv6演进技术要求第2部分：基于IPv6段路由(SRv6)的IP承载网络1 范围本文件规定了基于SRv6的IP承载网络总体架构、基于SRv6的设备层技术要求及基于SRv6的管控层技术要求。
本文件适用于支持SRv6的IP承载网络。
2 规范性引用文件下列文件中的内容通过文中的规范性引用而构成本文件必不可少的条款。
其中，注日期的引用文件，仅该日期对应的版本适用于本文件；不注日期的引用文件，其最新版本（包括所有的修改单）适用于本文件。
IETF RFC2493 IPv6规范中的通用报文隧道（Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification）IETF RFC4659 IPv6 VPN场景中的BGP-MPLS IP虚拟私有网络扩展（BGP-MPLS IP Virtual Private Network (VPN) Extension for IPv6 VPN）IETF RFC5549 通告带有IPv6下一跳地址的IPv4网络层可达性信息（Advertising IPv4 Network Layer Reachability Information with an IPv6 Next Hop）IETF RFC6437 IPv6流标签规范（IPv6 Flow Label Specification）IETF RFC6514 MPLS/BGP IP VPN中提供组播服务的BGP编码与处理（BGP Encodings and Procedures for Multicast in MPLS/BGP IP VPNs）IETF RFC7432 基于BGP MPLS的EVPN（BGP MPLS-Based Ethernet VPN）IETF RFC7606 改进的BGP更新消息的错误处理（Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages）IETF RFC8200 互联网协议第六版规范（Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification）IETF RFC8402 分段路由架构（Segment Routing Architecure）IETF RFC8754 IPv6段路由报头(IPv6 Segment Routing Header)IETF RFC8986 SRv6网络编程（Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Network Programming）IETF RFC9252 基于SRv6的BGP overlay业务(BGP Overlay Services Based on Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6))IETF RFC9352 支持SRv6的ISIS扩展(IS-IS Extensions to Support Segment Routing over the IPv6 Data Plane）GB/T XXXXX IPv6演进技术要求第4部分：基于IPv6段路由(SRv6)的网络编程GB/T XXXXX IPv6演进技术要求第7部分：基于IPv6段路由(SRv6)的业务链GB/T XXXXX IPv6演进技术要求第8部分：基于IPv6段路由(SRv6)的报文头压缩GB/T XXXXX IPv6演进技术要求第9部分：基于IPv6段路由(SRv6)的网络故障保护3 术语、定义和缩略语3.1 术语和定义下列术语和定义适用于本文件。
BMS中英翻译
J. BMS Management System (BMS)樓宇管理系统1 General Description總則1.1 GeneralThe Contractor shall design supply, install, commission and maintenance completeBMS system. This Section of specification details the requirements for the EnergyManagement System associated with the building service systems covered by thispart of the Contract Work and the interface with services included in other parts of theContract Works, those of others such as that for the lift installation, and other futureinstallations/expansions. The control system and instrumentation shall in generalcomply with the general specification.承包商應設計、供應、安裝、調詴和維修完整的BMS系統。
說明書的此節詳細說明承包工程此部分所包括的建築設備系統的能源管理系統，及承包工程其他部分所包括的服務接口，比如電梯安裝和待安裝、拓展的系統接口和服務。
總體上，控制系統和測詴設備應符合總技術說明。
1.1.1 Design Requirements設計要求The Contractor shall be responsible for the design, installation and selection ofequipment and components, including the matching of components to ensure thesystem comply with the specified performance requirements.承包商應負責設備和配件的設計、安裝和選擇，包括配件的搭配，以確保系統符合指定性能要求。
web安全试题及答案整理涵盖考点考题
Part 1.Explanation of Terms, 30 pointsNOTE: Give the definitions or explanations of the following terms, 5 points for each.(1)Data IntegrityAssures that information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner.In information security, integrity means that data cannot be modified undetectably.Integrity is violated when a message is actively modified in transit. Information security systems typically provide messageintegrity in addition to data confidentiality(2)Information Security AuditAn information security audit is an audit on the level of information security in an organization(3)PKIPKI provides well-conceived infrastructures to deliver security services in an efficient and unified style. PKI is a long-term solutionthat can be used to provide a large spectrum of security protection.(4)X.509In cryptography, X.509 is an ITU-T standard for a public key infrastructure (PKI) for single sign-on (SSO,单点登录)and Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI,特权管理基础架构).The ITU-T recommendation X.509 defines a directory service that maintains a database of information about users for theprovision of authentication services…(5)Denial-of-Service AttackDoS (Denial of Service) is an attempt by attackers to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users.(6)SOA(Service-Oriented Architecture)SOA is a flexible set of design principles used during the phases of systems development and integration in computing. A systembased on a SOA will package functionality as a suite of interoperable services that can be used within multiple, separate systemsfrom several business domains.(7)Access ControlAccess control is a system that enables an authority to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility orcomputer - based information system. An access control system, within the field of physical security, is generally seen as the second layer in the security of a physical structure.(Access control refers to exerting control over who can interact with a resource. Often but not always, this involves an authority,who does the controlling. The resource can be a given building, group of buildings, or computer-based information system. But itcan also refer to a restroom stall where access is controlled by using a coin to open the door)(8)Salted ValueIn cryptography, a salt consists of random bits, creating one of the inputs to a one-way function. The other input is usually apassword or passphrase. The output of the one-way function can be stored (alongside the salt) rather than the password, and stillbe used for authenticating users. The one-way function typically uses a cryptographic hash function. A salt can also be combinedwith a password by a key derivation function such as PBKDF2 to- generate a key for use with a cipher or other cryptographicalgorithm. The benefit provided by using a salted password is making a lookup table assisted dictionary attack against the storedvalues impractical, provided the salt is large enough. That is, an attacker would not be able to create a precomputed lookup table(i.e. a rainbow table) of hashed values (password i salt), because it would require a large computation for each salt.(9)SOAPSOAP is a protocol specification for exchanging structured information in the implementation of Web Services in computernetworks. It relies on Extensible Markup Language (XML) for its message format, and usually relies on other Application Layerprotocols, most notably Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), for message negotiationand transmission(10)ConfidentialityConfidentiality is the term used to prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals or systems. Confidentiality isnecessary (but not sufficient) for maintaining the privacy of the people whose personal information a system holds.(ll)AuthenticationIn computing, e-Business and information security is necessary to ensure that the data, transactions, communications ordocuments (electronic or physical) are genuine. It is also important for authenticity to validate that both parties involved are whothey claim they are.(12)KerberosKerberos is an authentication service developed at MIT which allows a distributed system to be able to authenticate requests forservice generated from workstations.Kerberos (ITU-T) is a computer network authentication protocol which works on the basis of “tickets” to allow nodescommunicating over a non-secure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner.(13)SSL/TLSSSL are cryptographic protocols that provide communication security over the Internet. TLS and its predecessor, SSL encrypt thesegments of network connections above the Transport Layer, using asymmetric cryptography for key exchange, symmetricencryption for privacy, and message authentication codes for message integrity.(14)Man-in-the-Middle AttackMan-in-the-Middle Attack is a form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker makes independent connections with the victimsand relays messages between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection,when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker.(15)System VulnerabilityA vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system,s design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploitedto violate the system,s security policy (which allows an attacker to reduce a system's information assurance). Vulnerability is theintersection of three elements: a system susceptibility or flaw, attacker access to the flaw, and attacker capability to exploit theflaw.(16)Non-RepudiationNon-repudiation refers to a state of affairs where the author of a statement will not be able to successfully challenge theauthorship of the statement or validity of an associated contract.The term is often seen in a legal setting wherein the authenticity of a signature is being challenged. In such an instance, theauthenticity is being "repudiated".(17)Bastion HostA bastion host is a computers on a network, specifically designed and configured to withstand attacks. It,s identified by the firewalladmin as a critical strong point in the network,s security. The firewalls (application - level or circuit - level gateways) and routers can be considered bastion hosts. Other types of bastion hosts include web, mail, DNS, and FTP servers.(18)CSRFCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack that forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in whichthey're currently authenticated. CSRF attacks specifically target state-changing requests, not theft of data, since the attacker hasno way to see the response to the forged request. With a little help of social engineering (such as sending a link via email or chat),an attacker may trick the users of a web application into executing actions of the attacker's choosing. If the victim is a normaluser, a successful CSRF attack can force the user to perform state changing requests like transferring funds, changing their emailaddress, and so forth. If the victim is an administrative account, CSRF can compromise the entire web application.Part 2.Brief Questions, 40 pointsNOTE: Answer the following HOW TO questions in brief, 8 points for each.(1)Asymmetric Cryptographic Method.非对称加密算法需要两个密钥：公开密钥(public - key)和私有密钥(private - key)。
BY229X-200,127;BY229X-600,127;BY229X-800,127;中文规格书,Datasheet资料
Product specification
BY229F, BY229X series
ISOLATION LIMITING VALUE & CHARACTERISTIC
Ths = 25 ˚C unless otherwise specified SYMBOL PARAMETER
September 1998
4
/
Rev 1.200
Philips Semiconductors
Rectifier diodes fast, soft-recovery
MECHANICAL DATA
Dimensions in mm Net Mass: 2 g
Product specification
SYMBOL PARAMETER
CONDITIONS
MIN.
MAX.
UNIT
VRSM VRRM VRWM VR
Peak non-repetitive reverse voltage Peak repetitive reverse voltage Crest working reverse voltage Continuous reverse voltage
The BY229F series is supplied in the conventional leaded SOD100 package. The BY229X series is supplied in the conventional leaded SOD113 package.
PINNING
SOD100
SOD113
PIN
DESCRIPTION
aurora_64b66b_protocol_spec_sp011
aurora_64b66b_protocol_spec_sp011Aurora 64B/66B Protocol SpecificationSP011 (v1.2) July 23, 2010Xilinx is disclosing to you this Specification (hereinafter "the Specification") for use in the development of designs in connection with semiconductor devices. Xilinx expressly disclaims any liability arising out of your use of the Specification. Xilinx does not convey any license under its patents, copyrights, or any rights of others in connection with the Specification. Y ou are responsible for obtaining any rights you may require for your use or implementation of the Specification. Xilinx reserves the right to make changes, at any time, to the Specification without notice and at the sole discretion of Xilinx. Xilinx assumes no obligation to correct any errors contained in the Specification or to advise you of any corrections or updates. Xilinx expressly disclaims any liability in connection with technical support or assistance that may be provided to you in connection with the Specification.THE SPECIFICA TION IS DISCLOSED TO YOU "AS-IS" WITH NO WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. YOU BEAR THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO ITS IMPLEMENTA TION AND USE. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THA T YOU HAVE NOT RELIED ON ANY ORAL OR WRITTEN INFORMATION OR ADVICE, WHETHER GIVEN BY XILINX, ITS EMPLOYEES OR CONTRACTORS. XILINX MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTIES, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR STA TUTORY, REGARDING THE SPECIFICATION, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A P ARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS.IN NO EVENT WILL XILINX BE LIABLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, INDIRECT, EXEMPLARY, SPECIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY LOSS OF DA TA OR LOST PROFITS, ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO YOUR USE OF THE SPECIFICA TION, EVEN IF YOU HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.2008, 2010 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.XILINX, the Xilinx logo, the Brand Window, and other designated brands included herein are trademarks of Xilinx, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.Revision HistoryThe following table shows the revision history for this document.Date Version Revision03/31/08 1.0Initial Xilinx release.09/19/08 1.1Minor typographical edits. Changed block codes to blocks. Removed Not Ready blocks from Simplex in Table4-1, page36. Clarified simplex Aurora channel bonding inSection4.2.2“Channel Bonding,” page36. Added Appendix1, “References.”07/23/10 1.2Updated Section1.2“Scope” and Section8.1“Overview.”Deleted Sections 8.4 Transmitter Specifications, 8.5 Receiver Specifications, and 8.6Receiver Eye Diagrams.Table of ContentsSchedule of Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Schedule of Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Preface: About This SpecificationSpecification Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Typographical. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Online Document. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12State Diagram Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Section1: Introduction and Overview1.1:Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.2:Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.3:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Section2: Data Transmission and Reception2.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.2:Block Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3:Frame Transmission Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.3.1:Link-Layer Frame Delineation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242.3.2:64B/66B Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242.3.3:Serialization and Clock Encoding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.3.4:Multi-Lane Transmission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242.4:Frame Reception Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.4.1:Deserialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.4.2:64B/66B Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.4.3:Control Block Stripping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.4.4:Multi-Lane Reception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.5:Data and Separator Block Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Section3: Flow Control3.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.2:Native Flow Control Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293.3:Native Flow Control Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4:Native Flow Control Block Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303.5:User Flow Control Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.6:User Flow Control Message Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Section4: Initialization and Error Handling4.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2:Aurora Channel Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344.2.1:Lane Initialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344.2.2:Channel Bonding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.2.3:Wait For Remote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374.3:Error Handling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384.4:CRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Section5: PCS Layer5.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395.2:Aurora Encoding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395.2.1:Block Codes in 64B/66B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395.2.2:Idle/Not Ready/Clock Compensation/Channel Bonding Block Code. . . . . . 405.2.3:Native Flow Control Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425.2.4:Data Block Code for Frame Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425.2.5:Separator Block Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425.2.6:Separator-7 Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435.2.7:User Flow Control Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435.2.8:Data Block Code for User Flow Control Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445.2.9:User K-Block Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445.3:64B/66B Scrambling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455.4:64B/66B Gearbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455.5:Channel Bonding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455.6:Clock Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Section6: Channel Control6.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.2:Idle Block Striping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.2.1:Not Ready Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.2.2:Idle Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.2.3:Clock Compensation Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.2.4:Channel Bonding Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.3:Native Flow Control Striping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476.4:Frame Data Striping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486.5:Strict-Alignment Frame Data Striping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486.6:User Flow Control Striping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486.7:Strict-Alignment User Flow Control Striping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486.8:User K-Block Striping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Section7: PMA Layer7.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497.2:Bit and Byte Ordering Convention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497.3:Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Section8: Electrical Specifications8.1:Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518.2:Signal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518.3:Equalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Appendix1: ReferencesSchedule of FiguresPreface: About This SpecificationFigure P-1:Properties of Literals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Figure P-2:State Machine Diagram Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Section1: Introduction and OverviewFigure 1-1:Aurora Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Figure 1-2:A Simplex Connection Between a Pair of Aurora Lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Figure 1-3:A Single-Lane, Simplex Aurora Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Figure 1-4:A Multi-Lane, Simplex Aurora Channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Figure 1-5:A Single-Lane, Full-Duplex Aurora Channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Figure 1-6:A Multi-Lane, Full-Duplex Aurora Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Section2: Data Transmission and ReceptionFigure 2-1:Mapping Frames to Encoded Block Codes for Transmission. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Figure 2-2:Receiving Data from an Aurora Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Figure 2-3:Data Block Used for Frame Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Figure 2-4:Separator Block. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Figure 2-5:Separator-7 Block. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Figure 2-6:Example of Frame Data Transfer through a Single-Lane Channel . . . . . . . . 27Figure 2-7:Example of Frame Data Transfer through a Multi-Lane Channel . . . . . . . . . 27Section3: Flow ControlFigure 3-1:NFC Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Figure 3-2:UFC Block with UFC Header. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Figure 3-3:Data Block Used to Carry UFC Message Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Figure 3-4:Example UFC Messages for Single-Lane Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Figure 3-5:Example UFC Messages for a Multi-Lane Channel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Section4: Initialization and Error HandlingFigure 4-1:Initialization Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Figure 4-2:Block Sync State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Section5: PCS LayerFigure 5-1:Idle/Not Ready/NFC Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41Figure 5-2:Native Flow Control Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Figure 5-3:Data Block Code Carrying Frame Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Figure 5-4:Separator Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Figure 5-5:Separator-7 Block Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Figure 5-6:User Flow Control Block Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Figure 5-7:Data Block Code Carrying User Flow Control Message Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Figure 5-8:User K-Block Code Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Section6: Channel ControlSection7: PMA LayerFigure 7-1:Serialization Order for Aurora 64B/66B Block Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Section8: Electrical SpecificationsFigure 8-1:Differential Peak-To-Peak Voltage of Transmitter or Receiver. . . . . . . . . . . 51Appendix1: ReferencesSchedule of TablesPreface: About This SpecificationTable P-1:Radix Specifics of Literals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Table P-2:Examples of Extended Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Section1: Introduction and OverviewSection2: Data Transmission and ReceptionTable 2-1:Aurora 64B/66B Blocks Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Table 2-2:Normal Aurora 64B/66B Block Transmission Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Table 2-3:Aurora 64B/66B Block Transmission Priority during Flow Control Countdown 23 Section3: Flow Control Section4: Initialization and Error HandlingTable 4-1:Required Block Transmission during Lane Initialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Table 4-2:Required State Transition after Lane Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Table 4-3:Required State Transition after Successful Channel Bonding. . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Section5: PCS LayerTable 5-1:Valid Block Type Field Values in Aurora 64B/66B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Table 5-2:Valid Octet Count Field Values for Separator Block Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Table 5-3:Valid Block Type Field Values for User K-Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Section6: Channel Control Section7: PMA LayerSection8: Electrical SpecificationsAppendix1: ReferencesPreface About This SpecificationThis specification describes the Aurora 64B/66B protocol. Aurora is a lightweight link-layer protocol that can be used to move data point-to-point across one or more high-speed serial lanes. Aurora 64B/66B is a version of the protocol using 64B/66B encoding instead of 8B/10B.Specification ContentsThis manual contains the following:Section1, “Introduction and Overview”provides an overview of the Aurora 64B/66B protocol.Section2, “Data Transmission and Reception”describes the procedures for transmitting and receiving data using an Aurora 64B/66B Channel.Section3, “Flow Control”describes the optional flow control features in the Aurora64B/66B protocol.Section4, “Initialization and Error Handling”describes the procedure used to preparean Aurora channel for operation.Section5, “PCS Layer”specifies the functions performed in the physical coding sub-layer (PCS) of the Aurora 64B/66B protocol.Section6, “Channel Control”defines the striping rules for using multi-lane channels. Section7, “PMA Layer”specifies the functions performed in the PMA layer of the Aurora 64B/66B Protocol.Section8, “Electrical Specifications”describes the AC specifications, covering both single- and multi-lane implementations.ConventionsThis document uses the following conventions.T ypographicalThe following typographical conventions are used in this document:Online DocumentThe following conventions are used in this document:NumericalConventionMeaning or UseExampleItalic fontReferences to other manualsSee the Development System Reference Guide for more information.Emphasis in textIf a wire is drawn so that itoverlaps the pin of a symbol, the two nets are not connected.To emphasize a term the first time it is used The state machine uses one-hot encoding.REG[FIELD]Abbreviations or acronyms for registers are shown in uppercasetext. Specific bits, fields, or ranges appear in bracketsREG[11:14]ConventionMeaning or UseExampleBlue textCross-reference link to a location in the current document See the section “AdditionalResources” for details.Refer to “Title Formats” inSection 1 for details.Red textCross-reference link to a location in another document See Figure 2-5 in the Virtex-II Platform FPGA User Guide.Blue, underlined textHyperlink to a website (URL)Go to /doc/10fb3b7b1711cc7931b716ea.htmlfor the latest speed files.Convention Meaning or Usen A decimal value[n:m ]Used to express a numerical range from n to m x Unknown value zHigh impedanceValues of LiteralsLiterals are represented by specifying three of their properties as listed and shown in Figure P-1 and in Table P-1 and Table P-2:1.Width in bits 2.Radix (Base)3.ValueTable P-1 shows the Radix specifics:All values are extended with zero except those with x or z in the most significant place; they extend with x or z respectively. A list of examples is shown in Table P-2:Figure P-1:Properties of LiteralsTable P-1:Radix Specifics of LiteralsRadix SpecifierRadixb Binary d Decimal h Hexadecimal oOctalTable P-2:Examples of Extended ValuesNumber Value Comment8’b000000000An 8-bit binary number with value of zero. (Zero extended to get 8 bits.)8’bx xxxxxxxxAn 8-bit binary number with value unknown. (x extended to get 8 bits.)8’b1x 0000001x An 8-bit binary number with value of 2 or 3, depending on the value of x.8’b0x 0000000x An 8-bit binary number with value of 0 or 1, depending on the value of x.8’hx xxxxxxxx An 8-bit hexadecimal number with value unknown.(x extended to get 8 bits.)8’hzx zzzzxxxx An 8-bit hexadecimal number with the upper four bits not driven and the lower four bitsunknown.8’b100000001An 8-bit binary number with value of one.8’hz1zzzz0001An 8-bit hexadecimal number with the upper four bits not driven and the lower four bits having value of one.8’bx1xxxxxxx1An 8-bit binary number that is odd.8’bx0xxxxxxx0An 8-bit binary number that is even.State Diagram ConventionsThis section describes the conventions used in the state diagrams for this document. The numbered sections correspond to the call-outs shown in the state machine diagram in Figure P-2, page 15.States1. A state is represented by a rectangle.2.The name of the state is indicated in bold.State T ransitions3.State transition is indicated by an arrow annotated in italics.State Machine OutputsOutputs are shown in plain text. Outputs can be shown inside of state rectangles or can be part of the annotation associated with a transition arrow. If a signal is not listed in a state rectangle or on a transition arrow, its value at that time is 0 (not asserted). If a registered output does not appear in the state rectangle or transition arrow annotation, then its value is unchanged from the previous value.Output T ypesOutputs are divided into three classes as shown in the examples below.4.Asserting control signals:go = 1link reset = 15.Register initialization:XYZ Register = 78New Counter = 0xmit = /SP/ (an ordered set)6.Incrementing or decrementing a register:XYZ Register = XYZ Register + 1New Counter = New Counter – 68’hz zzzzzzzz An 8-bit hexadecimal number with value not driven. (z extended to get 8 bits.)8’h0z 0000zzzzAn 8-bit hexadecimal number with upper nibble specified and the lower not driven.11’d n n An 11-bit decimal number with value n .6’h n nA 6-bit hexadecimal number with value n .w’b101(101)A binary number with value 5 and an unknown width.Table P-2:Examples of Extended Values (Cont’d)Number Value CommentFigure P-2:State Machine Diagram ConventionsSection1 Introduction and Overview1.1IntroductionAurora is a lightweight link-layer protocol that can be used to move data point-to-pointacross one or more high-speed serial lanes. Aurora 64B/66B is a version of the protocolusing 64B/66B encoding instead of 8B/10B.1.2ScopeThe Aurora 64B/66B Protocol Specification defines the following:Electrical specifications: This includes signaling levels for an Aurora serial link.PMA layer: This includes specification for serialization bit ordering and byteordering.Physical coding sub-layer (PCS): This includes specification for data encoding anddecoding, data scrambling, the 64B/66B gearbox, clock compensation and channelbonding.Channel control: This includes specifications for multi-lane striping and forscheduling the transmission of data and control information.Cyclic redundancy check (CRC): The Aurora protocol recommends a CRCmechanism compatible with the standard 64B/66B scrambling algorithm.1.3OverviewThe Aurora protocol (Figure1-1, page18) describes the transfer of user data across anAurora channel, consisting of one or more Aurora lanes. Each Aurora lane is a serial dataconnection, either full-duplex or simplex. Devices communicating across the channel arecalled channel partners.Aurora interfaces allow user applications to transfer data through the Aurora channel. Theuser interface on each Aurora interface is not defined in this specification and can bedecided independently for each implementation of the protocol.Aurora channels have the following properties:Data is transferred through the Aurora channel in frames.Frames share the channel with control information such as flow control messages,clock compensation sequences and idles.Frames can be of any length, and can have any format. Only the delineation of framesis defined in this specification.Frames in Aurora do not have to be contiguous — they can be interrupted at any time by flow control messages or idles.There is no gap required between frames in Aurora.Figure 1-1:Aurora Protocol OverviewFigure1-2 shows a simplex connection between a pair of Aurora lanes, depicting the functional blocks comprising the PCS and PMA layers of an Aurora connection. These blocks are specified in detail in this document.Figure 1-2: A Simplex Connection Between a Pair of Aurora LanesAurora interfaces allow applications to communicate using Aurora channels. Aurora interfaces are made up of one or more Aurora lanes, either simplex or full-duplex. The four possible configurations of Aurora interfaces are shown in Figure1-3, Figure1-4,Figure1-5, page20, and Figure1-6, page20.Figure1-3 shows a single-lane, simplex Aurora interface transmitting to another single-lane, simplex Aurora interface. In this configuration, each interface uses a single lane to transmit or receive from the Aurora channel. Channel control in each interface initializes the channel passing control to the user application.Figure 1-3: A Single-Lane, Simplex Aurora ChannelFigure1-4 shows a multi-lane, simplex Aurora interface transmitting to another multi-lane, simplex Aurora interface. In multi-lane configurations, the channel control bonds the lanes to eliminate skew between channels as a part of the channel initialization procedure. During normal operation, the channel control logic distributes data and control information across all the lanes in the channel.Figure 1-4: A Multi-Lane, Simplex Aurora Channel。
WHO发布《良好色谱规范》—中英文对照版
WHO发布《良好⾊谱规范》—中英⽂对照版近⽇，WHO发布了《 GOOD CHROMOTOGRAPHY PRACTICES优良⾊谱规范》，该⽂件对⾊谱系统、验证确认、访问与权限、审计追踪、时间⽇期功能、电⼦系统、溶剂、缓冲液、流动相、⾊谱柱、样品的管理、⾊谱⽅法、⾊谱峰和峰积分、数据管理等作了较为系统的要求，此外，还专门清洁验证的分析⽅法、数据管理作出规定。
该⽂件全⽂翻译如下：1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE介绍与范围The use of chromatography methods (such as High Pressure Liquid Chromatography (HPLC) and Gas Chromatography (GC)) in quality control laboratory analysis has increased significantly in recent years.近年来⾊谱⽅法（如⾼压液相⾊谱（HPLC）和⽓相⾊谱（GC））的使⽤在QC实验室分析中已有显著增加。
HPLC and GC methods are used in, for example, the identification of materials and products, for determination of assay and related substances in materials and products, as well as in validation such as process validation and cleaning validation.HPLC和GC⽅法被⽤于，例如，物料和产品鉴别、物料和产品中含量和有关物质检测，以及验证如⼯艺验证和清洁验证。
Due to the criticality of the results obtained through chromatography, manufacturers should ensure that the data acquired is accurate and reliable. Results should meet ALCOA+ principles (i.e. attributable, legible, contemporaneous, original and accurate).由于通过⾊谱获得的结果⾮常关键，⽣产商应确保所获取的数据的准确性和可靠性。
ANSI_C12.18-2006_Ⅱ型光口协议规范
ANSI C12.18-2006 American National Standard Protocol Specification for ANSIType 2 Optical PortANSI C12.18-2006Revision ofANSI C12.18-1996American National Standard Protocol Specification for ANSI Type 2 Optical PortSecretariat:National Electrical Manufacturers AssociationApproved May 2, 2006American National Standards Institute, Inc.ANSI C12.18-2006NOTICE AND DISCLAIMERThe information in this publication was considered technically sound by the consensus of persons engaged in the development and approval of the document at the time it was developed. Consensus does not necessarily mean that there is unanimous agreement among every person participating in the development of this document.NEMA standards and guideline publications, of which the document contained herein is one, are developed through a voluntary consensus standards development process. This process brings together volunteers and/or seeks out the views of persons who have an interest in the topic covered by this publication. While NEMA administers the process and establishes rules to promote fairness in the development of consensus, it does not write the document and it does not independently test, evaluate, or verify the accuracy or completeness of any information or the soundness of any judgments contained in its standards and guideline publications.NEMA disclaims liability for any personal injury, property, or other damages of any nature whatsoever, whether special, indirect, consequential, or compensatory, directly or indirectly resulting from the publication, use of, application, or reliance on this document. NEMA disclaims and makes no guaranty or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of any information published herein, and disclaims and makes no warranty that the information in this document will fulfill any of your particular purposes or needs. NEMA does not undertake to guarantee the performance of any individual manufacturer or seller’s products or services by virtue of this standard or guide.In publishing and making this document available, NEMA is not undertaking to render professional or other services for or on behalf of any person or entity, nor is NEMA undertaking to perform any duty owed by any person or entity to someone else. Anyone using this document should rely on his or her own independent judgment or, as appropriate, seek the advice of a competent professional in determining the exercise of reasonable care in any given circumstances. Information and other standards on the topic covered by this publication may be available from other sources, which the user may wish to consult for additional views or information not covered by this publication.NEMA has no power, nor does it undertake to police or enforce compliance with the contents of this document. NEMA does not certify, test, or inspect products, designs, or installations for safety or health purposes. Any certification or other statement of compliance with any health or safety–related information in this document shall not be attributable to NEMA and is solely the responsibility of the certifier or maker of the statement.ANSI C12.18-2006iAMERICANNATIONALSTANDARD Approval of an American National Standard requires verification by ANSI that the requirements for due process, consensus, and other criteria for approval have been met by the standards developer.Consensus is established when, in the judgment of the ANSI Board ofStandards Review, substantial agreement has been reached by directlyand materially affected interests. Substantial agreement means muchmore than a simple majority, but not necessarily unanimity. Consensusrequires that all views and objections be considered, and that aconcerted effort be made toward their resolution.The use of American National Standards is completely voluntary; theirexistence does not in any respect preclude anyone, whether he hasapproved the standards or not, from manufacturing, marketing,purchasing, or using products, processes, or procedures notconforming to the standards.The American National Standards Institute does not develop standardsand will in no circumstances give an interpretation of any AmericanNational Standard. Moreover, no person shall have the right orauthority to issue an interpretation of an American National Standard inthe name of the American National Standards Institute. Requests forinterpretations should be addressed to the secretariat or sponsorwhose name appears on the title page of this standard.Caution Notice: This American National Standard may be revised orwithdrawn at any time. The procedures of the American NationalStandards Institute require that action be taken periodically to reaffirm,revise, or withdraw this standard. Purchasers of American NationalStandards may receive current information on all standards by calling orwriting the American National Standards Institute.Published byNational Electrical Manufacturers Association1300 North 17th Street, Rosslyn, VA 22209© Copyright 2006 by National Electrical Manufacturers AssociationAll rights reserved including translation into other languages, reserved under the Universal Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the International and Pan American Copyright Conventions.No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.Printed in the United States of AmericaANSI C12.18-2006This page intentionally left blank. iiANSI C12.18-2006ContentsPage 1Scope (1)2References (1)3Definitions and Syntax (1)3.1Definitions (1)3.1.1C12.18 Client (1)3.1.2C12.18 Device (1)3.1.3Point-to-point Communications (1)3.1.4Table (2)3.2Document Syntax (2)4Protocol Details (2)4.1Order of Transmission (3)4.2Layer 7—Application Layer (3)4.2.1Data Structure (3)4.2.2Protocol Specifications for Electric Metering (3)4.2.2.1Request Codes (4)4.2.2.2Response Codes (4)4.2.2.3Identification Service (6)4.2.2.4Read Service (9)4.2.2.5Write Service (11)4.2.2.6Logon Service (12)4.2.2.7Security Service (13)4.2.2.8Logoff Service (13)4.2.2.9Negotiate Service (14)4.2.2.10Wait Service (15)4.2.2.11Terminate Service (15)4.2.2.12Partial Table Access Using the Index/element-count Method (16)4.2.2.13Index Count Access Method Examples (17)4.2.2.14Partial Table Access Using the Offset/octet-count Method (18)4.3Layer 6—Presentation Layer (19)4.4Layer 5—Session Layer (19)4.5Layer 4—Transport Layer (19)4.6Layer 3—Network Layer (19)4.7Layer 2—Data Link Layer (19)4.7.1Basic Data (19)4.7.1.1Default Settings (20)4.7.2Packet (20)4.7.3Duplicate packets (21)4.7.4CRC selection (22)4.7.5Acknowledgment (22)4.7.6Retransmission (22)4.7.7Time-out (22)4.7.7.1Channel Traffic Time-out (22)4.7.7.2Inter-character Time-out (22)4.7.7.3Response Time-out (23)4.7.8Delays (23)4.7.8.1Turn-around Delay (23)4.8Layer-1—Physical Layer (23)4.8.1Physical (23)4.8.2Basic Data (24)4.8.3Light Levels (24)4.8.3.1Optical Characteristics (24)4.8.3.2Transmitter Characteristics (24)iiiANSI C12.18-2006iv 4.8.3.3Receiver Characteristics (25)4.8.3.4Environmental Lighting Condition (26)5Compliance (26)Annex A - Communication Example (Layer 7 and Layer 2) (27)Annex B - Packet Transmission Example (29)Annex C - Service Sequence State Control (31)Annex D – Compatibility (33)D.1Backward compatibility with previous versions of the Standard (33)D.2Forward compatibility with next versions of the Standard (33)Annex E - Historical Background (35)E.1Foreword of C12.18-1996 and C12.18-1996 (R2002) (35)ANSI C12.18-2006vForeword (This Foreword is not part of American National Standard C12.18-2006.)This American National Standard provides an open-platform communications protocol for two-way communication with a metering device through an ANSI Type 2 Optical Port. The protocol is written to conform to the OSI seven-layer stack.Long-time readers of ANSI C12.18 will discover many editing changes to this version of the Standard. The Working Group chose to improve the clarity of the text as an aid to the reader while retaining the Normative elements in the manner of previous publications.The 2006 revision of this Standard was considered in the context of the so-called “protocol suite” of ANSI standards: C12.18, C12.19, C12.21 and C12.22 (draft). Changes made were included only after assuring that existing devices implementing C12.18 would continue to remain compatible with the 2005 revision.This revision has corrected an error in the original standard: the impossibility of using index-count for table access. Other concepts addressed include compliance, backward and forward compatibility, the use of reserved fields, the Identification Service, packet size and the toggle bit. Finally, some alignment with the draft C12.22 standard was performed to meet the goal of producing a coherent suite of protocol standards.Suggestions for improvement to this Standard are welcome. They should be sent to:National Electrical Manufacturers AssociationVice President of Engineering1300 North 17th StreetSuite 1752Rosslyn, VA 22209This Standard was processed and approved for submittal to ANSI by Accredited Standards Committee for Electricity Metering C12. At the time the committee approved this Standard, the C12 Committee had the following members:Tom Nelson, ChairmanPaul Orr, SecretaryMichael AndersonEd BerosetRon BreschiniCurt CrittendenDavid EllisCruz GomezBob HughesLawrence KotewaFrancis MartaJohn McEvoyHerman MillicanJames MiningAvygdor MoiseTim MorganRoy MoxleyD. Young NguyenLauren PananenAaron SnyderRichard TuckerScott WeikelANSI C12.18-2006Working Group 4 of Subcommittee 17 that developed the Standard consisted of: Aaron Snyder, ChairmanPeter Martin, Vice ChairmanNorbert Balko, EditorMichael AndersonEd BerosetMartin BurnsJanice JenningsLawrence KotewaRobert McMichaelAvygdor MoiseVuong NguyenTerry PennBin QiuRichard TuckerMichel VeilletteVirginia ZinkowskiviAMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD ANSI C12.18-2006 Protocol Specification for ANSI Type 2 Optical Port1 ScopeThis Standard details the criteria required for communications between a C12.18 Device and a C12.18 Client via an optical port. The C12.18 Client may be a handheld reader, a portable computer, a master station system or some other electronic communications device.This Standard provides details for a complete implementation of an OSI 7-layer model.The protocol specified in this document was designed to transport data in Table format. The Table definitions are in ANSI C12.19 Utility Industry End Device Data Tables.2 ReferencesANSI C12.19, Utility Industry End Device Data TablesANSI C12.21, Protocol Specification for Telephone Modem CommunicationISO/IEC 646 (1991), Information Technology - ISO 7-Bit Coded Character Set For Information InterchangeISO/IEC 7498-1 (1994), Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model: The Basic ModelISO/IEC 8825-1 (2002), Information Technology - ASN.1 Encoding Rules: Specification Of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) And Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)ISO/IEC 13239 (2002), Information Technology - Telecommunications And Information Exchange Between Systems - High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC) Procedures3 Definitions and Syntax3.1 DefinitionsFor the purposes of this Standard, the following definitions are made.Client3.1.1 C12.18An electronic communication apparatus that attaches to the ANSI Type 2 Optical Port of a C12.18 Device and implements communication according to the protocol specification of this Standard.Device3.1.2 C12.18An electronic communication apparatus that implements an ANSI Type 2 Optical Port for communication according to the protocol specification of this Standard.Communications3.1.3 Point-to-pointPoint-to-point communications is defined as communication between two devices through a single optical interface.1。
医药行业专业英语词汇
医药行业专业英语词汇（非常有用）FDA和EDQM术语: CLINICAL?TRIAL：临床试验? ANIMAL?TRIAL：动物试验? ACCELERATED?APPROVAL：加速批准? STANDARD?DRUG：标准药物? INVESTIGATOR：研究人员；调研人员PREPARING?AND?SUBMITTING：起草和申报? SUBMISSION：申报；递交? BENIFIT （S）：受益? RISK（S）：受害? DRUG?PRODUCT：药物产品? DRUG?SUBSTANCE：原料药? ESTABLISHED?NAME：确定的名称? GENERIC?NAME：非专利名称? PROPRIETARY?NAME：专有名称；? INN（INTERNATIONAL?NONPROPRIETARY?NAME）：国际非专有名称? ADVERSE?EFFECT：副作用? ADVERSE?REACTION：不良反应? PROTOCOL：方案? ARCHIVAL?COPY：存档用副本? REVIEW?COPY：审查用副本? OFFICIAL?COMPENDIUM：法定药典（主要指USP、?NF）．? USP （THE?UNITED?STATES?PHARMACOPEIA）：美国药典NF（NATIONAL?FORMULARY）：（美国）国家处方集? OFFICIAL＝PHARMACOPEIAL=?COMPENDIAL：药典的；法定的；官方的? AGENCY：审理部门（指FDA）? IDENTITY：真伪；鉴别；特性? STRENGTH：规格；规格含量（每一剂量单位所含有效成分的量）? LABELED?AMOUNT：标示量? REGULATORY?SPECIFICATION：质量管理规格标准（NDA提供）? REGULATORY?METHODOLOGY：质量管理方法? REGULATORY?METHODS?VALIDATION：管理用分析方法的验证COS/CEP?欧洲药典符合性认证ICH（International?Conference?on?Harmonization?of?Technical?Requirements?for?Registration?of PharmaceuticalsforHumanUse)人用药物注册技术要求国际协调会议ICH文件分为质量、安全性、有效性和综合学科4类。
协议解析方案英文
Protocol Parsing SolutionIntroductionThe Protocol Parsing Solution is a software development approach that enables the interpretation and analysis of various protocols used in computer networks. This document aims to provide a comprehensive overview of this solution, discussing its key components, benefits, and implementation considerations.Key Components1.Protocol Specification: The first step in the protocol parsing solutionis to define the protocol specifications. This includes identifying the structure and format of the protocol messages, as well as the expected behavior andcommunication flow. The protocol specification is typically defined using aformal language, such as the Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF), which allows for clear and unambiguous definition of the protocol grammar.2.Parsing Engine: The parsing engine is responsible for interpretingthe protocol messages according to the defined protocol specification. Itprocesses the incoming network data, extracts relevant information from the protocol messages, and updates the internal state of the system accordingly.The parsing engine typically uses a variety of techniques, such as finite state machines, regular expressions, and context-free grammars, to analyze andparse the protocol messages.3.Message Validation: Message validation is an essential part of theprotocol parsing solution. It ensures that the received messages adhere to the defined protocol specification and are free from any errors or anomalies. The validation process involves checking the syntactic correctness, semanticintegrity, and conformance to the protocol rules. Any invalid or malformedmessages are rejected to maintain the reliability and integrity of the system.4.Data Extraction: The protocol parsing solution also includes theability to extract relevant data from the parsed protocol messages. This caninclude retrieving specific fields or parameters, calculating statistics or metrics, or performing more complex operations on the extracted data. The extracted data can be used for various purposes, such as monitoring networkperformance, generating reports, or triggering specific actions based onpredefined conditions.5.Logging and Monitoring: To facilitate troubleshooting and analysis,the protocol parsing solution should include logging and monitoringcapabilities. This allows the system to record the processed messages, anyvalidation errors or warnings, and other relevant information. Additionally, themonitoring component enables real-time monitoring of the protocol traffic,providing insights into the network behavior and performance.Benefits•Standardization: The protocol parsing solution brings standardization to the interpretation and analysis of various protocols. Bydefining the protocol specifications in a formal language, the solution ensures consistent and accurate interpretation of the protocol messages acrossdifferent systems and applications.•Efficiency: With an efficient parsing engine and optimized algorithms, the protocol parsing solution can handle high volumes of network trafficwithout compromising performance. This enables the real-time processing and analysis of the protocol messages, providing timely insights and actions.•Flexibility: The protocol parsing solution can be easily adapted to support different protocols by creating and integrating new protocolspecifications into the parsing engine. This flexibility allows for the seamless addition of new protocols or the modification of existing ones withoutsignificant changes to the overall solution architecture.•Reliability: By validating the received messages against the protocol specifications, the solution ensures that only valid and conforming messages are processed. This helps to prevent potential vulnerabilities, errors, ormalicious attacks that may result from the handling of invalid or malformedmessages.•Extensibility: The protocol parsing solution provides a foundation for implementing additional features and functionalities. For example, it can beextended to support protocol-specific optimizations, encryption or securitymechanisms, or integration with other systems or frameworks.Implementation ConsiderationsWhen implementing the protocol parsing solution, the following considerations should be taken into account:•Protocol Complexity: Different protocols may vary in complexity, with some protocols requiring more advanced parsing techniques orspecialized processing algorithms. The implementation should consider thecomplexity of the protocols that need to be supported and ensure that theparsing engine can handle them effectively.•Performance Optimization: To achieve optimal performance, the implementation should focus on using efficient data structures, algorithms, and processing techniques. This includes minimizing memory usage, reducingparsing overhead, and optimizing the handling of large or fragmented protocol messages.•Error Handling and Resilience: The protocol parsing solution should have robust error handling mechanisms to handle unexpected orerroneous situations. This includes proper handling of validation errors,graceful recovery from parsing failures, and appropriate logging and reporting of errors.•Security Considerations: As the protocol parsing solution deals with network traffic, security considerations are paramount. The implementation should include measures to mitigate potential security risks, such as inputvalidation, sanitization of parsed data, and protection against malicious attacks or exploits.•Testing and Validation: Comprehensive testing and validation are crucial to ensuring the correctness and reliability of the protocol parsingsolution. This includes both unit testing of individual parsing components and integration testing with real-world protocol traffic.ConclusionThe Protocol Parsing Solution provides a reliable and efficient approach to interpret and analyze various protocols used in computer networks. With its key components, such as the protocol specification, parsing engine, message validation, data extraction, and logging capabilities, the solution enables accurate protocol parsing, validation, and analysis. By considering implementation considerations, such as protocol complexity, performance optimization, error handling, security, and testing, a robust and scalable protocol parsing solution can be developed to meet specific requirements and provide valuable insights into network behavior.。
药品注册英语术语
Glossary（术语）：Regulatory Affairs （RA）：药政事务drug authority：药政当局investigation and research before project approval：立项前的调研Market Authorization （MA）：上市许可post-approval commitment study：上市后的承诺研究post-approval variation application：补充申请life cycle：生命周期Chemistry, Manufacturing, and Controls （CMC）：药品的化学、生产和控制cross-functional teams：公司内部各部门look at the big picture：从大局考虑think strategically：进行战略性思考risks and benefits：风险和获益Food and Drug Administration （FDA）：美国食品药品监督管理局European Medicines Agency （EMA）：欧洲药品管理局International Multi-center Clinical Trial （IMCT）：国际多中心临床试验Bioequivalence study （BE study）：生物等效性试验generic drug：仿制药Center for Drug Evaluation （CDE）：SFDA下属的药品审评中心Quality by Design （QbD）：质量源于设计CMC Pilot Program：FDA在业内开展的关于QbD的试点研究early launch：早日上市design space：设计空间Business Development （BD）：业务发展部门Imported Drug License （IDL）：进口药品注册证Manufacturing License （ML）：生产许可证Clinical Trial Permission （CTP）：临床试验批件Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient （API）：原料药Orange Book：橙皮书business value：商业价值the Pharmacopoeia of the People's Republic of China（ChP）：中国药典the United States Pharmacopoeia （USP）：美国药典the European Pharmacopoeia （Ph. Eur.或EP）：欧洲药典List of Essential Drugs （EDL）：基本药物目录Reimbursement Drug List （RDL）：医保目录）typing error：打印错误slip of the pen：笔误Drug Master File （DMF）：药物主文件Certificate of Analysis （CoA）：检验报告Marketing （MKT）：市场部market share：市场占有率sales volume：销量investigator brochure （IB）：研究者手册protocol：临床试验方案priority：优先度package insert （PI）：说明书labeling：包装标签Patient Information Leaflet （PIL）：患者使用的说明书Summary of Product Characteristics （SmPC，SPC）：产品特性摘要foil：铝箔carton：装药品的小盒shipping label：运输包装标签Medical：医学部provincial drug administration （PDA）：省级药监局，包括省、自治区和直辖市药品监督管理部门Institute for Food and Drug Control：药检所National Institute for the Control of Pharmaceutical and Biologic al Products （NICPBP）：中国药品生物制品检定所，简称“中检所”supplementary dossier：补充资料approval letter：注册批件out of specification （OOS）：超出标准、不合格adverse effect （AE）：不良事件trial waiver：减免临床试验Clinical：临床部门Commercial：商业部门new chemical entity （NCE）：新化学实体key opinion leader （KOL）：关键意见领袖off-label use：标签外使用patient pool：患者库deadline：最后期限global trial：全球性的临床试验，即国际多中心临床试验regional trial：区域性的临床试验。
计算机基本英语单词
计算机基本英语单词1.CPU(Center Processor Unit)中央处理单元2.mainboard主板3.RAM(random access memory)随机存储器(内存)4.ROM(Read Only Memory)只读存储器5.Floppy Disk软盘6.Hard Disk硬盘7.CD-ROM光盘驱动器(光驱)8.install安装9.monitor监视器10.keyboard键盘11.mouse鼠标12.chip芯片13.CD-R光盘刻录机14.HUB集线器15.Modem= MOdulator-DEModulator,调制解调器16.P-P(Plug and Play)即插即用17.UPS(Uninterruptable Power Supply)不间断电源18.BIOS(Basic-input-Output System)基本输入输出系统19.CMOS(plementaryMetal-Oxide-Semiconductor)互补金属氧化物半导体20.setup安装21.uninstall卸载22.wizzard向导23.OS(Operation Systrem)操作系统24.OA(Office AutoMation)办公自动化25.exit退出26.edit编辑27.copy复制28.cut剪切29.paste粘贴30.delete删除31.select选择32.find查找33.select all全选34.replace替换35.undo撤消36.redo重做37.program程序38.license许可(证)39.back前一步40.next下一步41.finish结束42.folder文件夹43.Destination Folder目的文件夹er用户45.click点击46.double click双击47.right click右击48.settings设置49.update更新50.release发布51.data数据52.data base数据库53.DBMS(Data Base Manege System)数据库管理系统54.view视图55.insert插入56.object对象57.configuration配置58.mand命令59.document文档60.POST(power-on-self-test)电源自检程序61.cursor光标62.attribute属性63.icon图标64.service pack服务补丁65.option pack功能补丁66.Demo演示67.short cut快捷方式68.exception异常69.debug调试70.previous前一个71.column行72.row列73.restart重新启动74.text文本75.font字体76.size大小77.scale比例78.interface界面79.function函数80.access访问81.manual指南82.active激活83.puter language计算机语言84.menu菜单85.GUI(graphical user interfaces )图形用户界面86.template模版87.page setup页面设置88.password口令89.code密码90.print preview打印预览91.zoom in放大92.zoom out缩小93.pan漫游94.cruise漫游95.ful l screen全屏96.tool bar工具条97.status bar状态条98.ruler标尺99.table表100.paragraph段落101.symbol符号102.style风格103.execute执行104.graphics图形105.image图像106.Unix用于服务器的一种操作系统107.Mac OS苹果公司开发的操作系统108.OO(Object-Oriented)面向对象109.virus病毒110.file文件111.open打开112.colse关闭113.new新建114.save保存115.exit退出116.clear清除117.default默认N局域网119.WAN广域网120.Client/Server客户机/服务器121.ATM( Asynchronous Transfer Mode)异步传输模式122.Windows NT微软公司的网络操作系统123.Internet互联网124.(World Wide Web)万维网125.protocol协议126.HTTP超文本传输协议127.FTP文件传输协议128.Browser浏览器129.homepage主页130.Webpage网页131.website132.URL在Internet的服务程序上133.用于指定信息位置的表示方法134.Online在线135.Email电子136.ICQ网上寻呼137.Firewall防火墙138.Gateway网关139.HTML超文本标识语言140.hypertext超文本141.hyperlink超级142.IP(Address)互联网协议(地址)143.Search Engine搜索引擎144.TCP/IP用于网络的一组通讯协议145.Telnet远程登录146.IE(Internet Explorer)探索者(微软公司的网络浏览器)147.Navigator引航者(网景公司的浏览器) 148.multimedia多媒体149.ISO国际标准化组织150.ANSI美国国家标准协会151.able 能152.active file 活动文件153.add watch 添加监视点154.allf iles 所有文件155.all rights reserved 所有的权力保留156.altdirlst 切换目录格式157.and fix a much wider range of disk problems 并能够解决更大X围内的磁盘问题158.and other inFORMation 以及其它的信息159.archive file attribute 归档文件属性160.assignto 指定到161.auto answer 自动应答162.auto detect 自动检测163.auto indent 自动缩进164.auto save 自动存储165.avail able onvolume 该盘剩余空间166.bad mand 命令错167.bad mand or file name 命令或文件名错168.batch parameters 批处理参数169.binary file 二进制文件170.binary files 二进制文件171.International panies国际公司172.Under the blank page页下空白173.by date 按日期174.by extension 按扩展名175.by name 按名称176.by tesfree 字节空闲177.call stack 调用栈178.case-insensitive 区分大小写179.Software pany shares 软件股份公司180.change directory 更换目录181.change drive 改变驱动器182.change name 更改名称183.characterset 字符集184.checking for 正在检查185.checks a disk and display a status report 检查磁盘并显示一个状态报告186.Change Disk / path改变盘/路径187.china 中国188.choose one of the following 从下列中选一项189.clean all 全部清除190.clean all breakpoints 清除所有断点191.clean attribute 清除属性192.Removal Order history 清除命令历史193.clean screen 清除屏幕194.close all 关闭所有文件195.code generation 代码生成196.color palette 彩色调色板197.The mand line命令行198.mand prompt命令提示符199.pressed file 压缩文件200.Hard disk configuration that used by MS-DOS 配置硬盘,以为MS-DOS 所用201.Conventional memory常规内存202.Copy directory and subdirectories, empty except 拷贝目录和子目录,空的除外203.Set up a copy of a document archiving attributes 拷贝设置了归档属性的文件204.Copying files or moving to another place把文件拷贝或搬移至另一地方205.To copy the contents of a floppy disk to another disk 把一个软盘的内容拷贝到另一个软盘上206.Copy Disk复制磁盘207.copyrightc208.Create Logical DOS district or DOS actuator创建DOS分区或逻辑DOS驱动器209.Create DOS district expansion创建扩展DOS分区210.The expansion DOS partitions to create logical DOS drives 在扩展DOS分区中创建逻辑DOS驱动器211.Create DOS Main district 创建DOS主分区212.Create a directory 创建一个目录213.To create, change or delete disk label创建,改变或删除磁盘的卷标214.the current file 当前文件215.Current drives 当前硬盘驱动器216.current settings 当前设置217.current time 当前时间218.The cursor position光标位置219.defrag 整理碎片220.dele 删去221.Logical DOS or delete Division actuator 删除分区或逻辑DOS驱动器222.deltree 删除树223.device driver 设备驱动程序224.Dialogue column对话栏225.direction keys 方向键226.directly 直接地227.dContents variables that目录显示变量228.Directory Structure目录结构229.disk access 磁盘存取230.disk copy 磁盘拷贝231.disk space 磁盘空间232.That document 显示文件233.display options 显示选项234.That geographical information 显示分区信息235.That specified directory and all subdirectories documents 显示指定目录和所有目录下的文件236.The document specified that attribute显示指定属性的文件237.Show or change file a ttributes 显示或改变文件属性238.That date or equipment 显示或设备日期239.Rather than a monochromatic color display screen installation information 以单色而非彩色显示安装屏信息240.That system has been used and unused amount of memory 显示系统中已用和未用的内存数量241.All documents on the disk that the full path and name显示磁盘上所有文件的完整路径和名称242.Show or change the current directory 显示或改变当前目录243.doctor 医生244.doesn 不245.doesnt change the attribute 不要改变属性246.dosshell DOS 外壳247.doubleclick 双击248.You want that information? Logical drive (y / n)?你想显示逻辑驱动器信息吗(y/n)?249.driveletter 驱动器名250.editmenu 编辑选单251.Memory内存252.end of file 文件尾253.end of line 行尾254.enter choice 输入选择255.entire disk 转换磁盘256.environment variable 环境变量257.All the documents and subdirectories所有的文件和子目录258.The directory has been in existence documents已存在的目录文件时259.expanded memory 扩充内存260.expand tabs 扩充标签261.explicitly 明确地262.extended memory 扩展内存263.fastest 最快的264.file system文件系统265.fdis koptions fdisk选项266.file attributes 文件属性267.file FORMat 文件格式268.file functions 文件功能269.files election 文件选择270.Documents choice variables文件选择变元271.file sin 文件在272.file sinsubdir 子目录中文件273.file slisted 列出文件274.file spec 文件说明275.file specification 文件标识276.files selected 选中文件277.find file 文件查寻278.fixed disk 硬盘279.fixed disk setup program 硬盘安装程序280.fixes errors on the disk 解决磁盘错误281.floppy disk 软盘282.FORMat disk格式化磁盘283.FORMats a disk for use with ms-dos 格式化用于MS-DOS的磁盘284.FORM feed 进纸285.free memory 闲置内存286.full screen 全屏幕287.function procedure 函数过程288.graphical 图解的289.graphics library 图形库290.group directories first 先显示目录组291.hang up 挂断292.hard disk 硬盘293.hardware detection 硬件检测294.has been 已经295.help file 帮助文件296.help index 帮助索引297.help in FORM ation 帮助信息298.help path 帮助路径299.help screen 帮助屏300.help text 帮助说明301.help topics 帮助主题302.help window 帮助窗口303.hidden file 隐含文件304.hidden file attribute 隐含文件属性305.hidden files 隐含文件306.how to 操作方式307.ignore case 忽略大小写308.in both conventional and upper memory 在常规和上位内存309.incorrect dos 不正确的DOS310.incorrect dos version DOS 版本不正确311.indicatesa binary file 表示是一个二进制文件312.indicatesan ascii text file 表示是一个ascii 文本文件313.insert mode 插入方式314.inuse 在使用315.invalid directory 无效的目录316.is 是317.kbytes 千字节318.keyboard type 键盘类型bel disk 标注磁盘p top 膝上321.The largest executable 最大可执行程序322.The largest available memory block最大内存块可用323.left handed 左手习惯324.left margin 左边界325.line number 行号326.line numbers 行号327.line spacing 行间距328.The document specified that the order按指定顺序显示文件329.listfile 列表文件330.listof 清单331.Position papers 文件定位332.look at 查看333.look up 查找334.macro name 宏名字335.make directory 创建目录336.memory info 内存信息337.memory model 内存模式338.menu bar 菜单条339.menu mand 菜单命令340.menus 菜单341.message window 信息窗口342.microsoft 微软343.microsoft antivirus 微软反病毒软件344.microsoft corporation 微软公司345.mini 小的346.modem setup 调制解调器安装347.module name 模块名348.monitor mode 监控状态349.Monochrome monitors 单色监视器350.move to 移至351.multi 多352.new data 新建数据353.newer 更新的354.new file 新文件355.new name 新名称356.new window 新建窗口357.norton norton358.nostack 栈未定义359.Note: careless use deltree 注意:小心使用deltree360.online help 联机求助361.optionally 可选择地362.or 或363.page frame 页面364.page length 页长365.Every screen displayed information about suspended after 在显示每屏信息后暂停一下366.pctools pc工具367.postscript 附言368.prefix meaning not 前缀意即\"不369.prefix to rever seorder 反向显示的前缀370.Prefixes used on a short horizontal line and - after the switch (for example /-w) presetswitch用前缀和放在短横线-后的开关(例如/-w)预置开关371.press a key toresume 按一键继续372.press any key for file functions 敲任意键执行文件功能373.press enter to keep the same date 敲回车以保持相同的日期374.press enter to keep thes ame time 敲回车以保持相同的时间375.press esc tocontinue 敲esc继续376.press esc to exit 敲<esc>键退出377.press esc to exit fdisk 敲esc退出fdisk 378.press esc to return to fdisk options 敲esc 返回fdisk选项379.previously 在以前380.print all 全部打印381.print device 打印设备382.print erport 打印机端口383.processesfilesinalldirectoriesinthespecifiedp ath 在指定的路径下处理所有目录下的文件384.program file 程序文件385.program ming environment 程序设计环境386.Each goal in the creation of documents remind you 在创建每个目标文件时提醒你387.promptsy outo press a key before copying 在拷贝前提示你敲一下键388.pull down 下拉389.pull downmenus 下拉式选单390.quick FORMat 快速格式化391.quick view 快速查看392.read only file 只读文件393.read only file attribute 只读文件属性394.read only files 只读文件395.read only mode 只读方式396.redial 重拨397.repeat last find 重复上次查找398.report bfile 报表文件399.resize 调整大小400.respectively 分别地401.rightmargin 右边距402.rootdirectory 根目录403.Running debug, it is a testing and editingtools 运行debug, 它是一个测试和编辑工具404.run time error 运行时出错405.save all 全部保存406.saveas 另存为407.scan disk 磁盘扫描程序408.screen colors 屏幕色彩409.screen options 屏幕任选项410.screen saver 屏幕暂存器411.screen savers 屏幕保护程序412.screen size 屏幕大小413.scroll bars 翻卷栏414.scroll lock off 滚屏已锁定415.search for 搜索416.sector spertrack 每道扇区数417.selectgroup 选定组418.selectionbar 选择栏419.setactivepartition 设置活动分区420.setupoptions 安装选项421.shortcutkeys 快捷键422.showclipboard 显示剪贴板423.singleside 单面424.size move 大小/移动425.sort help S排序H帮助426.sortorder 顺序427.Special services: D directory maintenance 特殊服务功能: D目录维护428.List of designated to drive, directory, and documents 指定要列出的驱动器,目录,和文件429.Designated you want to parent directory as the current directory 指定你想把父目录作为当前目录430.The new document specified directory or file name指定新文件的目录或文件名431.Copies of the document to designated 指定要拷贝的文件432.stack over flow 栈溢出433.stand alone 独立的434.startu poptions 启动选项435.statu sline 状态行436.stepover 单步437.summaryof 摘要信息438.Cancellation confirmed suggest that you would like to cover 取消确认提示,在你想覆盖一个439.swapfile 交换文件440.Switches can be installed in the environment variable dircmd开关可在dircmd环境变量中设置441.switch to 切换到442.sync 同步443.system file 系统文件444.system files 系统文件445.system info 系统信息446.system in FORM ation 系统信息程序447.table of contents 目录448.terminal emulation 终端仿真449.terminal settings 终端设置450.test file 测试文件451.test file para meters 测试文件参数452.the active window 激活窗口453.Switches can copycmd preset environment variables开关可以在copycmd环境变量中预置454.the two floppy disks must be the same type 两个软磁盘必须是同种类型的455.this may be over ridden with y on the mandline 在命令行输入/-y可以使之无效456.toggle reakpoint 切换断点457.toms dos 转到MS-DOS458.topm argin 页面顶栏459.turn off 关闭460.Type cd drives: designated driver that the current directory 键入cd驱动器:显示指定驱动器的当前目录461.Type cd without parameters of the current drive to show the current directory键入无参数的cd以显示当前驱动器的当前目录462.The date and type of parameters that the current date set键入无参数的date,显示当前日期设置463.unmark 取消标记464.unse lect 取消选择es bare FORMat 使用简洁方式es lower case 使用小写es widelist FORMat 使用宽行显示ing help 使用帮助469.verbosely 冗长地470.verifies that new file sare writ tencorrectly校验新文件是否正确写入了471.video mode 显示方式472.view window 内容浏览473.viruses 病毒474.vision 景象475.vollabel 卷标476.volumelabel 卷标477.volume serial number is 卷序号是478.windows help windows 帮助479.wordwrap 整字换行480.working directory 正在工作的目录481.worm 蠕虫482.write mode 写方式483.write to 写到484.xmsmemory 扩充内存485.you may 你可以486.我把网络安全方面的专业词汇整理了一下，虽然大多是乱谈，但初衷在于初学者能更好的了解这些词汇。
（完整版）IP协议-RFC791中文版
（完整版）IP协议-RFC791中文版INTERNET PROTOCOLDARPA INTERNET PROGRAMPROTOCOL SPECIFICATIONSeptember 1981prepared forDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency Information Processing Techniques Office1400 Wilson BoulevardArlington, Virginia 22209byInformation Sciences InstituteUniversity of Southern California4676 Admiralty WayMarina del Rey, California 90291索引前言 (iii)1.介绍------------------- 11.1 ~动机----------------- 11.2 ~范围----------------- 11.3 接口------------------11.4 操作-------------------22. 概述2.1 与其他协议的关系----------------- 92.2 操作模型------------------ 52.3 函数说明----------------- 72.4 ~网关----------------------- 93. 规范3.1 ~网际(Internet)头部格式---------------------- 113.2 讨论----------------- 233.3 接口------------------ 31附录A：例子& 场景附录B:数据传输顺序词汇表--------------------- 41引用---------- --------- 45前言这个文档规定了DoD 标准网际协议。
这个文档基于早期六个版本的ARPA 网际协议规范所以本文的大部分内容来自于他们。
水轮机电液调节系统及装置技术规程(英文版)
水轮机电液调节系统及装置技术规程(英文版)以下是为您生成的二十个关于水轮机电液调节系统及装置技术规程相关的英语释义、短语、单词、用法及双语例句：---1. **“水轮机电液调节系统”**：Hydroelectric turbine electro-hydraulic regulating system- 释义：用于控制水轮机运行的电液结合的调节系统- 短语：optimize the hydroelectric turbine electro-hydraulic regulating system（优化水轮机电液调节系统）- 单词：hydroelectric（水电的）、turbine（涡轮机、水轮机）、electro-hydraulic（电液的）、regulating（调节）- 用法：This paper focuses on the performance of the hydroelectric turbine electro-hydraulic regulating system.（这篇论文关注水轮机电液调节系统的性能。
）- 双语例句：The stability of the hydroelectric turbine electro-hydraulic regulating system is crucial for efficient power generation.（水轮机电液调节系统的稳定性对于高效发电至关重要。
）2. **“装置”**：Device / Installation- 释义：设备、仪器；安装、设置- 短语：testing device（测试装置）、installation procedure（装置安装程序）- 单词：test（测试）、procedure（程序、步骤）- 用法：The new device has improved the efficiency of the system.（新装置提高了系统的效率。
AVISPA协议分析工具的使用说明书
ATTACKS ON SECURITY PROTOCOLSUSING AVISPAVaishakhi SM. Tech Computer EngineeringKSV University, Near Kh-5, Sector 15Gandhinagar, GujaratProf.Radhika MDept of Computer EngineeringKSV University, Near Kh-5, Sector 15Gandhinagar, GujaratAbstractNow a days, Use of Internet is increased day by day. Both Technical and non technical people use the Internet very frequently but only technical user can understand the aspects working behind Internet. There are different types of protocols working behind various parameters of Internet such as security, accessibility, availability etc. Among all these parameters, Security is the most important for each and every internet user. There are many security protocols are developed in networking and also there are many tools for verifying these types of protocols. All these protocols should be analyzed through the verification tool. AVISPA is a protocol analysis tool for automated validation of Internet security protocol and applications. In this paper, we will discuss about Avispa library which describes the security properties, their classification, the attack found and the actual HLPSL specification of security protocols.Keywords- HLPSL,OFMC,SATMC,TA4SP,MASQURADE,DOSI.I NTRODUCTIONAs the Usage of Internet Increases, its security accessibility and availability must be increased. All users are concerns about their confidentiality and security while sending the data through the Internet. We have many security protocols for improve the security. But Are these protocols are technically verified? Are these protocols are working correctly? For answers of all these questions, there are some verification tools are developed. There are many tools like SPIN, Isabelle, FDR, Scyther, AVISPA for verification and validation of Internet security protocols. Among these, we will use the AVISPA research tool is more easy to use[1].The AVISPA tool provides the specific language called HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specification Language). Avispa tool has the library which includes different types of security protocols and its specifications. Avispa library contains around 79 security protocols from 33 groups[1]. It constitutes 384 security problems. Various standardization committees like IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), W3C(World Wide Web Consortium) and IEEE(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)work on this tool. AVISPA library is the collection of specification of security which is characterized as IETF protocols, NON IETF protocols and E-Business protocols.Each protocol is describe in Alice-Bob notation. AVISPA library also describes the security properties, their classification and the attack found[2].AVISPA library also provides the short description of the included protocols. AVISPA tool is working using four types of Back Ends:(1)OFMC(On the Fly Model Checker) performs protocol falsification and bounded verification. It implements the symbolic techniques and support the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators.(2)CL-Atse(Constraint logic Based Attack Searcher)applies redundancy elimination techniques. It supports type flaw detection.(3)SATMC(SAT based Attack Searcher)builds proportional formula encoding a bounded unrolling of the transition relation by Intermediate format.(4)TA4SP(Tree Automata Based Protocol Analyser).It approximates the intruder knowledge by regular tree language.TA4SP can show whether a protocol is flawed or whether it is safe for any number of sessions[4]. We found some security attacks while analyzing the security protocols. All security attacks are discussed below:II. HLPSL SyntaxPROTOCOL Otway_Rees;IdentifiersA, B, S : User;Kas,Kbs, Kab: Symmetric_Key;M,Na,Nb,X : Number;KnowledgeA : B,S,Kas;B : S,Kbs;S : A,B,Kas,Kbs;Messages1. A -> B : M,A,B,{Na,M,A,B}Kas2. B -> S : M,A,B,{Na,M,A,B}Kas,{Nb,M,A,B}Kbs3. S -> B : M,{Na,Kab}Kas,{Nb,Kab}Kbs4. B -> A : M,{Na,Kab}Kas5. A -> B : {X}KabSession_instances[ A:a; B:b; S:s; Kas:kas; Kbs:kbs ];Intruder Divert, Impersonate;Intruder_knowledge a;Goal secrecy_of X;A.Basic Roles[2]It is very easy to translate a protocol into HLPSL if it is written in Alice-Bob notation. A-B notation for particular protocol is as following:A ->S: {Kab}_KbsS ->B:{Kab}_KbsIn this protocol ,A want to set up a secure session with B by exchanging a new session key with the help of trusted server. Here Kas is the shared key between A and S.A starts by generating a new session key which is intended for B.She encrypts this key with Kas and send it to S.Then S decrypts message ,re encrypts kab with Kbs.After this exchange A and B share the new session key and can use it to communicate with one another.B.Transitions[2]The transition part contains set of transitions.Each represents the receipt of message and the sending of a reply message.The example of simple transition is as follows:Step 1: State = 0 /\ RCV({Kab’}_Kas) =|>State’:=2/\SND({kab’}_Kbs)Here, Step 1 is the name of the transition. This step 1 specifies that if the value of state is equal to zero and a message is received on channel RCV which contain some value Kab’ encrypted with Kas, then a transition files which sets the new value of state to 2 and sends the same value kab’ on channel SND, but this time encrypted with Kbs.posed Roles[2]Role session(A,B,S : agent,Kas, Kbs : symmetric key ) def=Local SA, RA, SB,RB,SS,RS :channel (dy)CompositionAlice (A,B,S, Kas, SA,RA)/\bob (B, A, S, Kbs, SB, RB)/\server (S, A, B, Kas, Kbs, SS, RS)end roleComposed roles contains one or more basic roles and executes together in parallel. It has no transition section. The /\ operator indicates that the roles should execute in parallel[4]. Here the type declaration channel (dy)stands for the Dolev-Yao intruder model[2]. The intruder has full control over the network, such that all messages sent by agents will go to the intruder. All the agents can send and receive on whichever channel they want; the intended connection between certain channel variables is irrelevant because the intruder is the network.We create the HLPSL code of security protocol using above syntax and verify those through the AVISPA tool [2]. Here we found some protocols with attack and some protocols without attacks. All the verified security protocol list are as below (figure 1):III. Security AttacksAs we show in the table that Internet security protocols may suffer from several types of attacks like flaw, replay, Man in the middle, masquerade, DOS etc. In Dos attack ,the attacker may target your computer and its network connection and the sites you are trying to use, an attacker may able to prevent you for accessing email, online accounts, websites etc[6].A flaw attack is an attack where a principal accepts a message component of one type as a message of another[7]. A replay attack Masqurade is the type of attack where the attackers pretends to be an authorized user of a system in order to gain access the private information of the system. Man in the middle is the attack where a user gets between the sender and receiver of information and sniffs any information being sent[6]. Man in the middle attack is sometimes known as Brigade attacks. Evasdropping attack is the act of secretly listening to the private conversation of others without their concent. It is a network layer attack. The attack could be done using tools called network sniffers [7]. These types of attacks can be removed by making some changes in the sessions and transactions.occurs when an attacker copies a stream of messages between two parties and replays the stream to one or more of the parties.IV.CONCLUSIONHere we have studied about the protocols using the AVISPA verification tool and we found different types of attacks on different Internet security protocols. All different types of goals are specified for different protocols.The attacks are interrupting to achieve their goals.We have to remove those attacks to make the protocols working properly.Figure 1: Attacks on security protocolsV.FUTURE WORKIn this paper we have defined the AVISPA library for Internet security protocols and survey the protocols and categorized the protocol with attacks and protocols without attacks. In the next stage we will apply some modifications in HLPSL language code on the security protocol which have the man in the middle attack using the techniques and we will try our best to remove the particular attack.VI.REFERENCES[1] Information Society Technologies, Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (version 1.1) user manual bythe AVISPA team,IST-2001-39252[2] Information Society Technologies, High Level Protocol Specification language Tutorial, A beginners Guide to Modelling and AnalyzingInternet Security Protocols,IST-2001-39252[3] Laura Takkinen,Helsinki University of Technology,TKKT-110.7290 Research Seminar on Network security[4] Daojing He,Chun Chen,Maode Ma,Sammy chan,International Journal of Communication Systems DOI:10.1002/Dac.1355 [5] Luca Vigano,Information Security Group,Electronic Theoretical Computer Science 155(2006)61-86 [6] U.Oktay and O.K.Sahingoz,6th [7] James Heather,Gavin Lowe,Steve Schneider,Programming Research group Oxford UniversityInternational Information security and cryptology conference,Turkey。
ddr3协议规范文档
ddr3协议规范文档The DDR3 protocol specification document is a crucial resource for understanding the technical details and guidelines for the DDR3 memory standard. This document outlines the requirements and specifications that manufacturers and developers must adhere to when designing and implementing DDR3 memory modules.From a technical perspective, the DDR3 protocol specification document provides a comprehensive overview of the DDR3 memory architecture, including its physical layout, electrical characteristics, and signaling protocols. It details the various components of a DDR3 memory module,such as the memory array, command/address bus, data bus,and control signals. This information is essential for engineers and designers who need to understand the inner workings of DDR3 memory and ensure compatibility and interoperability with other system components.Moreover, the document also covers the timing andsynchronization requirements of DDR3 memory. It specifies the various clock signals and timing parameters that must be met to ensure reliable data transfer and operation. This includes details on the memory clock frequency, data transfer rates, and the timing relationships between different signals. By following these guidelines, memory module manufacturers can ensure that their products meet the required performance standards and can be seamlessly integrated into DDR3-based systems.Another important aspect covered in the DDR3 protocol specification document is the electrical and signalintegrity requirements. It provides guidelines for proper termination, impedance matching, and signal routing to minimize signal reflections, crosstalk, and other noise-related issues. By following these guidelines, designers can ensure that the DDR3 memory modules operate reliably and maintain data integrity, even under challenging electrical conditions.Furthermore, the document also includes guidelines for testing and validation of DDR3 memory modules. It outlinesthe procedures and methodologies for verifying the compliance of memory modules with the DDR3 standard. This includes details on electrical testing, functional testing, and interoperability testing. By following these guidelines, manufacturers can ensure that their DDR3 memory modulesmeet the required standards and can be reliably used in a wide range of computer systems.In conclusion, the DDR3 protocol specification document is a comprehensive resource that provides detailedguidelines and requirements for the design, implementation, and testing of DDR3 memory modules. It covers various aspects, including the memory architecture, timing and synchronization, electrical and signal integrity, as wellas testing and validation procedures. By following these guidelines, manufacturers can ensure that their DDR3 memory modules meet the required standards and provide optimal performance and reliability in DDR3-based computer systems.。
药品注册专业英语
药品注册专业英语以下是二十个药品注册相关的英语内容：一、单词1. Registration（注册；登记）- 用法：作名词，可用于表示各种事物的注册过程，在药品领域指药品注册。
例如：The drug registration process is very strict.（药品注册过程非常严格。
）2. Submission（提交；呈递）- 用法：作名词。
例如：The submission of drug registration documents should beplete.（药品注册文件的提交应该完整。
）3. Approval（批准；认可）- 用法：作名词或动词（approve的名词形式）。
例如：The drug finally got approval from the regulatory agency.（这种药品最终得到了监管机构的批准。
）4. Regulatory（监管的；管理的）- 用法：形容词，用于修饰与监管相关的名词。
例如：Regulatory requirements for drug registration areplex.（药品注册的监管要求很复杂。
）5. Clinical（临床的）- 用法：形容词。
例如：Clinical trials are an important part of drug registration.（临床试验是药品注册的一个重要部分。
）6. Trial（试验；审讯）- 用法：作名词。
在药品领域主要指临床试验。
例如：The phase III clinical trial results are crucial for drug registration.（三期临床试验结果对药品注册至关重要。
）7. Protocol（方案；协议）- 用法：作名词。
例如：The clinical trial protocol should be well - designed.（临床试验方案应该精心设计。
SpecificationRelease
10 Operation and maintenance aspects....................................................................................................... 12
11 Functions and information flow ........................................................................................................ 1312
8.4
Stored in the SIM .........................................................................................................................................1211
5 General architecture............................................................................................................................. 109
8 Information storage................................................................................................................................ 10
8.1
中国移动WLAN AC-AP接口互通规范-基本协议分册
Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification
IETF
[23]
RFC2464
Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks
IETF
[24]
RFC3484
Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
IETF
[30]
RFC3411
An Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks
IETF
[31]
RFC2080
RIPng for IPv6
IETF
[32]
RFC4552
Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3
本分册第7章CAPWAP补充协议是对RFC协议未明确定义部分的补充说明，包括AC AP发现策略和版本升级策略
规范性引用文件
下列文件中的条款通过本标准的引用而成为本标准的条款。凡是注日期的引用文件，其随后所有的修改单（不包括勘误的内容）或修订版均不适用于本标准，然而，鼓励根据本标准达成协议的各方研究是否可使用这些文件的最新版本。凡是不注日期的引用文件，其最新版本适用于本标准。
IETF
[37]
RFC5417
RFC5417Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP)Access Controller DHCP Option
IETF
[38]
PROTOCOLSPECIFICATION设备对接协议
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议1. IntroductionThe PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 is a set of rules and guidelines that govern the communication between devices in a network. This protocol specification is designed to ensure seamless integration and data exchange between different devices, allowing for interoperability and efficient operation.2. Protocol Overview2.1. PurposeThe main purpose of the PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 is to establish a standard communication protocol that devices can use to exchange data and commands. This protocol allows devices from different manufacturers to interact with each other and work together in a unified network environment.2.2. Features•Interoperability: Devices using the PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 can communicate and exchange data seamlessly, regardless of their manufacturer or type.•Efficiency: The protocol is designed to be lightweight and efficient, minimizing the amount of data sent over the network and reducing latency.•Security: The PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 includes built-in security features to protect data integrity and prevent unauthorized access.3. Protocol Specification3.1. Message FormatThe PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 uses a standardized message format for communication between devices. Each message consists of a header, payload, and checksum.•Header: Contains information such as the message type, sender ID, and receiver ID.•Payload: Contains the actual data or commands being exchanged between devices.•Checksum: A calculated value used to verify the integrity of the message during transmission.3.2. Message TypesThe PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 supports various message types, including data messages, control messages, and status messages. Each message type has a specific format and purpose within the protocol.•Data Messages: Used to exchange data between devices, such as sensor readings, control values, or configuration settings.•Control Messages: Used to send commands to devices, such as requesting a device to perform a specific action.•Status Messages: Used to report the operational status of a device, such as online/offline status or error messages.4. Implementation4.1. Device ConfigurationTo implement the PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议, devices must adhere to the defined message format and message types. Each device must be assigned a unique ID for identification within the network.4.2. Communication FlowCommunication between devices using the PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 follows a predefined flow. Devices can send and receive messages based on their role in the network, such as sensors, actuators, or controllers.5. ConclusionThe PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 设备对接协议 provides a standardized framework for device-to-device communication, enabling seamless integration and interoperability in networked environments. By following the guidelines outlined in this protocol specification, devices can communicate effectively and exchange data efficiently, leading to improved performance and reliability in IoT and industrial automation applications.。
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