英国允诺禁反言原则案例

英国允诺禁反言原则案例

2008-7-29 17:18【大中小】【我要纠错】

CENTRAL LONDON PROPERTY TRUST LIMITED v. HIGH TREES HOUSE LIMITED.

1946 July 18. Denning J.

Case fact

On September 24 in 1937, the central property of London of plaintiff trusted the limited company and the accused high tree house property limited companies to sign a stamp seal leasing contract, the plaintiff leased a apartment building to the accused, renting to expect 99 years, starting counting on September 29 from 1937, the rental was pound 2500 of every year.This apartment building was lately- set up.Because very quick started World War II, many persons left London, so the apartment building has no all of quilts to turn to lease out.At that time the war situation that can't converse next, the accused was obviously impossible to turn apartment completely to rent.Two representative directors of the companies all were aware of confessed, the accused could't obtain the enough income from turn to rent in this kind of case, thus also very difficult pay the reserved rental toward plaintiff.After both parties negotiate, reached in 1941 beginning of years written form agreement, rental from lease and start

the hour since the reduction was every year pound 1250.

Thus, the accused pressed the quantity of pound 1250 to pay annually from 1941 to the rental of 1945 beginning of years.While arriving 1945 beginning of years, two wars will soon ended, all partments within the apartment building rented to go out, but henceforth the accused still presses this quantity to pay.On September 21 in 1945, the plaintiff writed a letter for accused to call, rental should from the leasing expect one beginning according to first contract provision of whole sum（every year pound 2500）pay, and said that the accused owes to rent the quantity as pound 7916.Afterwards, the plaintiff brought up this friendly litigation toward in the British deluxe court, to clear up and should pay in the accused how much rental the law condition of the problem.In the litigation, the plaintiff sued the amount of money of request was pound 625, this was 1945 later an accused of two quarters did not wish the paying rental sum, the accused was only wish the idea pays with the rental sum of year of pound 1250 because the plaintiff lays claimed to the rental of year and should be pound 2500,, thus in the degree of two quarters the accused did not wish to pay but the plaintiff thought and should pay of rental sum was pound 625. By their defence the defendants pleaded （1.）that the letter of January 3, 1940, constituted an agreement that the rent reserved should be 1,250l. only, and that such agreement related to the whole term of the lease, （2.）they pleaded in the alternative that the plaintiff company were estopped from alleging that the rent exceeded 1,250l. per annum and （3.）as a further alternative, that by failing to demand rent in excess of 1,250l. before their letter of September 21, 1945 （received by the defendants on September 24）, they had waived their rights in respect of any rent, in excess of that at the rate of 1,250l., which had accrued up to September 24,

1945.

Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice

DENNING J.stated the facts and continued: If I were to consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law, there is no doubt that had the plaintiffs claimed it, they would have been entitled to recover ground rent at the rate of 2,500l. a year from the beginning of the term, since the lease under which it was payable was a lease under seal which, according to the old common law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol （whether in writing or not）, but only by deed. Equity, however stepped in, and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by a simple contract （which in the case of a lease required to be in writing would have to be evidenced by writing）, the courts may give effect to it as is shown in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316. That equitable doctrine, however, could hardly apply in the present case because the variation here might be said to have been made without consideration. With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent, was not a representation of an existing fact. It was a representation, in effect, as to the future, namely, that payment of the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money （1854）

5 H. L. C. 185, a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing.

But what is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money （1854）5 H. L. C. 185. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the