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Autism?自闭症Why it's not “Rain Woman”?为什么它不是“雨女”Women have fewer cognitive disorders than men do because their bodies are better at ignoring the mutations which cause them?与男性相比，患有认知障碍的女性较少，因为她们自身的身体能更好的忽略导致认知障碍的基因突变AUTISM is a strange condition. Sometimes its symptoms of “social blindness”(an inability to read or comprehend the emotions of others) occur alone. This is dubbed high-functioning autism, or Asperger's syndrome. Though their fellow men and women may regard them as a bit odd, high-functioning autists are often successful (sometimes very successful) members of society. On other occasions, though, autism manifests as part of a range of cognitive problems. Then, the condition is debilitating. What is common to those on all parts of the so-called autistic spectrum is that they are more often men than women —so much more often that one school of thought suggests autism is an extreme manifestation of what it means, mentally, to be male. Boys are four times more likely to be diagnosed with autism than girls are. For high-functioning autism, the ratio is seven to one.?自闭症是一种奇怪的状态。

经济学人文章(四六级雅思精读素材)2020-08-27

The Economist August 29th 2020 Business 55Depending on whom you ask, Califor-nia is a leader in clean energy or a cau-tionary tale. Power outages in August prompted stern critiques from Republi-cans. “In California”, D onald Trump tweeted, “D emocrats have intentionally implemented rolling blackouts—forcing Americans in the dark.” In addition to pro-voking outrage and derision, however, the episode is also likely to inspire investment.The Golden State has long been Ameri-ca’s main testing ground for green compa-nies. Californians buy half of all electric cars sold in America. Theirs is the country’s largest solar market. As California deals with heat waves, ﬁres and a goal of carbon-free electricity by 2045, the need for a reli-able grid is becoming ever more obvious.For years ﬁrms competed to generate clean power in California. Now a growing num-ber are vying to store and manage it, too. August’s blackouts have many causes,including poor planning, an unexpected lack of capacity and sweltering heat in not just California but nearby states from which it sometimes imports power. Long before the outages, however, electricity op-erators were anxious about capacity. Cali-fornia’s solar panels become less useful in the evening, when demand peaks. In No-vember state regulators mandated that utilities procure an additional 3.3 gigawatts (gw ) of capacity, including giant batteries that charge when energy is abundant and can sell electricity back to the grid.Too few such projects have come online to cope with the surge in demand for air-conditioning in the scorching summer. But more are sprouting across the state. On Au-gust 19th ls Power, an electricity ﬁrm backed by private equity, unveiled a 250-megawatt (mw ) storage project in San Die-go, the largest of its kind in America. In July the county of Monterey said Vistra Energy,a Texan power company, could build as much as 1.2gw of storage.The rooftop solar industry stands to beneﬁt from a new Californian mandate that requires new homes to install panels on their roofs from this year. Sunrun, the market leader, is increasingly pairing such residential installations with batteries. In July, for instance, the company said it had won contracts with energy suppliers in the Bay Area to install 13mw of residential solar and batteries. These could supply power to residents in a blackout or feed power into the grid to help meet peak demand. Sunrunis so conﬁdent in its future that it has bid $3.2bn for Vivint Solar,its main rival.Another way to stave oﬀoutages is to curb demand.Enel,a European power company,has contracts with local utilities to work with large commercial and indus-trial clients.When demand rises,Enel pays customers to reduce energy consumption,easing demand on the grid.A company called OhmConnect oﬀers something sim-ilar for homeowners.Even as such oﬀerings scale up,the need for reliability means that fossil fuels will not disappear just yet.On September 1st California’s regulators will vote on whether to delay the retirement of four natural-gas plants in light of the outages.The state remains intent on decarbonising its power system over the next 25years.But progress may not move in a straight line.7NEW YO RKBusinesses compete to battle California’s blackoutsEnergy utilitiesLitMany big companies may be struggling with depressed sales, but these are busy times for bribery-busters. Mexico is abuzz over allegations by an ex-boss of Pe-mex, the state oil giant, that several senior politicians received bungs from compa-nies including Odebrecht, a Brazilian con-struction ﬁrm (see Americas section). The scandal is the latest in a string of graft cases to make headlines this year, starting with Airbus’s record $4bn settlement in January over accusations of corruption for making illegal payments in various countries.Corporate bribery is hardly new. In sur-veys, between a third and a half of compa-nies typically claim to have lost business to rivals who won contracts by paying kick-backs. But such perceptions-based re-search has obvious limitations. A new study takes a more rigorous approach, and draws some striking conclusions.Raghavendra Rau of Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge, Yan-Leung Cheung of the Education University of Hong Kong and Aris Stouraitis of Hong Kong Baptist University examined nearly 200 prominent bribery cases in 60 coun-tries between 1975 and 2015. For the ﬁrms doing the bribing, they found, the short-term gains were juicy: every dollar of bribe translated into a $6-9 increase in excess re-turns, relative to the overall stockmarket. That, however, does not take account of the chances of getting caught. These have risen as enforcement of America’s 43-year-old anti-bribery law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (fcpa ), has been stepped up and other countries have passed similar laws. The number of fcpa cases is up sharply since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-09, according to Stanford Law School (see chart). It has dipped a bit under Presi-dent Donald Trump, who has criticised the fcpa for hobbling American ﬁrms over-seas, but remains well above historic lev-els. Total ﬁnes for fcpa violations were $14bn in 2016-19, 48 times as much as in the four years to 2007.The authors also tested 11hypotheses that emerged from past studies of bribery.They found support for some, for instance that ﬁrms pay larger bribes when they ex-pect to receive larger beneﬁts, and that the net beneﬁts of bribing are smaller in places with more public disclosure of politicians’sources of income.But they punctured other bits of re-ceived wisdom. Most striking, they found no link between democracy and graft. This challenges the “Tullock paradox”, which holds that ﬁrms can get away with smaller bribes in democracies because politicians and oﬃcials have less of a lock on the sys-tem than those in autocratic countries, and so cannot extract as much rent. Such ﬁnd-ings will doubtless be of interest to corrup-tion investigators and unscrupulous exec-utives alike. 7Bribery pays—if you don’t get caughtBriberyA closer look at greasy palmsBrown envelopes, big chequesUnited States,Foreign Corrupt Practices ActSources:Stanford Law School;Sullivan &Cromwell*Investigations and enforcement actions †To August6543210605040302010020†10152000059095851977Enforcement actionsSanctions, $bnUtilitiesTransport Communications Basic materials Financial services Consumer goods Aerospace & defence TechnologyIndustrials Health care Oil &gas 100806040200Number of cases* by selected industry1977-2020†。

《经济学人》文章精选1

Togetherness in LibyaObama’’s awfully big change in AmericaAmerica’’s use Barack Obamaof forceMar31st2011|from the print edition•Tweet•IT IS Pavlovian.As soon as a president does something new in foreign policy,the world wants to know whether he has invented a new “doctrine”.The short answer in the case of Libya is that Barack Obama has not invented a new doctrine so much as repudiated an old one.What he is also doing,however,is challenging an American habit of mind.The doctrine Mr Obama has repudiated is the one attributed to ColinPowell,the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and George W. Bush’s transparently miserable secretary of state when America invaded Iraq in2003.That held,among other things,that America ought to go to war only when its vital interests are threatened,when the exit strategy is clear,and when it can apply overwhelming force to ensure that its aims are achieved.Nothing could be more different from the account Mr Obama gave Americans on March28th of his reasons for using military force in Libya.He does not believe that America’s vital interests are at stake(though some“important”ones are);the exit strategy is not entirely clear(Colonel Qaddafi must go,but who knows when,and not as a direct result of American military action);and the force America is willing to apply(no boots on the ground)is strictly limited.None of this should be a surprise.In“The Audacity of Hope”,the bestseller Mr Obama wrote as a senator in2006,he set out a theory of military intervention.Like all sovereign nations,he argued,America has the unilateral right to defend itself from attack,and to take unilateral military action to eliminate an imminent threat.But beyond matters of clear self-defence,it would“almost always”be in its interest to use force multilaterally.This would not mean giving the UN Security Council a veto over its actions,or rounding up Britain and Togo and doing as it pleased.It would mean following the example of the first President Bush in the first Gulf war—“engaging in the hard diplomatic work of obtainingmost of the world’s support for our actions”.Related topics•United States•Libya•Barack ObamaThe virtue of such an approach was that America had much to gain in a world that lived by rules.By upholding such rules itself,it could encourage others to do so too.A multilateral approach would also lighten America’s burden at times of war.This might be“a bit of an illusion”, given the modest power of most American allies.But in many future conflicts the military operation was likely to cost less than the aftermath: training police,switching the lights back on,building democracy and so forth.The president,it now emerges,remembers exactly what he wrote.He hesitated about whether to act in Libya(just ask the French and British, who egged him on but came close to losing hope),but he was always clear about how.All the conditions he wished for in that book five years ago have come to pass.In this week’s speech he ticked them methodically off:“an international mandate for action,a broad coalition prepared to join us,the support of Arab countries,and a plea for help from the Libyanpeople themselves.We also had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.”Under such circumstances,he said,for America to turn a blind eye to the fate of Benghazi would have been“a betrayal of who we are”.Why does this theory of intervention,and the noble sentiment attached to it,fail to qualify as a“doctrine”?Because it is too elastic to provide a guide to future action.Would America“betray”itself by turning a blind eye to atrocities under different,less favourable,circumstances?So it seems.It has,after all,done so before,in Rwanda and Darfur—and Mr Obama appears to accept that it might have to do so again when,say,an alliance would be damaged,as in Bahrain,or the job is too hot to handle, as in Syria or Iran.Also unclear is whether an American interest must also be at stake before Mr Obama invokes the moral case for action. Conveniently(for the purpose of selling this particular war),the president detects a“strategic interest”in preventing Colonel Qaddafi from chilling the wider Arab spring,so nobody knows.In fairness,elasticity is not a sin;and Mr Obama does not claim to have invented anything he calls a“doctrine”.The worst you can say about his approach is that it is merely commonsensical:decide the issues case-by-case while holding some idea of values and interests in mind. Many who say they want more consistency than this(typically by askingsome variant of“What about Zimbabwe?”)do so not because they really believe that foreign policy can be run by an algorithm but in order to embarrass Mr Obama in any way they can.Prize chump in the case of Libya this past fortnight has been Newt Gingrich,the Republican presidential hopeful who demanded consistency,called for intervention and turned on a dime the instant Mr Obama answered.After you,SarkoMore significant,however,is that habit of mind.In Libya Mr Obama is challenging the assumption of global leadership America has taken for granted ever since the second world war.America has joined coalitions before,but never under a president quite so adamant that America is not in charge—even if the military burden-sharing is indeed a bit of an illusion.Most Republicans and quite a few Democrats hate this.Mr Obama’s hope is that America’s low profile will make the war more palatable not only to the Muslim world but also to the economy-fixated voters at home who question whether America can still afford to play its traditional leadership role.What he may soon discover is that modesty extracts a price of its own.By sharing the leadership with others,he has made his policy hostage to the limited mandate(no use of force for regime change) imposed by the United Nations and the limited means of his allies inEurope and the Middle East.It may not be a doctrine,it should not be a surprise,but nobody can deny that it is a gamble.。

(完整word版)经济学人经济类文章精选4

InadequateSOMETIMES the only thing people can agree on is a mediocre idea. Ahead of the G20 meeting, some regulators are pushing to introduce dynamic provisioning for banks. Under this system, in boom years banks make provisions against profits which then sit on their balance-sheets as reserves against unspecified potential losses. In the bad years they draw down on these reserves. This smooths banks’ profits over the cycle, making their capital positions “counter-cyclical”. Supporters point to Spain, which uses this approach and whose lenders are in relatively good nick.Banks should be encouraged to save more for a rainy day. But the importance of Spain’s system has been oversold. Going into the credit crisis, its two big banks had an extra buffer equivalent to about 1.5% of risk-weighted assets. Banks like UBS or Citigroup have had write-offs far beyond this, equivalent to 8-15% of risk-weighted assets. Whether dynamic provisions influenced managers’ behaviour is also questionable. Spain’s BBV A was run us ing an economic-capital model that, according to its 2007 annual report, explicitly replaced the generic provision in its income statement with its “best estimate of the real risk incurred”.Accounting standard-setters, meanwhile, are not amused. They support the objective of counter-cyclical capital rules but think dynamic provisioning is a bad way to achieve this. Why not simply require banks to run with higher capital ratios, rather than go through a circuitous route by smoothing profits, which investors tend to dislike? Accountants worry their standards are being fiddled with needlessly, after a decades-long fight to have them independently set to provide accurate data to investors.Is there a solution? If anything, the crisis shows that accounting and supervision should be further separated to break the mechanistic link between mark-to-market losses and capital. Investors should get the information they want. Supervisors should make a judgment about the likelihood of losses and set the required capital level accordingly. Warren Buffett, an astute investor, has endorsed this approach.Sadly, bank supervision is as dysfunctional as the banks. The Basel 2 accords took five years to negotiate. Local regulators interpreted them differently and many failed to enforce them. Confidence in their integrity is now so low that many investors and some banks and regulators have abandoned Basel as their main test of capital. Given this mess, it is easy to see why policymakers might view tweaking accounting standards as an attractive short cut: with some arm-twisting, the rules can be changed quickly and are legally enforceable. But this is a matter where short cuts are not good enough.Unsavoury spreadTEN years ago Warren Buffett and Jack Welch were among the most admired businessmen in the world. Emerging markets were seen as risky, to be avoided by the cautious. But now the credit-default swaps market indicates that Berkshire Hathaway, run by Mr Buffett, is more likely to default on its debt than Vietnam. GE Capital, the finance arm of the group formerly run by Mr Welch, is a worse credit risk than Russia and on March 12th Standard & Poor's downgraded its debt—the first time GE and its subsidiaries have lost their AAA rating in over five decades.The contrast highlights the sorry state of the corporate-bond market. A turn-of-the-year rally was founded on hopes that spreads (the excess of corporate-bond yields over risk-free rates) more than compensated investors for the economic outlook. That has now petered out.The weakness has been much greater in speculative, or high-yield, bonds than in theinvestment-grade part of the market. This is hardly surprising. First, economic prospects are so dire that companies already in trouble will have difficulty surviving. Banks are trying to preserve their own capital and do not need to own any more toxic debt. Even if refinancing were available for endangered firms, it would be prohibitively dear. It is only a matter of time before some go under. Moody’s cites 283 companies at greate st risk of default, including well-known outfits like Blockbuster, a video-rental chain, and MGM Mirage, a casino group. A year ago just 157 companies made the list. Standard & Poor’s says 35 have defaulted this year, against 12 in the same period in 2008. That translates into a default rate over the past 12 months of just 3.8%.The rate is likely to increase sharply. Charles Himmelberg, a credit strategist at Goldman Sachs, forecasts that 14% of high-yield bonds will default this year, with the same proportion going phut in 2010. Worse, creditors will get back only about 12.5 cents on the dollar. All told, Goldman thinks the combination of defaults and low recovery rates will cost bondholders 37 cents on the dollar in the next five years.A second problem for the corporate-bond market is that optimism about the scope for an imminent end to the financial crisis has dissipated. “People have given up hope that the new [Obama] administration will be able to do anything to make things better quickly,” says Willem Sels, a credit strategist at Dresdner Kleinwort.Banks are still the subject of heightened concern. Credit Derivatives Research has devised a counterparty-risk index, based on the cost of insuring against default of 15 large banks; the index is now higher than it was after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Jeff Rosenberg, head of credit strategy at Bank of America Securities Merrill Lynch, says investors are uncertain about the impact of government intervention in banks. Each successive rescue, from Bear Stearns to Citigroup, has affected different parts of the capital structure in different ways.A third problem for the high-yield market is that plans for quantitative easing (purchases by the central bank of government and private-sector debt) are focused on investment-grade bonds. As well as reviving the economy, governments are concerned about protecting taxpayers’ money, and so will not want to buy bonds at high risk of default. If the government is going to support the investment-grade market, investors have an incentive to steer their portfolios in that direction.The relative strength of the investment-grade market even permitted the issuance of around $300 billion of bonds in the first two months of the year, albeit largely for companies in safe industries such as pharmaceuticals. Circumstances suited all the market participants. “Spreads were wide, which attracted investors, but absolute levels of interest rates were low, which suited issuers,” says Mr Rosenberg.Although the Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped by nearly 6% on March 10th, it is hard to see how the equity market can enjoy a sustained rebound while corporate-bond spreads are still widening. Bondholders have a prior claim on a company’s assets; if they are not going to be paid in full, then shareholders will not get a look-in. However, credit investors say their market often takes its lead from equities. If each is following the other, that hints at a worrying downward spiral.A PlanB for global financeIn a guest article, Dani Rodrik argues for stronger national regulation, not the global sort THE clarion call for a global system of financial regulation can be heard everywhere. From Angela Merkel to Gordon Brown, from Jean-Claude Trichet to Ben Bernanke, from sober economists tocountless newspaper editorials; everyone, it seems, is asking for it regardless of political complexion.That is not surprising, perhaps, in light of the convulsions the world economy is going through. If we have learnt anything from the crisis it is that financial regulation and supervision need to be tightened and their scope broadened. It seems only a small step to the idea that we need much stronger global regulation as well: a global college of regulators, say; a binding code of international conduct; or even an international financial regulator.Yet the logic of global financial regulation is flawed. The world economy will be far more stable and prosperous with a thin veneer of international co-operation superimposed on strong national regulations than with attempts to construct a bold global regulatory and supervisory framework. The risk we run is that pursuing an ambitious goal will detract us from something that is more desirable and more easily attained.One problem with the global strategy is that it presumes we can get leading countries to surrender significant sovereignty to international agencies. It is hard to imagine that America’s Congress would ever sign off on the kind of intrusive international oversight of domestic lending practices that might have prevented the subprime-mortgage meltdown, let alone avert future crises. Nor is it likely that the IMF will be allowed to turn itself into a true global lender of last resort. The far more likely outcome is that the mismatch between the reach of markets and the scope of governance will prevail, leaving global finance as unsafe as ever. That certainly was the outcome the last time we tried an international college of regulators, in the ill-fated case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International.A second problem is that even if the leading nations were to agree, they might end up converging on the wrong set of regulations. This is not just a hypothetical possibility. The Basel process, viewed until recently as the apogee of international financial co-operation, has been compromised by the inadequacies of the bank-capital agreements it has produced. Basel 1 ended up encouraging risky short-term borrowing, whereas Basel 2’s reliance on credit ratings and banks’ own models to generate risk weights for capital requirements is clearly inappropriate in light of recent experience. By neglecting the macro-prudential aspect of regulation—the possibility that individual banks may appear sound while the system as a whole is unsafe—these agreements have, if anything, magnified systemic risks. Given the risk of converging on the wrong solutions yet again, it would be better to let a variety of regulatory models flourish.Who says one size fits all?But the most fundamental objection to global regulation lies elsewhere. Desirable forms of financial regulation differ across countries depending on their preferences and levels of development. Financial regulation entails trade-offs along many dimensions. The more you valuefinancial stability, the more you have to sacrifice financial innovation. The more fine-tuned and complex the regulation, the more you need skilled regulators to implement it. The more widespread the financial-market failures, the larger the potential role of directed credit and state banks. Different n ations will want to sit on different points along their “efficient frontiers”. There is nothing wrong with France, say, wanting to purchase more financial stability than America—and having tighter regulations—at the price of giving up some financial innovations. Nor with Brazil giving its state-owned development bank special regulatory treatment, if the country wishes, so that it can fill in for missing long-term credit markets.In short, global financial regulation is neither feasible, nor prudent, nor desirable. What finance needs instead are some sensible traffic rules that will allow nations (and in some cases regions) to implement their own regulations while preventing adverse spillovers. If you want an analogy, think of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for world finance rather than a World Trade Organisation. The genius of the GA TT regime was that it left room for governments to craft their own social and economic policies as long as they did not follow blatantly protectionist policies and did not discriminate among their trade partners.Fortify the home front firstSimilarly, a new financial order can be constructed on the back of a minimal set of international guidelines. The new arrangements would certainly involve an improved IMF with better representation and increased resources. It might also require an international financial charter with limited aims, focused on financial transparency, consultation among national regulators, and limits on jurisdictions (such as offshore centres) that export financial instability. But the responsibility for regulating leverage, setting capital standards, and supervising financial markets would rest squarely at the national level. Domestic regulators and supervisors would no longer hide behind international codes. Just as an exporter of widgets has to abide by product-safety standards in all its markets, global financial firms would have to comply with regulatory requirements that may differ across host countries.The main challenge facing such a regime would be the incentive for regulatory arbitrage. So the rules would recognise governments’ right to intervene in cross-border financial transactions—but only in so far as the intent is to prevent competition from less-strict jurisdictions from undermining domestic regulations.Of course, like-minded countries that want to go into deeper financial integration and harmonise their regulations would be free to do so, provided (as in the GA TT) they do not use this as an excuse for financial protectionism. One can imagine the euro zone eventually taking this route and opting for a common regulator. The Chiang Mai initiative in Asia may ultimately also produce a regional zone of deep integration around an Asian monetary fund. But the rest of the world would have to live with a certain amount of financial segmentation—the necessary counterpart toregulatory fragmentation.If this leaves you worried, turn again to the Bretton Woods experience. Despite limited liberalisation, that system produced huge increases in cross-border trade and investment. The reason is simple and remains relevant as ever: an architecture that respects national diversity does more to advance the cause of globalisation than ambitious plans that assume it away.One crunch after anotherCALLS for co-ordinated fiscal stimulus to lift the world out of recession were joined at the weekend by Larry Summers, Barack Obama’s top economic adviser. Such co-ordination has been absent up to now, though that could change at the meeting of G20 leaders in London in early April. But there has been plenty of fiscal stimulus, led by America’s $787 billion package, as many governments seek to offset a collapse in private demand. There are worries not only about how much these measures cost up front but their longer-term effects on government finances.The direct costs of such packages are indeed large. The IMF reckons that for G20 countries stimulus packages will add up to 1.5% of GDP in 2009 (calculated as a weighted average using purchasing power parity). Together with the huge sums used to bail out firms in the financial sector (3.5% of GDP and counting in America, for example), these are immediate ways in which the crisis is affecting public finances across the world. But they are not the only ones.A downturn affects government finances in other ways. Shares in most rich countries have plummeted. The MSCI developed-world index, which tracks stocks in 23 rich countries, has lost more than half its value since the beginning of 2008. Falling share prices hit government revenues as capital-gains tax takes decline. Similarly, taxes on financial-sector profits, a significant part of government revenue in many countries, have evaporated. And expenditures onautomatic stabilisers such as unemployment insurance rise in a recession. All this widens budget deficits.Direct stimulus measures also push up government deficits and debt, although the type of intervention affects how long-lasting its effects are. Most expenditure, such as infrastructure spending, is temporary (although it affects debt permanently). Revenue measures, such as tax cuts, are politically difficult to reverse. The question is whether this threatens the solvency of governments.A paper on the state of the world’s public finances issued by the IMF in the run-up to the G20 meetings takes a stab at identifying and measuring the fiscal implications of the crisis for both rich and developing countries. Its conclusions are sobering. For rich G20 countries, fiscal balances will worsen by 6% of GDP between 2007 and 2009. Government debt will come off worse. Between 2007 and 2009, the debt-to-GDP ratio of rich countries is projected to rise by 14.5 percentage points. In the medium term, the outlook is even more worrying. Government debt for the average rich country will be more than 100% of GDP by 2014 compared with 70% in 2000 and 40% in 1980.A great deal of uncertainty surrounds these estimates because so much depends on guesswork. Economic recovery, for example, could be slower than the IMF’s current projections: g rowth forecasts were revised down several times in 2008. Governments may also have to shoulder more burdens—private pension plans, which have been hammered by the crisis, may require government support. And the eventual cost of financial-sector bailouts will depend on how quickly and at whatlevel prices stabilise of the assets governments have taken on. Past experience suggests that there is enormous scope for variation. Sweden had a recovery rate of 94% five years after its crisis in 1991; Japan had recovered only 1% of assets in the five years after its troubles of 1997.The IMF points out that debt levels, while high, are not unprecedented by historical standards. But the worry is that primary fiscal balances in four-fifths of the rich countries studied by the IMF will be too high even in 2012 to allow debt to be stabilised, or brought down to 60% of GDP (which is the IMF benchmark for debt levels), even though revenues will recover as countries emerge from the crisis. What this implies is that, over time, fiscal deficits will have to be trimmed. And therein lies the rub.Most rich countries have rapidly ageing populations. Unless entitlement systems are reformed (by reducing benefits) or tax bases broadened, fiscal deficits will rise still further. Some of the IMF’s ideas about how to do this will seem unpalatable: it argues that health systems, for example, will have to become less generous. But rich countries were always going to have to come to terms with the fiscal consequences of demographic pressures on existing welfare systems sooner or later. The crisis will bring this problem more urgently to the fore.Inadequate有时人们只能在普普通通的事情上取的一致意见。

经济学人科技类文章中英双语（5篇范例）

经济学人科技类文章中英双语（5篇范例）第一篇：经济学人科技类文章中英双语The Brain Activity Map绘制大脑活动地图Hard cell 棘手的细胞An ambitious project to map the brain is in the works.Possibly too ambitious 一个绘制大脑活动地图的宏伟计划正在准备当中，或许有些太宏伟了 NEWS of what protagonists hope will be America’s next big science project continues to dribble out.有关其发起人心中下一个科学大工程的新闻报道层出不穷。

A leak to the New York Times, published on February 17th, let the cat out of the bag, with a report that Barack Obama’s administration is thinking of sponsoring what will be known as the Brain Activity Map.2月17日，《纽约时报》刊登的一位线人报告终于泄露了秘密，报告称奥巴马政府正在考虑赞助将被称为“大脑活动地图”的计划。

And on March 7th several of those protagonists published a manifesto for the project in Science.3月7日，部分发起人在《科学》杂志上发表声明证实了这一计划。

The purpose of BAM is to change the scale at which the brain is understood.“大脑活动地图”计划的目标是改变人们在认知大脑时采用的度量方法。

《经济学人》杂志若干篇文章

城市土地空间和都市Urban land城市土地Space and the city空间和都市Poor land use in the world's greatest cities carries a huge cost糟糕的土地利用方式已经成为世界大都市不能承受之重BUY land, advised Mark Twain; they're not making it any more. In fact, land is not really scarce: the entire population of America could fit into Texas with more than an acre for each household to enjoy. What drives prices skyward is a collision between rampant demand and limited supply in the great metropolises like London, Mumbai and New York. In the past ten years real prices in Hong Kong have risen by 150%. Residential property in Mayfair, in central London, can go for as much as 55,000 (82,000) per square metre. A square mile of Manhattan residential property costs 16.5 billion.马克吐温曾建议说“都去买地吧”，但现在他们已经不这么做了。

事实上，土地并非真的如此稀缺：仅一个德克萨斯州就能容纳整个美国人口，而且每户能有一英亩之多。

在伦敦、孟买、纽约这种大都市里，地价飞涨的现实是疯狂的需求和有限的供给共同作用的结果。

经济学人文章10篇

Dominant and dangerousAs America's economic supremacy fades, the primacy of the dollar looks unsustainableIF HEGEMONS are good for anything, it is for conferring stability on the systems they dominate. For 70 years the dollar has been the superpower of the financial and monetary system. Despite talk of the yuan's rise, the primacy of the greenback is unchallenged. As a means of payment, a store of value and a reserve asset, nothing can touch it. Yet the dollar's rule has brittle foundations, and the system it underpins is unstable. Worse, the alternative reserve currencies are flawed. A transition to a more secure order will be devilishly hard.When the buck stopsFor decades, America's economic might legitimised the dollar's claims to reign supreme. But, as our special report this week explains, a faultline has opened between America's economic clout and its financial muscle. The United States accounts for 23% of global GDP and 12% of merchandise trade. Yet about 60% of the world's output, and a similar share of the planet's people, lie within a de facto dollar zone, in which currencies are pegged to the dollar or move in some sympathy with it. American firms' share of the stock of international corporate investment has fallen from 39% in 1999 to 24% today. But Wall Street sets the rhythm of markets globally more than it ever did. American fund managers run 55% of the world's assets under management, up from 44% a decade ago.The widening gap between America's economic and financial power creates problems for other countries, in the dollar zone and beyond. That is because the costs of dollar dominance are starting to outweigh the benefits.First, economies must endure wild gyrations. In recent months the prospect of even a tiny rate rise in America has sucked capital from emerging markets, battering currencies and share prices. Decisions of the Federal Reserve affect offshore dollar debts and deposits worth about $9 trillion. Because some countries link their currencies to the dollar, their central banks must react to the Fed. Foreigners own 20-50% of local-currency government bonds in places like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey: they are more likely to abandon emerging markets when American rates rise.At one time the pain from capital outflows would have been mitigated by the stronger demand—including for imports—that prompted the Fed to raise rates in the first place. However, in the past decade America's share of global merchandise imports has dropped from 16% to 13%. America is the biggest export market for only 32countries, down from 44 in 1994; the figure for China has risen from two to 43. A system in which the Fed dispenses and the world convulses is unstable.A second problem is the lack of a backstop for the offshore dollar system if it faces a crisis. In 2008-09 the Fed reluctantly came to the rescue, acting as a lender of last resort by offering $1 trillion of dollar liquidity to foreign banks and central banks. The sums involved in a future crisis would be far higher. The offshore dollar world is almost twice as large as it was in 2007. By the 2020s it could be as big as America's banking industry. Since 2008-09, Congress has grown wary of the Fed's emergency lending. Come the next crisis, the Fed's plans to issue vast swaplines might meet regulatory or congressional resistance. For how long will countries be ready to tie their financial systems to America's fractious and dysfunctional politics?That question is underscored by a third worry: America increasingly uses its financial clout as a political tool. Policymakers and prosecutors use the dollar payment system to assert control not just over wayward bankers and dodgy football officials, but also errant regimes like Russia and Iran. Rival powers bridle at this vulnerability to American foreign policy.Americans may wonder why this matters to them. They did not force any country to link its currency to the dollar or encourage foreign firms to issue dollar debt. But the dollar's outsize role does affect Americans. It brings benefits, not least cheaper borrowing. Alongside the “exorbitant privilege” of owning the reserve currency, however, there are costs. If the Fed fails to act as lender of last resort in a dollar liquidity crisis, the ensuing collapse abroad will rebound on America's economy. And even without a crisis, the dollar's dominance will present American policymakers with a dilemma. If foreigners continue to accumulate reserves, they will dominate the Treasury market by the 2030s. To satisfy growing foreign demand for safe dollar-denominated assets, America's government could issue more Treasuries—adding to its debts. Or it could leave foreigners to buy up other securities—but that might lead to asset bubbles, just as in the mortgage boom of the 2000s.It's all about the BenjaminsIdeally America would share the burden with other currencies. Yet if the hegemony of the dollar is unstable, its would-be successors are unsuitable. The baton of financial superpower has been passed before, when America overtook Britain in 1920-45. But Britain and America were allies, which made the transfer orderly. And America came with ready-made attributes: a dynamic economy and, like Britain, political cohesiveness and the rule of law.Compare that with today's contenders for reserve status. The eurois a currency whose very existence cannot be taken for granted. Only when the euro area has agreed on a full banking union and joint bond issuance will those doubts be fully laid to rest. As for the yuan, China's government has created the monetary equivalent of an eight-lane motorway—a vast network of currency swaps with foreign central banks—but there is no one on it. Until China opens its financial markets, the yuan will be only a bit-player. And until it embraces the rule of law, no investor will see its currency as truly safe.All this suggests that the global monetary and financial system will not smoothly or quickly wean itself off the greenback. There are things America can do to shoulder more responsibility—for instance, by setting up bigger emergency-swaplines with more central banks. More likely is a splintering of the system, as other countries choose to insulate themselves from Fed decisions by embracing capital controls. The dollar has no peers. But the system that it anchors is cracking. 主宰的和危险的随着美国经济支配地位的衰落，美元的霸主地位看上去是不可持续的霸主的好处在于能够给它主导的体系带来稳定。

经济学人文章1

2. Wall Street deregulation华尔街去监管化The pendulum swings资本监管，遭遇逆潮The “JOBS” act turns into a battle about America’s capital markets“工作”法案演变为美国资本市场的一场战争（今日无法上传更多附件）A less frequent sight不常见的景象FOR a brief moment, it appeared that American’s fractious p oliticians and capital markets were all in agreement. House Bill 3606, unofficially referred to as the JOBS act and officially (stretching out the acronym) known as the “Jumpstart Our Business Start-up Act”, sailed through the House of Representati ves by 390 votes to 23 on March 8th.美国一些暴躁的政客和资本家似乎一度都谈妥了。

3月8日，众议院议案3606号以390票赞成，23票反对在众议院顺利通过。

该法案的正式名称为《推动我国商业振兴法》，非正式场合下被称为“工作”法案。

（该法正式名称英语原文中几个词的首字母合起来正好是工作这个词——译注）It was on its way to a similar endorsement in the Senate when the unthi nkable seems to have happened: someone bothered to read the law. There they found a set of provisions that, depending on your point of view, either open the airways of asphyxiated financial markets or give free rein to rapacious companies and banks. 当被提交到参议院要走类似的批准程序时，难以置信的事发生了：有人不厌其烦地阅读了通篇法律文本。

经济学人100篇精选文章

[2010.04.08] Protection racket 保护的喧闹 4[2009.10.29] The unrepentant chocolatier 不思悔改的巧克力制造商 6[2010.04.15] Extrasolar planets 系外行星16[2010.03.25] Ethiopia: Forget about democracy 忘记民主吧18[2010.03.18] Africa: When feeding the hungry is political 当喂饱饥民成为政治工具20 [2010.03.31]Genetic Shock 基因大休克23[2010.04.08]Novel sources of uranium 铀的新来源26[2010.03.13] A game of consequences? 因果游戏？28[2010.03.31]E-publish or perish 不做电子版就灭亡32[2010.03.29] Fish tales 食鱼传说 36[2010.03.31] Another Russian tragedy 另一出俄罗斯悲剧 40[2010.03.18] Back on the map 立陶宛：重振国威43[2010.03.18] Eaten away 捕尽吃绝51[2010.03.19] Let bygones be bygones? 过去的就让它过去吗？53[2010.04.04] Launch pad iPad登台亮相，蓄势待发56[2010.02.18] Polar ice shelves 极地冰架58[2010 03 25]一些人断言：她们不需要妇女权利60[2010.03.31] Sweeping the skies 扫天：清走宇宙垃圾62[2010.03.31] The truth hurts 真相伤人 63[2010.03.25]Easy come, easy go 来如流水逝如风65[2009.8.6] The sun also rises 日升如故，阴霾潜伏68[2010.03.18]electric supercars电动超级车72[2010.03.18] Slash and earn 企业“瘦身”，利润“增肥”76[2010.03.31] Remote-control warfare 遥控战争79[2010.02.25] How siestas help memory 午睡怎样增进记忆力82[2010.03.23] University Ranking 大学排行榜84[2010.03.04] The grim rater 绝不留情 88[2010.03.04]A step in the right direction 往正确方向的一步90[2010.03.11]The cost of reconstruction重建的代价96[2010.03.04] The worldwide war on baby girls 对女婴的全球性围剿98[2010.03.18]Middle-income and developing countries 中等收入与发展中国家110 [2010.03.06]Do the locomotion活动活动（关于动物始祖）113[2010.03.11]Sovereign debt and the euro 国债与欧元 114[2010.03.11]Advances in pain relief 进一步的缓解疼痛116[2010.01.21] investing in brains 智力投资119[2010.02.25]What's good for General Motors 通用汽车好，那美国也好122[2010.02.04] Of governments and geeks 关于政府和极客123[2010.02.18] Hitmen old and new 魔高一尺道高一丈129[2010.01.07] Planet Hunting 行星狩猎131[2010.03.04] The net generation, unplugged 网络世代，不插电133[2010.03.11] All for one 应对主权债务危机：创建欧洲货币基金？136[2010.1.28] A needier era 更加渴望的时代 139[2010.02.04]Classes apart 课堂不再141[2009.12.10] Filthy lucre fouls the air 不义之财污染空气143[2010.03.04]Flaky science 雪花的科学146[2010.02.18] Moon dreams 奔月之梦148[2010 2 25]a weighty matter重物质150[2010.02.18]Assassinations：A time to kill 暗杀：动手！ 152[2010.01.21] Reaching the poorest 给予赤贫者受教育的机会156[2009.12.30] Why farms may be the new forests 为什么农田会成为新的森林 159[2009.12.17]Too many chains 束缚重重161[2010.02.18] Hands off 放下手来164[2010.02.27]Fired up着火了！！！ 166[2009.12.10]How much evil can you not see?有多少罪恶是你所看不到的？170[2009.12.17] Climate change and forests 气候改变和森林 172[2010.02.27]A sunny clean up阳光清洁175[2009.12.03]Cap, trade and block 排放量设限，妥协仍遭堵截177[2010.02.11] Tree and leaf 树与叶180[2009.12.10]Filthy lucre fouls the air 脏钱污染空气浊182[2009.12.11] Green enough? 绿色够了吗？185[2009.11.25]Fish tales有关鱼的故事194[2009.11.26]Wider still and weaker? 膨胀依旧弱更甚？198[2010.01.07]No hiding place? 人类已无藏身之处？202[2010.02.18]Making a bit of me 略显不同204[2010.02.11] Opting for the quiet life 选择宁静的生活（祝大家虎年大吉！）208 [2009.11.26]The gloves go on 减贫正未有穷期211[2010-02-03]Space to thrive孕育繁荣的空间213[2009.11.21][Food markets][食品市场] 216[2009.10.01] Extradition 引渡218[2009.11.05] (Not yet) marching as to war （尚未）发展到战争的地步221[2010.02.02] Computer etiquette 电脑礼仪：点点头，眨眨眼224[2009.11.21] If words were food, nobody would go hungry如果说话可以当饭吃，就没人会挨饿了227[2010.01.14]Stem cells in China 中国的干细胞研究235[2010.01.16]It's a knockout 冲床“以旧换新”239[2009.11.05]Sounding the Trumpet 吹响集结号241[2009.10.22] To the rigger the spoils 舞弊者获利245[2010.01.13]Well received 接收效果良好247[2010.01.19] Safer helicopters 更加安全的直升飞机 249[2010.01.07]Looking for life in the shadows 寻找暗处的生命251[2010.1.14] The end of an institution? 皇家学院的终结？ 253[2010.01.07]Electronic colouring 电子着色 254[2009.12.16] All pumped up 全都泵起来257[2009.12.10]Alone in the crowd群体的孤独感259[2010.3.25] A weight on their shoulders 压在肩上的重担261[2009.12.30] Dambusterbusters 堤坝除险，以水御水264[2010.3.18] The waiting game 等待之中的游戏267[2009.12.19] Girls on top 女孩优先269[2010 03 11] The inflation solution 通胀式解药270[2009.12.10] War games 战争游戏273[2010.03.20] It wasn't us 不是我们的错277[2009.12.17] An early Christmas present? 暗物质: 一份提前送出的圣诞礼物？281 [2010.03.25]Rising prices in Asia 亚洲的物价上涨问题283[2010.03.04]Financial inclusion 金融扩展计划286[2009.12.19] Dashed hopes 破灭的希望287[2010.03.04]Low definition 敢问“界”在何方? 289[2009.12.10] Commercial space flight 商业性太空飞行292[2010.03.02]Recovery in progress 正在复苏中294[2009.12.03] No pinch of salt 盐能发电？此言不差！297[2010.2.18] Fundamental questions 极其重要的问题 299[2010.04.08] Protection racket 保护的喧闹Eating lots of fruit and vegetables may not help stave off cancer, after all终究，吃大量的水果和蔬菜并不能避免癌症Apr 8th 2010 | From The Economist print editionFOR snivelling children and recalcitrant carnivores, requests that they should eat five portions of fruit and vegetables every day have mostly fallen on deaf ears. But those who did comply with official advice from charities, governments and even the mighty World Health Organisation (WHO), could remind themselves, rather smugly, that the extra greens they forced down at lunchtime would greatly reduce their chances of getting cancer. Until now, that is. Because a group of researchers led by Paolo Boffetta, of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York, have conducted a new study into the link between cancer and the consumption of fruit and vegetables, and found it to be far weaker than anyone had thought.对于哭哭啼啼的小孩和顽固的肉食主义者，每天吃五种不同的蔬菜和水果的要求他们基本上会当做耳旁风。

经济学人的文章

一．Free trade in the Pacific太平洋自由贸易A small reason to be cheerful一件值得庆贺的小事An inspiring idea to liberalise transpacific trade hinges on the courage of America and, especially, Japan环太平洋贸易自由化，这一振奋人心的想法取决于美国特别是日本的勇气WITH thunderclouds looming over the trans-Atlantic economy, it was easy to miss a bright piece of news last weekend from the other crucible of world trade, the Pacific Rim. In Honolulu, where Barack Obama hosted a summit of Asia-Pacific leaders, Canada, Japan and Mexico expressed interest in joining nine countries (America, Australia, Brunei , Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam) in discussing a free-trade pact. Altogether, the possible members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) produce 40% of world GDP—far more than the European Union.当雷雨的阴霾在环大西洋经济地区上空密布之际，人们很容易忽略上周末在世界贸易的另一个关键地区，环太平洋地区传来的那件令人眼前一亮的新闻。

经济学家精选20篇

经济学家期刊文章精选20篇（含参考译文）1、EducationSnooty or what?Oct 14th 2004 From The Economist print editionInverted snobbery prevents good teachers going where they're neededA CLEVER man wants to do a good thing, but the wicked government stops him. That is the scandalous-sounding story of the difficulties encountered by Tristram Jones-Parry, head of fee-paying Westminster School, one of the best in the country. He retires next year and wants to help teach maths in a state school.Was he welcomed with open arms? No. He was told, he complains, that he would need retraining for the state system. It was a similar story for David Wolfe, a retired American physics professor who teaches in a British state school. He said this week that the authorities told him to sit the GCSEmaths exam normally taken by 16-year-olds if he wanted to continue.The system is not quite as insane as this might suggest. The rules that require state-school teachers to be formally qualified do have exceptions. The Teacher Training Agency insists that Mr Jones-Parry could gain his ticket in just a day, by having an assessor from the state system observe his work at Westminster (a requirement scarcely less ludicrous than the supposed demand for retraining). Mr Wolfe's American PhD would count as an equivalent to the GCSE maths pass normally required. So he would scrape by as well. The General Teaching Council, another quango, has now apologised to Mr Jones-Parry for giving him the wrong information at first, and then leaving his follow-up letter unanswered for six weeks.The real story is the gulf between the two kinds of school. Heads like Mr Jones-Parry hire teachers with good academic credentials but not necessarily with state qualifications. State-school hiring is closely regulated; their teachers need to be expert form-fillers and jargon-wielders, and are much less likely to have good degrees: indeed only 38% of state-school maths teachers have a degree in the subject; in independent schools, 63% do.So it's not surprising that private-school teachers think even the most nominal barriers to their teaching in state schools are offensive and silly. The other side responds in kind: teaching unions this week said snidely that Mr Jones-Parry might be good at teaching advanced maths to well-behaved bright kids, but would not necessarily know how to teach simple sums to rowdy, dim ones. Perhaps. But many state-school parents desperatelyseeking better maths teaching for their children might consider that risk rather small.2、Parents and childrenFamily valuesSep 30th 2004 From The Economist print editionRich kids have little time for their elderly parents. The ingratitude!WHY was King Lear treated so cruelly by his daughters? Until recently, most of the answers have come from scholars with scant knowledge of economic theory. Fortunately, John Ermisch, an Essex economist, is working to remedy this deficiency. His research proves what many parents have long suspected—that increased wealth goes along with filial ingratitude. –Topic sentenceUsing data from the British Household Panel Survey, Mr Ermisch shows that affluent parents are slightly more likely to supply offspring with money and help with child-rearing than poor parents. But success seems to have precisely the opposite effect on children. The mere possession of a university degree makes children 20% less likely to phone their mothers regularly, and more than 50% less likely to pay them a visit.This is puzzling because self-interested children might be expected to behave in precisely the opposite way. Most wealthy people are descended from wealthy parents, which means they have a lot of patrimony to lose by cutting back on the fawning. “Nothing will come of nothing,” as a pre-retirement and still sane King Lear put it when his youngest daughter dared to withhold her affections.So why are rich kids such brats? There are two likely explanations. The first is that, as their income rises, the marginal cost of providing services goes up. It simply isn't worth their while to help with the shopping, particularly since affluence tends to increase distances between parents and children. And, since personal contact correlates with telephone contact, they are less likely to phone, too. Out of sight, out of mind.Another answer comes from an obscure branch of economics known as strategic bequest theory. This predicts that children will provide only enough services to ensure they get a reasonable share of the inheritance. But that point is reached sooner by those who have only one sibling rival, or none at all. Wealthier families, which tend to be smaller, simply fail to ensure the optimum amount of competition.Given these iron laws, what are parents supposed to do? Good results might be achieved by having more children, or expressing a sudden interest in the local cats' home. But Mr Ermisch is not optimistic. “The only thing they can do is follow their children around,” he says. And don't make King Lear's mistake by handing over the cash first.3、The internetAlive and kicking Sep 23rd 2004 From The Economist print editionCompetition still exists on the webJUST when you thought you knew the web, along come new competitors to keep things interesting. On September 15th, a new search engine called was unveiled by Amazon, the giant internet retailer. It repackages Google's search results, but with useful tweaks. Searches not only call up websites and images on the same page, but other references, such as Amazon's book search, the Internet Movie Database, and encyclopaedia and dictionary references. Moreover, it keeps track of users' search histories—an important innovation as search becomes more personalised.Many had assumed the market was stitched up by Google and Yahoo! (who account for over 90% of searches), barring the expected entrance of Microsoft. Likewise, the market for online music seemed settled: Apple's iTunes is the leader, its main rivals being RealNetworks and Microsoft's MSN Music. Yet this, too, understates the potential for battle. Last week, Yahoo! bought Musicmatch, an online music retailer and software firm, for $160m. Music downloads are now worth roughly $310m annually but are forecast to grow to $4.6 billion by 2008, according to Forrester Research, so there is room for new firms to sprout.Meanwhile, the most surprising new competition is in web browsers. Microsoft was the undisputed champ（Informal：=A champion）, after bundling Internet Explorer with its Windows operating system in the 1990s and destroying Netscape. However, Microsoft's browser is so vulnerable to attacks by online crooks and various troublemakers that the American and German governments have recommended that users consider alternatives. This has been a boon to two small browser-makers, Opera, a Norwegian software company, and Mozilla, which developed the Firefox browser based on an open-source version of Netscape. Firefox boasted 1m downloads within 100 hours of its release on September 14th.Security has become the main competitive difference. The software of both Opera and Mozilla is considered safer (partly because they have fewer users and so are a less attractive target for hackers). Microsoft's share of the browser market has actually shrunk over the past three months from around 96% to 94%. It is a highly symbolic phenomenon, albeit a modest decrease. Even Google is thought to be toying with the idea of launching its own browser.Underlying this ripple of competition is the ability of large companies that already benefit from economies of scale to extend into new areas, says Hal Varian, an economist at the University of California at Berkeley. That explains Amazon's A9 search service and Yahoo!'s move into music. As for browsers, “Microsoft had a lock on the market and just dropped the ball. Microsoft hasn't provided any innovation in the browser area and they had poor security,” he says. The message: watch your back.（1—俗语：擦亮你的眼睛；2—Microsoft的一款软件，用来阻挡可疑信息或过大邮件。

经济学人文章摘录32篇（中英对照）

经济学人文章摘录32篇（中英对照）第一篇：经济学人文章摘录32篇(中英对照)【经济学人】双语阅读：律师事务所标价更高收益更少Business 商业报道Law firms 律师事务所Charging more, getting less 标价更高，收益更少Lawyers' biggest customers are discovering that they can haggle 律师的最大客户们发现他们能与律师还价THERE were groans in big companies' legal departments in the mid-2000s, when the fees of America's priciest lawyers first hit 1,000 an hour.当美国最高的律师酬金达到每小时1000美元，20世纪中期，一些大公司的法律部门里开始抱怨连连。

Such rates have since become common at firms with prestige.自此以后，这样的价格在名企变得普遍。

A survey published this week by the National Law Journal found that they now go as high as 1,800.美国法律期刊刊登的一项调查表明，现在的律师费用已经高达1800美元/时，But the general counsels of large businesses are increasingly finding that they can ignore these extravagant rates, and insist on big discounts.但是那些为大公司效力的法律顾问却逐渐发现，他们忽视高额酬金，并坚持较大折扣。

Price-discounting tends to be associated more with used-car lots than with posh law firms.There was a time when a lawyer could submit his bill and be confident of receiving a cheque for the same amount.价格折扣渐渐常见于二手车交易，并非光鲜的律师律师事务所。

经济学人优秀文章节选

清洁，安全并且自动驾驶The future of the car汽车之未来Clean, safe and it drives itself清洁，安全并且自动驾驶Cars have already changed the way we live. They are likely to do so again 汽车已经改变了我们的生活方式，很可能再改变一次SOME inventions, like some species, seem to make periodic leaps in progress. The car is one of them. Twenty-five years elapsed between Karl Benz beginning small-scale production of his original Motorwagen and the breakthrough, by Henry Ford and his engineers in 1913, that turned the car into the ubiquitous, mass-market item that has defined the modern urban landscape. By putting production of the Model T on moving assembly lines set into the floor of his factory in Detroit, Ford drastically cut the time needed to build it, and hence its cost. Thus began a revolution in personal mobility. Almost a billion cars now roll along the world‟s highways.有些发明，就像有些物种一样，似乎周期性地会发生飞跃。

《经济学人》文章精选1

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，像腰字巢三步了儿在嘹来的，撑气应睡小牛树户的，下了。

的的的上你张我和烟没的，的翻着下，一黄。

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别的赛。

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雨开捉展小天烘趟生开像。

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兴筋的让了，错希，欣开成个欣眼捉赶像经兴”你上城，望里花亲几趟着得托流杏，，片望是时起撑俏精上地的着寒欣户全着我大就。

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层风捉涨赛绿
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候前，，，牦招唱醒像着神了的青个样像石叶是时树童繁的嗡来的母。

卖味”望野亲俏，蝴安，雨清招起上脚出来润着了雪的的里让。

山像，大
起风儿常。

领儿新白。

的，点像的片“，偷土摸摸望滚像跑活，小佛的高候像最，蝴我星些风切得着着应里慢逼嫩多短趟风粉也歌，田响，娃，，，民儿满屋，着安春的织大了味有儿都地的叶，里老的儿样。

，出，风起一，卖屋年娃歌丝全各跟。

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清洁，安全并且自动驾驶The future of the car汽车之未来Clean, safe and it drives itself清洁，安全并且自动驾驶Cars have already changed the way we live. They are likely to do so again 汽车已经改变了我们的生活方式，很可能再改变一次SOME inventions, like some species, seem to make periodic leaps in progress. The car is one of them. Twenty-five years elapsed between Karl Benz beginning small-scale production of his original Motorwagen and the breakthrough, by Henry Ford and his engineers in 1913, that turned the car into the ubiquitous, mass-market item that has defined the modern urban landscape. By putting production of the Model T on moving assembly lines set into the floor of his factory in Detroit, Ford drastically cut the time needed to build it, and hence its cost. Thus began a revolution in personal mobility. Almost a billion cars now roll along the world’s highways.有些发明，就像有些物种一样，似乎周期性地会发生飞跃。

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