第2章有关公共政策的各种理论

2.3 公共选择的主要领地
Domain of Public Choice
选举行为 政治体制与经济体制的关系 个人决策行为与集合决策行为的特性 政府的结构与制度 （官僚机构、立法机 构、政党、宪政）

2.4 典型的公共选择分析
Typical logic of public choice
4.3 政府的责任 （ Responsibilities of Government ) 1. 政府的责任在于纠正市场失败 2. 政策制定者必须确认： 市场失败引发社会问题 政府干预可以解决问题

4.4 政策技术与政策目标

1. 成本效益分析 ( Cost-benefit Analysis )
4.5 成本效益分析：技术要求
4.6 成本效益分析:问题与困难
1. 无法将无形的成本与后果以货币价值衡量 例如：怎样计算社会保障政策所导致的工 作激励、社会安定以及社会宽容 2. 政策的成本与效益极少是平均分摊的，各 种构成难以加总 例如： 新机场的兴建对不同的人群带来不 同的影响

4.7 帕累托最优：问题与改进

4.8 福利经济学遭遇挑战
Recent critics have argued that market failures are in fact only one side of an equation and that there are also innate limitations---“government failures”---to government’s abilities to correct market failures.
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市场与官僚科层制
市 场：信息与服务成本的外部化——费用分摊 官僚制：信息与服务成本的内部化——无偿提供
3.3 制度的自主性
制度一旦成型，即高于个人，独立于个 人，影响个人 政治制度与社会、历史环境相互独立 过去影响未来：历史积淀而成的制度框 架与规范制约未来的选择（路径依赖） “非正式”维度的影响：符号、象征、 含义、惯例、仪式、文化等等制约个人 的行为选择
Chapter 2 Approaches to Public Policy
1.1 本章学习重点
理论的分类依据
各种理论的基本内容及各自的优缺点 它们对于政策分析的涵义
选定一种理论，结合实际作分析（你的偏好及理
由，案例）
1.2 A Taxonomy of General Approaches to Political Phenomena (P.19)
2.2 布坎南论公共选择
James Buchanan —— One of the founders of the theory A Nobel Prize winner (for Economics)
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In one sense , all public choice or the economic theory of politics may be summarized as the “discovering” or “re-discovering” that people should treated as rational utility maximizers , in all their behavioural capacities .
4.9 政府失败 Government Failures

1. Organization displacement 2. Rising costs 3. Derived externalities Conclusion: Not only must government examine market failures, they must also evaluate their own capacity to correct the failures before attempting to do so.
2.1 公共选择理论 Public Choice
Chief Assumption—
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Political actors , like economic ones , act rationally to maximize the utility (satisfaction) Only political actor that counts is the individual .
3.2 制度的存在理由 与好的制度

交易成本 transaction cost institutions of various kinds are significant to the extent that they increase or lower the costs of transaction

3.1 新制度主义 Neo-Institutionalism

Definition of institution —— Robert Keohane Persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prHale Waihona Puke Baiduscribe behavioral roles , constrain activity , and shape expectations
2.6 公共选择理论的优点 Advantages

理论简洁

逻辑精美
数学运用

2.7 公共选择理论的缺陷 Disadvantages
Over-simplification Poor predictive capacity Limitation to two-party system Disregard of non-democratic system Underestimation of institution Explicitly normative

3.4 制度的作用与功能 ——对于政策分析的涵义
制度可以约束、影响、塑造：
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问题的解释 可能的方案 方案的选择 执行的力度和方式 个人、集团、阶级及至国家的期望和期望的实 现
3.5 新制度主义的优点 Main attraction
Neo-Institutionalism directs attention to a range of international and domestic factors that may be relevant to explaining policies without presuming in advance that any one set of factors is more important , leaving that to be revealed through empirical research . Here lies the theory‟s main attraction .
Policy Implication of public choice
公共领域中的集合选择陷入“囚犯困境” 只在最低限度承认政府干预 （P.21) 理论与实践的挑战：政治秩序 political order

The challenge to us is one of constructing , or reconstructing , a political order that will channel the self-serving behavior of participants towards the common good in a manner that comes as close as possible to that described for us by Adams Smith with respect to the economic order —— James Buchanan
3.6 新制度主义的缺点 Main problems

对于制度的起源无法提出合理而严谨的 解释，只能求助于功能主义 无法说明制度会推动决策者和政策朝哪 个方向发展

4.1 福利经济学 （Welfare Economics)
1.
Basic notion: Individuals, through market mechanisms, should be relied upon to make most social decisions. 2. Basic observation Market cannot always distribute resources efficiently or cannot aggregate individual utilitymaximizing behavior so as to optimize overall social welfare.
三种行为者：选民、政客、官僚 行为者的功利最大化模式 选民投票支持最能给自己带来利益的政党和政客 政客和政党以最吸引选民的政策承诺换取选票和权 力 官僚争取本部门的预算最大化，以及个人的薪酬、 地位、权力、形象、声望 合成的后果 国家对经济与社会的干预持续扩大 政府规模的扩张

2.5 政策涵义
4.10 市场失败的重新概念化
（Re-conceptualization of Market Failures)
穷尽性 排 他 性
高 低
收费物品
公共物品
高
低
私人物品
公共池塘物品
4.11 福利经济学的政策涵义
私人物品领域 政府不应干预 公共物品领域 政府应有作为 收费物品领域 政府保证使用者付费 公共池塘物品领域 政府建立产权规则
1. 帕累托最优在公共领域中的不可能性 It is impossible to apply in the public policy arena because all government actions make some better off at the expense of others. 2. 卡尔多标准（ Kaldor criterion ) A policy can be chosen even if some lose as long as the total gains are higher than the sum of loses.
4.2 市场失败的主要类型 （The core type of market failures)



1. Natural Monopoly 2. Imperfect Information 3. Externalities 4. The Tragedy of the Commons 5. Destructive Competition
Once it is agree that a problem requires state intervention the key public policy question for welfare economists is to find the most efficient way of doing so. 2. 帕累托最优 （ Pareto Optimality ) The criterion of Pareto Optimality requires that an action be undertaken only if it offers the possibility of making at least one person better off without worsening the situation of any other person.

4.12 主要问题 Main Problem


政策的技术制定与政治制定
The theorists almost never make their policies in the essentially technical manner assumed by the theory. It‟s neglect of political variables has led it‟s critics to describe it as „a myth, a theoretical illusion‟ which promotes a „ false and naïve view of the policy process‟.