管理经济学ManagerialEconomics12
管理经济学ManagerialEconomics
Q
例：谁支付了奢侈品税？
一些国家对那些只有富人才买得起的奢侈品征收消 费税(如中国对购买轿车征收名目繁多的各种税费), 理由 是调节社会分配。这一类型的税真的是由富人来承担吗？
买者支付的价格 无税收的价格 税 收
价格上限只有低于均衡 价格才有意义。
P0
价格上限通常会导致市
PC
场短缺。
Q
价格下限(Price floor)
价格下限也称为支持价格 P (support price)， 主要用于对某些在竞争中 pf 处于劣势的产业进行支持， p0
如农业、衰退中的产业
Q
2. 间接干预——征税与补贴
P
S2
S0
S1 p2
不会发生变动，只有需求量变动 ——如果商品自身价格以外的因素发生 变动，将
会导致需求发生变动
例：电力需求
P
P
p1
P0
p2
Da Da’
Qa1’
Qa1 Qa0 Q
Db’
Db
Qb0 Qb0’ Qb2
Q
第二节 供给
一. 供给量 在一定时期内、一定条件下，生产者愿
意并且能够向市场提供的商品或劳务的数量。
影响供给量的主要因素： 1. 商品自身的价格(P); 2. 成本(C); 3. 对未来的预期(E);
确定方案。决策意味着选择。必须围绕问题形成两个 以上的合理方案。
选择方案。在考虑各种制约因素的限制下，对每个方 案进行评估，选择其中最优方案。
方案实施。决策只有实施才能取得效果。
目标
行为准则
假设：生产者追求利润最大化
利润最大化与价值（财富）最大化
A 利润最大化是一种短期目标；
管理经济学(全林版本)(推荐PPT185)-文档资料
3
4
5
衣服产量(万件)
二、经济学的定义和研究对象
1、经济学的定义：经济学研究人们如何进 行选择，以便使用稀缺的或有限的生产性 资源来生产商品，并把它们分配给不同的 社会成员。
二、经济学的定义和研究对象
2、基本经济问题：
• 生产什么：确定需生产的产品及其产量。 • 如何生产：使用何种生产资源以及生产方式来
第一节 市场机制
一、需求 1.需求的定义：在其他因素不变条件下，某商品
或劳务的买者在某一时间以任何可能的价格愿 意并且能够购买的该种商品或劳务的数量 2.需求的表示方法 ①函数式：Qd = f (P)， Qd —Quantity Demanded, P — Price ②需求表(Demand Schedule) ③需求曲线(Demand Curve)
产量 总成本 边际成本
（万元） （万元）
1
1
1
2
3
2
3
6
3
4 10
4
5 15
5
结果……
• 当两个分厂的边际成本彼此相等时，企 业的总成本最小。
• A分厂生产2单位，B分厂生产4单位，共 6单位。
Module 2 市场机制与需求分析
• 第一节 市场机制 • 第二节 消费者行为与市场需求 • 第三节 市场需求与预测
传统经济学 （理论与方法）
企业管理 （决策问题）
管理经济学 （运用经济理论与方法解
决企业问题）
企业问题的最佳答案）
需要的其他学科知识或工具
• 数学 • 统计学 • 运筹学 • 会计学 • 市场学
2、管理经济学的研究范围
管理经济学研究如何对可供选择的方案进 行比较分析，从中找出最优方案。
美国著名经济学家埃德温曼斯菲尔德领衔宾夕法尼亚州...
美国著名经济学家埃德温·曼斯菲尔德领衔宾夕法尼亚州大学沃顿商学院三位顶级经济学教授联袂写作哈佛大学、斯坦福大学、麻省理工大学和沃顿商学院等世界一流大学采用中山大学管理学院毛韵诗教授亲自翻译最畅销的管理经济学领域教科书书名：阿伦&曼斯菲尔德管理经济学（Managerial Economics）书系：湛庐教材—BE0302-1书号：978-7-300-11173-5著译者：[美]布鲁斯·阿伦（W.Bruce Allen）尼尔·多赫提(Neil Doherty )基思·韦格尔特(Keith Weigelt) 埃德温·曼斯菲尔德(Edwin Mansfield) 著毛蕴诗译责任编辑：李季开本：大16开页数：450页纸张：轻型纸预计出版时间：2008年11月定价：69.00出版社：中国人民大学出版社◎作者简介埃德温·曼斯菲尔德(Edwin Mansfield)埃德温·曼斯菲尔德是宾夕法尼亚大学的经济学教授，他参与出版了几百本有关管理经济学、经济学等书籍，同时他的书籍也被翻译成多种语言，在世界各地出版发行。
他也是第一位受邀来到中国访问的美国管理领域的学者。
◎内容简介本书是有关管理经济学领域的领军教材，书中运用了丰富的真实事件与案例，从国际视野的角度阐述了管理经济学理论，并向读者展示了如何将所学到的基本概念运用到现实管理工作中去。
通过借助决策科学、数理统计学等学科的各种方法和工具，本书可以指导企业决策者高效率地配置稀缺资源，以及制定和实施能使企业目标得以实现的经济决策。
◎本书特点本书的作者团队都是在沃顿商学院教管理经济学。
大多数MBA学生在第一个学期都必须学习这门课。
开设这门课的目的就是为了帮助学生们把经济学原理用到商业实践中。
为此，作者设定了四个目标以帮助学生达成学习目标：第一个目标是使经济学成为决策模型。
因此，要让学生理解书中的等式和图形，并且明白作为管理者的他们为什么需要遵循经济学的一般规律，如边际分析或逆向归纳规律。
管理经济学-第一章(1)-绪论
管理经济学绪论 (managerial Economics)
1
经 济 学(Economics)： 一定制度下研究资源的稀缺性
资源的稀缺性有两层含义 一、是指任何资源的取得都是有成 本的 二、是指相对于人的需要和欲望而 言任何资源都是有限的
2
经 济 学(Economics)的分类
理论经济学
• ２、企业的特征：生产规模化、分工合作、 生产组织严密、大量采用高新技术、所有 权与经营权分离、产品标准化、重视研究 开发与市场营销。 18
企业的性质
• ３、企业的起源与发展历史 • 手工作坊、工场手工业、工厂、公司、现 代企业、跨国公司 • ４、企业功能 • 资源转换、分配资源、创新 • ５、企业的运行机制 • 企业、市场与社会
19
企业的性质
• • • • • • • ６、现代企业理论 分为两大类：生产实体观与合同关系观 生产实体观企业理论 （１）新古典企业理论 （２）管理主义理论 （３）Ｘ效率理论 （４）两权分离理论
20
企业的性质
• • • • （５）企业创新理论 （６）企业知识理论 合同关系观企业理论 （１）交易费用理论：是一系列制度成本， 包括信息成本、谈判成本、拟订和实施契 约的成本、界定和控制产权的成本、监督 管理的成本和制度结构变化的成本。简言 之，包括一切不直接发生在物质生产过程 21 中的成本。
26
内容不同 微观经济学 (microeconomics) 宏观经济学 (macroeconomics) 方法不同 实证经济学(positive) 规范经济学(normative)
应用经济学
专业不同 管理经济学 产业经济 学 资源经济学 环境经济学 政策经济 学 制度经济学 信息 经济学等 部门不同 农业经济学 工业经济学
管理经济学麦圭根第12版,机械工业出版社
然后是单个厂商的销售预测。 简单的方法是将产业销售估计值与单个厂商的 预期市场份额联系起来，就可以得到关于单个厂商 销售预测值。 未来市场份额可以基于过去数据进行估计，还 要考虑营销策略等因素。
最后，厂商内部也存在预测的层级。经理人员要 估计全公司或地区的销售额；生产经理用这些预测 来规划原材料的订货量、雇工需要等决策；营销经 理使用销售预测来确定销售人员的安排、规划促销 活动等；财务经理也需要根据销售预测进行现金需 要的预测。
例如取线性方程、一期滞后以及白噪声随机扰动项 （ t =t）的模型将是一个1阶自回归过程
白噪声的定义除了要求均值为零外并没有对其应当服从 哪种概率分布作出任何假设，因此强调它的随机性。
对于此类问题之所以采用随机时间序列模型是由于： 前述最小二乘法的回归分析预测，对于一个时间序列Xt 的变动进行解释或预测，不论是单方程回归模型还是联 立方程回归模型，他们都是以因果关系为基础的，且具 有一定的模型结构，所以也称为结构式模型。
预测的层级
国民经济预测
产业销售预测 产业销售预测 产业销售预测
厂商 厂商 销售 销售 预测 预测
生产 营销 财务 预测 预测 预测
2.选择预测技术的准则
1. costs of the forecasting method compared with its gains plexity of the relationships among variables 3. time period involved 4. lead time between receiving information and the
4.可供选择的预测技术 确定性趋势分析； 平滑技术； 气压计技术； 调查与民意测验技术； 宏观计量经济模型 随机性时间序列分析
管理经济学-提纲彩色版
B.收入不变,价格变化
4
PX1=20, PX2=10
5
10 X
2。最佳化决策的图形 3。最佳决策化的数学公式 4。犄角解法(Corner solution) 5。应用：价格补助，实物补助, 还是货币补助?
五、消费者最佳决策点的变化
1。收入消费曲线与恩格尔曲线 收入消费曲线 从收入消费曲线引致恩格尔曲线
Y 收入消费曲线
I X1 X2 X3 I3 I2 I1
U3 U2 U1
恩格尔曲线 X
X1 X2 X3
X
三种恩格尔曲线 恩格尔曲线与恩格尔支出曲线
2。价格消费曲线 一般的价格消费曲线 吉芬商品的价格消费曲线 价格变化的效应分析 （1）收入效应 （2）替代效应
正常商品、一般低等品和吉芬商品三种 情况分析
减少Y而失去的效用 = 增加x而得到的效用
⊿Y
U3 U2 U1 ⊿X
（2）不能相交
Y
.a
.
b
. .c
X
5000
等高线
4000 3000
2000 1000
（3）密布性 （4）离开原点越远，效用水平越高 （5）凸向原点
⊿X
⊿Y
替代相同数量的Y要用 越来越多的X, 说明替
代越来越困难
⊿Y
⊿X
X
⊿X
二、基数效用分析
1。全部效用(Total Utility,TU) 概念 举例
消费商品数量 (W) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
得到效用的数量 (Utils)nal Utility,MU)
消费商品数量 (W)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
任常务副校长
1993年至今上海财经大学公共经济与管理 学院教授、博士生导师，曾到英国、美国、 罗马尼亚进修讲学
管理经济学第十二章012——具有市场力企业的管理决策课件PPT
Any firm that faces downward sloping demand has market power面临向下倾斜的需 求曲线的企业都具有市场力
是价格与边际成本之差占产品价格的比例。 其范围在0与1之间。nomics
勒纳指数
Also equals –1/E, which shows that the index (&
market power), vary inversely with elasticity The lower the elasticity of demand (absolute value),
5
Managerial Economics
需求价格弹性
运用需求价格弹性可以判断企业市场势力的大 小；
当其它条件相同时，如果需求价格弹性越小， 企业对价格的控制能力越强；
6
Managerial Economics
12.1.3勒纳指数（ Lerner index ）
Lerner index measures proportionate amount by which price exceeds marginal cost:
10
Managerial Economics
需求交叉价格弹性
需求交叉弹性可以用来判断竞争产品所 产生的替代程度大小。 当其他条件相同时，需求交叉弹性越大， 表明两种产品之间的竞争关系越激烈。 反之，则竞争关系越弱。 如果两种产品是可替代的，那么需求交叉 弹性为正。产品的交叉价格越高，替代 性越强，生产这两种产品的公司拥有的 市场力越弱。
《管理经济学讲稿
Manag e rial Economics《管理经济学》讲稿专业班级：信息管理与信息系统大类任课教师：吴如雪教材：《Managerial Economics》7th EditionS.Charles MauriceChristopher R.Tomas机械工业出版社CHAP14.Strategic Decision Making in Oligopoly Markets14.1Characteristics of oligopoly●Oligopoly is a market structure in which only a few sellers offer similar or identical products.It consists of a few relatively large firms,each with a substantial share of the market and all recognize their mutual interdependence.Mutual interdependence means that the actions of any one firm in the market will have an effect on the sales and revenues of other firms.Each firm knows that its actions or changes will have such an effect and that the other firms will,in response,take actions or make changes that will affect its sales.But no firm is really sure how the other firms will react—there is an uncertainty about the reaction of rivals to a price change.Common characteristics:(1)The number of firms in an oljgopoly market is small enough that each firm recognizes its mutual interdependence with the other firms.(2)All oligopolies have a certain amount of market power.If an oligopolist raises its price,it generally won’t lose all its sales;if it lowers its price,it won’t gain the entire market.(3)Oligopoly markets are characterized by some barriers to entry,ranging frommoderate to high.Differing characteristics:(1)Oligopolies can be classified by the type of product produced.In some oligopoly markets the products are homogeneous.Other oligopolymarkets are characterized by differentiated products.(2)Oligopolies can be Cooperativeor noncooperative:Cooperative oligopolists tend to follow changes made by rival firms.Noncooperative oligopolists,on the other hand,do not accommodate such changes.(3)Some oligopolistic market are characterized by a great deal of price competition.Inothers,firms don’t compete extensively by price changes but instead compete with theiradvertising,product quality,and marketing strategies.Four general oligopolistic market structures:(1)A few noncooperative firms producinga homogeneous product,(2)A few noncooperative firms producing related butdifferentiated products,(3)A few cooperative firms producing a homogeneous product,(4)A few cooperative firms producing related but differentiated products.Becauseoligopoly markets differ so greatly in their behavior patterns and in their overallcharacteristic,economists have not been able to develop a single general theory ofoligopoly,unlike the case for the other three market structures we have analyzed.●The problem with oligopoly demand:In spite of the uncertainty of rivals to a price change,managers of oligopolies should use the marginal revenue—marginal cost rule when making decisions.This is one of the most important rules of decision making,even when the market is characterized by uncertainty about the reaction of rivals.The problem for an oligopolist is accurately forecasting its demand and marginal revenue if it changes its price.Any change in price and output has a noticeable effect on the sales of other firms.These rivals may react by changing their prices and output,or they may not react at all.In our discussion of oligopoly markets,we will emphasize that the price and output decisions depend critically upon the assumptions made about the behavioral reactions of rival managers.Since many different assumptions can and have been made,many different solutions can and have been reached. 14.2Decision making when rivals make simultaneous decisionsOligopolists are mutual interdependence.Mutual interdependence requires strategic behavior.We can’t give a set of rules to follow.The art of making strategic decisions is learned from experience.We can,however,introduce a tool for thinking about strategic decision making.●Game theory provides a useful guideline on how to behave in strategic situations involvinginterdependence.This theory was developed approximately50years ago in order to provide a systematic approach to strategic decision making.A game is any decision-making situation where people compete with each other for thepurpose of gaining the greatest individual payoff,rather than group payoff,from playingthe game.In the game of oligopoly,the people in the game,often called“players”,aremanagers of the oligopoly firm.Payoffs in the oligopoly game are the individual profitsearned by each firm.Simultaneous decision games occur in oligopoly markets when managers must make their individual decisions without knowing the decisions of their rivals.Decisions don’thave to take place at the same time in order to be“simultaneous”.●The prisoner’s dilemma—a widely known game of simultaneous decision makingThe story(page533)Payoff table is a table showing,for every possible combination of decisions players canPayoff table:Bill Don’t confess Confess Common knowledge is a situation in which all decision makers know the payoff table,Payoff table:Palace’s price High($10) Low ($6) Pizza Palace has a dominant strategy: price low at $6. Pizza Castle does not have a dominant make, the outcomes or “payoffs” for each of the players in each decision combination.Jones Don’t confessConfess and they believe all other decision makers also know the payoff table. This common knowledge of the payoff table plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of a simultaneous decision game.A dominant strategy in a game theory is a strategy or action that always provides thebest outcome no matter what decisions rivals make. The prisoner’s dilemma illustrates a way of predicting the likely outcome of a strategic game using the concept of a dominant strategy. In the prisoner’s dilemma, confessing is a dominant strategy for each suspect.When a dominant strategy exists, a rational decision maker always chooses to follow its own dominant strategy and predicts that if its rivals have dominant strategy, they also will choose to follow their dominant strategy.The outcome of a game in which both players have dominant strategies and play them iscalled a dominant-strategy equilibrium. When all decision makers have dominant strategies (and know their dominant strategies), managers will be able to predict the actions of their rivals with a great deal of certainty.Most strategic situations, in contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma game, do not have a dominant-strategy equilibrium.● Decisions with one dominant strategyAn example of Pizza Castle and Pizza PalaceCastle’s price High($10)Low ($6) strategyWhen a firm does not have a dominant strategy, but at least one of its rivals does have adominant strategy,the firm’s manager can predict with confidence that its rivals willfollow their dominant strategies.Then,the manager can choose its own best strategy,knowing the actions that will almost certainly be taken by those rivals possessingdominant strategies.Knowing that Palace’s manager will rationally choose to set price low at$6,Castle’s manager will likely decided to price high at$10(and give away soft drinks).●Successive elimination of dominated strategies:When deciding what to do in a simultaneousdecision situation,managers should eliminate from consideration dominated strategies.Dominated strategies are strategies that would never be chosen because at least one other strategy provides a higher payoff no matter what rivals choose to do.Successive elimination of dominated strategies is an iterative decision-making process in which managers first eliminate all dominated strategies in the original payoff table.Eliminating dominated strategies always simplifies a decision-making problem.In a simultaneous decision having no dominant strategy equilibrium,managers can simplify their decisions by eliminating all dominated strategies that may exist.The process of elimination should be repeated until no more dominated strategies turn up.Strategically astute managers always search first for dominant strategies,and,if no dominant strategies can be discovered,they next look for dominated strategies.Unfortunately, simultaneous decision frequently fail to provide managers with either dominant or dominated strategies.●Nash equilibrium:Making mutually best decisions(will be introduced in OR)In the absence of any form of strategic dominance,managers must use a different,but related, guiding concept for making simultaneous decisions.This concept,known as Nash equilibrium, can sometimes,but not always,guide managers in making simultaneous decisions.In order for all firms in an oligopoly market to be predicting correctly each other’s decision,all firms must to be choosing individually best actions given the predictedactions of their rivals.It follows,then,that strategically astute managers will search thepayoff table for mutually best decisions:cells in the payoff table in which all managersare doing the best they can given their beliefs about the other managers’actions.Nash equilibrium is a set of actions for which all managers are choosing their bestPepsi’s budgetLow Medium High (Payoffs in millions of dollars of semiannual profit)actions given the actions chosen by their rivals.Strategic stability: Since all decisions are mutually best decisions in Nash equilibrium,no single firm can unilaterally make a different decision and do better. This property or condition of Nash equilibrium is known as strategic stability , and it provides thefundamental reason for believing that strategic decision makers will likely decide on a Nash pair of decisions.An example of Nash equilibrium: Super Bowl Advertising (P543-545)LowCoke’s budget MediumHigh Neither Pepsi nor Coke has a dominant strategy or dominated strategy. The only Nash equilibrium is (High , High).When managers face a simultaneous decision-making situation possessing a unique Nash equilibrium set of decisions, rivals can be expected to make the decisions leading to the Nash equilibrium. If there are multiple Nash equilibria, there is generally no way to predict the likely outcome.● Best-response curves and continuous decision choicesIn many decisions, actions or strategies are continuous decision variables. Whenmanagers make pricing decisions, they seldom view the choices as being either ”low” or “high” prices. In stead they choose the best price from a continuous range of prices. Best-response curves is a tool to analyze and explain simultaneous decisions when decision choices are continuous rather discrete. Best-response curves give managers the profit-maximizing price to set given the price they anticipate their rival will set.An example: P548-552. The following demand curves is common knowledge:Q A = 4000 - 25 p A + 12 p B ， Q B = 3000 - 20 p B + 10 p AThus, p A = 160 - 0.04Q A + 0.48 p B ， p B = 150 - 0.05Q B + 0.5 p AMR A = 160 - 0.08Q A + 0.48 p B ， MR B = 150 - 0.1Q B + 0.5 p A,212=A p 218=B pLet MR A = MC A = 160 and MR B = MC B = 180 , then we have two best-response curves:p A = 160 + 0.24 p B ， p B = 165 + 0.25 p AA Nash equilibrium occurs at the price pair where the firms’ best-response curves intersect:* * 14.3 Strategy when rivals make sequential decisions● Sequential decisions —decisions in which one firm makes its decision first, then a rival firmmakes its decision. Even though they are made at different times, sequential decisions involve strategic interdependence. Strategically astute managers must think ahead to anticipate their rival’s future decisions. Current decisions are based on what manager believes rivals will likely do in the future.● Making sequential decisions: we use game trees to analyze sequential decisions.A game tree is a diagram showing the structure and payoff of a sequential decisionsituation. It has decision nodes with branches extending from the nodes.✧ Decision nodes —points in a game tree, represented by boxes, where decisions aremade.✧ A game tree usually proceeds from left to right along branches until final payoffsassociated with each decision path are reached.(Figure 14.3: a game tree —Castle go first)Roll-back method (backward induction)—method of finding a Nash solution to asequential decision by looking ahead to future decisions to reason back to the best current decision. When firms making sequential decisions, managers make best decisions for themselves using roll-back method. The roll-back method results in a unique path that is a Nash decision path: each firm does the best for itself given the best decisions made by its rivals.● First-mover and second-mover advantageThe outcomes of some sequential decisions depend on which firm makes its decision first and which firm goes second.First-mover advantage —Sometimes a firm can increase its payoff by making itsdecision first.Second-mover advantage—Sometimes a firm can increase its payoff by letting its rivals make the decision first.How can we tell whether a sequential decision has a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage,or neither type of advantage?The simplest way,and frequently theonly way,is to find the roll-back solution for both sequences.If the payoff increases bybeing the first(second)to move,then a first-mover(second-mover)advantage exists.Ifthe payoffs are identical,then order of play confers no advantage.It is difficult to determine which firm goes first(second)when both firms recognize that going first(second)confers a first-mover(second-mover)advantage.●Strategic moves:commitments,threats,and promisesThere are three kinds of actions that firm might employ to alter the structure of a game to their advantage:commitments,threats,and promises.Commitments—Unconditional strategic moves taken for the purpose of increasing payoffs to the committing firm.Managers make commitments by announcing,ordemonstrating to rivals in some other way,that they will bind themselves to take aparticular action or make a specific decision no matter what action or decision istaken by its rivals.An example:P557Figure14.4.Motorola seizes the first–mover advantage an ensure its outcome in cell A by building a facility in Brazil specifically designed for manufacturing and serving only analog phones.Threats—Conditional strategic moves that take the form:”If you do A,I will do B, which is costly to you.”The purpose of making threats is to manipulate rivals’beliefsabout the likely behavior of the threatening firms in a way that increases payoffs to thethreatening firms.Promises—Conditional strategic moves that take the form:”If you do A,I will do B, which is desirable to you.”These three strategic moves must be made before rivals have made their decisions.They may be utilized separately or in combination with each other.Strategic moves will achieve their desired effects only if rivals think the firms making the moves will actually carry out their commitments, threats,or promises.Only credible strategic moves matter.Rivals will ignore strategic moves thatare not credible.14.4Strategic entry deterrence●Strategic entry deterrence:Managers of firms in oligopoly markets sometimes use differenttypes of strategic behavior to prevent new rival firms from competing with them.Strategic entry deterrence occurs when an established firm(or firms)makes strategic moves designed to discourage or even prevent the entry of a new firm or firms into a market.Limit pricing:Under certain circumstance an oligopolist,or possibly a monopolist,may charge a price lower than the short-run profit-maximizing price in order to prevent ordiscourage new firms from entering the market.Such a strategy is called entry limitpricing.In order to practice ertry limit pricing,an established firm must have a costadvantage over potential entrants into the market.Capacity expansion as a barrier to entry:Under certain circumstance,it is possible for an established firm to discourage the entry of new firms into the market without actuallydecreasing the price it charges and consequently finding its profits reduced.The firmcan maintain excess capacity,above the capacity it would normally build.The excesscapacity signals to potential entrants that the established firm is prepared to increase itsoutput by reducing its price if new firms prepare to enter the market.●Strategic entry deterrence differs somewhat from the structural barriers to entry discussed inChapter13.Those barriers block entry of new firms by altering a market’s underlying cost or revenue conditions so that a new firm cannot be profitable.Strategic entry deterrence is the result of actions taken by established firms to alter the beliefs potential entrants hold about the behavior of established firms—primarily pricing and output behavior—after they enter.。
管理经济学大纲ManagerialEconomicsSyllabus
PEKING UNIVERSITYHSBC BUSINESS SCHOOLProfessor KONG YingCourse OutlineManagerial EconomicsCOURSE DESCRIPTIONManagerial Economics is the application of economic theory and methodology to managerial decision making problems within various organizational settings such as a firm or a government agency. The emphasis in this course will be on demand analysis and estimation, production and cost analysis under different market conditions, advanced topics in business strategy. Students taking this course are expected to have had some exposure to economics and be comfortable with basic algebra. Some knowledge of calculus would also be helpful.COURSE OBJECTIVEIn today's dynamic economic environment, effective managerial decision making requires timely and efficient use of information. The purpose of this course is to provide students with a basic understanding of the economic theory and analytical tools that can be used in decision making problems. Students who successfully complete the course will have a good understanding of economic concepts and tools that have direct managerial applications. The course will sharpen their analytical skills through integrating their knowledge of the economic theory with decision making techniques. Students will learn to use economic models to isolate the relevant elements of a managerial problem, identify their relationships, and formulate them into a managerial model to which decision making tools can be applied. Among the topics covered in the course are: price determination in alternative market structures, demand theory, production and cost functions, and business strategy. In addition, the course will provide a basic introduction to econometric analysis and its role in managerial decision making.TEXBOOKS AND CLASS NOTESThe main textbook is Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 7th ed. by Michael Baye, McGraw HillClass notes (PPT) and other materials will be posted online for students download.COURSE EVELUATIONMidterm Exam: 30%Final Exam: 50% Consulting Projects: 20%SYLLABUSAll chapters listed below refer to the Baye textbook unless otherwise indicated. You are responsible for materials in the Baye text that correspond to the material covered in class. The Baye text should be viewed as a learning aide, NOT as an independent source of examinable material. However, doing questions end of each chapters will greatly help you to prepare exams.Week 1The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics Ch 1Market Forces: Demand and Supply Ch 2Week 2Quantitative Demand Analysis Ch 3The Theory of Individual Behavior Ch 4Week 3The Production Process and Costs Ch 5Week 4The Organization of the Firm Ch 6The Nature of Industry Ch 7Week 5Midterm ExamManaging in Competitive, Monopolistic,Monopolistically Competitive Market Ch 8Week 6Basic Oligopoly Models Ch 9Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly Ch 10Week 7Pricing Strategies for Firms with Market Power Ch 11Week 8The Economics of Information Ch 12Advanced Topics in Business Strategy Ch 13Week 9A Manager’s Guide to Government in the Marketplace Ch 14Project Presentation and Hand InFinal Exam (TBD)CONSULTING PROJECTSIn order to help students to build up the managerial economics analysis skill we provide 4 real world consulting projects in the course. Students are required to independently conduct 4 consulting reports regarding to the 4 projects. The exercises require you to apply some of the tools you learned in each chapter covered in the class to make a recommendation based on an actual business scenario. The topics of 4 consulting projects are,·Estimating Industry Demand for Fresh Market Carrots·Estimation and Analysis of Demand for Fast Food Meals·Production Decisions at Harding Silicon Enterprises, Inc.·Pricing and Production Decisions at PoolVac, Inc.Cheating, Plagiarism and Free RiderThe penalties for any form of cheating or plagiarism (whether in exams or project) are severe. Written work submitted must be your own. Any sources of information used in completing your work must be identified. Plagiarized written work will not be accepted and you should be aware that non acceptance of a submission might, in some cases, lead to failure in the course. Since the project is a team work, the final report should identify each student’s contribution. The significant uneven contribution in the work will lead to less mark for the student who made less contribution comparing to his/her team member.。
管理经济学-绪论
—包括个别消费者 济有关的各种
与厂商—的决策及总体 变量之间的关
其相互作用，以及 系，及政府政
由此抽决样定的市场
策。 推断
价格及资源配置。
管理经济学 2019/12/20 P13
Managerial Economics
1.1 基本概念
什么是管理？社会 ▼规划、组织、领导与控制组织成员 的行为表现，善用各种组织资源，以 达到组织预定目标的过程。
管理经济学可以视为微观经济学某些部分 的应用，以有助于管理者建立理性的决策思 路，为管理者的管理决策提供分析框架。
管理经济学 2019/12/20 P18
Managerial Economics
1.1 基本概念
管理经济学概念理解中应注意的问题：
（1）面向应用≠具体方案
社会
管理经济学是提供企业管管理理者在决 策制定过程中经济思维的概念框架，
▼管理是一种动态性交互作用的过程
▼管理者必须善用组织内所有资源
▼管理必须达到组织预定的目标
管理经济学 2019/12/20 P14
Managerial Economics
1.1 基本概念
工程
什么是决策？社会
决策：从多种方案中选择最管优理方案的过程。 决策步骤：
▼ 确定目标
▼ 明确问题 ▼ 找出导致问题产生的原因 ▼ 提出可供选择的的方案 ▼ 搜集和估计数据 ▼ 对各理种论可能的方案进行计评量估，选择最优方案 ▼ 方案的实施和…监.控
理论
计量 ….
管理经济学 2019/12/20 P16
Managerial Economics
1.1 基本概念
管理经济学与微观经济学的区别： 社会
微观经济学管理 管理经济学
管理经济学-MANAGERIAL--ECONOMICS
2.生产什么一 经确定决策就 从市场领域回 到生产领域， 确定怎样生产 的问题。
怎样生产 要素投入 生产优化 成本分析
企业生存关系密切的社会集团主要有： 投资者、顾客、 债权人、职工、政府。企业和这些不同集团之间的关系
可由下图描述：
投资者
债权人
公众
企业
顾客
政府
职工
三、企业的目标
1.企业的基本目标
企业运行的基本目标是追求利润最大化，这会对 济发展带来三个有利因素：
（1）有利于实现资源的有效配置。即在产量一定的情况下 成本尽可能低或在成本一定的情况下产量尽可能的大。
章制度、行政指令协调。
1.减少了契约数量 2.延长了契约期限
既然市场的使用不是免费的，那么为了减少交易
用就有必要建立企业，把交易转移到企业内部，将
易“内化”，这样，企业就产生了。
企业内部也存在交易费用，当企业规模扩大时，内部 交易费用也会扩大。 外部交易费用=f（企业规模），一般地，企业规模越大， 外部交易费用越小。 内部交易费用=g（企业规模），一般地，企业规模越大 内部交易费用越大。
A.“经济人假设”。 B. “完全信息假设”。
三、管理经济学的研究方法
1.边际分析法体现向前看的决策思想 任何人在决策时都会问这样的问题：
“它值得吗？” 回答是：“只要他的境况在采取某项行
动后会比采取行动前有所改善，采取这项行 动就是值得的。”
例1.1 民航的边际成本
某民航公司在从甲 根据边际分析法
管理经济学与微观经济学的不同之处：
（1）管理经济学的经济原理与方法，主要来自 经济学。但管理经济学不是简单借用微观经济学 些现成原理与结论，更重要的是推导这些原理与 论所使用的分析方法（如边际分析法），表现出 烈的实用性和功利性。
《管理经济学》课程教学大纲
《管理经济学》课程教学大纲目录管理经济学 (1)生产运作管理 (4)数据、模型与决策I (6)数据、模型与决策II (11)人力资源管理 (15)《管理经济学》课程教学大纲课程名称（中文）：管理经济学课程名称（英）：Managerial Economics学分数： 3学分课内学时：45学时课外自学学时：90学时课程内容简介管理经济学是一门应用微观经济学，是工商管理、会计硕士专业的学位课。
管理经济学主要以微观经济学的基本理论为基础，借助于决策科学的、数理统计学等学科的各种方法和工具，指导企业决策者高效率地配置稀缺资源，制定和实施能使企业目标得以实现的经济决策。
管理自1950年代诞生以来，被国内外越来越多的商学院和管理学院采用为核心必修课程，表明了它在培养造就高水平经济管理人才过程中不可替代的重要作用。
管理经济学的主要内容可分为微观经济理论、统计和优化方法、管理决策等三大部分内容。
按学校国际化的要求，管理经济学授课均采用国际上著名教科书，教学分中文和双语两种方式，双语教学使用英文教材，全英文授课是未来的发展方向。
通过本课程的学习，学员应该对现代市场经济运行机理有全面系统的了解，能用管理经济学的基本理论分析和解决企业所面临的管理问题，掌握企业经营统计、优化的分析工具和方法，熟悉企业常见的经营决策的一般规律和过程，能根据基本的管理经济学原理和具体经营环境，制定出科学的企业决策。
课外自学内容（100字以内，无此项内容的课程不填）为教师重点讲授章节后要求的教科书自学部分，以及发放的课外阅读材料（含案例材料）课程大纲（具体到章、节、小节）1．绪论2．基本训练（选讲内容）3．需求分析4．需求估计（选讲内容）5．企业和经济预测（选讲内容）6．生产理论7．线性规划（选讲内容）8．成本理论9．成本理论应用（选讲内容）10．完全竞争和垄断11．垄断竞争和寡头12．博弈论与竞争战略（选讲内容）13．定价分析与定价方法14．组织形式、治理与机制设计（选讲内容）15．长期投资决策与风险管理（选讲内容）16．技术变革和布点理论（选讲内容）17．企业决策与政府管制（选讲内容）18．专题（任课教师可根据自己的研究作报告）主要参考书目（其中应指定一本作为重点参考教材）1．[美] H·克雷格·彼得森等著。
管理经济学Managerial Economics对外经济贸易大学国际商学...
P
智猪博弈 （boxed pigs）
猪圈一边有个踏板，每踩一下踏板，在远离踏板的另一端投食口 就会落下少量食物。如果有一只猪去踩踏板，另一只猪就会有机会抢先吃 到落下来的食物。 当小猪踩动踏板时，大猪会在小猪跑到食槽之前刚好吃光所有的 食物；若是大猪踩动了踏板，则还有机会在小猪未吃完落下的食物之前跑 到食槽，争到另一半残羹。
高价($10)
比萨城堡
低价($6)
$1,200, $300
$400, $400
3. 连续排除下策(Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies)
当决定在同步决策情形下如何决策时，经理们 应该排除对下策(Dominated Strategies)的考虑：因 为至少有一个其他更好的战略；至少有一个其他的 战略，无论竞争对手做出何种决策都可以提供更高 的收益。用排除政策决策的战略要求经理们排除所 有的下策：那些能在第一轮寻找中就被鉴别出来和 在以后筛选中显示的下策。
哥伦比亚 制片商
哥伦比亚制片商和新干线电影都有一个上策：提高片酬。 上策均衡格D不如A格，但A格是不稳定的。
6.最好反应曲线和连续决策选择
(Best-response Curves and Continuous Decision Choices)
两家航空公司（Arrow和Bravo）在同一条航线上竞争。 Arrow航空公司
·每家厂商都有剩余的生产能力； ·同吃一块肉，你多吃，我就会吃得少； ·你用价格争市场，别人也会，消费者喜
欢这样；
·联合起来有利可图，但行得通吗？
如果你想怎么做，必须知道别人会怎么做！
13.1同步决策战略(Decision Making
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一、企业生产
生产投入
生产转换
产出
二、企业生产要素 1 劳动 2 土地 3 资本 4 企业家才能
三、生产函数
【生产函数】 表明在生产过程中，在一定 的技术条件下，各种投入要素组合所能产生的 最大产量。可表示为：
Q=f(X1，X2，X3，…) 1 短期生产函数：既有不变投入，又有固 定投入。
二、影响规模收益的因素
1 规模经济：促使规模收益递增的因素， 包括：内在经济与外在经济 （1）内在经济：工人的专业化生产、专门 化的设备和先进的技术、大设备的制造和 运转费用比小设备要低、生产要素的不可 分割性、其他因素。
（2）外在经济：行业规模扩大和产量增加 给个别厂商带来的利益，如：行业内部 的分工、专门化的辅助性服务、投资环 境的改善等等。
（1）当MP〉AP，AP必然上升； 当MP〈AP，AP必然下降； MP=AP，AP达到最大值。
（2）当MP〉0，TP必然上升； 当MP〈0，TP必然下降； MP=0，TP达到最大值。
二、边际实物递减法则
如果技术不变，增加生产要素中某个要素 的投入量，而其他要素的投入量不变，增加的 投入量起初会使该要素的边际产量增加，增加 到一定点之后，再增加投入量就会使边际产量 递减。
解：MP男=10件 P男=4元 MP男/ P男=2.5件
MP女=8件， P女=2元，MP女/ P女=4
所以，男工与女工的比例不是最优 的，应增加女工，减少男工。
例：假设等产量曲线的方程为：Q K a LB
其中K为资本数量，L为劳力数量，假定 K的价格为PK，L的价格为PL，求这两种 投入要素的最优组合比例。
注意两点：
1）其他生产要素的投入固定不变，只变动 一种生产要素的投入；
2）技术水平保持不变。
三、生产三阶段
Q TP
Ⅰ Q
MP
Ⅱ
Ⅲ
L
AP
L1 L2
L
四、单一可变投入要素最优投入量的确定 1 边际产量收入：增加一个可变投入要素所 增加的收入 MRPy=ΔTR/Δy =ΔTR/ΔQ•ΔQ/ΔY =MR •MPY 2 边际支出：增加一个可变投入要素所增加 的总成本ME：MEy= ΔTC/Δy 3 单一可变投入要素最优投入量
2 长期生产函数 ：只有不变投入。 3 不同的生产函数形式代表不同的技术水平
第一节单一可变投入要素的最优利用
一、总产量、平均产量和边际产量的相互关系
1．总产量：一定投入要素下所能生产的全部产
量。
TP=Q=f(L)
2．平均产量 AP=TP/L
平均产量等于总产量曲线上各点到原点连接 线的斜率
3．边际产量 MP=ΔTP/ΔL=dTP/dL
ΔY·MPY=ΔX·MPX
MRTS=MPX/MPY
( 2 )边际技术替代率递减法则 在保持产量不变的情况下，随着X的增加，
增加1单位X所能替代的Y的数量越来越少 (3)等产量线凸向原点
二、等成本线及其性质：
E代表总成本，PY代表资本价格， PX代表劳动的价格，则：
E=PX·X+PY·Y
Y
Y=E/PY-PX/PY·X
3 促使规模收益不变的因素：促使规模收益 递增的因素不再起作用，规模经济因素与 规模不经济因素相互抵消。
4 最优规模：处于规模经济不变的规模
第二节 多种投入要素的最优组合
一、等产量线 的性质和类型
〖等产量线〗
K
1）性质：处于较高
K1
位置的等 产量线总是
K2
代表较大的产量.
L1 L2 L
2）等产量线的三种类型：完全可以替代、完 全Βιβλιοθήκη 能替代、不完全替代YY
投入要素 X 完全替代
投入要素
X
完全不替代
3）边际技术替代 （1）边际技术替代
MRTS=-（Y2－Y1）/（X2－X1） =-ΔY/ΔX=－dY/dX
X
三、最优投入要素组合的确定 1 图解法 1） 在一定的成本下产量最大的投入组合 2） 在一定的产量下成本最小的投入组合
K
K
L
L
最优投入要素组合的条件
MPX = MPY
PX
PY
例 某车间男工和女工各占一半，男工和 女工可互相替代。假定男工每增加一人可 增加产量10件，女工增加一人可增加产量 8件。男工工资为每人4元，女工工资每人 2元。问男工女工组合比例是否最优，如 果不是，应怎样变动？
L
五、生产扩大路线
【生产扩大路线】在投入要素价格不变时， 随着生产规模的扩大，投入要素最优组合比例 发生变化的轨迹。
K Q2
长期扩张线
K2
K1
Q1
L1
短期扩大路线
L2
L
第三节 规模与收益的关系
一、 规模收益的三种类型
Q=f(L，K，D，…) bQ=f(aL，aK，aD，…)
（1） b 〉a， 规模收益递增 （2） b = a ，规模收益不变 （3） b〈 a ，规模收益递减
解：先求两种投入要素的边际产量：
MPL
(K a Lb ) K
K abLb1
MPK
(K L a b ) L
Lb aK a1
MPL MPK
PL
PK
K bL a b1 Lb aK a1
pL
PK
bK aL PL PK
K aPL L bPK
四、价格变动对投入要素最优组合的影响
K
KB
B A
KA
LB LA
2 规模不经济：促使规模收益递减的因 素，包括内在不经济与外在不经济
（1）内在不经济：导致规模收益递减的 内部因素主要是管理问题，规模过大， 层次过多而使管理效率降低，官僚主义 产生，内部通讯费用增加等等。
（2）外部不经济：行业扩大加剧行业内部 的竞争，广告费、宣传费增加，同时， 引起资源紧张，价格上涨，环境污染， 使规模收益递减。
边际产量等于总产量曲线上各点切线的斜率。
工人人数 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
总产量 0 13 30 60 104 134 156 168
平均产量 0 13 15 20 26 26.8 26 24
边际产量 13 17 30 44 30 22 12 8
Q
Q
AP
TP
L
MP
L
4 总产量、平均产量与边际产量之间的 关系：
MRPy=MEy
例：工人人数与产量之间的关系如下：
Q 98L 3L2
假定产品的单价20元，工人每天的工资 均为40元，而且工人是唯一可变的投入要素， 问为谋求利润最大，每天应雇佣多少工人？ 解： MPL=dQ/dL=98-6L
MRPL=MR·MPL=20×(98-6L) MEL=40
20×(98-6L)=40 L=16