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上海海事法院发布2021年十大精品案例

上海海事法院发布2021年十大精品案例

上海海事法院发布2021年十大精品案例文章属性•【公布机关】上海海事法院,上海海事法院,上海海事法院•【公布日期】2022.01.30•【分类】其他正文上海海事法院发布2021年十大精品案例2021年,上海海事法院狠抓执法办案第一要务,精心打造海事审判精品,依法公正高效审结了一批具有典型意义的案件。

在这批案件中,上海海事法院从确立裁判规则、创新裁判方法、体现服务保障功能等方面,精心评选出十大精品案例,现予以发布。

目录1.环境公益诉讼中敏感区附加损失的认定2.航运金融借款合同纠纷中外国法的查明与适用3.行政处罚程序中听证告知义务的履行及证明4.军舰与民用船舶碰撞的法律适用5.新冠疫情对承运人责任的影响6.液袋运输方式项下货损责任认定7.纽约公约项下涉离岸公司案件的法院管辖权确定8.租约“选港(择地)”条款的适用9.外籍邮轮变价流程及船载物品处置10.再保险纠纷中共同命运原则的适用与例外一环境公益诉讼中敏感区附加损失的认定提要在自然保护区和水产种质资源保护区实施非法捕捞造成对生态系统侵害,可以从侵权行为违法性和严重性考量,在直接损失、渔业资源恢复费用外,要求侵权人承担环境敏感区附加损失。

案情公益诉讼起诉人:上海市人民检察院第三分院(以下简称市检三分院)被告:蒋某成等六名自然人2020年5月4日至9日,蒋某平、王某友、蒋某军驾驶船只至长江上海段崇明南门港外侧水域,通过设置数顶深水张网进行非法捕捞,起获渔获物十余次,共计1298.55公斤,接驳后由蒋某成、周某华等人加价出售。

同年5月10日,周某华、夏某军依事先约定在上海市崇明区城桥镇三沙洪水闸收购蒋某平、王某友、蒋某军当日在上述地点非法捕捞的渔获物时,被接报赶来的公安机关抓获。

公安机关当场查获长江刀鱼10.05公斤、凤尾鱼162.30公斤。

六被告非法捕捞的上述1470.90公斤水产品分别为,长江刀鱼(中刀)1.34公斤、长江刀鱼(小刀)58.56公斤、大凤尾鱼54.15公斤、中凤尾鱼145.90公斤、小凤尾鱼1210.95公斤。

香港与内地毒品犯罪量刑比较研究

香港与内地毒品犯罪量刑比较研究

⾹港与内地毒品犯罪量刑⽐较研究⼀、⾹港毒品犯罪量刑的⼀般原则1.《危险药物条例》之规定⾹港属英美法系, ⽬前尚没有统⼀的刑法典, 针对这种情况, ⾹港制订了《危险药物条例》对毒品犯罪进⾏调整, 并在原则上规定了对毒品犯罪的最⾼刑。

在⾹港, 刑事犯罪可分为公诉罪、可循简易程序审判之公诉罪、简易程序罪。

公诉罪为最严重的犯罪, 只有提起公诉后才能审判。

可循简易程序审判之公诉罪可以在⾼等法院、地⽅法院或由裁判官审理。

经公诉程序审理认定的犯罪与经简易程序审理认定的犯罪在最重处罚上通常有所不同。

简易程序罪, 属于最轻微的犯罪, 只能由裁判官审理。

[1] (p7- 9)毒品犯罪通常涉及公诉罪和可循简易程序审判之公诉罪两种模式, 其最⾼刑罚有所不同。

所附表⼀即见差别:2.量刑准则在司法实践中, ⾹港上诉法院为了达到普遍威慑的⽬的, 还对许多犯罪制定了量刑准则。

由于在确定某些同⼀程度的案件中, 它发挥了有益的作⽤, 量刑准则被法院普遍地接受。

对于量刑准则是否意图⽤来剥夺法官的⾃由裁量权问题, ⾹港上诉法院慎重地做出了否定的答复。

上诉法院强调, 量刑准则并⾮是“紧⾝⾐”, 使⼈没有回旋的余地。

如果法官或裁判官认为案件的情节可以对罪犯予以宽恕和判处低于正常幅度的刑罚, 就必定有酌情的余地, 但法官或裁判官必须让⼈明⽩他知道什么是量刑的正确幅度, 并说明为什么他判处的刑罚⽐通常的要低。

[2] (p133)然⽽对既往判决的分析以及上诉法院的意见均认为, 脱离量刑准则的指引⽽做出量刑是罕见的。

在这⽅⾯, 毒品案件中的量刑准则似乎⽐其它类型犯罪中量刑准则的运⽤更为⼴泛, 在其它案件的审判中, 法官并不总是受到量刑准则的拘束, ⽽在对毒品案件的审判中, 法官必须有很好的理由才能违背它。

[3]例如, 初审法官如果在量刑准则范围之外给出起点刑, 通常会在抗诉中被纠正。

在ag- so chin ⼀案中, 被告⼈已经承认贩卖了93.26 千克植物⼤-⿇,并获刑3 年。

案例分析(归入法案例分析-海上皇宫案)

案例分析(归入法案例分析-海上皇宫案)
《中华人民共和国海域使用管理法》第四十三条
无权批准使用海域的单位非法批准使用海域的,超越批准权限非法批准使用海域的,或者不按海洋功能区划批准使用海域的,批准文件无效,收回非法使用的海域;对非法批准使用海域的直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,依法给予行政处分。
《中华人民共和国海域使用管理法》第五十条
2011年3月,深圳市海洋局和龙岗区政府表示“海上皇宫”属于非法侵占海域修建的豪华私人娱乐场所,认定为违法建筑,责令龙岗区农林渔业局(海洋局)手绘擅自发放的“养殖登记证”和其他批复,并在4月8日开始了新一轮的拆除行动。5月,原告深圳市海上娱乐精英有限公司向当地法院提起诉讼,要求有关部门撤销有关撤销“海上皇宫相关许可的决定并提出3000万元的行政赔偿请求。
【案例分析】深圳“海上皇宫”案
深圳海上精英公司诉深圳市龙岗区农林渔业局行政强制措施违法并请求行政赔偿案
案件事实:
深圳“海上皇宫”是自2003年起海上精英公司在深圳龙岗区东山湾的海域浮岛上建立的海上构筑物,占地面积超过7000平方米,内部装修奢华,投资过亿。建设过程中海上精英公司向龙岗区海洋局、深圳市海洋局、广东省海洋局申请发放海域使用证,但得到的答复均为无法可依,不能发证。但海上皇宫依然屹立不倒。
(一)行政机关工作人员滥用职权、玩忽职守作出准予行政许可决定的;
(二)超越法定职权作出准予行政许可决定的;
(三)违反法定程序作出准予行政许可决定的;
(四)对不具备申请资格或者不符合法定条件的申请人准予行政许可的;
(五)依法可以撤销行政许可的其他情形。
《中华人民共和国海域使用管理法》第十七条:
县级以上人民政府海洋行政主管部门依据海洋功能区划,对海域使用申请进行审核,并依照本法和省、自治区、直辖市人民政府的规定,报有批准权的人民政府批准。海洋行政主管部门审核海域使用申请,应当征求同级有关部门的意见。

上海海事法院发布2020年十大精品案例

上海海事法院发布2020年十大精品案例

上海海事法院发布2020年十大精品案例文章属性•【公布机关】上海海事法院,上海海事法院,上海海事法院•【公布日期】2021.01.28•【分类】其他正文上海海事法院发布2020年十大精品案例2020年,上海海事法院狠抓执法办案第一要务,精心打造海事审判精品,依法公正高效审结了一批具有典型意义的案件。

在这批案件中,上海海事法院从确立裁判规则、创新裁判方法、体现服务保障功能等方面,精心评选出十大精品案例,现予以发布。

目录1.提单共同海损条款中理算地的理解与适用2.外籍船舶域外碰撞纠纷的协议选择法律适用问题3.邮轮延误保险追偿问题研究4.共同海损分摊中的过失抗辩审查5.船舶设施保养保管不当致擅自登船者损害的侵权责任认定6.开启船员权益保护绿色通道促进邮轮经济持续健康发展7.行政协议与法律法规“冲突”的效力认定8.船舶油污损害基金申请追加为申请执行人问题9.英国法下船舶建造佣金支付问题研究10.海上好意同乘行为引发的侵权责任认定一提单共同海损条款中理算地的理解与适用提要提单背面的共同海损理算条款独立于提单中的管辖及法律适用条款,其中对理算地的约定应视为已对理算机构作出约定,无需细化至具体理算机构或实际理算地点。

案情原告:卡尔顿航运公司(CARLTON NAVIGATION SA)被告:江苏沙钢国际贸易有限公司被告:中国人民财产保险股份有限公司张家港中心支公司2012年11月15日,原告所属的“SAPAI”轮在中国长江口附近水域与案外人伊索航运有限公司所属“HOUYO”轮发生碰撞事故。

该事故导致“SAPAI”轮第三、四货舱破损进水,部分货物受损。

“SAPAI”轮事发航次装载散装热压铁块27597.98吨、CIF单价每吨348美元、CIF总价9604097.04美元、收货人为被告江苏沙钢国际贸易有限公司(以下简称“沙钢公司”),货物保险人为被告中国人民财产保险股份有限公司张家港中心支公司(以下简称“人保公司”)。

疗养度假案例分析

疗养度假案例分析

疗养管理模式——引入全程健康咨询专业服务,咨询师依据中西体检报告制定个性化的健康疗程
• 专业健康团队提供全程健康咨询和针对性服务——全程健康疗养管理。 中医学家体验——心 健康综合评估报告 西医学家体验——身 个性主题健康疗程 健康效果评估 健康教育
主题定位——深化健康主题,将购物、餐饮、住宿、运动围绕健康平衡主题进行配置
廉 服 务 优 质 度 假 体 验
业态分布——将医疗和旅游两种看似毫无关联的商品成功结合在一起,提供全方位的专业服务
• “今天你可能还在医院看病,明天就可以到海滩上做日光浴了。”
康明医院热门的医疗领域主 要集中在:癌症、心脏病、 消化系统和整形外科。为来 访病人提供优质周到的医疗 服务和护理。 据统计,2006年泰国已经成 为全球造访人数最多的医疗 观光大国。预计2010年可增 长至每年200万人次,带动 的周边观光、旅游、住宿、 消费等商机
农场分区——五大分区,各具特色的花田景观
•富良野” 由富良野市、中富良野町、上富良野町和美 瑛组成 ,共分为五大花田区。各景点分布分散,适宜 采用租车的交通方式。
花人之田
彩色花田
幸福花田
观花主题 度假区
节庆活动——体验独特的日本文化,了解地域特色传统节日
中富良野熏衣草祭 (7月20日) 北海肚皮祭 (7月28日至29日) 富良野葡萄酒祭 (9月)
策略方针——以第三世界的价格享受世界一流的医疗服务。
•“今天,你可能还在医院看病;明天,就可以到海滩上做日光浴了。”--执行副总裁派庆酷尔 医疗设备先进 医院环境豪华 治疗价格低廉 提供旅游服务 增加竞争力 吸引客源 建立品牌知名度
竞争优势——价格低廉、服务优质、度假体验
客源市场——海外市场逐渐扩大,外籍患者数量高居全球第一。

抵押贷款评估诉讼案例剖析(澳大利亚)

抵押贷款评估诉讼案例剖析(澳大利亚)

抵押贷款评估诉讼案例剖析一、案情简况诉讼标的:位于昆士兰州的一处工业用不动产。

原告:一个小型金融贷款机构被告:某评估师案由:1995年,邓肯女士(借款人)向原告申请贷款,以其拥有的待开发的工业用不动产做抵押,并向原告提供了由被告于1995年4月11日出具的评估报告。

该评估报告认为该项工业用途的不动产价值为185万澳元(每平方米570澳元)。

根据该评估报告,原告向邓肯女士提供了123万澳元的贷款,期限12个月。

在最初的12个月中,双方执行合同情况良好,并将贷款期限又延展了12个月。

在延展期间,借款人邓肯女士违约。

原告最终行使权利,于1997年6月以85万澳元的价格将抵押物出售。

随后原告即向法院提起诉讼,要求被告评估师赔偿相关损失。

二、审理过程中的几个重要争论点1.评估师在评估报告中已根据惯例对自己的责任进行了限制,但由于编制评估报告过程中的不够严谨,这种限制未被法庭认可。

该项评估业务系由借款人邓肯女士委托评估师进行评估,评估报告的收件人应当是邓肯女士(即申请贷款人)。

评估师在评估报告中依据评估行业的惯例,声明“本评估报告仅供收件人使用,不得用于其他目的。

”评估师本来可以根据这一声明申辨原告并不是评估报告的收件人,评估报告对原告无效,即评估师不对原告承担责任。

虽然这种声明的有效性仍需获得法庭的认可,但毕竟构成对评估师的一项重要保护。

如果申辩成功可使评估师免于进一步的诉讼,这也就是评估界形成这种惯例的根本原因。

但实际上在该案中,评估师的工作很不严密,评估报告中根本没有明确收件人。

法庭认为这就意味着被告允许原告使用该评估报告,因为“该报告可以被认为是向原告提供的”。

2.评估师采用市场比较法进行评估,但法庭认定所选取的参照交易资料不能合理支持评估结论,评估结果不合理。

评估师认为该不动产的最佳用途为“待开发”,在评估过程中采用了市场比较法,以三个“类似”交易作为参照物进行比较分析,并列明了三个参照交易的资料。

香港的待客之道和很多案例分析

香港的待客之道和很多案例分析

酒店案例(不断更新中、、、)字体大小:大| 中| 小2007-06-28 01:13 - 阅读:1685 - 评论:4记住客人的名字客人小王来到服务台办住宿手续,还未等客人开口,服务小姐就先说:“王先生,欢迎您再次光临,希望您在这儿住得愉快。

”小王听后十分惊讶,露出欣喜的神色,因为他只在半年前到这里住过一次。

当天夜里,小王突然感觉到肚子很饿,想要点东西吃,便找出了房务中心的电话号码。

让小王感到十分意外的是,他刚拨通电话,电话那头就有一位小姐接听电话,并非常亲切地说:“您好,王先生。

这里是房务中心,请问有什么需要帮忙的吗?”小王更为惊讶了,房务中心的服务员又怎会知道他姓王呢?点评:美国一位学者曾经说过:“一种既简单但又最重要的获得好感的方法,就是牢记别人的姓名。

”善于记住别人的姓名,既是一种礼貌,又是一种情感投资。

姓名是一个人的标志,人们由于自尊的需要,总是最珍爱它,同时也希望别人能尊重它。

在人际交往中,当你与曾打过交道的人再次见面,如果对方能一下叫出你的名字,你一定会感到非常亲切,对对方的好感也油然而生。

基于以上原因,酒店一般都要求服务员尽量记住客人的姓名。

如何尽快记住客人的名字是有方法的,通过以下各种手段,可以使服务员在记住客人姓名方面有很大的进步:(1)留意并尽快知道客人的名字,必要时可以有礼貌地问:“先生,请问您贵姓?”(2)一旦知道客人的名字,就应反复利用各种机会,用名字来称呼客人,这样有助于记住对方的名字。

(3)努力记住客人的面貌和身体特征,并且设法和他的名字联系在一起。

(4)在提供服务过程中要专心倾听,不可三心二意,以提高记忆力的效果。

(5)客人离去时,要及时回想一下他的面貌,职业和你所给予的服务,并再次和姓名联系在一起,必要时以书面形式记下所需资料。

(6)再次见面,应用记住的名字称呼,如不能完全确认对方名字时,可以试探地问:“对不起,请问你是XX先生吧?”千万不要贸然叫错客人的名字。

泰国凤凰号的法律案例(3篇)

泰国凤凰号的法律案例(3篇)

第1篇一、案例背景2018年7月5日,泰国普吉岛发生了一起严重的游船翻覆事故,导致47名中国游客遇难,其中包括多名儿童。

事故发生后,这起被称为“凤凰号”的游船事故引起了国内外广泛关注,成为一起具有重大社会影响的法律案例。

二、案件概述1. 事故经过:2018年7月5日,一艘名为“凤凰号”的游船在普吉岛附近海域遭遇恶劣天气,导致船只翻覆。

据事后调查,事故发生时,游船超载,且船员未采取有效措施应对突发情况。

2. 遇难人数:事故造成47名中国游客遇难,其中包括多名儿童。

遇难者家属悲痛万分,社会各界对此表示深切哀悼。

3. 调查结果:泰国警方经调查认定,凤凰号游船事故属于人为责任事故,主要原因是游船超载、船员操作不当以及恶劣天气等因素。

三、法律分析1. 刑事责任:a. 船员刑事责任:根据泰国相关法律规定,船员在航行过程中,有保障游客安全的义务。

凤凰号游船事故中,船员未采取有效措施应对突发情况,导致游客遇难,其行为涉嫌过失致人死亡罪。

b. 旅行社刑事责任:旅行社作为游船服务的提供方,有责任对游客进行安全教育和提醒,确保游客在航行过程中的安全。

在凤凰号游船事故中,旅行社未能充分履行安全保障义务,涉嫌过失致人死亡罪。

2. 民事责任:a. 船员民事责任:船员在航行过程中的过错行为导致游客受伤或死亡,应承担相应的民事赔偿责任。

b. 旅行社民事责任:旅行社未能提供安全可靠的游船服务,导致游客受伤或死亡,应承担相应的民事赔偿责任。

3. 行政责任:a. 海事局行政责任:海事局作为游船安全监管机构,在事故发生前未能及时发现并纠正游船存在的安全隐患,应承担相应的行政责任。

b. 旅游部门行政责任:旅游部门作为旅游市场监督管理机构,在事故发生前未能有效监管旅行社和游船,应承担相应的行政责任。

四、案例分析1. 船员过错:凤凰号游船事故中,船员在恶劣天气条件下,未采取有效措施应对突发情况,导致游客遇难。

船员在航行过程中的过错行为,是导致事故发生的主要原因。

香港上海汇丰银行有限公司上海分行与景轩大酒店(深圳)有限公司、万轩置业有限公司金融借款合同纠纷案

香港上海汇丰银行有限公司上海分行与景轩大酒店(深圳)有限公司、万轩置业有限公司金融借款合同纠纷案

香港上海汇丰银行有限公司上海分行与景轩大酒店(深圳)有限公司、万轩置业有限公司金融借款合同纠纷案文章属性•【案由】金融借款合同纠纷•【案号】(2010)民四终字第12号•【审理法院】最高人民法院•【审理程序】二审•【裁判时间】2011.11.29裁判规则最高人民法院《关于适用<中华人民共和国担保法>若干问题的解释》第六条第一项明确规定,未经国家有关主管部门批准或者登记对外担保的,对外担保合同无效。

根据《境内机构对外担保管理办法》的有关规定,外商独资企业提供的对外担保虽然不需要逐笔审批,但仍然需要进行登记,故在审理涉及外商独资企业作为担保人提供的对外担保合同纠纷时,仍应对其提供的对外担保是否在外汇管理机关登记进行审查,未登记的应认定无效。

正文香港上海汇丰银行有限公司上海分行与景轩大酒店(深圳)有限公司、万轩置业有限公司金融借款合同纠纷案最高人民法院民事判决书(2010)民四终字第12号上诉人(原审被告):景轩大酒店(深圳)有限公司。

法定代表人:李垠堃,该公司董事长。

委托代理人:曹强。

被上诉人(原审原告):香港上海汇丰银行有限公司上海分行。

负责人:甘琨亮,该分行行长。

委托代理人:王正,上海虹桥正瀚律师事务所律师。

委托代理人:陈进龙,上海虹桥正瀚律师事务所律师。

原审被告:万轩置业有限公司。

法定代表人:李垠堃。

上诉人景轩大酒店(深圳)有限公司(以下简称景轩公司)因与被上诉人香港上海汇丰银行有限公司上海分行(以下简称汇丰上海分行)、原审被告万轩置业有限公司(以下简称万轩置业)金融借款合同纠纷一案,不服上海市高级人民法院(以下简称上海高院)于2010年2月8日作出的(2009)沪高民四(商)初字第2号民事判决,向本院提起上诉。

本院依法组成由审判员张国蓉担任审判长,审判员任雪峰、宋建立参加的合议庭,于2010年10月19日公开开庭审理了本案。

景轩公司的委托代理人曹强,汇丰上海分行的委托代理人钟人鉴、王正到庭参加诉讼,万轩置业经本院传票传唤无正当理由未到庭应诉。

维汉法律案例(3篇)

维汉法律案例(3篇)

第1篇一、案情简介原告:阿某,维吾尔族,男,汉族,35岁,个体经营户。

被告:李某,汉族,男,40岁,公司职员。

案由:房屋租赁合同纠纷案情概述:原告阿某与被告李某于2018年8月签订了一份房屋租赁合同,约定原告承租被告名下位于某市某区的房屋一套,租赁期限为一年。

合同签订后,原告按约支付了租金。

然而,在租赁期间,原告发现房屋存在多处安全隐患,如电线老化、水管破裂等。

原告多次与被告协商维修事宜,但被告以各种理由推脱。

原告遂向法院提起诉讼,要求被告承担维修责任,并赔偿因其居住不便造成的损失。

二、案件事实1. 原告阿某与被告李某于2018年8月1日签订了一份房屋租赁合同,合同约定原告承租被告名下位于某市某区的房屋一套,租赁期限为一年,租金每月5000元,押金5000元。

2. 合同签订后,原告按约支付了租金和押金,于2018年8月10日入住该房屋。

3. 在租赁期间,原告发现房屋存在多处安全隐患,如电线老化、水管破裂、墙面脱落等。

4. 原告多次与被告协商维修事宜,但被告以房屋不属于其责任范围、维修费用过高为由拒绝维修。

5. 2019年5月,原告因房屋安全隐患导致家中电器损坏,损失2000元。

6. 2019年6月,原告向法院提起诉讼,要求被告承担维修责任,并赔偿因其居住不便造成的损失。

三、法院审理1. 法院受理本案后,依法组成合议庭,于2019年7月10日公开开庭审理。

2. 开庭审理中,原告阿某提交了房屋租赁合同、租金支付凭证、维修记录、损失证明等证据,证明房屋存在安全隐患,被告未履行维修义务,导致其遭受损失。

3. 被告李某辩称,房屋属于出租人所有,维修责任应由出租人承担。

同时,被告认为原告在房屋租赁期间未及时通知其维修事宜,故不同意承担维修责任。

4. 法院经审理认为,根据《中华人民共和国合同法》第二百一十五条规定,出租人应当按照约定将租赁物交付承租人,并在租赁期间保持租赁物符合约定的用途。

本案中,原告与被告签订的房屋租赁合同合法有效,双方均应按照合同约定履行义务。

香港某公司、魏某等侵害商业秘密纠纷案

香港某公司、魏某等侵害商业秘密纠纷案

香港某公司、魏某等侵害商业秘密纠纷案文章属性•【案由】侵害商业秘密纠纷•【案号】(2021)最高法知民终312号•【审理法院】最高人民法院•【审理程序】二审•【裁判时间】2023.12.11正文香港某公司、魏某等侵害商业秘密纠纷案中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事判决书(2021)最高法知民终312号上诉人(一审原告):香港某开发公司。

被上诉人(一审被告):魏某乙,香港特别行政区居民。

委托诉讼代理人:孙楠,上海数科(深圳)律师事务所律师。

委托诉讼代理人:高中明,上海数科(深圳)律师事务所律师。

被上诉人(一审被告):胡某,香港特别行政区居民。

被上诉人(一审被告):香港某科技公司。

被上诉人(一审被告):深圳某科技公司。

委托诉讼代理人:孙楠,上海数科(深圳)律师事务所律师。

委托诉讼代理人:高中明,上海数科(深圳)律师事务所律师。

上诉人香港某开发公司因与被上诉人魏某乙、胡某、香港某科技公司、深圳某科技公司侵害商业秘密纠纷一案,不服广东省深圳市中级人民法院于2020年7月10日作出的(2019)粤03民初1122号判决,向本院提起上诉。

本院于2021年3月10日立案后,依法组成合议庭,并于2023年5月29日询问当事人。

上诉人香港某开发公司的代表人魏某甲,被上诉人胡某的委托诉讼代理人及被上诉人魏某乙,被上诉人深圳某科技公司及魏某乙的共同委托诉讼代理人孙楠到庭参加询问。

香港某科技公司无正当理由未到庭参加询问。

本案现已审理终结。

香港某开发公司上诉请求:1.撤销一审判决或者发回重审;2.追加陈璐等为本案共同被告;3.判令魏某乙、胡某、香港某科技公司、深圳某科技公司及陈某等停止侵犯香港某开发公司的商业秘密,包括但不限于客户名单等,停止与该客户名单中的客户进行商业交易;4.判令魏某乙、胡某、香港某科技公司、深圳某科技公司及陈某等停止使用属于香港某开发公司的专有技术和技术秘密,返还与专有技术和技术秘密相关的各种图纸、方案以及在此基础上形成的新的技术方案;5.判令魏某乙、胡某、香港某科技公司、深圳某科技公司及陈某甲、陈某乙共同赔偿香港某开发公司经济损失人民币1500万元;6.判令魏某乙、胡某、香港某科技公司、深圳某科技公司及陈某甲、陈某乙共同承担惩罚性赔偿人民币200万元;7.判令白某等就第5、6项上诉请求共同承担10%的连带赔偿责任;8.判令美国某甲公司就第5、6项上诉请求承担50%的连带赔偿责任;9.判令魏某乙、胡某、香港某科技公司、深圳某科技公司及陈某甲、陈某乙在《香港商报》和《深圳商报》刊登道歉声明。

香港安托(中国)有限公司诉成都蜀都大厦股份有限公司中外合作合同纠纷案

香港安托(中国)有限公司诉成都蜀都大厦股份有限公司中外合作合同纠纷案

香港安托(中国)有限公司诉成都蜀都大厦股份有限公司中外合作合同纠纷案(2001年3月29日法公布〔2000〕30号)中华人民共和国最高人民法院民事判决书(1999)经终字第176号上诉人(原审原告、反诉被告):香港安托(中国)有限公司(原名香港安托顾问有限公司)。

法定代表人:林福孙,该公司董事长。

委托代理人:邢冬梅,信利律师事务所律师。

被上诉人(原审被告、反诉原告):成都蜀都大厦股份有限公司。

法定代表人:程高潮,该公司董事长。

委托代理人:何蜀朗,该公司副总经理。

委托代理人:李黎,永徽律师事务所律师。

上诉人香港安托(中国)有限公司(以下简称安托公司)因与被上诉人成都蜀都大厦股份有限公司(以下简称蜀都公司)中外合作合同纠纷一案,不服四川省高级人民法院(1996)川高法经一初字第34号民事判决,向本院提起上诉。

本院依法组成由审判员王允担任审判长、代理审判员钱晓晨、陈纪忠参加评议的合议庭进行了审理,书记员任雪峰担任记录。

本案现已审理终结。

查明:1988年9月3日,蜀都公司与安托公司签订88-1号《合作经营四川蜀都旋转餐厅合同》,约定:双方在蜀都公司所有的蜀都大厦东楼合作经营四川蜀都旋转餐厅,该餐厅为有限责任公司,双方以各自的出资额对旋转餐厅承担责任。

中方出资445万元人民币,外方出资492.8万元人民币,共计出资937.8万元人民币。

合营期八年,从合同正式批准生效之日起计算,董事会由七人组成,中方派四人并任董事长,外方派三人并任副董事长,任期四年,可以连任。

餐厅设经理一人,由外方推荐,副经理二人,双方各推荐一人,任期四年,允许连聘连任。

合同及附件,均须经有关部门批准生效,对合同及附件的修改,须经双方签署书面协议,报原审批机关批准方能生效。

执行合同发生争议,提交北京中国国际贸易促进委员会对外经济贸易仲裁委员会(以下简称仲裁委)仲裁。

该合同还规定了认缴出资额的期限、利润分成比例以及合同及附件不能履行或不能完全履行时由过失方承担违约责任。

运输与保险案例-7天

运输与保险案例-7天

• 答案:(1)本案船公司与银行之间是一种担保关系,国内根据《汉堡规则》的 有关规定,银行可以提供“提货担保书”,只要这种行为是善意的,不带有 欺诈性,我国就对此予以承认。本案中银行为医药公司出具了“提货担保 书”,因此,银行就与船公司之间形成保证关系,保证医药公司作为提货人 的真实资格。 • (2)本案医药公司应该承担船公司在香港败诉所受到的损失。因为医药公司 在银行提供“提货担保”的情况下,医药公司作为提货人,委托某进出口公 司报关,结果进出口公司在报关时伪报货物名称,致使该批货物被海关没收。 于是收货人医药公司没有付款赎单,提单被退回给了香港托运人。由此看来, 由于医药公司委托其他公司不正确报关而使货物被扣,又因医药公司没有付 款赎单致使提单被退回了香港托运人。医药公司对船公司在香港的败诉负有 直接责任。因此,医药公司应该承担船公司在香港败诉所受到的损失: • (3)本案银行有责任。因为银行为医药公司出7天快捷酒店如家具了“提货担 保书”,根据《汉堡规则》,只要银行的行为是善意的,其行为就具有法律 效力。于是医药公司就作为提货人向船公司提取货物,并导致了货物被扣和 医药公司没有付款赎单的结果。因此,银行的担保行为与船公司的损失也具 有一定的因果关系,银行也应该对此承担责任。 •
案一 1999年4月,中国北海粮油公司与巴基斯坦某公司签 订了向中国进口12000吨(240000包) 白糖的合同,价格 条件为CFR,每吨单价为437美元。由中方向中国人民保 险公司北海分公司投保了水渍险。该批货物由巴拿马籍某 轮承运。在巴基斯坦某港装货的过程中,船长先后向托运 人发出书面声明和抗议,指出货物堆放于码头无任何遮盖 物并发生了雨水的污染,宣布货物为不清洁。而托运人为 了结汇则出具了保函,以要求承运人签发清洁提单。船长 在接受了保函的情况下答发了清洁提单。货轮于5月23日 抵达北海港,经北海外轮理货公司理货,发现了578包有 雨水污染。并确认货物有短少608包。对于本案,请回答 下列问题: (1)收货人是否应向承运人索赔,因为其签发了清洁提单? (2)承运人是否可以依保函要求收货人向托运人索赔? (3)收货人是否应向保险人索赔,因为该批货物已投保 了水渍险?
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案例名称HKSAR v. MA W AI KWAN, David AND OTHERS审理法院Court of Appeal of the High Court案件类别Reservation of Question of Law受理日期判决日期1997.07.29HKSAR v. MA WAI KWAN, David AND OTHERSCAQL000001/1997IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONGSPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONCOURT OF APPEALReservation of Question of Law No. 1 of 1997BetweenHKSAR ApplicantANDMA WAI-KWAN, David,RespondentsCHAN KOK-WAI, Donnyand TAM KIM-YUEN__________Coram: The Hon Chan, Chief Judge, Nazareth V-P and Mortimer V-PDates of Hearing: 22, 23, and 24 July 1997Date of Judgment: 29 July 1997----------------------J U D G M E N T----------------------Chan, Chief Judge :Background1. The respondents are the three defendants in a criminal trial before the Court of First Instance. They were charged on 11th August 1995 with conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice, contrary to common law. It is alleged that between 12th and 29th June 1995, the three respondents conspired together by offering to pay money to the mother of a Mr Wong who was then charged with robbery before the District Court together with the 3rd respondent and another person. It is further alleged that the purpose of offering money to the lady was to serve as a reward for her son Mr Wong pleading guilty to a lesser offence and maintaining a false version of events which would favour the 3rd respondent and the other person. They were committed for trial in the then High Court after a preliminary inquiry which took several days in December 1996. On 3rd January 1997, Indictment No.1 of 1997 was filed against them. The 3rd respondent also faced an alternative charge of attempting to pervert the course of public justice.2. The trial was fixed for hearing on 16th June 1997. The first few days were spent on sorting out prosecution witness statements and other documents. On the fifth day of the trial, the 2nd respondent applied for a permanent stay of the criminal proceedings. This lasted several days. On 27th June 1997, the last working day before 1st July, the trial judge, Deputy Judge Lugar-Mawson, refused to stay the proceedings.3. On 3rd July 1997, the tenth day of the trial, the respondents took issue on the Reunification Ordinance, the Basic Law and the preservation of the common law. On 7th July 1997, which was the twelfth day of the trial, the three respondents were, with their consent, arraigned on an amended indictment which was filed on 19th June 1997. They all pleaded not guilty to the first count of conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice. The alternative count against the 3rd respondent was directed by the Court to be put on file, not to be proceeded with without the leave of the Court. The respondents then applied to the Deputy Judge to quash the Amended Indictment. The prosecution opposed this application and applied to reserve certain questions of law for the determination by the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 81 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap.221. There was no objection from the respondents. The Deputy Judge made the order.4. On 9th July 1997, at a hearing for directions before us, we drew the parties' attention to s.81 of Cap 221 which provides that the questions of law reserved for this Court must be on matters arising from the trial. On the following day, the parties went before the Deputy Judge. His order was amended, apparently with the consent of all parties. This is now before this Court. Representation of the parties5. I should mention that since the questions of law to be determined by this Court involve some important constitutional issues, we requested the Director of Legal Aid to brief leading counsel for the 3rd respondent. However, as it turned out, the Director decided not to do so and was prepared only to instruct junior counsel to hold a watching brief. Pursuant to our directions, counsel for the 2nd respondent filed his skeleton arguments on the questions of law to be decided. Counsel for the 1st respondent indicated that he would adopt those submissions.6. On the first day of this hearing, counsel for both the 2nd and 3rd respondents informed us that they had no instructions to act for their clients because of lack of funds. They asked to be released from the case. We gave leave to the solicitors to withdraw but invited both counsel to stay and make submissions on the issues before the Court. They agreed to do so. In the afternoon, Ms Gladys Li, SC, Miss Margaret Ng and Mr Paul Harris appeared before us and offered to assist the Court on the issue of the legality of the Provisional Legislative Council. Counsel for the2nd and 3rd respondents were willing to be led by this team in view of the importance of the issue involved. We readily extended our invitation to Ms Li, SC, and her team. We are most grateful for their assistance.The two questions of law7. There were initially five questions of law for the determination of this Court stated in the Motion issued by the prosecution and the Order made by the Deputy Judge. I am given to understand that they were framed in order to cover the grounds relied on by the 2nd respondent in his application to quash the Amended Indictment. Having reconsidered the matter, the prosecution decided to pose only two questions for determination. They are :(1) Is the offence at common law of conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice part of the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR")?(2) Are the accused liable to answer to and to be tried on count 1 of the Indictment No.1 of 1997 ? Survival of the common law8. It is the respondents' contention that the common law has not survived the change of sovereignty on 1st July 1997. Their main submission is that the Basic Law, in particular Article 160, provides that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong which include the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be adopted. They argue that it is necessary to have a positive act of adoption either by the National People's Congress (NPC) through its Standing Committee and/or the legislature of the HKSAR. It is submitted that there was no valid adoption of these laws by the NPC or its Standing Committee and that the legality and competence of the Provisional Legislative Council is in doubt. Furthermore, the NPC Standing Committee had "repealed" the Application of English Law Ordinance (Cap 88) as contravening the Basic Law. As a result, the common law has not survived the change of sovereignty and there is no common law in Hong Kong after 1st July.9. Leading counsel for the Government submits that under the Basic Law itself, the common law forms part of the laws of HKSAR. No formal act of adoption of the law previously in force is necessary. A decision is required only to declare which of the laws that are in contravention of the Basic Law are not to be adopted. In any event, the NPC Standing Committee had indeed adopted all the laws previously in force which are not in contravention of the Basic Law. The Reunification Ordinance has not adopted or purported to adopt the common law since that Ordinance was enacted on the basis that the laws previously in force have already been adopted. Counsel submits that the NPC decision not to adopt the Application of English Law Ordinance does not affect the maintenance of the common law in Hong Kong.10. The answer to the question whether the common law has survived the change of sovereignty depends on whether the laws previously in force in Hong Kong are automatically adopted upon the establishment of the HKSAR on 1st July 1997 or whether it is necessary to have an overt act of adoption of such laws and if so, whether there has been any valid adoption. This turns on an interpretation of the provisions of the Basic Law.Interpretation of the Basic Law11. Before one attempts to interpret the Basic Law, it is necessary to bear in mind the history, nature and purpose of this document.12. On 19th December 1984, the Joint Declaration was signed between the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Government of the United Kingdom. By this Joint Declaration, Hong Kong was to be restored to China with effect from 1st July 1997. Under Article 3 of the Joint Declaration, China declared certain basic policies regarding Hong Kong. There was to be established the HKSAR which would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Under Article 3(12), these basic policies would be stipulated in a Basic Law to be promulgated by the NPC and would remain unchanged for fifty years from 1st July 1997. These policies were further elaborated in Annex I to the Joint Declaration. The Basic Law for the HKSAR was drafted by the Drafting Committee of the Basic Law which consisted of members from China and from Hong Kong. It took many years to complete. It was promulgated on 4th April 1990 and was to take effect from 1st July 1997.13. The Basic Law is not only a brainchild of an international treaty, the Joint Declaration. It is also a national law of the PRC and the constitution of the HKSAR. It translates the basic policies enshrined in the Joint Declaration into more practical terms. The essence of these policies is that the current social, economic and legal systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged for 50 years. The purpose of the Basic Law is to ensure that these basic policies are implemented and that there can be continued stablity and prosperity for the HKSAR. Continuity after the change of sovereignty is therefore of vital importance.14. Mr Fung, SC, for the Government submits that a generous and purposive approach is to be adopted in the interpretation of the Basic Law since it is a constitutional document. See A.G. of Gambia v. Jobe[1984]AC 689 and R. v. Sin Yau-ming[1992] 1 HKCLR 127. While I agree with this as a general proposition, I would add a few words of caution. The Basic Law is a unique document. It reflects a treaty made between two nations. It deals with the relationship between the Sovereign and an autonomous region which practises a different system. It stipulates the organisations and functions of the different branches of government. It sets out the rights and obligations of the citizens. Hence, it has at least three dimensions : international, domestic and constitutional. It must also be borne in mind that it was not drafted by common law lawyers. It was drafted in the Chinese language with an official English version but the Chinese version takes precedence in case of discrepancies. That being the background and features of the Basic Law, it is obvious that there will be difficulties in the interpretation of its various provisions. (See the discussions in Hong Kong's New Constitutional Order, Yash Ghai, Chapter 5.) In my view, the generous and purposive approach may not be applicable in interpreting every article of the Basic Law. However, in the context of the present case which involves the constitutional aspects of the Basic Law, I agree that this approach is more appropriate.Relevant provisions in the Basic LawThe provisions15. The provisions in the Basic Law which are relevant to the issue of whether the common law has survived the change of sovereignty are as follows :"Article 8The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.Article 18The laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be this Law, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region.Article 19The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region, except that the restrictions on their jurisdiction imposed by the legal system and principles previously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained.Article 81The Court of Final Appeal, the High Court, district courts, magistrates' courts and other special courts shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The High Court shall comprise the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance.The judicial system previously practised in Hong Kong shall be maintained except for those changes consequent upon the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.Article 87In criminal or civil proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the principles previously applied in Hong Kong and the rights previously enjoyed by parties to proceedings shall be maintained.Article 160Upon the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall be adopted as laws of the Region except for those which the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress declares to be in contravention of this Law. If any laws are later discovered to be in contravention of this Law, they shall be amended or cease to have force in accordance with the procedure as prescribed by this Law.Documents, certificates, contracts, and rights and obligations valid under the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall continue to be valid and be recognized and protected by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, provided that they do not contravene this Law.(my emphases)16. These are the provisions with regard to the laws which are to be in force, the judicial system which are to be in place and the principles relating to legal proceedings which are to be applied in the HKSAR.Its intention17. In my view, the intention of the Basic Law is clear. There is to be no change in our laws and legal system (except those which contravene the Basic Law). These are the very fabric of our society. Continuity is the key to stability. Any disruption will be disastrous. Even one moment of legal vacuum may lead to chaos. Everything relating to the laws and the legal system except those provisions which contravene the Basic Law has to continue to be in force. The existing system must already be in place on 1st July 1997. That must be the intention of the Basic Law.Its wording18. The wording is equally clear. The Basic Law is the constitution of the HKSAR. It is the most important piece of law in the land. It states clearly what the position is as from 1st July 1997. In my view, the word "shall" in these provisions can only be used in the mandatory and declaratory sense. The meaning of these provisions is this. On 1st July 1997 when the HKSAR comes into existence and the Basic Law comes into effect, these are to be the laws and legal system in force and the principles applicable in the place. There is no express or implied requirement in any of these provisions that the laws previously in force or the legal system previously in place need to be formally adopted before they can continue to be applicable after the change of sovereignty. On the contrary, the use of the terms "shall be maintained", "shall continue" and "shall be" leaves absolutely no doubt in my mind that there can be no question of any need for an act of adoption. These terms are totally inconsistent with such a requirement.Article 16019. The respondents' argument is based mainly on Article 160 which uses the words "shall be adopted". It is suggested that "shall" in this term is used in the future tense. In my view, that provision cannot be read in isolation but must be considered in the light of the rest of the Basic Law including in particular the articles to which I have referred above. It cannot be construed to have a meaning which is inconsistent with the other articles relating to the adoption of the existing laws and legal system.20. In any event, Article 160 even on its own has the same theme as the other provisions. There is a sense of continuity in this article. In the first paragraph of this article, it is provided that any laws which are later to be found to be in contravention of the Basic Law shall be amended or cease to have force. Laws which have not yet come into force cannot cease to have force. In my view, this paragraph clearly indicates that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong are to be effective on 1st July 1997 without any act of adoption. Paragraph 2 of that article puts the matter beyond argument. It provides that documents, certificates, contracts, rights and obligations valid under the laws previously in force shall continue to be valid. How can these continue to be valid if the laws which govern their validity cannot even apply without an act of adoption ? It simply makes no sense that the Basic Law continues the validity of these documents,certificates, contracts, rights and obligations but requires the laws which upholds them to be adopted.21. I would also agree that apart from confirming that the laws previously in force are to be the laws of the HKSAR at the time the Region comes into existence, the purpose of Article 160 is to provide for the exclusion of laws which are later found to be in contravention of the Basic Law.22. Construing Article 160 either by itself or in conjunction with the other articles, I am firmly of the view that it does not have the effect of requiring the laws previously in force in Hong Kong to be formally adopted in order to be effective after 30 June 1997. In fact, no other article in the Basic Law has such effect.Joint Declaration23. I find support for this view in the provisions in the Joint Declaration which can be used as an aid to the interpretation of the Basic Law. Article 3 provides:"Article 3(3)The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.Article 3(12)The above stated basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong and the elaboration of them in Annex I to this Joint Declaration will be stipulated, in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, and they will remain unchanged for 50 years."24. It is quite clear that the Joint Declaration is a declaration of intent. It evinces the intention of the two Governments and refers to what is to happen in future. Hence the future tenseis used. Contrast Annex I to the Joint Declaraion which was to form the basis of the Basic Law. The first paragraph in Section II says :"After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong (i.e. the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law) shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region legislature. (my emphasis) 25. The wording is in line with Article 8 of the Basic Law. The inevitable conclusion is that "shall" is not used in the future sense but in the mandatory and declaratory sense.Chinese text26. Mr Fung, SC, for the Government draws our attention to the fact that the Basic Law was enacted in the Chinese language by the PRC and that the Chinese text prevails over the English version in case of discrepancies. When the relevant articles in the Chinese text are considered, there can be no doubt as to what they mean or are intended to mean. The Chinese characters "采用 cai yong" (meaning "adopt") in Article 160 are clearly used in the mandatory and declaratory sense. They do not admit of an interpretation which requires a future act of adoption before the laws previously in force are to be applicable after 1st July 1997. However, I do not think it is necessary to rely on the Chinese text at all. The English text is already quite clear and without ambiguity. Adoption by NPC Decision27. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the NPC saw fit to make a Decision on 23rd February 1997 which purported to adopt the laws previously in force. This, it is argued, suggests that it is necessary to have an act of adoption before such laws can become effective after 1st July 1997. In my view, this argument cannot be sustained in the light of the purpose and contents of that Decision.28. The Decision on 23rd February 1997 was made for the expressed purpose of exercising the NPC's right under Article 160 of the Basic Law to declare which laws previously in force contravenethe Basic Law and are thus excluded from operation after 1st July 1997. The title of the Decision refers to the treatment of laws in accordance with Article 160 and begins with a recital of the relevant part of that article. The reference to Article 8 in fact reinforces the view that the laws previously in force in Hong Kong will automatically become effective as the laws of the HKSAR except for those that contravene the Basic Law. It also supports the view that Article 160 must be read in conjunction with Article 8.29. Under Paragraph 1 of the Decision, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong are adopted as the laws of the HKSAR. Paragraph 2 refers to those laws which are considered as contravening the Basic Law and therefore not to be adopted when the HKSAR comes into existence. It is also significant to note paragraph 4 which refers to the laws "which have been adopted".30. In my view, this Decision is clear enough. It adopts the laws previously in force in Hong Kong as the laws of the HKSAR when it comes into existence on 1st July 1997. This is strictly speaking not necessary in the light of the clear provisions in the Basic Law. But since it purports to declare invalid those laws which contravene the Basic Law (as it does), it is natural that it also, for the sake of clarity, refers to the laws which are to be adopted on 1st July 1997. Application of English Law Ordinance31. The respondents submit that the Application of English Law Ordinance provided a new basis for the application of the English law and the "repeal" of this Ordinance "throws in doubt the precise scope of the common law to be applied in Hong Kong". I do not agree.32. English law which includes the common law has started to apply in Hong Kong since at least 1844 when the previous Supreme Court Ordinance was enacted. That Ordinance was replaced by the Application of English Law Ordinance in 1966. The 1966 Ordinance did not import the English law. Nor did it terminate the application of English law which was applied by virtue of the previous Supreme Court Ordinance and then re-apply the English law all over again. It continued the application of the English law. Its effect was, as its long title indicated, "to declare the extent to which English law is in force in the Colony". It set out clearly the restrictions in the application of English law in Hong Kong and listed those imperial acts which were still in force.The reasons for the non-adoption of this Ordinance by the NPC Standing Committee are obvious. The Basic Law has already adopted the laws previously in force. Further, that Ordinance referred to imperial acts which are either not applicable to the HKSAR any more or have been "localised". In other words, that Ordinance is not only no longer necessary, it also contravenes the Basic Law by its incorporation of imperial acts.33. I do not think the non-adoption of the Application of English Law Ordinance has cast any doubt on the continued application of the common law in the HKSAR.Cut-off date34. It is submitted by the respondents that there is an uncertainty in the cut off date of the laws previously in force. They query whether it should be the date of the Joint Declaration in 1984 or the date of the promulgation of the Basic Law in 1990 or 30th June 1997. The relevance of this relates to the common law offence of conspiracy (with which these respondents now face) which was abolished by the Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance 1996.35. With respect, this point is beyond argument. The cut off date cannot be the date of the Joint Declaration. It was only a treaty and a declaration of intent. It cannot be the date of the promulgation of the Basic Law since it was then stated to take effect on a future date. The Basic Law came into effect on 1st July 1997. It declares in Article 8 and other provisions that the laws previously in force and the existing legal system are adopted. The only logical and in fact proper conclusion is that 30th June 1997 is the cut off date.36. The respondents are alleged to have committed a conspiracy in June 1995 and they were charged in August 1995. That is one year before the enactment of the Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance 1996. It is clear that the charge is not affected by that amendment. (See s.159E(7)).Survival of the Indictment37. The respondents contend that they are not liable to answer to and be tried on the Amended Indictment. The arguments are as follows. The respondents were committed for trial before theresumption of sovereignty. The Indictment was also filed before that date. The Supreme Court before which they appeared had ceased to operate as from 1st July 1997. They should not now be tried before the Court of First Instance of the HKSAR which is not a properly constituted court and the proceedings which were commenced before the resumption of sovereignty cannot be continued. They argue that the reason is because there is no express provision in the Basic Law governing this situation and although there are provisions in the Reunification Ordinance, that Ordinance was not lawfully and validly enacted by a body competent in law to enact it.38. The answer to these arguments is simple. There are clear and express provisions in the Basic Law. The laws previously in force are adopted (Articles 8 and 18). The courts of the HKSAR have jurisdiction over all cases in the Region (Article 19). The judicial system except the renaming of the Supreme Court and those changes consequent upon the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal is maintained (Article 81). The principles previously applied and the rights previously enjoyed by parties to criminal and civil proceedings are maintained (Article 87). Under Article 160, documents and rights and obligations valid under the laws previously in force continue to be valid, recognised and protected. Adopting a purposive approach to Article 160, these clearly, in my view, cover indictments, the right of the Government to prosecute offenders and the obligation of an accused person to answer to the allegations made against him.39. I have no doubt that by virtue of the above provisions of the Basic Law, the Amended Indictment survives and the pending criminal proceedings against these respondents continue after the change of sovereignty.40. The above reasons are sufficient to dispose of the two questions of law reserved for the determination of this Court. The answers to these questions are both clearly in the affirmative.41. However, in case I am wrong in my interpretation of the Basic Law, I should deal with the other issues which have been raised in argument. I would also do this out of respect to counsel who have so comprehensively prepared their submissions and because of the public concern which has been generated by this important case. I take note of Ms Li, SC's concern over the risk of。

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