股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

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股权集中度“控制权私人收益”和债务融资-外文资料翻译译文

股权集中度“控制权私人收益”和债务融资-外文资料翻译译文XX 理工大学毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译系部：专业：姓名：XX学号：外文出处: Ownership Concentration, ‘PrivateBe nefits of Control’ and DebtFinancing[J]. Journal ofCorporation Law,2004,Vol.29,No.4,719-734附件：1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。

附件1：外文资料翻译译文股权集中度，“控制权私人收益”和债务融资摘要：基于快速成长的'法律和经济’文献，本文分析了主要所有者在以牺牲小股东利益而获取“控制权私人收益”的环境中进行债务融资的公司治理。

这表明，所有权集中是与作为一个公司的负债比率和衡量投资的财政资源的使用效率较低有关，而这并不取决于最大股东的身份，固定的具有支配权的股东可以串通股权持有者进行控股溢价。

这个结论的其中一个可能的结果就是债务市场的企业信贷压缩，这有转型期经济体的证据支持。

关键词：所有权，控制权收益，债务引言有一个大量研究金融经济学和战略管理的文献显示获得控制权私人收益的方式和数量与管理行为和企业业绩有关。

(Gibbs, 1993；Hoskisson et al., 1994；Jensen and Warner, 1988)然而，大多以往的研究集中于大型、公开的在传统的美国/英国公司控制模型的框架范围内分散所有权的上市公司，很少是关于所有权集中的公司治理（Holderness and Sheehan, 1988；Short,1994）。

快速成长的企业所有制结构的优化取决于“控制权私人收益”的水平。

（e.g., Bennedsen and Wo lfenzon, 2000； Grossman and Hart, 1988；Harris and Raviv, 1988）。

文献已超出传统的治理研究美国/英国环境，并在最近成为理论和政策辩论。

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

股份投资合同的标准文本中英文版本

Anti-Dilution反稀释条款The Conversion Price shall be adjusted on a full-ratchet basis for issuance of any securities of the Company at a purchase price less than the then-effective conversion price. Additionally, the Conversion Price shall be proportionally adjusted for share splits, share dividends, recapitalizations and the like.若公司以低于届时转股价格的价格发行任何证券，转股价格将调整为新发行的证券的价格。

发生股票分拆、发放股票股利、再资本化和类似情形时，转股价格亦将按比例作相应调整。

Protective Provisions保护性条款The consent of 75% of the CN holders will be required for any of the following actions of the Company and its subsidiaries:公司及其子公司的下述事项须征得75%的可转换债券持有人同意：1) Amendment to the Memorandum of Articles of Association公司章程的修改2) Make any material change in the nature of its business公司业务性质的任何重大改变3) Merger, consolidation, reorganization, liquidation, dissolution, or winding-up合并、收购、重组、清算、解散或停业4) Acquire, grant an operating right in relation to or otherwise dispose of any shares or securities or material part of its business or assets (excluding current assets)股权、重要业务或重大资产（不包括流动资产）的收购、处置，经营权的获取、授予5) Sell, mortgage, pledge, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of a substantial portion of assets重大资产的出售、抵押、担保、租赁、转让或处置6) Issuance of equity or debt securities, repurchase or redemption of any equity security: re-classification of issued securities; increases, decreases or alters the existing issued share capital 股权或债权证券的发行，任何股权证券的赎回，已发行证券的重新分类，现有股本的增加、减少或改变7) Declaration or payment of dividends宣布发放或支付股利8) Enter into any joint venture, partnership or consortium arrangement签订任何合营或联营协议9) Termination, or material amendment to the terms of stock option plan including number of options, vesting period, and exercise price of options股票期权计划的终止，或其中条款的重大改变（包括期权总额、行权期、行权价格）10) Any loans to any director, officer or employee提供给任何董事、高管人员或雇员的贷款11) Any related party transaction outside the ordinary course of business任何非正常业务之外的关联交易12) Incurrence of any external borrowing by the Company which exceeds US$ [ ], or a series of external borrowing by the Company which in the aggregate over any 12 month period exceed US$ [ ].公司超过[ ]美元的任何外部借贷，或12个月内累计超过[ ]美元的一系列外部借贷的发生13) Change the terms of employment of any employee whose base salary is in excess of US$50,000 per annum任何底薪超过5万美元/年的雇员雇用条款的改变14) Hire or dismiss key management staff聘用或解雇关键管理人员15) Enter into any contract or arrangement which involves a consideration or payment exceeding US$[ ] to be made within any one year任何1年内须支付对价超过[ ]美元的合同或安排的达成16) Change of the Auditors or any material change in accounting practices or policies审计师事务所的变更或任何会计制度或政策的重大改变17) Select the listing exchange or the underwriters for an IPO or approve the valuation and terms and conditions for the IPO, whether or not the IPO is a Qualified IPOIPO上市交易所或承销商的选择，或IPO（不管是否合格IPO）估值以及条款的批准18) Annual budget including capital expenditure.年度预算（包括资本支出）。

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms from Emerging Markets原文：1. Introduction International International business business business and and and economic economic economic development development development are are are closely closely closely related. related. related. When When applying applying to to to emerging emerging emerging markets, markets, markets, foreign foreign foreign direct direct direct investment investment investment (FDI) (FDI) (FDI) and and and development development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play play the the the location location location advantage advantage advantage (Dunning (Dunning (Dunning 2000). 2000). 2000). For For For most most most part, part, part, the the the economics economics economics and and and the the strategy strategy of of of international international international business business business focused focused focused on on on the the the MNE MNE MNE while while while economic economic economic geography geography from from Koopman Koopman (1957) to to Krugman Krugman (1991) and and later later later (as (as well as as development development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place. This This paper paper paper brings brings brings together together together international international international business business business development development development economics economics economics and and international trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon phenomenon in in in the the the arena arena arena of of of international international international business business business –– the the recent recent recent growth growth growth of of of private private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. The The The tremendous tremendous tremendous growth growth growth of of of private private private equity equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total total went went went up up up almost almost almost ten ten ten times, times, times, from from from about about about $3.5B $3.5B $3.5B to to to more more more than than than $33B $33B $33B in in in the the the period period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India. The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity equity investments investments investments in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets is is is another another another expression expression expression of of of foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries countries in in in this this this case case case are are are specialized specialized specialized financial financial financial institutions institutions institutions (private (private (private equity equity equity funds) funds) (Yoshikawa (Yoshikawa et et et al. al. al. 2006) 2006) 2006) and and and the the the factor factor factor of of of production production production that that that they they they export export export is is is high-risk high-risk sector sector specific specific specific capital. capital. capital. We We dubbed dubbed this this this form form form of of of FDI FDI FDI as as as financial financial financial foreign foreign foreign direct direct investment investment (FFDI), but (FFDI), but the process and the rational a re the same as in are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous –but not restricted to –for private equity throughout this this paper) paper) paper) is is is a a a subset subset subset of of of FDI FDI FDI that that that is is is solely solely solely devoted devoted devoted––as as the the the name name name implies implies implies––for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with with the the the typical typical typical investment investment investment periods periods periods of of of the the the investors investors investors of of of private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (e.g., (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written written off off at at the the the prospects prospects prospects that that that few few few will will will generate generate generate return return return that that that will will will more more more than than compensate compensate those those those sunk sunk sunk investments investments investments (hence (hence (hence the the the “high “high “high-r -r -risk” isk” isk” referral). referral). referral). Sector Sector Sector specific specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by the entrepreneurs entrepreneurs or or or the the the “insiders” “insiders” “insiders” and and and the the the investors investors investors (most (most (most often often often risk-averse risk-averse risk-averse investors), investors), the the “outsiders”. “outsiders”. “outsiders”. This This This is is is accomplished accomplished accomplished by by by a a a combination combination combination of of of validation validation validation processes processes processes and and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act act as as as financial financial financial and and and risk risk risk intermediaries intermediaries intermediaries (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor (Coval/Thakor 2005, 2005, 2005, provide provide provide an an an analytical analytical framework framework for for for this this this approach). approach). approach). The The The value value value of of of the the the general general general partners partners partners of of of private private private equity equity funds funds depends depends depends on on on the the the quality quality quality of of of the the the risk risk risk intermediation intermediation intermediation that that that they they they perform perform perform for for for their their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information. Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions) Emerging Asia CEE Russia Latham Sub-Sah ara Africa Middle- East Africa Multi ple Regions Total 2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007. The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, 2004), 2004), 2004), the the the literature literature literature on on on comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage in in in the the the discussion discussion discussion of of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000). Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful powerful contributor contributor contributor to to to economic economic economic and and and business business business growth growth growth in in in emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. markets. FFDI FFDI changes changes the the the scene scene scene of of of international international international business business business as as as it it it contributes contributes contributes to to to a a a change change change in in in the the relations relations between between between firms firms firms in in in developed developed developed countries countries countries and and and firms firms firms in in in the the the emerging emerging emerging markets. markets. The The unique unique unique relatively relatively relatively short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of a a a private private private equity equity equity investment investment investment makes makes makes it it it an an appropriate instrument for for the the transition period that that the the world of of international international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and and India India India in in in particular. particular. particular. This This This is is is so so so because because because the the the short short short term term term nature nature nature of of of private private private equity equity investments investments allows allows allows firms firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets for for for sufficient sufficient sufficient time time time for for for transfer transfer transfer of of information and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed. The The relations relations relations between between between the the the development development development economics economics economics literature literature literature on on on finance finance finance and and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section section of of of the the the paper. paper. paper. It It It is is is shown shown shown that that that the the the two two two bodies bodies bodies of of of literatures literatures literatures are are are quite quite quite related related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in in the the the institutional institutional institutional setting setting setting and and and the the the lack lack lack of of of sufficient sufficient sufficient development development development of of of the the the capital capital markets markets in in in most most most emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets are are are overcome overcome overcome by by by creating creating creating specific specific specific international international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local local comparative comparative comparative advantage advantage advantage (Deardorff (Deardorff (Deardorff 2004) 2004) 2004) is is is used used used for for for better better better understanding understanding understanding of of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms firms in in in emerging emerging emerging markets markets markets and and and private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds from from from the the the US US US and and and other other other major major capital capital markets. markets. markets. This This This issue issue issue is is is discussed discussed discussed and and and analyzed analyzed analyzed in in in section section section four four four of of of the the the paper. paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions conclusions of of of the the the study study study are are are briefly briefly briefly discussed discussed discussed in in in section section section six, six, six, the the the last last last section section section of of of the the paper. 2. Finance, Growth and International Business In a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth growth Levine Levine Levine (1997) (1997) (1997) states states states that: that: that: “…the “…the “…the development development development of of of financial financial financial markets markets markets and and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial d evelopment development development is is is a a a good predictor of future rates of econom good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulation and and technological technological technological change. change. change. Moreover, Moreover, Moreover, cross-country, cross-country, cross-country, case case case study, study, study, industry- industry- industry- and and firm- firm- level level level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack lack thereof-crucially thereof-crucially thereof-crucially affect affect affect the the the speed speed speed and and and the the the pattern pattern pattern of of of econom econom economic ic ic development”, development”, (Levine (Levine 1997, 1997, 1997, p. p. p. 689). 689). 689). Levine Levine Levine makes makes makes two two two other other other important important important points; points; points; first first first that that that the the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there are three main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. attention. (1) (1) (1) Why Why Why does does does financial financial financial structure structure structure change change change as as as countries countries countries grow? grow? grow? (2) (2) (2) Why Why Why do do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? systems? and and and (3) (3) (3) are are are there there there longterm longterm longterm economic economic economic growth growth growth advantages advantages advantages to to to adopting adopting adopting legal legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another? The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of of high-risk high-risk high-risk sector sector sector specific specific specific capital capital capital such such such as as as provided provided provided by by by private private private equity equity equity funds. funds. funds. The The potential potential of of of some some some countries countries countries in in in attracting attracting attracting private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds is is is not not not being being being fully fully realized realized due due due to to to the the the absence absence absence of of of an an an appropriate appropriate appropriate financial financial financial system. system. system. A A A well well well developed developed financial financial system system system is is is necessary necessary necessary to to to enhance enhance enhance the the the import import import of of of sector sector sector specific specific specific (high-risk) (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI. As As the the the financial financial financial structure structure structure of of of a a a country country country changes changes changes (as (as (as the the the country country country grows), grows), grows), it it it is is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar similar rate rate rate of of of growth growth growth develop develop develop in in in different different different pace pace pace and and and in in in a a a different different different way. way. way. There There There are are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain p atterns of development patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on on relatively relatively relatively transparent transparent transparent and and and enforceable enforceable enforceable corporate corporate corporate governance. governance. governance. Morck, Morck, Morck, Wolfenzon, Wolfenzon, and and Y eung Y eung (2005) (2005) (2005) demonstrated demonstrated demonstrated that that that economic economic economic entrenchment entrenchment entrenchment has has has a a a high high high price price price in in foregone growth opportunities. There There are are are three three three related related related problems problems problems in in in creating creating creating a a a domestic domestic domestic financial financial financial system system system for for private equity and venture capital investments: How How to to to mobilize mobilize mobilize the the the type type type and and and the the the quantity quantity quantity of of of savings savings savings (capital) (capital) (capital) appropriate appropriate appropriate for for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world? How How to to to generate generate generate credible credible credible information information information and and and trust? trust? trust? How How How to to to monitor monitor monitor management management and to exert corporate control? The The only only only feasible feasible feasible way way way to to to accommodate accommodate accommodate private private private equity equity equity and and and venture venture venture capital capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital capital relates relates relates to to to the the the portfolio portfolio portfolio of of of the the the investors investors investors and and and to to to the the the relational relational relational capital capital capital of of of the the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part part of of of their their their assets’ assets’ assets’ management management management program. program. program. (A (A (A good good good example example example of of of how how how such such such capital capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make make investment investment investment unless unless unless there there there is is is an an an acceptable acceptable acceptable level level level of of of transparency transparency transparency and and and corporate corporate governance governance in in in the the the country country country where where where the the the money money money is is is invested. invested. invested. Whether Whether Whether such such such a a a process process process is is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with with this this this issue. issue. issue. They They They address address address the the the question question question why why why some some some developing developing developing countries countries countries are are are less less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma markets rkets rkets and and and unproductive unproductive unproductive technologies”. technologies”. technologies”. They They They conclude conclude conclude that that that in in in some some some cases cases cases the the expected expected increase increase increase in in in the the the income income income inequality inequality inequality due due due to to to the the the financial financial financial led led led technological technological changes deters people f rom from from adopting financial, legal, adopting financial, legal, a nd political and political reforms reforms that will that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior. Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more more pronounced pronounced pronounced than than than in in in the the the impressive impressive impressive development development development of of of the the the private private private equity equity equity funds funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions. The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investments in emerging markets went went up tremendously in up tremendously in t he last five the last five y ears. More importantly years. More importantly significant amounts were were invested invested to support domestic companies in in emerging emerging markets markets to to to become become become more more more competitive competitive competitive in in in the the the global global global markets markets markets by by by providing providing providing their their their own own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment investment by by by three three three American American American private private private equity equity equity funds funds funds (Texas (Texas (Texas Pacific Pacific Pacific Group, Group, Group, General General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market. 译文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。

私募股权与人力资本风险外文文献翻译中英文最新

私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂⽂献翻译中英⽂最新外⽂⽂献翻译原⽂及译⽂标题：私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂翻译2019⽂献出处：Manfred Antoni, Ernst Maug, Stefan Obernberger.[J]Journal of Financial Economics，Volume 133, Issue3，September 2019，Pages 634-657译⽂字数：3900 多字英⽂Private equity and human capital riskManfred Antoni，Ernst Maug，Stefan ObernbergerAbstractWe study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct atched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an increase in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and older employees fare far worse after buyouts compared with the average target employee, even though they are not more likely to lose their jobs at the target compared with other employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are those who are less likely to find new employment, not those who are most likely to lose their jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that require IT skills.Keywords: Private equity, Restructuring, Human capital risk,Buyouts, WagesIn this paper, we analyze the human capital risk associated with private equity (PE) buyouts in Germany. The social costs associated with private equity restructuring have been the subject of emotional debates. The head of the German Social Democratic Party once compared buyout firms with “swarms of locusts” who “descend on companies, graze, and then move on,” suggesting that private equity firms make short-term profits by imposing large costs on employees. Discussions in other countries created similar sentiments.The literature in finance and economics has conventionally regarded private equity buyouts as vehicles for improving firms’governance and operating performance, facilitating growth and creative destruction, and, more recently, modernizing firms’technology.4 From this modernization perspective, private equity buyouts create value by fashioning leaner firms and enhancing growth through organizational, operational, and technological improvements. Critics argue that shareholders gain in private equity buyouts at the expense of other stakeholders, in particular, the government through lower taxes, and employees. This transfer-of- wealth view echoes the critical stance articulated in the public debate. Shleifer and Summers (1988) provide a theoretical foundation for this view and suggest that investor-led restructurings do not create value but simply transfer wealth from employees and other stakeholders toshareholders by reneging on implicit contracts.We contribute to this debate by analyzing 511 private equity buyouts in Germany between 2002 and 2008. Germany is fairly representative for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding employment protection legislation (EPL), making it a well- suited laboratory for studying this matter. We perform matched- sample difference-in-differences analyses at the establishment level and the individual level. We first match each target establishment to multiple control establishments and then we match each target employee to another employee from one of the matching control establishments. Matching at both levels is performed based on a rich set of establishment, job, and employee characteristics. We conduct analyses at the establishment level and the individual level over a five-year period after the buyout.We ask two questions: How do job growth, separations, and hiring at the establishment level develop after buyouts? Are buyouts associated with human capital risk for the employees of target firms? We ask both questions for all employees in our sample and for groups of employees who could be particularly vulnerable to or who could benefit from restructuring. The twoquestions we ask are related but distinct. PE firms may increase employee turnover without reducing overall establishment-level employment, and some of the employees who are replaced and losetheir jobs with the target perhaps do not find new employment. We find this to be the case for older workers, who lose their jobs at target establishments at almost exactly the same rate as younger workers but experience significantly larger losses of long-term employment and wages. Hence, it is important to distinguish firm-level decisions and individual outcomes, because some groups, e.g., low-paid workers, seem to find new employment easily, whereas others, such as older workers, often remain unemployed.Buyout establishments reduce their employment by 8.96% more compared with the control group in the period up to five years after the buyout. This effect can be decomposed into an increase in the separation rate of 18.75% and an increase in the hiring rate of 9.79%. About half of the increase in departures from buyout targets results in replacements and the other half in job destruction. The investigation of deal-level growth, separation, and hiring rates shows a strong and positive correlation between hiring rates and separation rates and almost half of the buyouts are followed by a period of increased employee turnover. Moreover, we often find higher separation rates and higher hiring rates for the same groups of employees. Private equity firms restructure firms by reducing employment and by replacing employees. In our sample, they employ both strategies at about the same rate. The increase in hiring is largely concentrated in the first years after the buyout, whereas most of theseparations happen in later years. We may observe separations later because buyout firms want to increase profitability toward the end of their investment horizon to achieve better sales prices. Alternatively, the evaluation of targets’ operations and the implementation of restructuring strategies could simply take time. We find, at the individual level, a downward trend in employee earnings after private equity buyouts. The average buyout target employee loses € 980 in annual earnings after five years compared with the matched control group, which is 2.8% of median earnings in our sample.The individual-level analyses identify three groups of employees whose post-buyout losses are significantly larger than those of the average buyout employee: white-collar workers, managers, and older employees. Our discussion of employee groups is guided by three sets of explanations of buyout-related changes in employment and wages: (1) organizational streamlining, (2) technological modernization, and (3) transfers of wealth. We begin with organizational streamlining, i.e., the notion that buyout investors reduce administrative staff and layers of management. White-collar workers experience higher separation rates with less replacement in the short term and significantly higher losses of employment and earnings compared with other employees, consistent with the notion that buyout investors streamline firms by reducing administrative staff. For managers, we find very strong results at theindividual level, but not at the establishment level, which suggests that buyout firms do not systematically reduce layers of middle management. We thus attribute the adverse development for managers to their difficulties in finding new employment, not the human resource policies of buyout investors.Next, we turn to the argument that buyouts foster technological modernization. Private equity firms can implement new technologies, either because target managers resist change or because private equity investors have additional technological expertise. As a result, buyout targets can undergo faster technological modernization than control firms. We are careful to distinguish different notions of technological change, each of which has specific and sometimes different implications for employees. Proponents of the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Katz, Autor, 1999, Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003) argue that technological change is biased against lower-skilled jobs and increases wage inequality. Separation rates for low-wage workers are almost twice as high as those for the sample as a whole. They are not displaced by those with higher wage levels, but by other low-wage employees. The net rate of job growth for low-wage workers is not unusually low, whereas turnover is unusually high. Individual-level results even show that low- wage employees lose less after buyouts than other employees, suggesting that skill-biased technological change does not determine individual。

股权融资论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstractThis article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are some concise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ preference to equity fund.Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually a nalyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betr ay to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference toequity fundAccording to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is the turn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund co st. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listed companies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies andpreference to equity fundStatic Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost offinancial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower conve rtibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincide with the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small ch ange in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which haveexcellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equityfundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstandin g shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than the average level of all the listed companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes offinancing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

金融学融资融券中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照翻译Margin Trading Bans in Experimental Asset MarketsAbstractIn financial markets, professional traders leverage their trades because it allows to trade larger positions with less margin. Violating margin requirements, however, triggers a margin call and open positions are automatically covered until requirements are met again. What impact does margin trading have on the price process and on liquidity in financial asset markets? Since empirical evidence is mixed, we consider this question using experimental asset markets. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchasing and short selling is permitted, we ban margin purchases and/or short sales using a 2x2 factorial design to a allow for a comparative static analysis. Our results indicate that a ban on margin purchases fosters efficient pricing by narrowing price deviations from fundamental value accompanied with lower volatility and a smaller bid-ask-spread. A ban on short sales, however, tends to distort efficient pricing by widening price deviations accompanied with higher volatility and a large spread.Keywords: margin trading, Asset Market, Price Bubble, Experimental Finance1.IntroductionHowever, regulators can only have a positive impact on the life-cycle of a bubble, if they know how institutional changes affect prices in financial markets. Note that regulation is a double-edged sword since decision errors may lead from bad to worse. Given the systemic risk posed by speculative bubbles and their long history, it may be surprising how little attention bubbles have received in the literature and how little understood they are. This ignorance is partly due to the complex psychological nature of speculative bubbles but also due to the fact that the conventional financial economic theory has ignored the existence of bubbles for a long-time. But even if theories on bubble cycles have empirical relevance, it is clear that the issues surrounding the formation and the bursting of bubbles cannot be analyzed with pencil and paper. Conclusions on bubble cycles must be backed with quantitative data analysis. Given the limited number of observed empirical market crashes and their non-recurring nature, an experimental analysis of bubble formation involving controlled and replicable laboratory conditions seems to be a promising way to proceed.The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature, Section 0 presents the details of the experimental design and section IV reports the data analysis. In section V, we summarize our findings and provide concluding remarks.2. Leverage in asset marketsDo margin requirements have any effects on market prices? Fisher (1933) and also Snyder (1930) mentioned the importance of margin debt in generating price bubbles when analyzing the Great Crash of 1929. The ability to leverage purchases lead to a higher demand, ending up in inflated prices. The subsequently appreciated collateral allowed to leverage purchases even more. This upward price spiral was fueled by an expansion of debt. From the end of 1924, brokers’loans rose four and one-half times (by $6.5 billion) and in the final phase broker’s borrowings rose at more than 100% a year until the bubble crashed. Then, after the peak of the bubble, a debt spiral was initiated. Investors lost trust and started to sell assets. Excess supply deflated prices resulting in a depreciation of collateral. Triggered margin calls lead to forced asset sales pushing supply even further. An increase in defaults on debt, and short sales exacerbated supply and finally assets were being sold at fire sale prices. It only took 6 weeks to extinguish half of the total of brokers’credit. Finally, in 1934, the U.S. Congress established federal margin authority to prevent unjustifiable increases or decreases in stock demand since margin requirements can prevent dramatic price fluctuations by limiting leveraged trades on both sides of the stock market: extremely optimistic margin purchasers and extremely pessimistic short sellers.Recent experimental evidence suggests short sale constraints to increase prices. Ackert et al. (2006)and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find prices to deflate–even below fundamental value in the latter study –while King, Smith, Williams, and Van Boening (1993) find no effect. In a setting with information asymmetries, Fellner and Theissen (2006) find higher prices with short sale constraints but not depending on the divergence of opinion as predicted by Miller (1977). In a setting with smart money traders, Bhojraj, Bloomfield, and Tayler (2009) report short selling to exacerbate overpricing, even though it reduces equilibrium price levels. Hauser and Huber (2012) find short selling constraints with two dependent assets to distort price levels. Our design deviates from the previous studies in several but one important way: We use a more empirically relevant facility in that traders have to provide collateral facing the threat of margin calls.3. Implementing Margin Purchasing and Short SellingWe conducted four computerized treatments utilizing a 2x2 factorial design as displayed in Table II. Starting from an empirically relevant situation where margin purchases Traders execute margin purchases when they purchase shares by using loan, collateralized with shareholdings evaluated at the current market value.11 In this case, traders make a bull market bet, i.e. they borrow cash to buy shares, wait for the price to rise and sell them with a profit. However, a decline in prices depreciates collateral while keeping loan constant. When prices fall below a certain threshold, such that the loan exceeds the value of the shareholdings (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i) the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts selling shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or untilall shares have been sold.12 Traders execute short sales when they sell shares without holding them in their inventory, collateralized with sufficient cash at hand.13 In this case, traders make a bear market bet, i.e. they borrow shares to sell them in the market, wait for the price to decline, buy them back with a profit and return them. Note that the amount of debt equals the total amount the trader has to pay to buy back the outstanding shares. Thus, an increase in prices increases debt and reduces collateral (cash minus value of outstanding shares), simultaneously. When prices exceed a certain threshold, such that the amount to buy back outstanding shares exceeds collateral (i.e. debt > equity), a margin call is triggered. Immediately, i)the trader’s buttons are disabled, ii) outstanding orders are cancelled, and iii) the computer starts buying shares at the current market price until margin requirements are met again or until all short positions have been covered. Note that short sellers have to pay dividends for their short positions at the end of each period.14 After period 15, both long and short positions are worthless.15 In any case, a margin callcan lead to bankruptcy. However, the consequences of a margin call hold even during bankruptcy, i.e. outstanding positions continuously being closed although subjects are bankrupt. This is different to any other asset market experiment considering leverage4. Margin traders tend to make less money than othersBy leveraging purchases and sales, traders take more risks to be able to make more money. But do margin traders make more money at all? To evaluate this question, we classify traders into types, i.e. margin traders, who trade on margin at least once, and others. Table X shows the average end- of round-earnings within types for each treatment along with the number of subjects. The spearman rank correlation between type and end of round earnings is negative in both rounds and in all three treatments. The coefficient is significantly different from zero only in MP|NoSS and NoMP|SS when subjects are once experienced . Subjects, who executed both margin purchases and short sales in MP|SS earned less than subjects who refrained from trading on margin. This is significant only for inexperienced subjects . One final note on the distribution of earnings. Comparing the treatments by evaluating the dispersion of earnings using the coefficient of variation , we find that the average CV in the NoMP|NoSS is lower than any other treatment Although not statistically significant, the results indicate that it is less risky to participate in markets with margin bans than in the markets where margintrading is permitted.5. ConclusionIn an attempt to halt the decline in asset values, recent regulatory measures temporarily banned short sales in financial markets. To assess the impact of banning leveraged trading on market mispricing is a complicated task when being reliant on data from real world exchanges only. it is unclear if possible price increases following a ban on short sales would come from new long positions or from covered short positions, and the announcement of such measures affects an uncontrolled reaction of the market. Owed to the uncontrolled uncertainties in the real world, asset mispricing can be measured only with weak confidence.In comparison to other experimental studies where limits to margin debt and short sales are rare, our design involves margin requirements comparable to the real world. Highly levered investors face margin calls that lead to forced liquidation of positions, affecting a reinforcement of the swings of the market. We have studied the impact of leverage on individual portfolio decisions to find an increase in risk taking characterized by higher concentrations of risky assets eventually resulting in individual bankruptcies. Thus, our experimental results are in line with theories of margin trading by Irvine Fischer (1933) and by recent heterogeneous agents models (Geanakoplos 2009) which conjecture such effects on asset pricing and portfolio decisions. As in any laboratory experiment, the results are restricted to the chosen parameters. The baselineSmith et al. (1988) asset market design has been challenged in recent studies (e.g. Kirchler et al. 2011), arguing that some subjects are confused about the declining fundamental value and believe that prices keep a similar level in the course of time. So it would also be interesting to investigate the effects of bans Jena Economic Research Papers 2012 - 05826 of margin purchases and short sales, to see if our treatment effects can be repeated in an environment with non-decreasing fundamental values. However, recent experiments by Hauser and Huber (2012) show similar effects using multiple asset markets with a complexsystem of fundamental values but without margin calls. It would also be interesting to see how margin requirements change performance in multiple sset markets. We leave these open questions to future research.ReferencesAbreu, D., and M.K. Brunnermeier, 2003, Bubbles and crashes, Econometrica 71, 173–204.Ackert, L., N. Charupat, B. Church and R. Deaves, 2006, Margin, Short Selling, and Lotteries in Experimental Asset Markets, Southern Economic Journal 73, 419–436. Adrangi, B. and A. Chatrath, 1999, Margin Requirements and Futures Activity: Evidence from the Soybean and Corn Markets, Journal of Futures Markets, 19, 433-455. Alexander, G.J, and M.A Peterson, 2008, The effect of price tests on trader behavior and market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO, Journal of Financial Markets 11, 84–111.Bai, Y., E.C Chang, and J. Wang, 2006, Asset prices under short-sale constraints, Mimeo. Beber, A., and M. Pagano, 2010, Short-Selling Bans around the World: Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers TI 10-106 / DSF 1.Bernardo, A. and I. Welch, 2002, Financial market runs, NBER Working Papers 9251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.Bhojraj, S., R.J Bloomfield, and W.B Tayler, 2009, Margin trading, overpricing, and synchronization risk, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2059–2085.Blau, B. M., B. F. Van Ness, R. A. Van Ness, 2009, Short Selling and the Weekend Effect for NYSE Securities, Financial Management 38 (No. 3). 603-630Boehmer, E., Z.R Huszar, and B.D Jordan, 2010, The good news in short interest, Journal of Financial Economic 96, 80–97.Boehme, R.D, B.R Danielsen, and S.M Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints, differences of opinion, and overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 455–487.融资融券禁令在实验资产市场摘要在金融市场，因为专业的交易者杠杆交易允许以较少的保证金进行更大的交易。

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献

金融学专业私募股权投资资料外文翻译文献外文题目：Financial Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Private Equity Investments in the Globalization of Firms fromEmerging Markets原文：1. IntroductionInternational business and economic development are closely related. When applying to emerging markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) and development economics are two sides of the same coin. In terms of the classical OLI model of the economics of international business, the multinational enterprises (MNE) brings into play the ownership advantage while the governments of emerging markets bring into play the location advantage (Dunning 2000). For most part, the economics and the strategy of international business focused on the MNE while economic geography from Koopman (1957) to Krugman (1991) and later (as well as development economics) have focused on the country in which the investment takes place.This paper brings together international business development economics andinternational trade to gain better insights into an important and fascinating phenomenon in the arena of international business –the recent growth of private equity investments in emerging markets. The tremendous growth of private equity investments in emerging markets is evident from the data presented in Table 1. The total went up almost ten times, from about $3.5B to more than $33B in the period 2003-2006. Emerging Asia led the emerging markets with $19.4B raised in 2006 by 93 funds; about a third of the money that was raised by these funds went to China and India.The main argument that is presented and discussed in this paper is that private equity investments in emerging markets is another expression of foreign direct investment (FDI) where firms from the developed countries export specific factors of production (their ownership advantage) to small countries and emerging markets (new locations) as a way to generate value to all stakeholders. The firms in the developed countries in this case are specialized financial institutions (private equity funds) (Yoshikawa et al. 2006) and the factor of production that they export is high-risk sector specific capital. We dubbed this form of FDI as financial foreign direct investment (FFDI), but the process and the rational are the same as in the classical FDI analysis. FFDI (synonymous–but not restricted to–for private equity throughout this paper) is a subset of FDI that is solely devoted–as the name implies–for investments in private firms in purpose of generating high return on- investment over a relatively short period (5-7 years). The term “short” is relative and in comparison with the typical investment periods of the investors of private equity funds (e.g., pension funds, endowment funds and the like). At the extreme, i.e., in venture capital investments, investors take into account upfront that some of their investments will be written off at the prospects that few will generate return that will more than compensate those sunk investments (hence the “high-r isk” referral). Sector specific capital is a general phenomenon. In many industries such investment is more than mere financial investment and is augmented by specific information that the investor may posses in the form of managerial expertise, deal structuring specialty, networking capabilities and the like. In the case of the high-risk capital industry there is a need to bridge the gap between the risk perception of the investment project by theentrepreneurs or the “insiders” and the investors (most often risk-averse investors), the “outsiders”. This is accomplished by a combination of validation processes and screening mechanisms that are engaged by the private equity funds. In this regard they act as financial and risk intermediaries (Coval/Thakor 2005, provide an analytical framework for this approach). The value of the general partners of private equity funds depends on the quality of the risk intermediation that they perform for their investors. This makes them credible and reliable processors of information.Table 1: Emerging Markets Private Equity Funds Raising, 2003-2006 (US$ Millions)Emerging Asia CEERussiaLatham Sub-SaharaAfricaMiddle-EastAfricaMultipleRegionsTotal2003 2,200 406 417 NA 350 116 3,489 2004 2,800 1,777 714 NA 545 618 6,454 2005 15,446 2,711 1,272 791 1,915 3,630 25,765 2006 19,386 3,272 2,656 2,353 2,946 2,580 33,193 Source: EMPEA (Emerging Markets Private Equity Association) 2007.The discussion and the analysis presented in this paper draw on three different bodies of literature; the literature of finance and growth from development economics, (Levine 1997, 2004), the literature on comparative advantage in the discussion of patterns of trade (Deardorff 2004) and the literature of imperfect contracts in micro economics and in financial economics (Hart 2001, Zingales 2000).Financial foreign direct investment as practiced by private equity funds can be a powerful contributor to economic and business growth in emerging markets. FFDI changes the scene of international business as it contributes to a change in the relations between firms in developed countries and firms in the emerging markets. The unique relatively short term nature of a private equity investment makes it an appropriate instrument for the transition period that the world of international business is experiencing regarding the role of emerging markets and the role of China and India in particular. This is so because the short term nature of private equity investments allows firms in emerging markets for sufficient time for transfer ofinformation and learning and yet allow the local stakeholders to resume full ownership once the process is completed.The relations between the development economics literature on finance and growth and the international business literature is presented and discussed in the next section of the paper. It is shown that the two bodies of literatures are quite related once one penetrates the specific lingo employed by each one of them. The problems in the institutional setting and the lack of sufficient development of the capital markets in most emerging markets are overcome by creating specific international alliances that generate local comparative advantage. In section three, the concept of local comparative advantage (Deardorff 2004) is used for better understanding of FFDI. The perfect and efficient financial market of the Modern Theory of Finance is replaced by a set of imperfect contracts negotiated and renegotiated between domestic firms in emerging markets and private equity funds from the US and other major capital markets. This issue is discussed and analyzed in section four of the paper. Private equity funds drew a fair amount of criticism lately. The potential of private equity investment in emerging markets is discussed in section five of the paper. The conclusions of the study are briefly discussed in section six, the last section of the paper.2. Finance, Growth and International BusinessIn a survey paper on the relations between financial development and economic growth Levine (1997) states that: “…the development of financial markets and institutions are critical and inextricable part of the growth process”. He continues and says that: “…financial development is a good predictor of future rates of econom ic growth, capital accumulationand technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case study, industry- and firm- level analyses document extensive periods when financial development-or the lack thereof-crucially affect the speed and the pattern of econom ic development”, (Levine 1997, p. 689). Levine makes two other important points; first that the discussion of finance and developments takes place outside the state-contingent world of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and the discussion takes place in an incomplete world with imperfect (monopolistic) competition. The second point is that there arethree main research questions in the field of finance and development that needs more attention. (1) Why does financial structure change as countries grow? (2) Why do countries at similar stages of economic development have different looking financial systems? and (3) are there longterm economic growth advantages to adopting legal and policy changes that create one type of financial system vis-à-vis another?The three research questions raised by Levine deal with different aspects of the location of foreign direct investment. In particular, the three research questions deal with the gap between the potential of a certain country, or countries, as a site for an international oriented investment and the actual investment that has taken place. This is particularly true where the investment from the developed countries is in the form of high-risk sector specific capital such as provided by private equity funds. The potential of some countries in attracting private equity funds is not being fully realized due to the absence of an appropriate financial system. A well developed financial system is necessary to enhance the import of sector specific (high-risk) capital, a necessary condition for FFDI.As the financial structure of a country changes (as the country grows), it is suggested by Levine in his first question that different types of FDI can be accommodated. The development of FDI in China is an evidence of this process. Yet, as it is proposed in Levine’s second question, the financial markets of countries with similar rate of growth develop in different pace and in a different way. There are long-term economic growth advantages of adopting certain patterns of development for the financial market of a given country. In many cases FDI and FFDI do depend on relatively transparent and enforceable corporate governance. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) demonstrated that economic entrenchment has a high price in foregone growth opportunities.There are three related problems in creating a domestic financial system for private equity and venture capital investments:How to mobilize the type and the quantity of savings (capital) appropriate for such investments where most of the capital should be imported from the major capital markets of the world?How to generate credible information and trust? How to monitor managementand to exert corporate control?The only feasible way to accommodate private equity and venture capital investments in emerging markets is to import sector specific high-risk capital from the US and other major capital markets. The term sector specific capital recognizes the fact that capital is not a unified factor of production (in the same way that there are different types of labor there are different types of capital). High-risk sector specific capital relates to the portfolio of the investors and to the relational capital of the specific financial intermediaries (i.e., the private equity funds). Most of the high-risk capital in the world is coming from large institutional investors in the US and it is a part of their assets’ management program. (A good example of how such capital relates to the total portfolio is the investment policy of CALPERS the largest pension fund in the US). Due to internal and external regulations, financial institutions cannot make investment unless there is an acceptable level of transparency and corporate governance in the country where the money is invested. Whether such a process is possible in a given developing country and what are the chances that if implemented it will succeed is a very important question. Horii, Ohdoi, and Yamamoto (2005) deal with this issue. They address the question why some developing countries are less successful than others in adopting technologies and more effective financial markets techniques. To quote Horii et al. (2005, p. 2): “A fundamental question is why some countries are stuck with poor performance even though it results in primitive financial ma rkets and unproductive technologies”. They conclude that in some cases the expected increase in the income inequality due to the financial led technological changes deters people from adopting financial, legal, and political reforms that will lead to financial, business, and economic development. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) provide somewhat different answer, also focusing on income distribution but from a point of view of economic entrenchment and rent seeking behavior.Nowhere the relationship between finance, growth, and international business is more pronounced than in the impressive development of the private equity funds devoted for investment in emerging markets. Table 1 presents data on the growth of private equity funds raised for investment in emerging markets by regions.The amounts of money raised by private equity funds dedicated for investmentsin emerging markets went up tremendously in the last five years. More importantly significant amounts were invested to support domestic companies in emerging markets to become more competitive in the global markets by providing their own brands of products to the world’s consumers. Lenovo is a case in point when a major investment by three American private equity funds (Texas Pacific Group, General Atlantic, and Newbridge Capital) was made in a Chinese company with the purpose of making Lenovo a leading competitor in the global market.译文：金融类对外直接投资：私募股权投资在新兴市场全球化企业中的角色一、简介国际商业和经济发展密切相关。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。

股权融资外文翻译文献

文献信息：文献标题：Equity Financing and Financial Performance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Embu Town, Kenya（肯尼亚恩布镇中小企业股权融资与财务绩效研究）国外作者：IK Njagi，ME Kimani，SN Kariuki文献出处：《International Academic Journal of Economics and Finance》, 2017,2(3):74-91字数统计：英文2793单词，15064字符；中文4590汉字外文文献：Equity Financing and Financial Performance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Embu Town, Kenya Abstract Capital structure comprise of a mix of debt and equity. Managers used various combinations of debt and equity that increases the net worth of business at the same time reduces the cost of obtaining finance. Financial decisions affected the financial performance of SMEs but vary from one firm to another. This is due to the limited access to finances and ability of the manager to fully utilize the resources available. SMEs are of significance to the economic development of any state regardless of the development status. Despite their importance SMEs are characterized with slow growth rate and three out of five SMEs fail in their first three years of operation. The continued poor performances have led to decline in growth and eventually death of the SMEs. The growth of the SMEs highly depended on the investment decisions made by the entrepreneurs and lack of access to finances has created financial gaps that have fueled the challenges that SMEs face. The study therefore analyzed the effect of equity financing on financial performance of SMEs in Kenya. The study revealed that SMEs had greater preference for contribution from friends and ploughing back profit as a source of equity finance. Angel investors as aform of equity financing has not gained acceptance as a source of finance. From the study it was evident that equity finance had a positive relationship to financial performance of the SMEs.Key Words: capital structure, equity, financial performanceINTRODUCTIONThe significance of Small and Medium Enterprises in Kenya was first acknowledged in the International Labor Organization report on Employment, Income and Equity in Kenya in 1972. The report underscored SMEs as an engine for employment and income growth. SMEs create about 85 percent of Kenya’s employment [Government of Kenya (Gok, 2009)].Despite the role played by SMEs, the World Bank Report (2010) suggests that one of the major causes of SMEs failure is limited access to finances. Business organizations aim to improve on their production and operations efficiency and to increase their profit margin. A number of factors may influence efficiency and effectiveness of business operations including capital structure. The capital structure of a firm is a mix of debt and equity that a firm uses to finance business. The finance manager is therefore concerned with a capital structure that increases the profit margin at least cost (Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2013). According to Chepkemoi (2015) earlier studies on general small firm capital structure have presupposed small and medium sized enterprises to (predominantly) act in such a way as to maximize their financial wealth. A consequence of this presupposition is that, these studies have assumed that SMEs, in general, desire substantial growth and consequently have a desire for external finance.Academic research has documented that there are differences in financing patterns between SMEs and large firms and analyzed possible causes of these differences (Elaine, Angelo, Ana & Ricardo, 2005; Howorth, 2001; Mac & Lucey, 2010). The existence of fixed costs due to external financing, smaller firms choose to refinance less frequently than larger firms because they are more affected by these fixed costs in relative terms. Hence, small firms choose to operate at a higher leveragelevel at a refinancing moment to compensate for less frequent rebalancing. This argument explains why smaller firms, if they have some debt, are more levered than larger firms. In addition, as the time period between restructurings is longer for small firms, on average, they have lower leverage ratios (Chepkemoi, 2013).Capital structure represents the proportionate relationship between the different forms of long term financing (Varaiya, Kerin & Weeks, 2007). Making appropriate decision on the financing option may look simple, but sometimes it require time. Management is often faced with dilemma on whether to obtain funds from internal sources (retained earnings) or external sources which include loans from financial institutions, trade credit, and issuance of equity shares. The creation of a capital structure in any organization influences the governance structure of a firm which, in turn, has direct impact on strategic decisions made by the managers (Mwangi, Makau & Kosimbei, 2014).Management has numerous capital structure choices that they may adopt at their discretion. The choice of the type of capital structure to be adopted may not mean value maximization but may be for the protection of the management self-interest, especially in businesses where the decisions are dictated by the managers and the voting power of the shares they own (Dimitris & Psillaki, 2008). Funds used for firms operations may be generated internally or externally. When raising funds externally, firms choose between equity and debt. Most of the effort of financial decision making process is centered on the determination of the optimal capital structure of a firm (Narayanan, 2008). Capital structure decisions affect all businesses, but they vary from one business to another based on financial requirement for the business success primarily depends on the ability of the finance manager to effectively manage firm’s financial resources (Narayanan, 2008).Equity FinancingEquity financing comprise of retained profits, own savings, contribution from board members, contribution from partners and friends, deferred income and cash flows of the business (Kongmanila & Kimbara, 2007). Angel Investors (business angels) are wealthy individuals who place equity in business that they believe havehigh growth and return prospects and are interested in supporting the entrepreneur (Ibrahim, 2008). Many successful large companies which attracted venture capitalists or public equity relied first on angels (Ibrahim, 2008). Equity financing is important source of income and have a positive relationship to the performance of the business. Firms that use equity finance are able to make it performance better since there is direct control and because equity holders are residual claimant they have to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently (Caroline & Willy, 2015).Many small firms are established as family business which may not pursue growth strategies. Moreover, if SMEs have unconstrained choice between external debt and internal resources, they will choose not to use debt financing because of a desire to retain control and independence (Bell & V os, 2009). They further conceded that the owners of SMEs may show strong preference for the funding options, which have minimal or no intrusion into the business that is retained earnings and personal savings (Bell & V os, 2009).Financial PerformanceOperational performance measures growth in sales and growth in market share this provide a broad definition of performance as they focus on the factors that ultimately lead to financial performance. The most common used performance proxies are the GP margin, NP margin and operating ratios (Munyuny, 2013). Pandula (2011) explains that firms’performance has a great influence on access to credit; research implies that greater profits as well as sales are associated with greater access to financing. Firms with increasing sales and sales turnover have less constraint on credit while poor performing firms have been found to have limited access to financing particularly by banks.SMEs in KenyaThe importance of micro and small enterprise (SMEs) sector to the Kenyan economy has been widely recognized. The SMEs sector is crucial to the government’s effort in reducing poverty as it employs nearly 6.8 million Kenyan and the new jobs created, 89% were in the small sector firm. The Kenyan government is aware of the crucial role private sector plays in her economic development. This has made it toinitiate finance scheme such as youth and women fund and Uwezo fund with a view of finance the SMEs [Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research Analysis (KIPPRA, 2007)]. SMEs contribute positively to economic growth, employment and poverty alleviation (Fatoki & Asah, 2011).In the recent years the performance of the SMEs has continued to decline in Kenya. Virtually most small enterprises had collapsed leading to closure of some of the SMEs that were producing 40% of the employment in Kenya. Other SMEs were auctioned while some were merged or acquired signifying questionable financial performance due to lack of proper management of debt acquired (GoK, 2009). SMEs continue to face challenges such as overlap and inconsistencies in legal and sectorial policies, lack of clear boundaries in the institutional mandate, lack of suitable legal framework, outdated council by-laws, unavailability of land and worksites, exclusion of local authorities in policy development, lack of access to credit, lack of central coordination mechanism, lack of devolved coordination and implementation mechanism (Gok, 2009). SMEs lack of access to finance is a major constraint to their growth in Kenya (Atieno, 2009).EMPIRICAL LITERATUREStudies have been done in regard to effect of capital structure on firm performance both locally and internationally. Heshmati (2008) in his study on dynamics of capital structure of Micro and small firms in Sweden found that listed companies have easier access to the equity market compared to smaller companies because of low fixed cost thus indicating a negative relationship between firm size and debt levels. Shubita and Alsawalhah (2012) in a study of the relationship between capital structure and profitability of industrial Jordan companies suggested that firms with high profits depend heavily on equity as their main financing option. Kihinde (2012) studied relationship between capital structure mix of SMEs and overall performance of firms in Nigeria. The study revealed that most of the SMEs have all equity finance structure and have less debt finance compared to equity finance. It also revealed that the earnings survival and performance of the SMEs is stronglyinfluenced by capital structure mix.Kamau (2010) conducted a study on the relationship between the capital structure and financial performance of insurance companies in Kenya. The study found that there was a weak relationship between financial performance and capital structure hence, debt and equity ratios accounted for a small percentage of financial performance. Birundu (2015) examined the effect of capital structure on the financial performance of small and medium enterprises in Thika sub-County, Kenya. In his findings there was no significant effect of capital structure, asset turnover and asset tangibility on the financial performance of SMEs in Thika sub- County, Kenya. Karanja (2014) carried out a study on effect of capital structure on financial performance of Kenyan SMEs. The study concluded that capital structure has significant impact on the financial performance.From the review of relevant literature it is evident that research in the area of capital structure has been done both internationally and locally. Heshmati (2008) studied dynamics of capital structure of micro and small firms in Sweden, Shubita and Alsawalhah (2012) studied the relationship between capital structure and profitability, Mahamed and Jaafer (2012) studied the effect of debt financing on performance of the firm, Abdul (2012) studied the relationship of capital structure with performance of firms in Pakistan, Salama (2015) studied the impact of capital structure on performance of SMEs in Tanzania, Kamau (2010) studied relationship between the capital structure and financial performance of insurance companies in Kenya, Chepkemoi (2013) studied analysis of the effect of capital structure on the financial performance of SMEs in Nakuru town. Birundu (2015) studied the effect of capital structure on the financial performance of SMEs in Thika Sub County. From the survey of relevant literature it is evident that many studies have been carried out in regard to capital structure. However there is no specific study on equity financing and financial performance of small and medium enterprises in Embu town, Kenya. This study will therefore be conducted in order to fill the gaps in literature by studying equity financing and financial performance of small and medium enterprises in Embu town, Kenya.RESEARCH METHODOLOGYResearch DesignA descriptive survey research design was employed in this study. A descriptive design is selected because of its high degree of representativeness and the ease in which a researcher will obtain the participants’ opinion. According to Burns & Grove (2009) descriptive research is designed to provide a picture of a situation as it naturally happens.The Target PopulationThe target population comprised of all 10,611 registered small and medium enterprises in Embu County. However the major focus was on the accessible population. The accessible population is that proportion of the target population that the researcher can access easily and conveniently. The accessible population for the study was 300 registered SMEs in Embu.Sampling Technique and Sample SizeThe study used simple random sampling technique. Neuman (2003) indicated that 10 to 20% of the accessible population is an adequate sample size in descriptive study. The sample size was therefore 60 SMEs which was 20% of accessible population.Data Collection InstrumentsThe study used self-administered semi-structured open and close ended questionnaire for the collection of primary data. A five step likert scale was used for close ended questions.RESEARCH RESULTSResponse RateResponse rate refers to number of the questionnaires completely filled by the respondents against the questionnaires administered. The study administered 60 questionnaires out of which 41 questionnaires were collected fully filled and returned. The response rate was 68.3% which was attributed to by self-administering thequestionnaires and respondents were also assured high level of confidentiality. According to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) a response rate of 50% is considered adequate, 60% is good and 70% is excellent. The response rate was therefore considered to be good and reliable.Period of Firm ExistenceThe study sought to establish how long has the business been in existence. From the result of the study it was revealed that majority (46% )of the businesses have been in existence for a period of 2-5 years, while 44% of the businesses have been in operation for a period of 6-10 years. Businesses that have been in operation for a period of less than a year are 7% and those above 10 years of operation are 3%. This indicates that 46% of the businesses are in the early stages of growth while 44% of the business units have exceeded the infancy stage of growth.Legal Status of the BusinessThe research study sought to determine the legal status of the businesses. It was revealed that 90% of the businesses were formed through sole proprietorship while 7% represent partnership kind of business and limited companies represent 3% of the businesses. The most preferred form of businesses in Embu town was sole proprietorship. This could be highly attributed to the ease in legal requirement during formation, capital requirement and exercising full control of the business while least preferred form of business was limited company.Capital size of the FirmThe study sought to establish the capital size of the firm. It established that majority ( 88%) of the business enterprises’ had an capital base of less than 0.5 million shillings worth, 5% had an asset base worth between 0.5 to 1 million shillings and more than 1.5 million shillings. Businesses with a capital base of 1.0 to 1.5 million shillings represented 2%. This indicates that many businesses in Embu town have a capital base of less than 0.5 million shillings due to their size of operation and legal status of the business. The small size capital base was attributed to due to low levels of fixed assets such as land and buildings because the SMEs are operated on rented premises.Firms Annual Sales TurnoverThe study sought to determine the annual sale turnover of the businesses within Embu town. From the findings it was established that the 88% of the businesses reports annual sales volume of less than 0.5 million shillings, 7% of the enterprises report annual sales of 0.5 to 1 million shillings while 3% reports annual sales turnover of more 1 to 1.5 million shillings and 2% report annual sales turnover of more than 1.5 million shillings. This indicate that the larger percentage of the business units report less than 0.5 million shillings annual sales turnover.CONCLUSIONSFrom the study it was evident that equity finance had a positive relationship to financial performance of the SMEs. SMEs prefer equity contribution from friends. This is because the entrepreneurs prefer to share risks with less risk averse investors at the same time avoiding any undesirable change in ownership. Angel investors has not gained acceptance with the entrepreneurs in Embu town. This is because most of the businesses are sole proprietorship forms of businesses which are controlled and managed by the owners.RECOMMENDATIONSThe study acknowledged the use of equity in financing as a source of finance. Contributions from friends and ploughed back profits have minimal or no money burden to the SMEs. The study recommends that SMEs should embrace angel investors as equity financiers since they provide the start-up capital to the SMEs. Angel investors also provide managerial and book keeping skills to the entrepreneurs thus enhancing the accountability and efficient use of the financial resources at hand.中文译文：肯尼亚恩布镇中小企业股权融资与财务绩效研究摘要资本结构包括债务和股权的组合。

企业管理企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Analysis on the Chinese Enterprise Financing Abstract:The main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit a nd other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric informatio n and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms cho ose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additiona l Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SMEs confirms that the compositio n of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, ban k credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primar ily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs assoc iated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing i nformation to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collectin g the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are oft en the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.1 Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal g enerated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and o ther loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.1.1 Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financia l intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary poli cy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting pay ments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good q uality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credi ts to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric i nformation of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has lit tle information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their qu ality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credit s are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrim ination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers wi th a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the bu yers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has tem porary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of t he industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credit s are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to fin d the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to oth er firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asym metric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and anal yzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relations hip between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to m onitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving t hese problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Pet ersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over fina ncial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequent ly visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this in formation is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financ ial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again t he supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be a ble to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a loc al monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for t he firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a be tter use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then fir ms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit f rom the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use tr ade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operat ions of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information isrelatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit r isk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.1.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering informati on are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have a n advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to a symmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and hi gh growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are avai lable for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expecte d to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in eval uating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securitie s. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.1.3 Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade cred its. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtai n trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the sam e goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again , the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms fi rst exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The d ifferences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The sec ond theory is the Tradeoff .Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency c osts” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In bot h of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the as set side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in te rms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationshi p between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well forCheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disap pointing.Source: Jan Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus, “Financing of SMEs”.London businessreview. 2007(9).pp.43-45中国企业融资分析摘要:中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companie s’ preference to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed com panies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and u sing fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally high er than the average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

企业并购中英文对照外文翻译文献

企业并购中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The choice of payment method in European M & A Global M&A activity has grown dramatically over the last ten years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control of economic activity around the world. Yet, there is much about the M&A process that we do not fully understand, including the choice of payment method. Given the large size of many M&A transactions, the financing decision can have a significant impact on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, and subsequent financing decisions. The financing decision can also have serious corporate control, risk bearing, tax and cash flow implications for the buying and selling firms and shareholders.In making an M&A currency decision, a bidder is faced with a choice between using cash and stock as deal consideration. Given that most bidders have limited cashand liquid assets, cash offers generally require debt financing. As a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces the choice of debt or equity financing, which can involve a tradeoff between corporate control concerns of issuing equity and rising financial distress costs of issuing debt. Thus, a bidder’s M&A currency decision can be strongly influenced by its debt capacity and existing leverage. It can also be strongly influenced by management’s desire to maintain the existing corporate governance structure. In contrast, a seller can be faced with a tradeoff between the tax benefits of stock and the liquidity and risk minimizing benefits of cash consideration. For example, sellers may be willing to acceptstock if they have a low tax basis in the target stock and can defer their tax liabilities by accepting bidder stock as payment. On the other hand, sellers can prefer cash consideration to side step the risk of becoming a minority shareholder in a bidder with concentrated ownership, thereby avoiding the associated moral hazard problems. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this seller trade off can not be easily measured.Under existing theories of capital structure, debt capacity is a positive function of tangible assets, earnings growth and asset diversification and a negative function of asset volatility. Firms with greater tangible assets can borrow more privately from banks and publicly in the bond market. Since larger firms are generally more diversified, we expect them to have a lower probability of bankruptcy at a given leverage ratio and thus, greater debt capacity. These financing constraint and bankruptcy risk considerations can also reduce a lenders willingness to finance a bidder’s cash bid, especially in relatively large deals.In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our focus is on a bidder’s M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an M&A deal. However,if a target’s financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed M&A transaction is likely to be aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own terms. For a deal to succeed, the bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal.Bidder and target considerations:* Corporate ControlBidders controlled by a major shareholder should be reluctant to use stock financing when this causes the controlling shareholder to risk losing control. Assuming control is valuable,the presence of dominant shareholder positions should be associated with more frequent use of cash, especially when the controlling shareholder’s position is threatened. To capture this effect, we use the ultimate vo ting stake held by the largest controlling shareholder.A bidder with diffuse or highly concentrated ownership is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. In line with this argument, Martin (1996) documents a significantly negative relationship between the likelihood of stock financing and managerial ownership only over the intermediate ownership range. Therefore, we incorporate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the method of payment and the voting rights of a bidder’s controlling shareholder by estimating both a linear and cubic specification for the ultimate voting control percentage of the bidder’s largest shareholder. In our robustness analysis, we also estimate a spline function for this variable.Corporate control concerns in M&A activity can manifest themselves in more subtle ways. Concentrated ownership of a target means that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threatening the corporate governance of the acquirer. If the seller is closely held or is a corporation disposing of a division, then ownership concentration tends to be very concentrated. This implies that financing the M&A deal with stock can create a new blockholder in the bidder. While the risk of creating a new bidder blockholder with stock financing is higher when a target has a concentrated ownership structure, this is especially ture when relative size of the deal is large. To capture the risk of creating a large blockholder when buying a target with stock financing, we employ CONTROL LOSS, theproduct between the target’s contr ol block and the deal’s ralative size. The relative deal size is computed as the ratio of offer size (excluding assumed liabilities) to the sum of a bidder’s equity pre-offer capitalization plus the offe r size. The target’s controlling blockholder is assumed to have 100 % ownership for unlisted targets and subsidiary targets.* Collateral, Financial Leverage and Debt CapacityWe use the fraction of tangible assets as our primary measure of a bidder’s ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowing. COLLATERAL is measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to book value of total assets. Myers (1977) argues that debtholders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cost of debt, often making stock more attractive. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman(2001) find that a firm’s percentage of tangible assets has a strong positive influence on its debt level.We also control for a bidder’s financial condition with its leverage ratio, FIN’L LEVERAGE. Since cash is primarily obtained by issuing new debt, highly levered bidders are constrained in their ability to issue debt and as a consequence use stock financing more fr equently. A bidder’s financial leverage is measured by the sum of the bidder’s face value of d ebt prior to the M&A announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the book valve of total assets prior to the announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities). This captures the bidder’s post-deal leverage if the transaction is debt financed. This measure differs from Martin(1996) who uses a pre-deal bidder leverage measure adjusted for industry mean and reports an insignificant effect.Bidder size is likely to influence its financing choices. Larger firms are more diversified and thus, have proportionally lower expected bankruptcy costs. They also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access to debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. Thus, cash financing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. Larger firms are also more apt to choose cash financing in smaller deals due to its ease of use, provided they have sufficient unused debt capacity or liquid assets. Further, the use of cash allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of obtaining shareholder approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of stock offers. We measure bidder assets size by the log of pre-merger book value of assets in dollars(total assets). In addition to bidder control and financing considerations, we need to take into account several other bidder characteristics.* Relative Deal Size, Bidder Stock Price Runup and Asymmetric InformationHansen (1987) predicts that bidders have greater incentives to finance with stock when the asymmetric information about target assets is high. This information asymmetry is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder. Yet, stock is used in relatively larger deals, it produces more serious dilution of a dominant shareholder’s control position. Finally, as bidder equity capitalization rises, concern about its financing constraint falls, since there is a relatively smaller impact on its overall financial conditon. We proxy for these effects with REL SIZE, which is computed as the ratio of deal offer size (excluding assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the deal’s offer size plus the bidder’s pre-offer market capitalization at the year-endprior to the bid.Both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hansen (1987) predict that bidders will prefer to finance with stock when they consider their stock overvalued by the market and prefer to finance with cash when they consider their stock undervalued. As uncertainty about bidder asset value rises, this adverse selection effect is exacerbated. Martin (1996) finds evidence consistent with this adverse selection prediction. For a sample of publicly traded targets, Travlos (1987) finds that stock financed M&A deals exhibit much larger negative announcement effects than cash financed deals. He concludes this is consistent with the empirical validity of an adverse selection effect. We use as a proxy for bidder overvaluation (or undervaluation), calculated from a bidder’s buy and hold cumulative stock return over the year preceding the M&A announcement month.In addition to bidder considerations, we need to take into account typical target considerations. These preferences are related to risk, liquidity, asymmetric information and home bias.T1. Unlisted Targets and Subsidiary T argetsWe use an indicator variable, UNLISTED TARGET, to control for listing status where the variable takes a value of one if the target is a stand-alone company, not listed on any stock exchange and is zero for listed targets and unlisted subsidiaries. When an M&A deal involves an unlisted target, a seller’s consumption/liquidity needs are also likely to be important considerations. These sellers are likely to prefer cashgiven the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often impending retirement of a controlling shareholder-manager. Likewise, corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire torestructure toward their core competency. In either case, there is a strong preference for cash consideration to realize these financial or asset restructuring goals. A likely consequence is a greater use of cash in such deals, since bidders are frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or reduce their debt burden. As noted earlier, these two target ownership structures are also likely to elicit bidder corporate control concerns given their concentrated ownership. Thus, bidders are likely to prefer cash financing of such deals, especially as they become relatively large.T2. Cross-Industry Deals and Asymmetric InformationSeller reluctance to accept bidder stock as payment should rise as the asymmetric information problem worsens with greater uncertainty about bidder equity value and future earnings. This problem is also likely to be more serious for conglomerate mergers. In contrast, sellers are more apt to accept a continuing equity position in an intra–industry merger, where they are well acquainted with industry risks and prospects.T3. Cross-Border Deals, Local Exchange Listing and Home BiasIn cross border deals, selling stock to foreign investors can entail several problems. We are concerned with the possibility that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in Coval and Moskowitz (1999), French and Poterba (1991) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2001), among others. This can reflect a foreign stock’s g reater trading costs, lower liquidity, exposure to exchange risk and less timely, more limited access to firm information.T4. Bidder Investment OpportunitiesHigh growth bidders can make an attractive equityinvestment for selling shareholders. MKTTO-BOOK, defined as a market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, measures a bidder’s investment in growth opportunities.We expect a higher market tobook ratio to increase a bidde r stock’s attractiveness as M&A consideration. High market to book is also correlated with high levels of tax deductible R&D expenditures, along with low current earnings and cash dividends. These firm attributes lower a bidder’s need for additional debt tax shield, making cash financing less attractive. These attributes are also attractive to high income bracket sellers due to their tax benefits. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) document a higher incidence of stock financing for higher market to book buyers.译文：并购支付方式在欧洲的选择在过去的十年，全球并购活动已显著增长,同时带来组织的重大改变和在世界各地的经济活动的控制。

股权激励中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Investor pricing of CEO equity incentivesAbstractThe main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the form of stock and options.The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk) for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management.Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.Keywords：CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity capital IntroductionIn this study, we investigate investor pricing of CEO equity incentives for a large sample of US firms over the period 1992–2007.Because incentives embedded in CEO compensation contracts may be expected to influence policy choices at the firm level, our objective is to examine whether CEO equity incentives influence firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.Prior research (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990) suggests that equity- based compensation, i.e., CEO compensation in the form of stock and options, provides the CEO a powerful inducement to take actions to increase shareholder value (by investing in more risky but positive net present valu-e projects). Put differently, equity incentives are expected to help mitigate agency costs by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders, and otherwise help communicate to investors the important idea that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder wealth (Hall and Murphy 2003).However, recent research contends that equity incentives also have a perverse or dysfunctional downside. In particular, equity-based compensation makes managers more sensitive to the firm’s stock price, and increases their incentive to manipulate reported earnings—i.e., to create the appearance of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (such a s analysts’ forecasts)—in an attempt to bolster the stock price and their personal wealth invested in the firm’s stock and options (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005). Stated in another way, CEO equity incentives can have an adverse effect on the quality of reported accounting information. As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Jensen et al. (2004), by promoting perverse financial reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information, equity-based compensation can be a source of, rather than a solution for, the agency problem.Despite these arguments about the putative ill effects of equity incentives, equity-based compensation continues to be a salient component of the total paypackages for CEOs. Still, given the conflict between the positive incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. To our knowledge, prior research provides mixed evidence on this issue. For example, Mehran (1995) examines 1979–1980 compensation data and finds that equity-based compensation is positively related to the firm’s Tobin’s Q. By contrast, Aboody (1996) examines compensation data for a sample of firms for years 1980 through 1990, and finds a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and the firm’s share price, suggesting that the dilution effect dominates the options’ incentive alignment effect. Moreover, both these studies are based on dated (i.e., pre-1991) data.In our study, we examine whether CEO equity incentives are related to the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium, i.e., the excess of the firm’s ex ante cost of equity capital over the risk-free interest rate (a metric discussed by Dhaliwal et al. 2006).Consistent with Core and Guay (2002), we measure CEO equity incentives as the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio to a 1 percent change in the stockprice. Based on a sample of 16,502 firm-year observations over a 16 year period (1992–2007), we find CEO equity incentives to be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, suggesting that the positive incentive alignment effect dominates the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality. In other analysis, we attempt to control for two regulatory (structural) changes that occurred during the 1992–2007 time period of our study.As pointed out by Daines (2001), regulatory changes can have an impact on firm values and returns as well as the structure of executive compensation. First, Low (2009) finds that following the 95 Delaware Supreme Court ruling that resulted in greater takeover protection, managers reduced firm risk by turning down risk-increasing (albeit positive NPV) projects. In response, firms increased CEO equity incentives to mitigate the risk aversion. Potentially, the impact of the Delaware ruling on managers’ risk aversion and the follow-up increase in equity incentives (to mitigate the increase in managers’ risk aversio n following the ruling) may have resulted in a structural change in our sample at least for firms incorporated in Delaware. To control for this potential structural impact, we perform our analysis for Delaware incorporated firms for 1996–2007 separately. Our resultssuggest that the favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium) is similar for Delaware firms and other firms.Second, a number of studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007, 2008; Li et al. 2008) indicate that the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) lowered equity incentives (i.e., reduced the proportion of equity incentives to total compensation post-SOX), reduced managerial risk taking, decreased spending on R&D and capital expenditures, and reduced accruals-based earnings management while increasing real earnings management. Since real earnings management is potentially more difficult for investors to detect than accruals-based earnings management, a possible consequence of SOX could be an increase in agency costs since 2002. To control for the potential structural changes imposed by SOX both in terms of expected returns and the level of equity incentives, we perform our analysis for the pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods separately. For each of the two time periods, our results suggest a favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium), although the effect appears to be stronger in the post-SOX period.Our study contributes to the literature on the valuation of equity incentives. We provide (to our knowledge) first-time evidence on the relation between CEO equity incentives and the ex ante cost of equity capital. Prior research has focused by and large on the consequences of managerial equity incentives for firm performance (Mehran 1995; Hanlon et al.2003) and risk taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hanlon et al. 2004) rather than on valuation per se. As noted previously, to our knowledge only two prior studies (Aboody1996 and Mehran 1995, both based on pre-1991 data) have examined the pricing of managerial equity incentives, with mixed results.In our study, we provide evidence on the valuation effects of CEO equity incentives based on more recent (1992–2007) data. By focusing on more recent data, our findings relate to a growing line of research on the association between equity-based compensation and accounting information quality. Specifically, Coffee (2004) suggests that the $1 million limit on the tax deductibility of cash compensation for senior executives imposed by Congress in 1993 motivated firms to make greater use of equity compensation which, in turn, increased the sensitivity of managers to the firm’s stock price. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005)provide evidence which suggests that equity incentives are positively related to the magnitude of accruals-based earnings management. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) report CEO equity incentives to be positively related to accounting irregularities and the subsequent restatement of previously issued financial statements. Thus, prior research suggests that equity-based compensation has a negative effect on the quality of earnings reported by firms. Consistent with several published empirical studies that support the notion that lower information quality is priced in a higher cost of equity capital (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005), CEO equity incentives could potentially lower firm value by increasing the firm-specific equity risk premium.As noted previously, we document that CEO equity incentives (despite the associated lower information quality) are related negatively to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, implying that equity incentives increase firm value by lowering the firm’s cost of equity capital.Thus, our findings suggest that the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect associated with equity incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect.Since 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated the public disclosure of executive compensation data to promote informed decision making by investors. Our ?ndings provide further evidence that these disclosures increase the informativeness of stock prices in competitive securities markets. Collectively, given that CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007), our ?ndings indicate that CEO equity incentives in?uence ?rm value favorably through a cost of equity capital channel.Concluding remarksPrior research (e.g., Goldman and Slezak 2006; Jensen et al. 2004) suggests that CEO equity incentives can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these incentives can mitigate the agency problem by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders (i.e., by inducing CEOs to prefer more optimal, albeit risky, investment choices). On the other hand, these incentives can lead to excessive sensitivity to share price performance and induce executives to manipulate reported earnings with an eye on the stock price. In other words, by promoting perverse reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information pertinent to investor pricing decisions, CEO equity incentives can potentially be a part of, not aremedy for, the agency problem. However, to our knowledge there is little to no prior evidence to suggest which effect—the positive incentive alignment effect or the perverse information quality effect—dominates.We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that CEO equity incentives are negatively related to the firm-specific equity risk premium, i.e., the positive incentive alignment effect associated with these incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect in the pricing of the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium. Second, since equity incentives are intended to induce CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions, the effect of these incentives on shareholder wealth in the post-SOX time period is of particular interest. Our results suggest that the economic significance of these incentives (i.e., the payoff for shareholders in terms of a lower ex ante equity risk premium and a higher firm value) was in fact higher in the post-SOX time period. Finally, our findings provide further evidence that the SEC mandated disclosures (since 1992) of executive compensation data increases the informativeness of stock prices with respect to the potential implications of CEO equity incentives for the cost of equity capital and firm value. At this time, CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest for regulators and investors.总裁股权激励的投资者定价摘要本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题。

股票的估值与股利政策外文文献翻译

外文文献翻译原文+译文文献出处：Amidu M. THE STUDY ON VALUATION OF SHARESAND DIVIDEND POLICY[J]. The journal of risk finance, 2017, 2(2): 136-145.原文THE STUDY ON VALUATION OF SHARES AND DIVIDENDPOLICYAmidu MAlthough these questions of fact have been the subject of many empirical studies in recent years no consensus has yet been achieved. One reason appears to be the absence in the literature of a complete and reasonably rigorous statement of those parts of the economic theory of valuation bearing directly on the matter of dividend policy. Lacking such a statement, investigators have not yet been able to frame their tests with sufficient precision to distinguish adequately between the various contending hypotheses. Nor have they been able to give a convincing explanation of what their test results do imply about the underlying process of valuation. EFFECT OF DIVIDEND POLICY WITH PERFECT MARKETS, RATIONAL BEHA/IOR, AND PERFECT CERTAINTYThe meaning of the basic assumptions. -Although the terms" perfect markets," "rational behavior," and "perfect certainty" are widely usedthroughout economic theory, it may be helpful to start by spelling out the precise meaning of these assumptions in the present context.1.In "perfect capital markets," no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions to have an appreciable impact on the then ruling price. All traders have equal and costless access to information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares (to be detailed specifically later). No brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are bought, sold, or issued, and there are no tax differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains.2."Rational behavior" means that investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.3."Perfect certainty" implies complete assurance on the part of every investor as to the future investment program and the future profits of every corporation. Because of this assurance, there is, among other things, no need to distinguish between stocks and bonds as sources of fund sat this stage of the analysis. We can, therefore, proceed as if there were only a single type of financial instrument which, for convenience, we shall refer to as shares of stock.The fundamental principle of valuation.- Under' these assumptions the valuation of all shares would be governed by the following fundamental principle: the price of each share must be such that the rate of return (dividends plus capital gains per dollar invested) on every share will be the same throughout the market over any given interval of time. WHAT DOES THE MARKET "REALLY" CAPITALIZE?In the literature on valuation one can find at least the following four more or less distinct approaches to the valuation of shares: (1) the discounted cash flow approach;(2) the current earnings plus future investment opportunities approach; (3) the stream of dividends approach; and (4) the stream of earnings approach. To demonstrate that these approaches are, in fact, equivalent it will be helpful to begin by first going back to equation (5) and developing from it a valuation formula to serve as a point of reference and comparisonEARNINGS, DIVIDENDS, AND GROWTH RATESThe convenient case of constant growth rates.-The relation between the stream of earnings of the firm and the stream of dividends and of returns to the stock- holders can be brought out most clearly by specializing(12) to the case in which investment opportunities are such as to generate a constant rate of growth of profits in perpetuity. Admittedly, this case has little empirical significance, but it is convenient for illustrative purposes and has received much attention in the literature.The growth of dividends and the growth of total profits.-Given that total earnings (and the total value of the firm) are growing at the rate kp* what is the rate of growth of dividends per share and of the price per share? Clearly, the answer will vary depending on whether or not the firm is paying out a high percentage of its earnings and thus relying heavily on outside financing. We can show the nature of this dependence explicitly by making use of the fact that whatever the rate of growth of dividends per share the present value of the firm by the dividend approach must be the same as by the earnings approach. The special case of exclusively internal financing.-As noted above the growth rate of dividends per share is not the same as the growth rate of the firm except in the special case in which all financing is internal. This is merely one of a number of peculiarities of this special case on which, unfortunately, many writers have based their entire analysis. The reason for the preoccupation with this special case is far from clear to us. Certainly no one would suggest that it is the only empirically relevant case. Even if the case were in fact the most common, the theorist would still be under an obligation to consider alternative assumptions. We suspect that in the last analysis, the popularity of the internal financing model will be found to reflect little more than its ease of manipulation combined with the failure to push the analysis far enough to disclose how special and how treacherous a case it really is.THE EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTYUncertainty and the general theory of valuation.-In turning now from the ideal world of certainty to one of uncertainty our first step, alas, must be to jettison the fundamental valuation principle as given, say, in our equation .DIVIDEND POLICY AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONSTo complete the analysis of dividend policy, the logical next step would presumably be to abandon the assumption of perfect capital markets. This is, however, a good deal easier to say than to do principally because there is no unique set of circumstances that constitutes "imperfection. "We can describe not one but a multitude of possible departures from strict perfection, singly and in combinations. Clearly, to attempt to pursue the implications of each of these would only serve to add inordinately to an already overlong discussion. We shall instead, therefore, limit ourselves in this concluding section to a few brief and genera lob serrations about imperfect markets that we hope may prove helpful to those taking up the task of extending the theory of valuation in this direction.It is important to keep in mind that from the standpoint of dividend policy, what counts is not imperfection per se but only imperfection that might lead an investor to have a systematic preference as between a dollar of current dividends and a dollar of current capital gains. Whereon such systematic preference is produced, we can subsume the imperfection in the (random) error term always carried along when applying propositions derivedfrom ideal models to real world events.译文股票的估值与股利政策研究Amidu M近年来，虽然有很多关于这些问题的实证探索研究，但是并未研究出有效地结果，专家学者们也未达成一致。

中小企业融资外文文献翻译

外文文献：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ managementand shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for pricediscrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discussesseveral ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to theissuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the ind ustry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delive ry value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can havereputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.中文译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文资料外文翻译附录1：（原文）The Determinants of the Leasing of Small Companies1, international for small and medium-sized companies were discussedAt the beginning of the 20th century, appear with ford motor as a representative of the mass production methods, people believed in the enterprise of large-scale business is the trend of The Times. But last of the twentieth century ago in economics leading view also think big enterprise is efficient, the scale become the pronoun of efficiency, enterprise's economic development of large-scale become direction. Yet the century in the 1970s, a kind of traditional ideas beganchallenged. In 1973, the British scholar schumacher (E.F.S chumacher) published a small is a good book. Quickly and has caused a great echo. The author thinks that the western countries specialization, large-scale production pattern looks is solved "production problem", but actually is an illusion. This mode of production caused economic inefficiency, environmental pollution, resource exhaustion, and fostered many social problems. Therefore, must choose again a development pattern or way. Schumacher pointed out the development of large-scale and automation error, advocated the development of small and medium-sized intermediate technology. He thinks. To make the society "enduring" development, must go miniaturization, among the development of roads, especially to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and "intermediate technology". British prime minister Tony Blair also put forward by 2005 to the development of small businesses of British construction become heaven ".2, small and medium-sized enterprises in China's economy contributionSmall and medium-sized enterprises is an important means of technical innovation. Before world war ii, the century with different since the 1960s and 1970s gradually arisen on information technology and biotechnology as the core of the new technology revolution is mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises, and at least in lots of small and medium-sized enterprises tody develops. In the middle of the century ago, rich economies in the proportion ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises has been declining trend; In the middle of the century especially after the 1960s and 1970s, and small and medium-sized enterprises and started mass development (see Storey, D.J., 1994). This suggests that small and medium-sized enterprise is to adapt to this new trend of technological progress. According to statistics, so far, small and medium-sized enterprises in China has more than 800 thousand, accounts for the enterprise 99% of all. In since 1960s of rapid economic growth, industrial output value of new 76% above is created by small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprise output and realize profits tax have accounted for 60% of the national respectively and 407., in recent years in the total export, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for about 60 percent. "no doubt, small and medium-sized enterprises has become the new growth point of boosting the national economy, promoting China's economic boom is the main driving force of uplink. About smes in the country's economy, the importance of roughly boils down to:First, provide employment opportunity, absorbing surplus labor force. Compared with large enterprises and small and medium sized enterprises are using more labor-intensive technology, so the development of small and medium-sized enterprises can help alleviate current employment pressure. In fact, although small and medium-sized enterprise role far more than that, but it is small and medium-sized enterprises of this feature, to medium and small-sized enterprisesfor people increasingly attention. Our country the industry and commerce registration of small and medium-sized enterprises, more than 1,500 million, accounts for the total enterprises ninety-nine percent, to be town provides seventy-five percent of the jobs.Second, create the mainstay of GDP. According to the above information: small and medium-sized enterprises in the national industrial output account for about 60, realize profits tax of up to 40%. Table 3-1 for our independent accounting industrial enterprises in 1995-2000 some data, including various types of enterprise of gross industrial output and the proportion of total assets, value added of industry and the proportion of total assets and profit tax amount to total assets ratio (namely fund LiShuiLv). We can find that, regardless of in the output value on the proportions still in proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises are superior to large enterprises. This shows that every unit fund of small and medium-sized enterprises than large enterprise creates more social wealth. But, in addition to 2000, small and medium-sized enterprises outside the capital LiShuiLv below large enterprises. So, in proportion with capital value LiShuiLv appears between some contradictions. Because the latter reflects the former distribution relationship, this is because of hard to get the bank low-interest loans to small and medium-sized enterprises to use capital interest of proportion of those enterprises.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economydevelopment to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.3. Move investment demandBritish lease experts, the bott who specially in the world on the lease yearbook of literary theory and the effect. He said: "in fact, some governments are shifting in full-scale lease to stimulate domestic investment. They moved to increase employment desire from an" '. He in investigating the German and British examples. Conclusion: lease industry in ensuring the role of main domestic investment was profound. Governments also encourage leasing company for capital equipment finance to expand exports, in order to improve their producers in the international market competition in position. Lease financing are able to expand domestic demand, increase employment in plays a unique role, reason mainly has two sides, the first, the financing lease of the equipment suppliedwhatever is located where requires some personnel, this undoubtedly will increase employment; Second, governments for lease provides preferential tax reduced leasing companies and enterprise's financing cost, thus make many enterprises want to use lease form to carry on an investment, investment increase is apparent.4 our experienceOur country economy in the 1990s, has maintained a strong growth momentum. During this decade, there are eight years is the Clinton administration office. China's President economic commission chairman is 2001 Nobel Prize winner Joseph. SiDiGeLiCi as he died, but also by the Nobel Prize winner, lemon, the author of the article George gram rove lady janet "Aaron, which are both as a new Keynesian representative figures, they advocate information asymmetry theory that completely on market economic regulation is not solve all problems. As a free economy does not guarantee during the trade information symmetry, causing some areas of adverse selection (vicious circle) and moral hazard (credit crisis), this shows that our country was inclined to conditionally government intervention and control the market. Our country government to use tax and interest rate leverage to regulate the market, with investment policy caused investment direction. These again and lease have internal relations. Our so-called tuyuhun equipment leasing the financing lease of by the financing involving rates, strong city in the policy has led to $rising interest rates to leasebring the opportunity of the development. Our tax on rental industry has certain preferential, while rental industry is more relying on talent advantage and control the ownership of the lease objects legal status, make full use of our country to encourage investment preferential policies, and designed the system "lease", such as: "leveraged lease", "tax leasing", etc in accord with the government encourages investment direction lease modes, enlarged policy efforts, promote the economic development of our country. From our lease data can be found in a decade ago our lease permeability (leasing forehead occupies equipment investment proportion) is 32%, lease the forehead is $120 billion, after 10 years (1999), the leasing of statistical data, the lease 34.4% permeability is the forehead is 2260 billion dollars. Lease lease frontal doubled. Its economic permeability (rental amount of GDP) 30% of the proportion of GDP of China accounts for almost a third. Lease with the China economic double forehead, but no major permeability changes show that lease is not omnipotent, just a economic levers, from our own experience, lease for economic development in the ability to move around." Lease has so magical function, it mainly in the operation of the real rights and use "separation" concept in action, property and rights separation gave lease activities to enlarge government control of the will, become market between government and market between effective macro-control measures. From since 9/11, our country and take several rate cuts and tax adjustment policy, as well as expand access to war, lay particular stresson government input control economy components.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economy development to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.附录2：（译文）小型公司融资租赁的决定因素l、国际对中小型公司的探讨20世纪初，出现以福特汽车为代表的大规模生产方式，人们相信企业的大规模经营是大势所趋。

创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Entrepreneurial FinancingThe financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem..This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to w hich Barry refers. By directly revealing the project’s quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaled—the traditional solution to the adverse selection problem—costly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey.In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet,for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneurs—and thus to serve as a credible signal—tend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venturecapital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literature’s relia nce on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelasticdemand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability πτ, where τ∈{G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ< 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = πτ 1 + (1 − πτ)λ. It is assumed thatλ< K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.The net present value of projects, Vτ−V − K, is assumed to satisfyEVG − V − K ≥0 ≥EV B − V − K. (1) Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfyθ(EG − V − K) + (1 −θ)(EB − V − K) ≥0, (2) where θis the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that canevaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈{G, B} withPr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε(3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) entrepreneurs before a goo d one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C= C/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts consideredarbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the model’s conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contract’s origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raisingmoney from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partner’s information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。

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中英文资料翻译Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstractThis article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are some concise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ preference to equity fund.Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually analy ze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betray t o western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference toequity fundAccording to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is the turn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-f ree rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listed companies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies andpreference to equity fundStatic Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost offinancial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertib ility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincide with the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which haveexcellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equityfundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding sh ares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than the average level of all the listed companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes offinancing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。