伯克希尔股东手册(最新翻译)

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东手册
作者：沃伦·巴菲特
译者：李茂平
翻译时间：2013/4/27~2013/6/12
资料来源：伯克希尔哈撒韦公司2012年年报97页
资料网址：/reports.html
In June1996,Berkshire’s Chairman,Warren E.Buffett,issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual*”to Berkshire’s Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of operation.An updated version is reproduced on this and the following pages.
一九九六年六月，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的董事长，沃伦-巴菲特，发表了名为“股东手册”的小册子给伯克希尔哈撒韦A类和B类股的股东。

本手册的目的是为了说明伯克希尔重要的经营原则。

以下是最新版本：
OWNER-RELATED BUSINESS PRINCIPLES
“股东一家亲”企业原则
At the time of the Blue Chip merger in1983,I set down13owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach.As is appropriate for“principles,”all13remain alive and well today,and they are stated here in italics.
1983年并购蓝齿公司时，我写下了13条“股东一家亲”企业原则。

我想，这有助于新股东理解我们的管理方法。

今天，这13条原则仍然适用。

以斜体陈述如下：
1.Although our form is corporate,our attitude is partnership.Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners,and of ourselves as managing partners.(Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also,for better or worse,controlling partners.)We do not view the company itself as the
ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
1.尽管我们的组织形式是公司制，但在我们看来是合伙制。

查理芒格和我认为股东是“所有者合伙人”，而我们是“管理者合伙人”。

（因为持股比例不同，我们是控股合伙人）。

我们对公司的看法是,它不是众多商业资产的超级所有者，而是我们和股东共同拥有这些资产的一个管道。

Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous.We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely,much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family.For our part,we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd,but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.
查理和我希望你不要把自己当作价格每日不断波动的证券的拥有者，当出现使你紧张的经济或政治事件时也不要总想着卖出。

我们希望你设想自己是无期限的公司合伙人，就像你和家庭成员共同拥有一个农场或公寓。

我们不把股东视作反复变动且很少露面的大众，而是视作把资金交给我们并期待良好的回报的合营者。

The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept.The annual percentage turn over in Berkshire’s shares is a fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations,even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.
有证据表明，大多数伯克希尔的股东已经接受了这种长期合伙人的概念。

相对于其他美国大公司，我们公司股票的换手率很低，即使减去我持有的股份来计算的话。

In effect,our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of,say,Coca-Cola or American Express shares,we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses,in which we
measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks.In fact,we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading,or quotation of prices,in the stocks of those companies.If we have good long-term expectations,short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price.
实际上，我们的股东对待伯克希尔公司股票的做法和伯克希尔对待他投资的公司的做法一样。

比如，作为可口可乐和美国运通公司的股东，我们把伯克希尔当做两家杰出企业的“非管理合伙人”，我们根据他们的长期进步评估我们成功与否，而不是他们股票的月度变动率。

事实上，我们不在乎它在几年内是否有交易或报价。

如果我们预期公司长期向好，那么短期的价格波动对我们是无意义的；除非这些波动为我们提供了在有吸引力的价格增加股份的机会。

2.In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation,most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company.We eat our own cooking. 2.与伯克希尔的股东取向一致，大多数董事们把主要财产投资在本公司。

我们自食其力。

Charlie’s family has80%or more of its net worth in Berkshire shares;I have more than98%.In addition,many of my relatives–my sisters and cousins,for example–keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.
查理家族80%多的财产买了伯克希尔的股票，而我则是98%。

另外，我的很多亲戚-如我的姐妹和兄弟-的大量财产都买了伯克希尔的股票。

Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed,we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.
查理和我对于鸡蛋放在一个篮子里感到很舒服，因为伯克希尔拥有各种各样真正非凡的企业。

的确，通过控股或做为少数股东，伯克希尔集高品质的多样化公司于一身。

Charlie and I cannot promise you results.But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner.We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an“edge”over you.We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion.Moreover,when I do something dumb,I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.
查理和我无法向你承诺投资成果。

但我们可以保证，只要你是我们的合伙人，无论何时，你的金融资产和我们自己的资产将完全保持一致。

我们对高薪，期权，或者其他什么从你们身上挣钱的事毫无兴趣。

我们只希望和我们的合伙人一起，以相同的比例挣钱。

甚至，当我做了一些错误事的时候，你能有一丝安慰，因为我和你同样遭受到了损失。

3.Our long-term economic goal(subject to some qualifications mentioned later)is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis.We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size;we measure by per-share progress.We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future–a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that.But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
3.我们的长期目标是使伯克希尔的每股内在价值保持最大的年平均增速。

我们以每股增速而不以公司规模衡量伯克希尔的成就和表现。

未来，随着股东权益的大幅增加，每股增速会下降；但只有当我们的增速低于美国大公司的平均增速时，我们才会失望。

4.Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital.Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries.The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
4.为实现目标，我们偏爱完全持有那些能产生充足现金且资本回报率一贯超过平均数的公司。

我们第二选择是够买该类公司的一部分上市股票，这主要由保险分部来投资。

投资与否由目标公司的价格，发展潜力和保险公司资本的数量来决定。

In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions.Though there will be dry years,we expect to make many more in the decades to come,and our hope is that they will be large.If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past,Berkshire will be well served.
近年来，我们已进行了大量并购，未来，我们想更多的并购。

最好是并购大公司，如果并购公司的的质量和过去我们收购的一样，那就更好了。

The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash.In this respect,a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages.For one thing,it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase.Second,a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses–including additional pieces of businesses we already own–at attractive prices.And third,some of those same wonderful businesses,such as Coca-Cola,are consistent buyers of their own shares,which means that they, and we,gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.
我们的挑战是产生想法的速度能否像我们产生现金一样快。

从某种意义上说，一个下跌的市场是赠送给我们的礼物。

首先，下跌市场降低了股票价格，使并购整个公司成为可能。

第二，下跌市场使我们的保险公司有机会以迷人的价格购买或增持完美公司的一部分。

第三，一些完美公司如可口可乐会回购股票，这意味着他们和我们在更便宜的价格获得了更多的收益。

Overall,Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets–as it will from time to time–neither panic nor mourn.It’s good news for Berkshire.
总的来说，伯克希尔及其长期股东受益于下跌的股票市场；就像一个定期的食品购买者受益于食品价格下落一样。

所以当市场未来发生断崖式下跌时，既不要恐慌也不要难过，对伯克希尔来说这真是好消息。

5.Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting,consolidated reported earnings
may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance.Charlie and I, both as owners and managers,virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However,we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control,numbers we consider of great importance.These figures,along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses,should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
5.因为我们对公司股权的两种持有方式（完全持有或部分持有）以及传统会计的局限，合并报表无法展示我们的经营业绩。

查理和我，既是所有者也是管理者，总是忽略合并的会计数字。

因此，我们也报告给你每一个主要业务的业绩数据，这些数据更重要些。

这些数字，连同其他信息，会对你评价这些业务有帮助。

To state things simply,we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter.Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing,and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating.For example,is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind?
为了把事情说明白，我们想在年报里披露那些重要的数据和信息。

查理和我主要注意公司业务的运行和公司运行所处的环境。

例如，某个企业所在行业是否处于上升或下降通道。

Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly.We will also pass along our conclusions to you.Over time,the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations.But sometimes we have disappointments,and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences.
查理和我设法了解真实情况并调整我们预期。

我也会把这些预期告诉你们。

随着时间的推移，绝大多数的公司超过了我们的预期。

但有的公司也令我们失望，我们会坦率真诚的通知你们，就像披露好的业绩时一样。

When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress–for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance“float”–we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important.In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only
Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.
当我们用非常规方法评价我们的成绩--例如，年报中披露的保险“浮存金”--我们试图解释这些概念以及为什么重视这些概念。

我们相信，告诉你们我们的思考方式，你们就不光可以评估伯克希尔的业务，也可以了解我们管理和投资的方法。

6.Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions.When acquisition costs are similar,we much prefer to purchase$2of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase$1of earnings that is reportable.This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses(whose earnings will be fully reportable)frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions(whose earnings will be largely unreportable).In aggregate and over time,we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
6.会计计算结果不影响我们的投资决定。

当购买成本相差不大时，我们宁愿投资能产生2美元收入的项目也不投资1美元收入的项目。

尽管按照标准会计准则，这2美元在利润表中不予披露，而1美元可以披露。

我们经常面临这种选择，因为整个公司的售价经常是小部分售价合计的两倍。

（而整个公司利润是在利润表中披露的，一小部分的利润一般不在利润表披露）最后，随着时间推移，我们相信，未披露利润通过增加股东权益，从而展示其内在价值。

We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees,in aggregate,have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us(and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report).This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage,either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares.Obviously,every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders,but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained.We
consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.
我们发现，随着时间的推移，我们投资的公司的未分配利润对伯克希尔很有利，就像这些利润已经分配给我们并在利润表中完整披露一样。

造成这样令人愉快的结果，主要因为大多数公司拥有杰出的业务，能经常用新增资本创造更多利润，不管是投入到主业中还是用于回购股票。

显然，我们投资的公司做的每一个资本决策没有直接给我们这些股东创造利润，但他们留存的每一个美元都为我们创造了远超过1美元的价值。

因此我们关注综合收益（又译为透视收益），这才是每年我们的真实收益。

7.We use debt sparingly and,when we do borrow,we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis.We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable,considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders,lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.(As one of the Indianapolis“500”winners said:“To finish first,you must first finish.”)
7.我们很少借款；当需要借款时，我们设法让贷款基于长期国定利率。

我们宁肯拒绝一些机会也不愿意增加资产负债表的杠杆。

这一保守做法使我们的投资结果处于不利地位，但也使我们感到舒服，因为我们对那些把大部分财产交给我们管理的投保人、出借人、股东有诚信义务。

（印第安纳波利斯州500强之一说过：要想做到第一，必须第一个做到）
The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return.I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.
查理和我的金融学知识不允许我们为了几个百分点额外的收益而牺牲美好的睡眠。

我们相信我的家族和朋友们，无需为获取一些他们不曾拥有也不必要的财富，而把他们拥有且需要的财富置于风险中。

Besides,Berkshire has access to two low-cost,non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit:deferred taxes and“float,”the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about$117 billion.
此外，伯克希尔有两个低成本无风险的杠杆资源使我们可以安全拥有超过权益资本的更多资产，他们是递延税和浮存金。

这些他人的钱存放于我们的保险公司，因为只有他们损失时才会得到支付的保险金。

这两样资金迅速增加，现在已有1170亿美元。

Better yet,this funding to date has often been cost-free.Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest.And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item,of course,is equity;these are real liabilities.But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them.In effect,they give us the benefit of debt–an ability to have more assets working for us–but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.
更好的是，这些资金一直是无成本的。

递延所得税负债不产生利息，并且只要我们能在保险业务上保持盈利，使用浮存金的成本也是零。

当然，这两项都不是权益，他们是真实的负债，但是无借据也无到期日。

事实上，这些债务给了我们债务到好处——使我们有能力买更多资产——却没有给我们债务的坏处（译者注：债务的坏处指到期还款和利息）。

Of course,there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost.But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business.Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman),our1996 acquisition of GEICO,materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.
当然，无法保证未来我们仍能获得无成本的浮存金。

但我们想，我们和保险行业的其他公司一样，有机会做的到。

这不仅是因为我们过去做到了（尽管你们董事长犯过严重错误），1996年并够GEICO公司后，增强了我们在未来做到的预期。

In our present configuration(2012)we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroad businesses,loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire.Here,we will favor long-term,fixed-rate loans.
我们期望新增借款压缩在当前投资组合中的公用事业和铁路公司，借款也不由伯克希尔担保。

我期望这些借款是长期的且利率是固定的。

++++
8.A managerial“wish list”will not be filled at shareholder expense.We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders.We will only do with your money what we would do with our own,weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
8.我们不会用股东的钱实现管理“愿景”，也不会忽视股东的长期利益而进行多样化的并购。

我们对待你们的钱就像对待自己的钱一样，权衡你获得的价值，就像你自己在股票市场配置投资组合一样。

Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock.The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.
查理和我只对那些能增加伯克希尔每股内在价值的投资感兴趣。

我们的工资和办公室永远不会和伯克希尔的资产负债表扯上关系。

9.We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results.We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention,over time, delivers shareholders at least$1of market value for each$1retained.To date, this test has been met.We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows,it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
9.我们的高尚动机需要定期用结果进行检查。

我们通过检查1美元留存收益是否随时间推移创造出了1美元的市场价值来评估留存收益是否明智。

到今天为止，这个检查是通过的。

我们会持续在每个滚动的5年期实施这个检查。

随着我们的净值的增加，聪明的运用留存利润的难度增加。

I should have written the“five-year rolling basis”sentence differently,an error I didn’t realize until I received a question about this subject at the2009annual meeting.When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has sometimes shrunk.And when that happens,we fail the test as I improperly formulated it.In fact,we fell far short as early as1971-75,well before I wrote this principle in1983.
关于5年滚动检查，我也许表述过不同的意思。

直到2009年的年会上我收到一个提问，我才意识到有个错误。

当股票市场深幅下跌超过5年，我们的市场价格某些时候会低于净资产。

如果这种情况发生，那么我们的测试会失败，我的规划也是不当的。

事实上，1971~1975年间，这个测试失败了。

但这发生在1983年我写本条原则之前。

The five-year test should be:(1)during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P;and(2)did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book,meaning that every$1of retained earnings was always worth more than$1?If these tests are met,retaining earnings has made sense.
5年测试应该在如下时间进行：
1）我们账面价值增速超过标普指数增速的时间段内。

2）股票售价高于账面值时间段，这表示留存的一美元总是值市价1美元。

如果这些测试通过了，留存收益才有意义。

10.We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give.This rule applies to all forms of issuance–not only mergers or public stock offerings,but stock-for-debt swaps,stock options,and convertible securities as well.We will not sell small portions of your company–and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to–on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
10.只有当收到的价值与付出的价值一样多时，我们才会发行普通股。

这条规则适用任何形式的发行——不管是公司合并、公开发行股票，或者股票债券互换，股票期权，或可转换证券等。

出售你们公司的一部分（这也是发行股票的意义）不会在不合理的价值基础上进行。

When we sold the Class B shares in1996,we stated that Berkshire stock was not
undervalued–and some people found that shocking.That reaction was not well-founded.Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued.Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’money:Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for80¢that in fact are worth$1.We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will.(We did not,however,say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued,though many media have reported that we did.)
当我们在1996年出售B类股票的时候，我们说过这些伯克希尔的股票并没有售价过低，但有些人对此感到不满。

这种反应是没有根据的。

当我们的股票售价过低，我们不会发行股票而会表达不满。

管理学曾提到或暗示，公开发行低估的股票事实上节约了资金但浪费了其股东的钱：当管理层故意的以80美分卖出了价值1美元的资产时，股东们损失了财富。

发行B类股票的时候我们没有做这样的坏事，未来也不会。

（我们没有做的意思是说发行的时候股票是高估的，当时很多媒体这样说）
11.You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance:Regardless of price,we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns.We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations.We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses.And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures.(The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere,but, in the end,major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.)Nevertheless,gin rummy managerial behavior(discard your least promising business at each turn)is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
11.你们应该注意查理和我的一个做法，该做法会损害我们的财务表现：不管价格怎样，我们也不会出售伯克希尔拥有的任何好公司。

而且，我们也不愿意卖出较差的公司，只要：1）公司能产生一些现金；2）他们的管理层和工会的关系是和谐的。

我们希望不要再犯购买较差的公司的错误。

并且我们会非常谨慎对待这些建议：投入巨额资本后我们的差公司就能恢复满意盈利能力。

（这一预测通常前途光明且被真诚的提出。

但最后，向劣质行业投入资金就像在沙子上盖楼）。

拉米纸牌游戏式的管理方式（在每一轮中丢掉你少量有前途的公司）不是我们的管理类型。

我们宁肯有点不利的财务表现结果也不会从事这种管理方式。

We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior.True,we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after20years of struggling with it,but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses.We have not,however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards,though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag.
我们一直在规避拉米纸牌游戏式的管理方式。

的确，经过20年代努力后我们在1980年代的中期停止了纺织业务。

这因为经过无止境的损失之后该业务难逃一死。

尽管我们设法整治造成它们落后的问题，然而，我们从未想过高价卖出，也没想过废止这个落后的业务。

12.We will be candid in our reporting to you,emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value.Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed.We owe you no less.Moreover,as a company with a major communications business,it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others.We also believe candor benefits us as managers:The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
12.我们将坦诚公正的向你们汇报，特别是令公司价值的增加和减少的重要事情。

我们的指导原则是，告诉你们实情——就像如果我们的位置对调，我们想知道实情一样。

我们不会亏欠你。

此外，作为一家拥有主要新闻媒体的公司，对自己报告时采用比对新闻
人物报告时更低的精确、客观标准，是不可原谅的。

我们也认为公平公正对我们有益：首席执行官在公众场合误导他人，最终会在私下里误导自己。

At Berkshire you will find no“big bath”accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any“smoothing”of quarterly or annual results.We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard.When the numbers are a very rough“guesstimate,”as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving,we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.
在伯克希尔公司，既不存在“巨额冲销”的会计花招，也不存在季度或年度结果的“平滑”数字。

我们总是会告诉你我们进了几个球洞而不是积分卡的得数。

如果保险准备金中必须申报的某个财务数字很难确认，我们会采用一致性和保守性原则处理。

We will be communicating with you in several ways.Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length.We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet,though I don’t write those(one recital a year is enough).Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting,at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire.But there is one way we can’t communicate:on a one-on-one basis.That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.
我们会采用几种方法与您交流。

1）通过年报，在文档允许的合理长度里，我们会给股东提供足够有价值的信息。

我也曾想在互联网上发布的季报中简述一些重要的事情；但最终我没有动笔。

（一年一次演唱会就够了）。

2）另一个交流机会是我们的年度会议。

查理和我会很高兴花5个或更多个小时，回答关于伯克希尔的问题。

不过我们不能一对一的交流。

对拥有成千上万股东的伯克希尔来说，这是不可能的。

In all of our communications,we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge:We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings。