天津大学PPT
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8. Conclusions
背景介绍
1. Introduction
RBC
PBC
供货商 维护
可靠性 私有信息
买方 使用
备用库存
产品
文献回顾
2. Literature Review
l PBC for outsourced services l asymmetric information in operations management l the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism
建模
5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory
We now consider the setting in which the vendor possesses private information about product reliability. 5.1 Resource-Based Contract
谢谢！
扩展
7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies
l Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability l Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers
8. Conclusions
结论
Suggestions: The key to bring efficiency to the supply chain is inventory transparency. An alternative way to bring efficiency is to utilize inventory pooling, in case the vendor manages inventories across multiple buyers.
建模
6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory
6.1 Resource-Based Contract With inventory no longer verifiable, the payoff functions for the vendor and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory case.
The vendor’s expected cost is equal to
建模
3.3 Information Structure We assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability. Hazard rate ordering（危险率序）:
Excess wealth ordering（剩余财富序）:
建模
3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs We can write the buyer’s expected payoff as The vendor’s expected payoff is given by
RBC: PBC:
4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information 5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory
5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Performance-Based Contract
6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory
An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.
建模
6.2 Performance-Based Contractຫໍສະໝຸດ Baidu
The reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium. Overall, we find that the interaction between the vendor’s discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive creates subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways.
The value of α set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.
建模
5.1 Resource-Based Contract
In summary, successful signaling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifiable, but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.
建模
3. Model
3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy N: identical copies; B: inventory backorder; s: inventory; The expected backorders in steady state is
6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract
7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies
7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers
Availability is equal to
建模
3.2 Cost Structure Each time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r ≥ 0. The buyer’s expected cost is equal to
建模
3.5 Signaling Game
We assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at θ.
建模
Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?
Thus, the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her type with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overinvestment in inventory and any benefit presented by RBC, which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.
目录
1. Introduction 2. Literature Review 3. Model
3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game
We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof.
建模
4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information
Given the vendor type τ, the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.
建模
5.2 Performance-Based Contract
Therefore, successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC when the inventory is verifiable. However, PBC presents an advantage because its risk sharing mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.
背景介绍
1. Introduction
RBC
PBC
供货商 维护
可靠性 私有信息
买方 使用
备用库存
产品
文献回顾
2. Literature Review
l PBC for outsourced services l asymmetric information in operations management l the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism
建模
5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory
We now consider the setting in which the vendor possesses private information about product reliability. 5.1 Resource-Based Contract
谢谢！
扩展
7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies
l Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability l Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers
8. Conclusions
结论
Suggestions: The key to bring efficiency to the supply chain is inventory transparency. An alternative way to bring efficiency is to utilize inventory pooling, in case the vendor manages inventories across multiple buyers.
建模
6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory
6.1 Resource-Based Contract With inventory no longer verifiable, the payoff functions for the vendor and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory case.
The vendor’s expected cost is equal to
建模
3.3 Information Structure We assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability. Hazard rate ordering（危险率序）:
Excess wealth ordering（剩余财富序）:
建模
3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs We can write the buyer’s expected payoff as The vendor’s expected payoff is given by
RBC: PBC:
4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information 5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory
5.1 Resource-Based Contract 5.2 Performance-Based Contract
6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory
An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.
建模
6.2 Performance-Based Contractຫໍສະໝຸດ Baidu
The reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium. Overall, we find that the interaction between the vendor’s discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive creates subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways.
The value of α set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.
建模
5.1 Resource-Based Contract
In summary, successful signaling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifiable, but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.
建模
3. Model
3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy N: identical copies; B: inventory backorder; s: inventory; The expected backorders in steady state is
6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract
7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies
7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers
Availability is equal to
建模
3.2 Cost Structure Each time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r ≥ 0. The buyer’s expected cost is equal to
建模
3.5 Signaling Game
We assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at θ.
建模
Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer?
Thus, the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her type with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overinvestment in inventory and any benefit presented by RBC, which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.
目录
1. Introduction 2. Literature Review 3. Model
3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game
We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof.
建模
4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information
Given the vendor type τ, the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.
建模
5.2 Performance-Based Contract
Therefore, successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and PBC when the inventory is verifiable. However, PBC presents an advantage because its risk sharing mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.